INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 25, 1974
• Content Type: MISC

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-
WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING
January 25, 1974
Time and Place: 10:11 a. m. - 10:54 a.m., White House Situation Room
Subject. Indochina
Participants :
Chairman Henry A. Kissinger
State Kenneth Rush
Monteagle Stearns NSC
DOD William Clements
V/A Raymond Peet
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
V/A John P. Weinel
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
It was agreed that:
William Colby
M,/G Brent Scowcroft
Charles C. Cooper
William R. Smyser
William Stearman
Lt. Col. Donald Stukel
James G. Barnum
JCS, OSD, DOS, NSA, &
OSD review(s) completed.
.... CIA will prepare, a paper on the current status of the Paracel.and
pratly`Islands. and an assessment of 'Chinese' intentioxi ixi? the.,aiea;.
. . . Additional (60 to 80) TOW (anti-tank) missiles will be supplied South
Vietnamese immediately;
...Defense will prepare an analysis of the military equipment list
requested by South Vietnam, `along with itb recommendations of South
... Mr. Clements and Mr. Rush will approach Congress within the next
week for a $150 million supplemental appropriation for Cambodia and South
Vietnam;
. . . A WSAG will be scheduled to take a look at the insurgency situation
in Thailand.
TOP XGDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
 TOP SECRE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
Secretary Kissinger: Bill, (Mr. Colby), do you want to brief?
Mr. Colby briefed from the attached text.
Secretary Kissinger: Why don't they recruit them? (In reference to the statement
in the briefing that the Cambodian Government needs another 10, 000 troops in
order to increase its manpower reserves). It seems to me that ten-thousand
wouldn't be hard to get.
Mr. Colby: They're trying, but it's tough to get people to join up.
Secretary Kissinger : How are they trying to recruit? I mean, what methods do
they use?
Mr. Clements: Actually, they have done quite well. They have a more energetic
program going now than they have ever had.
Adm. Moorer: They do it the same way as the British got their troops in the 1800s?--
they impress them. Except, now they "Phnom Penh t em" instead of Shanghai t em.
Secretary Kissinger: Where do they get them (the recruits)?
Adm. Moorer: Oh, everywhere, Kompong Sorn,. Kompong Charn. Out of all the
population centers.
000
hard to find 10
't b
ould
,
e,
n
Secretar Kissinger: It just seeds to me that it.w
recruits.
Mr. Clements: They're doing it. Their effort today is much rnore ambitious than
it ,was a: fe.w m.onths_ ago.
Mr. Stearns: The Khmer Communists are having their problems recruiting, too.
Mr. Colby continued with his briefing.
Adm. Moorer: I would just add that within the last twenty-four hours, fifty-five
rounds of artillery were .fired into Phnom Penh. And, according to some recent
#ntercepps ? 'they plan t'o coatiniie to harass :Phrioni Penh and-'the countryside around the capital. We don't think they can overrun the city in the immediate
future.
General Scowcroft was called out of the meeting at this point. )
Mr. Colby: Yes, we also think they (the government) can hold.
Adm. Moorer: The rice situation is in excellent shape too.
TOP SECRET /SENSITrVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
 TOP SECRE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
Sec story Kissi er: It seems to me that if the government can hold on during
this dry season then we have no reason to believe they can't in the next.
Mr. Colb : What gives the government its real advantage is the fickleness of the
Khmer Communists. They (the KC) are really running their own railroad, gen-
erally ignoring the advice of Hanoi.
Adm. Moorer: They have a real problem in coordinating their forces. For example,
they get instructions to do something, say like on 25 December, and then nothing
happens.
Secretary Kissinger: That's because it's Christmas . Nobody does anything on
Christmas !
Mr. Clements: Henry, I want to reiterate what you said before. I think it is
absolutely essential that they (the Cambodians) be assured of our continuing
support. Without it, they're dead ducks, no question about it.
Secretary Kissinger: Oh, I think that's clear. Nobody here disagrees with that,
do We really don't have a choice, do we?
Mr. Clements: No, but the method to give them the support is a real problem..
It's a miserable mess to straighten out.
Secreta Kissinger: Yes, and.now if we bring'peace to the Middle East, we can't
piggyback our needs in. Cambodia anymore.
Mr. Clements: We're. still doing it. But, you're" right, we won't have that piggy-
back anymore.
~
?
~"~
.- . ~?'~ ~~~ ~??`~?~:~' ~ ~???.~? ??~ ' .n
. ,
?
. ,
.
Mr. -Stearns. We have some left in the drawdown authority
Mr. Clements: We ought to accomplish as much as we possibly can now, while
conditions are favorable.
..Secretary'Kissingers . I have this thought that it might be easier to g.et something
out of Congress now.: 'The Deimoc: ats are .I ecoming more hawkish.: Maybe there.' ??
is a better chance of getting something through.
Mr. Rush: We'll never know unless we try.
Secretary Kissinger: We must make them (Congress) more responsible. We have
to put the responsibility (for continued peace in Indochina) on their back.
Mr. Clements: And early. Henry, we're almost out of soap. We're running out
of money, and damn fast!
TOP SECRET LSENSITIVE_
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0 4
ToP SECRET/SENSITIVE
(Gen. Scowcroft returned. )
Mr. Rush: What worries me is the psychological impact it would have in
Cambodia if we weren't to support....
Secretary Kissinger: Think of the psychological impact throughout Southeast Asia.
It would be disastrous. What have been the repercussions in South Vietnam to
the Paracels (Islands) thing?
Adm. Moorer: We (the U. S. ) have stayed far clear of the matter.
Secretary Kissinger: We have never supported their (South Vietnam's) claim?
Adm. Moorer: That whole area is a problem. The Spratly Islands and the others
in that area all have the same kind of problem--it's disputed territory. We have
given orders to stay clear of the area. That's our policy, right?
Secretary Kissinger: What are those, the Spratly's? (Pointing to.the map. )
Adm. Moorer: No, the Spratly's are south of the Paracels.
Mr. Colby: The problem is that the Spratly's are claimed by everybody.
Secretary Kissinger: We have never taken a position on these islands?
Mr'. Rush:. Are they.pcc. pied?
Mr. Stearns: Yes, we think there
Mr. Rush: Who has troops?
Mr. Stearns: There is a Philippine garrison on them, I think.
Secretary Kissinger: How did the fight get started? Who started the fight over the
Paracels?
?,?Adrn. Moorer: - A South..Vietnamese:patrol in-the area. observed some Chinese ships
:
headed for the islands, went in, and put?about'eventy-five ,mena,shore?at Dun:can.
Island. That's one of the southern islands of the Crescent Group. They were
engaged by two companies of Chinese troops. The South Vietnamese were forced
to withdraw to the other nearby islands. Four South Vietnamese ships and some
eleven Chinese ships then engaged in a battle at sea as the South Vietnamese
troops withdrew. The place has been an area of tension for some time. The
Chinese have been sending regular MIG patrols over almost every day.
Mr. Colby: The key to the whole area is the Paracels. There are two groups of
islands, the Crescent Group in the south, and the Amphitrite Group in the north.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
TOP SECRET.'/5k,;114z')1-J.av-r-
Secretary Kissinger: What has North Vietnam's reaction been to all of this?
Mr. Colby: They've ignored it, said it's below the 17th Parallel and thus doesn't
affect them. In general, they didn't take a position, didn't come out on either side.
Secretary Kissin er. They can't be very happy with the situation. They didn't
say anything, but what do you think they feel? Dick (Mr. Smyser)?
Mr. Smyser: It put them in a delicate situation. They said nothing until after it
was over, and then all they said was that they deplored the use of force.
Secretary Kissinger: I know what they said, but what do they really feel?
Adm. Moorer: I think they are worried.
Mr. Colby: North Vietnam might want to have that oil field.
Mr. Clements: Let's not get carried away on the possibility of oil in those islands.
That is still a pie-in-the-sky. There is nothing there now, it's all in the future.
Oil there is not realistic now. It's only a potential.
Adm. Moorer The French held the islands in the 1930s until the Japanese took
them over during the War; In 1955,.the French renounced their.claim?to the
d th a thin in I951 * South'Vietpam'and Communist.
axn
?
d
, s
i e.
, .
islands,.. and Japan
,Ghana have claimed them ever since: The Philippines: have:a weak claim, but:
.only on paper. ' '? ' '
Kissinger: Can we get a paper on the Spratly's,., Bill? What's there,
tar
S
y
ecre
what's '.;likely to?'happen?
Mr. Colby: Yes, we'll give you one on the whole area.
Adm. Moorer: My instructions have been to stay clear of the whole area. That's
what you want, right?
ree~nent to.thaf2?
o 'An
disa
e
s
in
r
'
'
g
e..
y
r
s
g
y
Ki:
ereta
;S
Mr. Rush: Not a bit.
Secretary Kissinger: Now, on the situation in Vietnam. I think we ought to take
advantage of this period of quiet and build up South Vietnam's capabilities as best
we can. We want to observe the terms of Article 7 (of the Agreement), but don't
want to put excessive restraints on ourselves. After all, they are violating the
Agreement. If they stretch the Agreement, we ought to be prepared to stretch
some too.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
 TOP SECR] No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
Mrs Clements: Do you anticipate making'a public announcement of this?
Secretary Kissinger: No, let them be the first to complain.
Adm. Peet: We already have some high-visibility items in there.
Secretary Kissinger: Like what?
Adm. Peet: TOW (anti-tank) missiles, for example.
Secretary Kissinger: I understand they need TOWs rather badly. Is there anything
else? How many TOWs do they have, fifty?
Adm. Moorer: About 140.
Secretary Kissinger: Can we give them a substantial number more?
Adm. Moorer: Yes, we can go a few more, say 60 to 80. We're running close
to the limit now, money-wise. We have only $299 million left.
Mr. Clements: The money is our whole problem.
Adm. Peet: It would only cost $5 ox '$6 million for 60 to 80 TOWS.
Adm.- Moorer: .We're pushing up to. that $1. 1'?6 million lixn.it? now.
Secretary Kissinger: ? We're not spending?that much money in Laos now, are we?
Mr. Rush:-We can spend $299 n illion more before. we hit. the legal limit? . .
.Adm. Moorer: $1. 126 million is the legal limit.
Secretary Kissinger: How does giving them an additional 80 TOWs effect the
$300 million we have left?
Mr. Clements: The TO Ws. are no problem. We can handle that. But, money for
tlx'efuture is'a problem.; `'I see no way of responding to that, list .they...(the.Soii..
Vietnamese) gave us.
Secretary Kissinger: I thought you scrubbed down that list to $250 million-- somewhere
in that ballpark.
Adm. Moorer: We've looked at it, scrubbed it down. We're recommending such
things like forty radios, six LSTs (landing craft).....
Secretary Kissinger: Why do they need LSTs?
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
Adm. Moorer: They use them for logistic support.
Mr. Colb : They have no need for them. They don't have the Paracels anymore.
Adm. Moorer: That's right, but we have 31 river boats and other items to give
them. It's equipment they don't have, but can use. We have saturated them with
equipment over the years. A lot of the stuff they can't even use. The equipment
they have asked for wouldn't be of any benefit to them. They are saturated. We
filled them up this time last year.
Secretary Kissinger: I thought they needed more TOWs.
Adm. Moorer: That is being taken care of.
Secretary Kissinger: How?
Adm. Moorer: We've started the training program....
Secretary Kissinger: Do they have the mines we talked about last time?
Adm. Moorer: We have some earmarked for them. We put these devices in bombs
a4 then fly them down to them when they need. them.
.
-lay. the National ;Anthem?
:Se, Are these the.'ones that
zretar Kissin er:
Adm. Moorer: ?It's a simple device they, put in the boxxibs. I think it
s the Mark'52...
Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what you call them, but they're the ones that get
you so excited all the time..
Adm. Moorer: I still say that that was' a real bargain for less than a million dollars-
(the mining of Haiphong Harbor).
Mr. Clements: How long does it take?
:Adrxi;= I~itaore"r: 'What,.. cis tiain'popleT'
Mr. Clements: Yes.
Adm. Moorer: To train people on the Mark 52 takes time. What we plan to do is
do the work--put the devices in there--at Subic Bay, then fly them to Vietnam
whenever they want them.
Secretary Kissinger: You can't just dump them in the China Sea can you? Is
some special skill required?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
TOP SECR.E'r / 5z;lv5rr1v J
Adm. Moorer: No, you can just dump them in. They sink to the bottom.
Secretary Kissinger: What do they do, walk around on the bottom and go off when
you push a button or something?
Mr. Clements: How long will it take to train?
Mr. Stearns: By the end of February they should be ready.
Secretary. Kissinger: What will the bombs accomplish? Will they seal off the
whole port? What do they do?
Adm. Moorer: They're like mines. I'm not familiar with the details, but you make
adjustments on them for what you want.
Mr. Rush: How long do they last?
Adm. Moorer: It depends on how you set them. Two weeks- -depending on the
temperature of the water--to a year, if you want.
Secretary Kissinger: If we do it, how long a time would we keep them there?
? Adm. Moorer I'd just let tbent .sit t$ere'on -the ;bottom indefinitely, until the-.
batteries run out: A year' or so.
secretary ? Kissin er: 1n my estiniati.on;. there 'is- nothing horrible enough fdr'theh.
They (the North Vietnamese) are the.biggest ?s. o. b. s. I've ever meet, - and I've met
Adm. Moorer: I wouldn't risk running a ship through there.
Secretary Kissinger: Can you mine other ports other than Haiphong?
Adm. Moorer: We plan to mine everything from Haiphong south.
Sec?retary.i(issin:gerer'think those. . "niines would give tlie North. Viettnamese-.ma:ssive
problems.
Adm. Moorer: Right!
Mr. Colby: North Vietnams been-a little lonely lately. Nobody's paying them
much attention.
Secretary Kissinger: They are getting strong discouragement fnnin mewhere.
Mr. Colby: They must be worried about being moved off of center stage.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Secretary Kissinger: I understand the Embassy scrubbed down the list and sent in
another at about $250 million. Is this list still too big?
Adm. Peet: We've scrubbed it down to about $22 million.
Mr. Clements: I'd say put it at the $22 million level, less the TOWS.
Secretary Kissinger: I have no judgement on that, but if we can create a situation
where the possiblity of an attack is less likely, then it is worth the money we have
to spend.
Adm. Peet: We can even improve on these items....
Gen. Scowcroft: Are you talking about the appropriations limit or the ceiling on
expenditures?
Adm. Peet: Both The. vole situation is a mess....
Secretary Kissinger: We always nit-pick when things are quiet, but when we are
confronted with a crisis, we rush in asking for hundreds of millions of dollars.
I'm more interested in seeing what we can do to prevent a situation-from
developing than jumping in ,after it has already happened. .
Mr. Cleni.en'ts: We can move forward on the' TOWS (60 to 80 more) with no
Secretary Kissinger: Do it, but before the offensive has already started.
Mr..* Clements:" We can do it right away.
Secretary Kissinger:' Can you (to Adm. Moorer and Mr. Clements) prepare a
paper for us on what is in the $200 million list so that we can compare it with
what is needed?
Adm. Moorer: Sure,, but I have it right here.
Secretary Kissinger: (to General Scowcroft) Have we seen the listl
Gen.. Scowcroft: No.
Secretary Kissinger: Why are we rapidly running out of money if there is some
$300 million left to be spent ?
Mr. Stearns: We already have expenditures on the books which will eat most of that
up. The expenditures are already programmed.
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
 TOP ( No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
Adm. Peet: The South Vietnamese are spending to the tune of $1.6 million a
day. If they keep spending like that and we can't get more money, we've had it.
Secretary Kissinger: If I could just get a list of the items you think are needed.:.
Mr. Clements: Fine, we'll do that.
Secretary Kissinger: Our desire is tb get in there with enough equipment to
deter an attack. The anti-tank weapons (TOWS) look to me like they would be
helpful.
Adm. Moorer: We have all these lists, but no money for them. If we spend
all the money today, in five months there will be nothing left. What we need
is some operating capital.
Col. Stukel: Is it a ceiling problem, or an authorization problem?
Adm. Peet: It's both.
Mr. Clements: We can't bet on Congress coming up with it, but if they don't,
our tails will be in the cracks 1
Adm. 'Peet: Could we get a. supplemental of $150 million just for the oil that
%
we`wi11 need in the -coming. months?
1Klr, i. iemenLs. VGJ:I.QJ4+.U.Y. a V-
7
Kissinger: That would certainly. help ease the situation.
Mr. Clements: It would help sigx'iificantly: Whatever the mechanics, we have
to get with Congress and get them to give us more. I think all three of us`
should work on them.
Secretary Kissinger: I agree, but you and Ken (Mr. Rush) should go first. I've
already got too many sessions on the Hill coming up.
tance supplemental.
a
`aa
e
'
.
ssis
. economic
d
We also n.e
Ivfx, Riish:
Secretary Kissinger: In the next week, you (Mr. Clements) and Ken (Mr. Rush)
start working on Congress. Wrap Cambodia and Vietnam together. 25X1
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0
 ? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0 11
XOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
Mr. Colby: We already have, up north. The Ambassador sent in an
assessment recently that takes an overall look at the insurgency situation.
He predicts an increase in insurgent activity of about ten to fifteen percent
a year. I think that is a little high, but it does raise some questions. I
think we ought to take a look at it.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. (to General Scowcroft) Schedule a WSAG on
that soon.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/09/29: LOC-HAK-527-5-1-0