BACKGROUND ON U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-510-5-12-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 23, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/01: LOC-HAK-510-5-12-6
C
IP
MORI C05077779 Pgs 2-6 ONLY.
TOP S.ECRET /SENSITIVE
ll&ElviORANDUM FOR THE PRES
FROM; Henry A. Kiesi
\?
IN OrtMATION
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
NVOSD Review Completed Pgs 2-6 ONLY.]
SUBJECT; Background on U. S. Military Op* t ons in Laos
,ye6
Secretary Laird has sent you a memorandum (Tab A) which sots forth
U.S. military operstions in Laos, and also outlines the rotativos strengths
of the Communist sod Lon Government forces, it notes that enemy and
friondly etraagthos are roughly the same (105,595 and 98,230, rospeetively,
as of April l969, including this North Viietnames* compontutt), and that
120.000 air attack sorties have been flown this year by U.S. an Laotian
aircraft. It goes on to suggisst, however, that th* avallobility of North
Viotnarnese manpower gives the Communists the edge dospite our air
power and that tho Commuaists can also match our pgrading of Lao
Govitrament weaponry. The conclusion is that a grater U.S. effort *nay
not alter the power balance substantially.
Since th* memorandum's purpose was to closer be tho situation Sololy in
military terms, it did not go into the politico/military implications of ea
ontrany dry-season offsasive which 1101111 gippesre to be building up. If the
Conuramist forciss should advance in North Laos significantly beyond thte
lirnits reached in provicous years, thoy would thrataton to anadorxrsine the
long-iestablishod but promotions balance of Prine* Soliavaltaa NUMMI.*
neutral goveramont. U this governmoat should collapse, wo would los* the
justification for oar attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, since wit
are operating at Siravramass requost. Alternatively, if Souvanna should
attompt to salvos* Ms position by. risaching an accord with the Communist*.
we might be actually ordered by him to stop bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
The Communists bays consistently domandisd this as *h. prima of removing
North Vital:mows* troops from Laos. in *Uhler case. Communist forces
would undoubtedly advance to the line of the Mekong.
It ist to countor tho .or of situotion which I have just 4a.crtbed
Washini ton Special Action group has rocas:m*04*d, and yo
opprovod the implomentatioa of military rnotasures designed to strougthen
the Lao Government JO TC11004
T9P SECRICT/pENS1TIVE
Itil-hnTish 10/22/6q (retyped)
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? - -----
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/01 : LOC-HAK-510-5-12-6
ler -01 L1.11;i15:i'.11. SENSIgh
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20301
OSD Review Completed
ImORANDWFOR THE PRESIDENT
frtiv- ?D94/4
?
SUBJECT: US Military Operations in Laos (S)
T 1269
In light of the current Congressional and public interest in US
military operations in Laos, you may find some additional background
information useful. This report deals separately with the two military
theaters in Laos. The first is in the Southern Panhandle where US air
operations and Laotian ground forces are attempting to interdict enemy
infiltration into South Vietnam. The second theater is in Northern Laos,
particularly in the eastern and central parts where the terrain is
mountainous and the area is thinly populated. Since the Geneva Accords
in 1962, the Communists have effectively controlled about 40% of the
territory and 25% of the population in Laos. The degree of Communist
control has fluctuated in response to the seasonal ebb and flow pattern
of the military conflict. During the dry season, beginning in October
and ending in March, the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces have
historically launched an offensive. The Royal Laotian Government (RLG)
forces counterattack during the wet season from May to September and
generally regain the positions they held the previous year.
At present there are an estimated 100,000 enemy troops in Laos.
About half of the total forces are Pathet Lao insurgents and half are
regular North Vietnamese troops and advisors. The RLG has about 100,000
men under arms including regulars of the Royal Laotian (Conservative)
and former Neutralist Armies, an air force of 53 T-28s and some other
planes, a river flotilla, and an irregular guerrilla army. The current
strength of the irregular guerrilla army is about 38,000 men, or nearly
- -40% of total Laotian armed forces. The guerrilla units are generally
regarded as highly effective combat forces and do much of the actual
fighting. A large pert of this force is composed of Meo tribesmen living
in the main areas of conflict. The table below summarizes the troop
strength of both sides (exclusive of any US military personnel) in 1968
and 1969.
ESTIMATE6-ENEW/FRIENDLY STRENGTHS IN LAOS
. --July-August 1968
'Friendly
f.Combat Forces
Command & Support
Total
58,255
14.3.2145_
. 1665-61Y
SOURCE: DIA
gobvgir?eaoo,m...vrev-va-..., .a-,,...r.r.o.....re...,..... ...
I
D?7=4,4:1:3; T=7.!: , 1*-? EFIETOEUSITIVE
D1Z Z2,70..10 .
-.......... T'az'a __
, .?..........?,w,......
- 16~14.6.1?4,...;,,,L.,,....,arS? s...,Mi
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/01 : LOC-HAK-510-5-12-6
April 1969
Enemy
Friendly Enemy.
57,690
56,964
55,745
42,850 -
41,266
49,850
100,540
98,230
105,595
Sec De Copt Nr 5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/01 : LOC-HAK-510-5-12-6
IP I OLUIAL 111111?
while the sides appear evenly matched, both in combat forces and support
personnel, the US military and intelligence community has long recognized
that the enemy could rapidly increase their forces in Laos and occupy
large sections of friendly territory if they desired. They have probably
not done so to date because the ebb and flow of the fighting in Laos
since 1962 has provided the North Vietnamese relatively easy access to
South Vietnam through Laos at a minimum cost in men and materiel. They
were probably also anxious to avoid an escalation of the conflict in
Laos merely to achieve objectives secondary to their basic aims in South
Vietnam.
The enemy strength of about 100,000 in mid-1968 was almost 30,000
troops (40%) larger than the previous year and there is reason to believe
the North Vietnamese could sustain even larger forces and casualties.
The PLANA forces currently lose about 8500 men per year in Laos from
all causes and the RIJG loses about 5500. About 120,000 physically fit
males in North Vietnam and about 11.000 Laotians under Comuunist control
-La Laos reach the draft age each year. This annual flow of men combined
with the large (900,000 men) surplus labor pool in North Vietnam is
sufficient to sustain the enemy's losses in Laos and its requirements
for infiltration into South Vietnam. Our Laotian allies can easily
replace their losses from the 12,000 physically fit males entering the
draft age each year and the reserve pool of 150,000 men under their con-
trol. Two conclusions emerge from these figures. First, both sides
can sustain the present level of combat almost indefinitely. Second,
the government forces can never hope to gain numerical superiority
over the enemy from its own reserves of manpower.
Based on recent combat activity on the ground and in the air over
Laos, the wax in Laos has been intensifying. So far this year US and
Laotian 'aircraft have flown about 120,000 attack sorties over Laos
(one-third in the northern sector). On the other hand, they flew only
79,000 in all of 1968 (about 20% in the North) and 52,000 in 1966. The
following table shows the monthly attack sorties during 1966-1969.
AVERAGE NUNBER OF ATTACK SORTIES PER MONTH
IN LACS
Northern Laos Southern Laos
RIAF .1_ US it_ Total
_
1966
355
8
313
12
341
80
4329
1967
601 /
14
458
11
.3246
75
4305
1968
300-8-1/
5
908
14
5352
81
6560
1969 (tiara July)
160CRY
12
2796
20
9373
68
13769
pfEstimated from incomplete monthly data.
By way of domparisoil, during the *bombing campaign over North Vietnam,.
- the US flew about 9000 attack sorties per month. The UO and Laotian
sit forces are now flying half that many just in Northern Laos at an
annual cost to the US of $370 million per year (including $143 million
in MASF funds)...
Arm) QPT'r SENSITIVE
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' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/03/01 : LOC-HAK-510-5-12-6
ur or:urcrimr"----
In the ground war, enemy and friendly initiated actions have more
than doubled during the recent vet season campaign and increased by
almost one-third in the most recent annual cycle. The table below also
shows that the enemy took the initiative away from the government
forces during the last year (the enemy initiated 57% of all actions
in the 1968-1969 period compared to 47% in the previous year).
MIME NUMBER OF GROUND COMBAT ACTIONS PER WEEK
. 1967- 1968-
2.968 1262_ Change
25X1
Enemy Initiated
Dry Season
16
15
-6
Wet Seaton
11
28
155
Total
59
Friendly Initiated
-' Dry Season
19 -
12
-37
Wet Season
12
20
67
Total
31
32
3
Total ,
Dry Season
35
27
-23
. Wet Season
23
48 ?
109
Total
3/3*75
29
SOURCE: Laos Ground Operations Summary (OPREP 5).
Two other facts about the war in Laos are important. First, only
2% of the total ground actions received air support (compared to 5% in
1968) even though US and Laotian pilots are flying nearly 150 attack
sorties per day over Northern Laos. Second, the combat performance of
the Laotian regular forces appears to be at about the same level as that
of the Popular Forces in South Vietnam that guard local villages and
hamlets from the VC. Both have a kill ratio of about 3 (the ratio of
enemy to friendly killed and captured). By contrast, the kill ratio of
ps units in South Vietnam is 12, that of the ARVN is 73 and of the
Regional Forces is 5. If the Laotian Army is to become a force compar-
able in effectiveness to the Vietnamese regular forces, these figures
indicate that more than a doubling in combat performance will be necessary.
The issue of American involvement in Laos and its current cost also
should be considered. About 200 American military personnel are in Laos
now.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
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IIP ? 1 yr Lllitt:
ESTIMPLTED INCREMENTAL COST OF THE VAR IN LAOS11/
Millions)
' North South. Total
25X1 Mr operations )
Attack Sorties
. 292
4,015
1307
Recce & Other Sorties
36
233
269
2,52 Sorties
Total Air
241
W5g
241
1BTf
25X1
VS Military Personnel
Total
1
469
1
1489 1958
W These costs are consistent with the current incremental cost of the
war in Southeast Asia of $17.6 billion.
Air operations account for 95% of the cost of the war in Laos (about 80%
of the war cost in Northern Laos). About one-quarter of the 52 billion
Irp hav. c,ommi1tA3 to Taos is allocated to Northern Laos.;
The provision of additional US arms, equipment, and advisory Per-
sonnel in Laos undoubtedly will increase the intensity of the military
conflict. Because of the inevitable delay in providing additional
equipment and getting it into operation, the short-run impact is likely
to be very small in light of enemy capabilities during the current dry
season. With the possible exception of M-16 rifles, at least several
weeks will be required for the provision of additional arms and equip-
ment. Getting the equipment operational in the field will involve
further delays. The dry season is about to begin in Laos, at which
time the PL/NVA. forces probably will regain the initiative. Opposition
to RLG operations has increased significantly in the last few days.
Intelligence sources indicate that up to a full North Vietnamese divi-
sion (over 9500 troops) is headed tonard the battle areas in Northern
Laos. The RLG troops are spread thin and currently are holding unfamiliar
and hostile territory. The general consensus of the US military and
intelligence community appears to be that the North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao
forces can retake substantial areas of Northern Laos in the next few
months if they desire. The immediate dispatch of additional US arms
and advisors will have little impact in stopping a renewed enemy offensive.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
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1.7 ?
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? cz erl
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SENSITIVE
? The longer-term impact of additional US assistance is more diffi-
cult to identify. Modern equipment will increase the combat capability
of the RLG forces and US advisors may be able to improve the training
and motivation ?of the Laotian troops. Whether or not this type of
assistance would improve appreciably, the military and political position
of the Royal Laotian Government in the-long run is doubtful.
The North Vietnamese have the capability (as they have demonstrated
numerous times in South Vietnam) to match US arms escalations by intro-
ducing more sophisticated equipment, rockets, AK-47s and armed vehicles.
They also have sufficient manpower reserves to sustain the current level
of losses almost indefinitely and be match any increase in combat force
within the capability of the Laotians. An arms escalation probably will
Increase just the intensity of the fighting and the casualties on both
sides without significantly improving the military control or the poli-
tical influence of the RIG. The escalation in combat activity in Northern
Laos in 1968 and 1969 has not improved the RLG position significantly over
what it was in prior years. Control of the infiltration system in Laos
is critical to North Vietnamese objectives in South Vietnam, and little
doubt exists that they are willing to allocate the relatively small
amounts of troops and equipment needed to protect these vital interests.
I am also not convinced that we have fully explored the risks assoc-
iated with providing additional US personnel in Laos to operate (or
train Laotian forces to operate) the,sophisticated new equipment.
Recent Congressional and public discontent with our current level of
involvement in Laos would probably increase significantly with any
commitment ?of additional arms and military. personnel.
I have asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide me with detailed
reports on the implications of increased military assistance to Laos.
Their analyses of cost and personnel increases required by the proposals
for immediate shipments of additional arms and equipment will be available
prior to October 20, and their comprehensive program for the improvement
of the Royal Laotian Armed Forces (and its implications in terms of cost
and manpower increases) late in October or early in November. We will
be in a better position to make sound judgments on these issues after
their review, but I do not believe, in any event, that additional US
advisors and military personnel should be sent to Laos at this time.
Besides increasing Congressional and public discontent with our involve-
ment there, expansion of our military presence in Laos will only escalate
the level of combat without improving the long-run position of the RLG.
This .has been demonstrated in Vietnam and in Laos where the fighting
already has escalated significantly in the last year without any important
change in the RIG position over what it was in prior years.
rt ',--'-? - .7) 7.--r
SENSITIVE
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