MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT KY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 23, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

pov. 4. -,!r 6 e4 4.2
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5
'C P Sr i '/ I?~ ~ 'i ? EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FORS
i'ROMs
SUBJECT:
President Ky`today -Which lasted an hour and a half. Thy was friendly
September 23, 1971
THE PRESIDENT
HENRY A, = -SINGER
Meeting with Vice President Ky
Attached at Tab A is General llaig'r report of his meeting with Vice
interesting c m entsi
sibllity. In the course of their conversation, he made the following
and made every effort to convey an Image of reasonableness and respou-
to change Its policy. In his view the problem is not that -%ve throve leverage
but that we are Supporting the wrong policies and the wrong man.
-- He agreed about the need for stability and professed under-
standing of your position belt stated that the- U. S. should not be afraid
again prepared to make personal sacrifices if the situation called for them.
Recalling that in 1967 he bad voluntarily withdrawn from the
Presidential race without pressure from any gv..arter, he said that he as
ists which will intensify after the U. S. withdraw a.
_- Ky feels that z- vtth President T ieu In power. the South Vint-
namesse cannot survive the long term, political struggle with the Corru un-
the problem in a reasonable and patriotic way.
In *nawer to a question as to whether he or Goneral Minh
plan to campaign. in the referendum, Ky stated that the referendum was
meaningless. He said he was ready for arrangements with Tbieu but
that Thieu's answer was that it is too late. Ky indicated he thought there
wai still time If Thieu were prepared to sit down alth others and solve
Icy said that if Thiau were to acknowledge existence of a political
crisis, then he and others would be prepared to help solve the problem.
In concluding, 'Ky stated that we shouldn't be afraid that he
would act without the fullest consideration of all the faccoro involved, By
way of Indicating his feeling that tho political spotlight focused on hies, he
noted that Big .-h had told him things were now up to K
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
"rr3'P !v c'ra'o'm _c .Worm rT.: /, vv o n my %r
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5
 OP_SE l T g1C i " 7 SUS ONLY
AA~
?3ss.'~~
1. 1 met with Vice President Ky for one and one-half hours today at his
made every effort o convey an image of reasonableness and responsibility,
office in the Presidential palane. The conversation was friendly and Ky
made. Nationalist forces must work out their differences in a legal and
constitution conteaet. Resort to extra-legal means or urgings in, that
-direction can only undermine the nationalist cause and encourage the
w
d_ our discussion with a presentation of our view of the present
situation. At this critical stage South Vietnam needs political unity and
strength above all to capitalize on the impressive gains it has already
defend itself and that in no small part depends on the U. 5. public support
ur eye oa inc main onjeee tivee which is the ability of South Vietnam to
of help that it will need for a long time to come.
4. So despite the disaappolntinents of this summer. I sad, we must keep
would Jeopardise our. efforts to guarantee that U. S. withdrawals are con-
ducted In as orderly a way as possible and that Vietnam gets the other kinds
support to South Vietnam. Clearly instability and disorder in Vietnam.
rea was & ,vital factor affecting our ability to assure continued U. S.
enemy which at this time is facing many difficulties.
S. I stressed to Ky that from the U. S. point of view continued stability
for our euorts here.
province and district chiefs the courage to disregard orders to rig the
of lhteu's incumbency. Ky's presence in the race would have given some
hie candidacy mould have offered some hope of neutralizing the advantages
Everyone anew that with Ky's tied to the military and government aapaaratus
withdrawaa because he knew that in a two-way race he couldn't win. He
(KY) had pulled out because Thieu had made things "Impossible" for him.
posted many of the arguments that are are already familiar to you. He said
Ift, had not understood the electoral process. It was more complicated
than just a three-way race between himself, Thieu and Minh. Minh had
. Ky said be agreed with me about the need for stability. He then ee...
b. Thus the Vietnamese people now face a dilemma. Do they resist
Thleu? rum An the risk of disorders and the attendant prospect of cuts in
;N'Sl_T V I :YE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5
1
U. S. aid? Or, do they re sign themselves to Thieu in the short-term
but face the certainty of instability and an inevitable '?explosion' in the
longer run? This dilemma weighs heavier on the Vietnam people than
It did is 1963 and they are considering what steps to take "more caree-
fully" than they did then because the canunu ists are stronger today,
to Thieu, e' and there is no telling what the so-called "baby Turks, "
disgruntled majors and-colonels in the armed forces, might so aeday
But, Ky said, we also shouldn't underestimate the strength of nation.-
, *list opposition to Ithieu. He is opposed by an array of Catholics. Budd-
blots, students and much of the 1.1 million many army. "No one even
knows whether the tanks which now surround the palace are really loyal
decide to dot.
S. i(y said that, therefore, the problem must be solved definitely and
thout delay. He fully understood President Nixon's position, his con-
cerns about disorder and about the uncertainties which would arise from
the United States shouldn't be afraid of change. Ky said he was not speak-
period of political transition by the creation of a political vacuum. But
deliberately.. made me wonder whether Ky wasn't leaving himself an
both the mad a Polity had to change but this first remark, said quite
ding. )
was that tho regime be able to move with unity and strength.
particular individual. However, what eras important to our mutual cause ;
sort Out their Own political problems and we were not committed to any
S. 1 told My It wasn't a matter of personalities. The Vietnamese must
selfish personal interests. He recalled that In 1967 he had voluntarily
situation, He would cover act in a way merely designed to promote hi
U. Ky said he was fully aware of his responsibilities in the present
mg the wrong policies and the wrong man.
age here. Thee Vietnamese know and accept this because they .re realistic
peopled. The problem is not that we have leverage but that`'mve are support-
President Niaon'a statement. These proved that the U. S. still has lever -
Ambassador Bunker's activities during the past weeks. There was
plea of our political involvement here were abundant. There had been
10. Ky rejoined that despite U. S. proEessionst6f non-interference, exam-
prepared to make it.
it twee situation again called for personal sacrifice on his part, he was
withdrawn trom the Presidential race without pressure from any quarter,
P S FIST/ SrTxvE/EYE.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5
tag about a leader but about a new policy. (Comments Later Ky said
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5
policies, it will be very difficult for South Vietnama to survive - not in
the neat five to six months but over a period of several years. When
the U. S. has withdrawn, then the political struggle with the communists
will begin. Ky said that with Thieu ln power he maw no hope for success
120 Ky said that if Thieu remains in power and continues his present
in such a struggle.
14. 1 repeated that the President had not Intended his statements an
meat had given Thiel more strength.
this di ieeeia ,ry bad proposed a solution within the framework of the
.constitution, a proposal which would have provided for an honest and
fair election ; but TThieu bad rejected it because president Nixon's state.
for U.S. support against be need to look to the political future. To solve
13. This, Ky repeated, was the dilemmae The short-term requirement
support r any individual,. Ky said he understood fu ly but the Vietnamese
people had nonetheless interpreted it that way. I, repeated that what
what the V. S. cannot accept are solutions which are not In accord with the
constitutional process.
about resorting to extra. constitutio and meaans. Our own President accepts
the concept of political struggle: he has extensive personal experience in
this regard; and he has himself lived through many disappointments. But
16. Ky then said'`X am ready for an arrangement with Thieu but Thieurs
s tan fed calk about democracy.
l!i. I asked Ky if either he or General Mash planned to campaign against
Thieeu in the referendum. Ky answered that the referendum was mean-
ingless and did not offer south Vietnamese people true opportunity to
express their will. Ky added that he was not against dictatorship if it is
a tempo xary necessity but then .the people mint be told this clearly rather
and Ky had replied that was fine with him but what about Thieet. Ky said,;
Senator Tran Van Don and other politicians. They had urged reconciliation
reasonable and patriotic way. He said he had met the other day with
2 eu. was prepared to sit down with other& and solve the oroblem in a
reies to recognise the existence of a polital crisis. Irv said if Thien
Thy said be saw no hope If Thieu stays isolated as he is now. He
were to acnowledge its existence, then he (Ky) and others 'would be
prepared to help solve the problem,
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05 : LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5
longtime to develop in the U. S. There had been some progress here
p SXCPrI N TIVE/ YES ON
8. As the conversation ended, I told Ky that democracy had taken a
ant it was that we hold the situation together now that success Is within
our grasp. I told Ky he would have to be patient in working towards his
19. I said I understood Ky's position, but I had to emphasis. how import-
U'. S. support.
we must keep our eye on the main threat, I said I could conceive a sit-
won in which disorders would reach a point where we couldn't assure,
but there was still a long way to go, night now the stakes are high and
strove to you particularly his concerns about the future and the political
struggle with the communists. Ky said he knew the people of North Viet
wA political goals.
20. Ky replied that he would never do anything which betrayed the sacra
f#ces of the South Vi tuam.eae and United States people. He asked that I
x were not hard-core communists and with a strong free bastion In the
South that someday the North could be liberated, But In the si*zort. Corm
South Vietnam mast ready Itself for the political struggle in Its own back
yard?
ra
CIV2v and everyone has their o P04, tica" position in
eye trained on hixxu He knew that whatever
course he chose it would affect the fture of the country. He said we
shouldn't be afraid that he would act without. the West consideration of
all. the factors L,nvolred. Ives, $ig Minh had told him that things were
Un to ~c,~_
Ky said bet t~e~lieved he was in the Est deli t i
r
22, 1 closed the conversation by saying J was confident Ky would act In
the best infests of his country.
, No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/03/05: LOC-HAK-503-5-2-5