CABLE TO ALEXANDER HAIG FROM HENRY KISSINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-505-2-20-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 20, 1972
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-2-20-6
19-12 20 f .l 3 26 Ecm
T 0 P S E C R -r' T SENSITIVE 2003502 OCT 72 VIA CAS CHANNELS (BUNKER)
DELIVER IUNIEDIATELY
SECTIGN I OF 2
OSD review completed
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
FIR Ox) HENTRYJ
C KISSINGER SAIGON 0199 FLASH
T^ THE WHITE HOUSE EXCLUSIVELY EYE'S ONLY FOR GENERAL HAIG
F n''T?:^ 22 OCTOB. ER 209 1972
PLEnSE TRAM:SE1ITHE FOLLOVIPoG MESSAGE TO COLONEL. GUAM. IMMEDIATELY
(bTITH I STRi3CTIONS TO DELIVER IT TO HIS CUSTOMER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
BEG1 N TEXT: THE FOLLOWING IS A MESSAGE ON BEHALF. OF THE PRESI-
ff i'ttiTi CF l''n : U'UT@ S! AIi IE Sr" 46 KICA TO fff) f'RIt f1INISfE;4 t7F f HE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
1. THE U.S. SIDE APPRECIATES THE GOOD WILL AND SERIOUS ATTITUDE
OF THE DRV SHOWN IN ITS MESSAGE OF OCTOBER 19, 1972. WITH THE TWO
PROVISIONS FOR ARTICLES 7 AND 8 AGREED. TO BY THE DRV SIDE IN ITS
MESSAGE, THE TEXT OF. THE AGREEMENT CAN NOW BE CONSIDERED COMPLETE.
FOR,.PURPOSES.OF CLARITY AND TO AVOID ANY AMBIGUITY, THE U 2. SIDE
HAS DELETED THE FIRST CLAUSE OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 7,
AND THE ENTIRE ' ARTICLE .7 AS ACCEPTED BY THE U.S..SIDE NOW READS AS
FOLLOWS:
QUOTE: ARTICLE 7. -` FROM THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE TO
THE' FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLES 9B AND
91 OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES SHALL NOT
ACCEPT THE INTRODUCTION OF TROOPS, MILITARY ADVISERS, AND
MILITARY PERSONNEL INCLUDING TECHNICAL MILITARY PERSONNEL,
ARAMENTS, MUNITIONS, ANDAR MATERIAL INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.
THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES SHALL BE PERMITTED TO
MAKE PERIODICAL REPLACEMENTS OF ARAMENTS, MUNITIONS AND WAR
MATERIAL WHICH HAVE, BEEN WORN OUT OR DAMAGED AFTER THE CEASE-
FIRE, ON THE BASIS OF PIECE-FOR-PIECE, OF THE SAME CHARACTER-
ISTICS AND PROPERTIES, UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE JOINT
MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES AND
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION.
END QUOTE..P4
2. THERE REMAINS TO BE SETTLED, HOWEVER, THE MATTER OF UNILATERAL
DECLARATIONS BY THE TWO SIDES. IN ORDER TO AVOID STARTING A NEW
RELATIONSHIP ON THE BASIS OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS, CLARIFICATION OF
THESE ST?ATEMEN UTELY NECESSARY.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-2-20-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-2-20-6
A) WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF PRISONERS, THE U.S. SIDS
HAS STATED ON INNUMERA3LE OCCASIONS THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSANCES CAN
IT SIGN AN AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT UNCONDITIONALLY GUARANTEE THE
,RETURN OF ALL ITS MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRISONERS THROUGHOUT INDU-
CHINA. ACCORDINGLYS, THE FORMULATION IN THE DHV UNILATERAL STATEMENT
HANDED OVER ON OCTOBER, 17 WHICH MAKES THE RETURN OF PRISONERS IN
LAO, CONDITIONAL ON A LAOTIAN SETTLEMENT AND MAKES NO MENTION OF
PRISONERS. IN CAMBODIA IS UNACCEPTABLE. THE U. S. SIDE HAS PROCEEDED
ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY SPECIAL ADVISOR LE DUC
THO THAT HTHE DRV WILL MAKE ITSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RETURN OF
ALL U.S. MILITARY AND CIVIALIAN PRISOP"'RS HELD-THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA.
THE'RE'FORE, THE U. S. SIDE REQUICRES A DRV UNILATERAL. STATEMENT ALONG
THE LINES OF THE TEXT HANDED OVER ON OCTOBER S, 9 AND 12, 1972, TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
QUOTE. WITH RESPECT TO U.S. MILITARY MEN AND CIVILIANS HELD
IN INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES OUTSIDE OF VIETNAM, THE DRV UNDERTAKES
TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR IDENTIFICATION AND RETURN TO
UNITED STATES AUTHORITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SAME SCHEDULE
ESTABLISHED FOR THE RELEASE OF.U.S. MILITARY MEN AND CIVILIANS
DETAINED IN VIETNAM. THE DRV WILL ALSO ASSURE THAT THE
PROVISION IN THE OVERALL AGREEMENT FOR VERIFICATION OF
THOSE U.S.. MILITARYMEN AND CIVILIANS CONSIDERED MISSING
IN ACTION WILL BE APPLIED ALSO IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA.
END QUOTE.
B) WITH RESPECT TO LAOS, THE U.S. SIDE ACCEPTS THE VERSION
HANDED OVER BY THE DRV SIDE ON OCTOBER 13, 1972, CONFORMING TO THE
U. S. TEXT HANDED OVER ON OCTOBER 12, 1972, AS FOLLOWS:
QUOTE: ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT OF THE.PRINCIPLES OF THE 1962
GENEVA. AGREEMENT ON L,\ OS, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM,
AND THE UNITED STATES WELCOME THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
THE TWO CONCERNED LAO PARTIES, AND WILL ACTIVELY CONTRIBITT.
TOWARD RAPIDLY BRINGING THESE NEGOTIATIONS.TO A SUCCESSFUL
CONCLUSION, SO AS TO MAKE POSSIBLE A CEASEFIRE IN LAOS WITHIN.
ONE MONTH AFTER THE "AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING
PEACE IN VIETNAM" COMES INTO FORCE.
AFTER THE CEASEFIRE IN LAOS .THE FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN LAOS
WILL ARRANGE 'THE MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 15 B) OF
THE "AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE. IN VIETNAM.
.END QUOTE.
C) WITH RESPECT TO CAMBODIA, THE U.S. SIDE OPERATES ON THE BASIS
OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS MADE BY SPECIAL ADVISOR LE DUC THO AT
PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH DR. KISSINGER ON SEPTEMBER 26 AND 27 AND OCTOBER
8 AND 119-1972.
QUOTE:
-- THE QUESTIONS OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA ARE CLOSELY
LINKED; WHEN THE WAR IS SETTLED IN VIETNAM, THERE IS NO REASON FOR
THE WAR TO CONTINUE IN CAMBODIA (SEPTEMBER 27);
-- ONCE THE VIETNAM PROBLEM IS SETTLED, THE QUESTION OF CAMBODIA
CERTAINLY WILL BE SETTLED; AND THE END OF THE VIETNAMESE WAR WILL
CREATE A VERY GREAT IMPACT THAT WILL END THE WAR IN CAMBODIA PREHAPS
IMMEDIATELY (OCTOBER -8)
i . P-
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-2-20-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-2-20-6
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F!A!KTO 22 OCTOBER 21, 1972
4
- IT IS AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US THAT. THE DRV WILL ABIDE BY
THE PRINCIPLE THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES, INCLUDING ITS OWN, MUST PUT
AN END TO T.HEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN CAMBODIA AND BE WITHDRAWN FRO
CAMBODIA AND NOT BE REINTRODUCED (SEPTEMBER 26);
THE DRV WILL FOLLOW THE SAME PRINCIPLES IN CAMBODIA THAT IT
WILL FOLLOW IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS, ,THAT IS9 IT WILL REFRAIN FRUI.I
INTRODUCING TROOPS ARMAMENT, AND WAR MATERIALINTO CAMBODIA (OCTOBE '. .;
11) , AND $
? AS ARTICLE 18 STATES, THE OBLIGATIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT COME
INTO FORCE ON THE DAY OF ITS SIGNING (OCTOBER 11). THE UNITED STATES REITERATES ITS VIEW AS EXPOUNDED BY DR. KISSIN`. `'
ON OCTOBER 11, 1972, THAT IF, PENDING A SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA,
.OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES ARE TAKEN THERE WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE
EXISTING SITUATION, SUCH OPERATIONS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE SPIRI
OF ARTICLE 15(B) AND TO THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH THIS AGREEMENT
BASED. END QUOTE.
3. WITH RESPECT TO OTHER UNILATERAL STATEMENTS HANDED OVER BY
THE DRV SIDE ON OCTOBER 17, 1972, THE U.S. POSITION IS AS FOLLOWS:
A) WITH RESPECT TO ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
DRV IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD, THIS MATTER WILL BE DISCUSSED DURING DR.
KISSINGER'S VISIT TO HANOI AND CAN BE SETTLED SATISFACTORILY.
B) WITH RESPECT TO RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES, THE U.S. SIDE
CONFIRMS THAT WITH. THE COMING INTO EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT, RE
CONNAIS8ANCE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
WILL CEASE.
C) WITH RESPEOT TO U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, THE U.S. SIDE CANNOT
ACCEPT ANY RESTRICTIONS REGARDING THE TRANSIT OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS,
AS WAS POINTED OUT BY DR. KISSINGER TO SPECIAL ADVISOR LE DUC THO
ON OCTOBER 11, 1972. THUS THE,UNDERSTANDING ON THIS QUESTION
REFERS ONLY TO THE STATIONING OF U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.
D) WITH RESPECT' TO INTERNAL-DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM,
THE MATTER REFERRED TO IN THE DRV STATEMENT WAS BEING DISCUSSED IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS OF SEPTEMBER 26 AND 27, 1972.
THESE PROPOSALS ARE SUPERSEDED BY THE AGREEMENT NOW BEING COMPLETED.
THE U.S. SIDE TAKES THE VIEW THAT THE QUESTION OF INTERNAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS SUFFICIENTLY CONVERED BY ARTICLE 9
OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AND THAT NO ADDITIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS
EXIST.
4. AS SOON AS THE DRV SIDE CONFIRMS THESE UNDERSTANDINGS AS
SET FORT R 7N R S 3 BOVE, TH AGREEMENT CAN BE CONSIDERED
37-70-N THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE QUESTION OF THE UNILATERAL STATE-
MENTS WILL BE SATISFACTORILY SETTLED, THE U.S. SIDE PROPOSES THE
FOLLOWING SCHEDULE WHICH WOULD NOT INVOLVE MORE THAN A 24-HOUR CHANGE
IN THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT.
A) BECAUSE OF THE DELAY CAUSED BY THE NEED TO RECEIVE REPLIES
ON REMAINING MATTERS, THE U.S. SIDE PROPOSES THAT DR. KISSINGER
ARRIVE IN HANOI ON OCTOBER 24-AT THE TIME AGREED UPON AND LEAVE ON
OCTOBER 26.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-2-20-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-2-20-6
B) THERE WOULD BE A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT IN
WASHINGTON AND HANOI ON OCTOBER 27, 1972 AT 2100 WASHINGTON TIME.
C) THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD TAKE PLACE ON OCTOBER 31
IN PARIS.
D) WHILE THE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT GO INTO EFFECT UNTIL ITS
SIGNATURE, IN ORDER TO SHOW ITS GOOD WILL THE U.S. SIDE IS PREPARED
TO OBSERVE A CEASEFIRE AS OF OCTOBER 29, NOON9 WASHINGTON TIME AND
ARRANGE FOR SIMILAR ACTION BY THE FORCES OF THE. GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.
E) ASSUMING THE DRV SIDE AGREES TO THIS MODIFIED SCHEDULE, THE
U.S. WOULD STOP BOMBING NORTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL ON THE MORNING OF
OCTOBER 23, 1972, AND ALL BOMBING, SHELLING AND MINING OF NORTH
VI,ETNACI ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 23, 1972.
F) THE U.S. SIDE REQUESTS URGENT CONFIRMATION WITH RESPECT
TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS IN THIS MESSAGE. THE U.S. SIDE ALSO REQUESTS
THE DRV SIDE TO CONFIRM THE ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING PUBLICITY OF,
DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT TO HANOI SET FORTH IN THE PAPER HANDED OVER TO
.MINISTER XUAN THUY BY DR. KISSINGER ON OCTOBER 179, 1972. AS SOON
AS THESE CONFIRMATIONS ARE RECEIVED THE DRV SIDE CAN COUNT ON THE
U.S. SIDE PROCEEDING WITH THE SCHEDULE PROPOSED ABOVE.
G) THE U.S. SIDE REGRETS THE 48-.HOUR DELAY IN CARRYING OUT THIS
SCHEDULE, BUT CONSIDERS THIS IS UNAVOIDABLE BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEXITY
OF THE SUBJECT AND THE NEED FOR PRECISE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. IT
DOE' NOT BELIEVE THAT NOW THAT TWO SIDES ARE SO CLOSE TO THE
tViP 1 T 10N OF SO LONG A CONFLICT THE DRV,SIDE WOULD PROCEED ON
THE 3ASIS OF THREATS.
H) THE U.S. SIDE REITTERATES' ITS CONVICTION THAT THE END OF THE
WAR, VW SO IMMINENT, SHOULD USHER IN A NEW ERA IN THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE U. S. AND THE DRV.
END TEXT
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/09/30: LOC-HAK-505-2-20-6