AMBASSADOR GODLEY'S COMMENTS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-508-2-11-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 5, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

- u sa /Y
No Objection to Declassification in Part 201i0//01/15: LOC-HAK-508-2-11-3
MEMORANDUM - ?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
INFORMATION
August 5, 1970
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley,
U. S. Amba s s ado r to Lao s
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. John H. Holdridge
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
TIME & PLACE: Dr. Kissinger's Office, July 23, 1970
SUBJECT: Ambassador Godley's Comments on Developments
in Lao s
Dr. Kissinger began by informing Ambassador Godley that the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board had reported that Ambassador Godley
was doing a great job in Laos. Dr. Kissinger added that Ambassador
Godley had more guts than most people in his Service, which was much
appreciated here.
Ambassador Godley thanked Dr. Kissinger for these remarks, and went
on to raise a specific question: the U. S. personnel limitations in Laos.
The ceiling established by the President was 1040 Americans, and
Ambassador Godley wanted to know whether if he were to come in with
a request for any more, there would be any heartburn in the White House.
Dr. Kissinger asked how many additional people might be involved, and
Ambassador Godley said that at the most there would be 80 more. Some
were already there on TDY, and would be shifted over to permanent change
of station. He didn't want to be pinned down on a fixed number. Dr. Kissinger
declared that the President as a matter of principle wanted to make a
maximum effort in Laos, and regardless of what messages might be sent
to Ambassador Godley this would remain the
~es4dent! a--was-h.---the-P~-silent--wad--ma.~imum-.~~P ~ ~? *-~,~--.Fze_x~aa~tai.xie_c1~.
during the summer, and if Ambassador Godley came in with a request for
..... na re.-pers.onnel as_.be.ing necessary_ fo.r_Ahis.purpose.,-._his....__Dr..K ssi,nger,'
instinct was that the President would agree. 80 could be accepted, but if
the--number could be squeezed to 40 we would be happier since there was
in effect a commitment not to increase the numbers. However, if
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/15: LOC-HAK-508-2-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/15: LOC-HAK-508-2-11-3
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Ambassador Godley told us that he had to have the extra personnel,
this would be acceptable.
it, could be arranged. He had checked with and with
Ambassador Godley said that if more Cambodian SG T- were desired,
Souvanna didn't mind; in fact, he would be delighted.
Souvanna regarded the Cambodians as "brown folk, similar to the
Lao, while the South Vietnamese were "yellow folk. " Souvanna would
be willing to live with the existing PRAIRIE FIRE operations, but there
would be trouble if these operations were extended westward. It would
be better to work out of the Bolovens with Cambodian and Lao SGUs.
Ambassador Godley felt that these operations would be effective, but
he was not so sure about the effectiveness of South Vietnamese operating
in South Laos.
Dr. Kissin er questioned Ambassador Godley about the possibility of a
Communist peace offensive in Laos. There apparently had been some
feelers from the Russians, but if a peace offensive was in fact, underway,
the President's present disposition was not to accept it unless it included
Vietnam. Ambassador Godley thought that it would be difficult for the Lao
to refuse to respond to a peace offensive. The Lao Armed Forces were
extremely tired, and had lost lots of men. Souvanna, however, would be
cautious.
had gone quite well
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Dr. Kissinger brought up Ambassador Godley's testimony before the
Symington Subcommittee, wondering in particular how Senator Fuibright
had treated him. Ambassador Godley expressed the opinion that the hearing
m assn or o ey
noted that he had made a memorandum covering the hearing for the record.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/15: LOC-HAK-508-2-11-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
Dr. Kissinger asked if Long Tieng could be held during the dry season,
to which Ambassador Godley replied that it could be held certainly until
after the U. S. elections. When Dr. Kissinger asked if it could be held
afterwards, Ambassador Godley stated that if the Lao could push out in
a crescent West, Southwest, and South of Long Tieng it would be possible
to hold the town. In response to a further question from Dr. Kissinger on
the fighting capacity of the Meos, Ambassador Godley described them as
being virtually out of the war. Many of the Meos had gone off to take care
of their families, although little by little they were coming back. The Lao
forces at Long Tieng now consisted of a national guerrilla force, i. e., were
made up of units drawn from all over Laos. Vang Pao was still the best
Lao general, but he was not as good now as he had been last year. He was
tired, and his charisma was down. He had a habit, too, of not using his
staff, and was a one-man artilleryman, even though he was an effective
political leader. Nevertheless, he was still the best the Lao had, and there
was no one else on the scene. In further describing the makup of the Lao
forces, Ambassador Godley observed that what had been Meo battalions a
year ago were now all 40 percent Lao, that is, of non-Meo personnel.
Dr. Kissinger asked about the fighting capacity of the North Vietnamese --
were they still good ? Ambassador Godley replied that they were very good.
Vang Pao had a practice of cutting open the stomachs of NVA casualties
to see if they had been eating well, and had found them still to be well fed.
There were no 16-18 year olds among the NVA troops. Originally, the
316th Division had not fought well, for example, the soldiers had jumped
out of their foxholes to fire at attacking aircraft, but they had learned.
Dr. Kissinger asked if the B-52s had helped. Ambassador God ey s ou n t
hesitate to ask for B-52 support -- if a request got to this building, it would
be approved. Ambassador Godlejr declared that the B-52 raids in Northern
Laos had produced more BDA than in any other area. The results had been
extremely good. He indicated that air activity in Laos had been cut down
by the Seventh Air Force, but that he didn't object because the present heavy
rains had reduced the effective ness of air action.
Dr. Kissinger asked if Ambassador Godley foresaw another Communist
'~ rte .-season-often ire-next-yeaarw- ~xx~bass~ d~ r C'od1e ug.geste~h~~? j c e
offensive might be expected instead, which as he had mentioned might be
attractive to the Lao. In the face of this. we needed to-maintain our around -_
capability in the South, and to hit the Trail. Ground action in South Laos
depended completely on the help provided by the RLG. All the officers in
.the SGUs were from the FAR.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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than those in the PRAIRIE FIRE -program.
0
Ambassador Godley described tho ISGU operations in Laos
as "superb" in contrast to MACSOG PRAIRIE FIRE operations, none of
which were undertaken without U. S. participation. There were no U. S.
personnel in the SGUs, just Lao. The SGU operations were much better
One other point which Ambassador Godley wanted to raise in connection with
the U. S. operations in Laos, as distinct from the. Steel Tiger strikes, was -that
the total cost was less than $500 million per year, including AID, MASF,
and the bombing. In all this, we were not losing a single American,
and we were killing over 30 North Vietnamese a day. $500 million was what
one U. S. division cost us in South Vietnam. In Laos, this same sum enabled
us to tie down two North Vietnamese divisions, numerous Binh Tram, plus
many trucks and anti-aircraft artillery sites. We were getting a bigger bang
for a buck in Laos than anywhere else.
Dr. Kissinger observed that there was no trouble within this Administration
concerning anything Ambassador Godley had said. He wondered how long
the North Vietnamese could keep going under the circumstances which
Ambassador Godley had described. The conversation concluded with a
remark by Ambassador Godley that the North Vietnamese could probably
go for some time yet, but undoubtedly had been hurt by their losses.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/15: LOC-HAK-508-2-11-3
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/15: LOC-HAK-508-2-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/15: LOC-HAK-508-2-11-3
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CFARTMENT OF STATE C - N'`
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEXQTRANDUM FOR T112 RECORD
July 22, 1970
Subject: ApPearance Before the Symington Sub-Committee
Yesterday I "briefed" the Symington Sub-Committee on Laos..
During the course of the discussion, Senator. Fuibright spoke
with force, but in an a e.eable manner, about our secrecy con-
cerning Lao matters
None of the Senators appeared to be interested in this
matter and Senator Fulbright said he knew all about it already
and that the St tment should be as forthcoming with
the Senators as Ei~a etc.
Subsequently, I vas-questioned by Mr. Roland Paul. Present
In the room at that time was Mr. Pincus as well as Mr. Carl
Marcy's assistant. Mr. Paul
him
in so doing, I once again drew his at.-
enth to the, high sensitivity of this information. He jotted
down on one of a number of cards he had in front of him some-
thing about my response.
7"
Ambassador G. McMurtrie cj '. ltm
White House -- Mr. Lehmann
PEA - Mr,. Helms
TOP SECRET/SENNSTTTVE
cc: J -- U. Alexis Johnson
SA - Marshall Green
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/15 : LOC-HAK-508-2-11-3