GENERAL WHEELER'S VIEWS ON PHASE IV TROOP WITHDRAWALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-502-3-2-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 20, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

MEMORANDW ?
THE WHITE HOUSE
TOP.SECRET /SENSITIVE
JCS review
completed.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kis singer
if
March 20, 1970
SUBJECT: General Wheeler's Views on Phase IV. Troop Withdrawals
You will recall that during your meeting with General Wheeler on
March 11 you asked him to forward his views on whether or not he would
prefer an announcement in two increments or in one increment for the
Phase IV withdrawals from Vietnam (April 15 - August 15).
General Wheeler has furnished via the JCS liaison officer a, one-page,
unsigned summary of his views (Tab A). He makes the following points:
-- Favors a single announcement covering the entire period since
it would:
(a) provide greater flexibility as to-the selection of units
for withdrawal; .
(b) permit retention of key units late into the period;
(c) allow more orderly completion of logistics tasks
remaining from earlier deployments;
(d) facilitate sea transport for the redeployment of Marine
Corps units; and
(e) lessen confusion by spreading withdrawal planning
over more extended period.
-- Opposes further redeployments at this time unless there are
compelling political and budgetary considerations.
- Recommends holding in abeyance the Phase IV redeployment
pending another assessment over the next 90 days.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/1
~ 9 : LOC-HAK-502-3-2-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-502-3-2-8
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
I am in full agreement with the single announcement alternative. Concerning
the timing of the Phase IV withdrawal itself, General Wheeler's views are
consistent with those of General Haig=s following his assessment of the
situation on the ground in Vietnam. last month. For this reason, I am
preparing a more detailed separate analysis for you which outlines some
of the considerations and options which are available as we approach the
next withdrawal announcement. I will forward this memorandum to you
by Monday of next week. I am also forwarding by separate memorandum
an .analysis of the fund availability for the balance of FY 71 and the impact
of these funds on the conduct of our operations in' Vietnam.
. Attachment
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-502-3-2-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-502-3-2-8
? W W w
TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE
PHASE IV TROOP WITHDRAWALS
-Timing Alternatives-
1. Phase IV troop withdrawals could be initiated in
one of several ways:
a. A relatively small reduction during the period
15 April-15 June, followed by another relatively small
reduction during the period 15 June-15 August; or
b. A more sizeable reduction to be announced and
accomplished during the period 15 April-15 August.
2. The one-bite approach, with the phase extending
over a four-month period, is preferable to the two-bite
method since it would:
a. Provide. greater flexibility in the selection
of options for the withdrawal of critical combat forces.
b. Permit retention of key units late into the
period, and extend the time frame in which to accomplish
required tactical readjustments.
c. Enable the more orderly completion of logistic
tasks remaining on 15 April from earlier redeployments.
d. Facilitate the arrival of necessary fleet
shipping for the movement of Marine Corps units.
e. Avoid confusion in the midst of a transition
to a possible subsequent phase in the June time frame,
(particularly complex administrative/logistics readjustments
in I CTZ at that time).
3. Even though the one-bite approach is preferable to
the two-bite method, the over-all situation is such that
no further redeployment should be directed at this time unless
there are compelling political or budgetary considerations.
4. On balance, it would be preferable from a military
standpoint to hold in abeyance the Phase IV redeployment
pending another assessment of developments over the next
90 days.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-502-3-2-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-502-3-2-8
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE March 17, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KXSSINGER
FROM: Al Haig /S!
SUBJECT: Timing Alternatives for Phase IV Troop Withdrawals
During his meeting with the President following the DPRC meeting on
March 11, General Wheeler was instructed to submit his preference on
two timing alternatives for the Phase IV troop withdrawals from Vietnam.
Apparently the President asked his views on whether he would prefer two
small reductions: one during the period April 15 - June 15 to be followed
by another small reduction during June 15 - August 15, or a more sizeable
reduction for the entire period April 15 - August 15.
General Wheeler recommends the "one-bite approach" in an unsigned,
single page memorandum delivered today by Capt. Robinson (Tab A).
I agree fully with his logic and bring to your attention paragraphs 3 and
4 of this same document in which the Chairman qualifies his recommendation
by stating that the overall situation is such that no further redeployments
should be directed at this time, and specifically that from a military
standpoint the Phase IV redeployment should be held in abeyance pending
another assessment of developments over the next 90 days. As you know,
I am in agreement with the Chairman's views on this issue and believe
that this is about to become a major problem for Secretary Laird and
the President. -
In addition to this unsigned piece of paper, I am informed that General
Wheeler has just forwarded a memorandum to Secretary Laird with the
specific request that it be transmitted to the President. This memorandum
contains the views of General Abrams, who categorically cha11 ... ...
enges the
current method of funding the war in Vietnam, raises the issue of pre-
cipitous troop withdrawals and insists that he must be permitted to retain
the current levels of attack air and B-52 operations as well as delay on,
the 4th traunche. As I predicted upon my return from Vietnam, this was
bound to happen and I believe the President is going to be faced with a
major crisis within the next three weeks on this issue. It will be interesting
to see whether Secretary Laird forwards the Chairman's memorandum.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-502-3-2-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/19: LOC-HAK-502-3-2-8
TOP SECRET I-S E-1-4 SIT IV -E
At Tab B is a transmittal memorandum for your signature to the
President conveying General Wheeler's recommendation.
Attachments
AMH:feg:3 / 17 /70
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/19 : LOC-HAK-502-3-2-8