ONE ESTIMATE OF HANOI'S STRATEGY IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-5-3-22-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 28, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/26: LOC-HAK-5-3-22-8
1 Aril 28, 1':71
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
A the Office of National. a;atlrx-te has r
by MMlr. i ebvis. The paver diacusaes the fol..lo yin, topics:
t a>f Hanoi'-, st.rate y in Cam ia. The paper has not yet
,.')N
states that Caunba
following; reasons:
role in the war is vital to Hanoi for the
id not uge Ct mbodias for ane tuary, xs fitteration, and
ieaa, it would ha to re aeaees its ability to cantinee
cauth V ietnarn along present l,fne .
-i'.a.Aot'ss 4nmedi ate concert woutd be the lase of 9aanctu ry areas,
uiarly, opt? xMite ill Corps ankh IV Cor
- ~- not At so t:kee -lthe4 la.-;e areas, w)Ach 'provide the ioQncla,tion
$DF: x, V Ch re5t ;ornMuni: t ex aect; tic s of TPAintAiAixatg an effe; ct:iV
mii ta:ry/pta1itical apparatua in zczthera South Vietrxe.x ; while the U.
:r.
withcdr: wal proceeds. ' The outhern base areAs have grown rapidly in
the taut two years.
-The base structure also :mpporta infiltration, ba.asdlin an esti-
e xatedt 5, 1"r'? NVA personnel is 11461 (about 61 rcent of total h VA:
infiltration, that year).
-.. : er be Tai . has long been an inaptortant source of supply, mainly
rice. "#' eze euppties could probably be replac
is a"t" irnportant to ktaea.oi., enabling it
a: a to its forces in South V etuaan. An estimated , 130
JH.: ..:' :aih (4128/70)
-The port of Slhanoukvill
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/26: LOC-HAK-5-3-22-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/26: LOC-HAK-5-3-22-8
, + through is nOukval.te bet een C to er 1968
and January 1971, , ,Marunt&aag to about one heat of the _ aaxar`r:aunist supply
re :,,u.irerneats durixa , this period in ii Corp*, IU ;carps, and
I'RF r vet, the loss of Biala :vttt, sea : # not be critical go long as
rtand trails area *aOab e.
now makes the following ass-drapti*na'
there is little likelihood of renewed arms shipnieats through
ukvilte.
. S. will bomb the a a ct as riee n, b* s e 4. and touter-, a
s rset)? po sited. northeast Camb dia.
-,.Mo t seriously, Hanoi tears allied p
f effective control of the bases and the territory
them would be a setb*ck of critical proportions. It would have great
psychological impact as well as military impact, it rust app,
tive for Hanoi to hold the key bases b Cambodia and a s re their security.
--Hanoi probably a s a Uma s that the southern bases Mill be iiaasc rea $
inglyr subject to allied OntrOschments, ha"s.ssments, and tirxaaiteei air
attacks. Hanoi does not fear Carba lss sctieas aa;gain t these bases as
much as AaVN attacks. It will be determined to show its readiness to
try to hold
IlL Anticipates not Actions
lowing 4etlon-.
this assessment, ONE believe Hanoi
ke the fel>,
ri To establish Carsuminist controls along the border and tnrrtheer
a a depth consistent with military *do.
protect the bases against attacks, but not to drop them except
t of major allied efforts.
.,_U allied efforts are not sa*staained, to re..astabti h the bases
to change the entire character of the Cam bs dian sa actesrey with new
bases being develope in areas less acceasibte to the allies.
E RXT
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/26: LOC-HAK-5-3-22-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/26: LOC-HAK-5-3-22-8
4P V
t exclude the poosibiilty of a more a res6,sire c-aurae
such as move ,44tn.$t . bn aat Ponh, b tt to r ncerteia that X&Aoi
rs a3W want to tua ort .ke as*eh a risky and coutii'' campaign. 7he thrust
r +srrve
ks cons
.,f iipn. i.'s policy since mid- 1468 has bon to limit riss
resource to concentrate ssr* getting the I?I.
--it is at** s sibie that lei at will still try to make deal with
Io t Nti.
f V ectiviti* in Vieetnsar
but there Wight be t%teppee, tx s Actin
it capabilities *:rt not li eiy? t be ff ct+ and
t to draw our forces..
--It is unlikely that Hanoi will move toward
ur?rent evelo monts in C .mba i& will bring
ton-C, tuniot cause but, that over
''the zaee s st eventr*t. Cnnmr i. t c trro& spread
tsebere in the c*rrtntx yr.:.
trz wilt p.robebly co with the degradott*n
by see rg .uizing their supply lines, relac.*ti , th is
g thei
debilitating h e r
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/05/26: LOC-HAK-5-3-22-8