CABLE TO HENRY KISSINGER FROM ALEXANDER HAIG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 11, 1972
• Content Type: CABLE

CORRECTED COPY
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09
T 0 P S E C R E T/SENSITIVE 1114 &D*V117 W LJSIVELY EYES ONLY
VIA CAS (BUNKLN) CHANNtL
NOVEMBER 1 1., 1972
FOR: KISSINGER
FROM: HAIG
H,AGTO 009
CITE SAIGON 0263
SECTION 1 OF 2
FLASH
--/073
AMBASSADOR BUNKER AMD I HAVE JUST COMPLETED A THREE HOUR
AND FIFTEEN MINUTE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT THIEtJ WHO AGAIN
AMBUSHED US BY CONVENING THE ENTIRE NSC9 INCLUDING GENERAL VIED
+'t' ~T D BY HIS THREE AMBASSADORS. HE, IN EFFECT,-ANSWERED
EACH PARAGRAPH OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER POINT BY POINT AND IS
PROVIDING US LATER TONIGHT WITH A MORE GENERALIZED WRITTEN RESPONSE,
NOTING THAT HE RELIED' ON ME TO FILL IN THE DETAILS FOR THE PRESIDENT.
SUM' A;RY OF HIS POINT BY POINT RESPONSE IS AS FOLLOWS:
--'RE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER, THIEU
SAID PRESIDENT'S, ALLEGATIONS ARE NOT JUST BECAUSE OF ALL OF HIS ATTACKS
HAVE BEEN AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS AND NOT THE UNITED STATES. THE
FACT TEAT HE HAD TO ATTACK THE ISSUE OF THE TROOPS IN THE SOUTH AND
THE A,D'MI!'ISTRATIVE STRUCTURE WAS DICTATED BY HIS NEED TO PRESERVE
THE MORALE OF HIS PEOPLE AND HIS ARMY. IF HANOI HAD NOT DISCLOSED
THEIR VERSION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE AGREEMENT,, HE WOULD HAVE SAID
NOTHING. HE ASKED FGR PRESIDENT "S UNDERST DING
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
C''CS ~lt-j P~YabZ~Z
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
WASPWDING ON THIS ISSUE,
STATI t G THAT HE t4EVER INTENDED TO ATTACK THE UNITED STATES.
-- RE PARAGRAPH 2, HE EXPRESSED DEEP GRATITUDE FOR
EXPEDITED MASSIVE RESUPPLIES AND FOR OFFER TO MEET WITH THE
MEETING WOULD DEPEND ON THE SITUATION. HQWEVER, GDC ,1,3; CvdC6r*J1
E^'tISSPRIES, HE STATED THAT HE HAD TO DO THIS TO FULFILL HIS DUTIES
TO COUNTRIES WHO HAD SUPPORTED HIM AND TO EXPLAIN HIS POSITION.
CONCERNING WHAT THIEU DESCRIBED AS THE POLITICAL PROVISIONS OF
THE FRESIDENT"S LETTER, THIEU. MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
HE AGREED THAT. DELETION OF THE COMMUNIST EXPRESSION
"CXINH GUYER" SHOULD BE MADE AND EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WISHED
IT TO BE MADE CLEAR IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT THAT THE BODY IS AN
ADt INISTRATIVE ORGAN WHOSE PURPOSE IS TO OVERSEE THE ELECTIONS
AS STIPULATED IN THE `DRAFT AGREEMENT, THE CHARACTER ,OF THE ELECTIONS
IS TO BE DECIDED THROUGH CONSULTATION BETWEEN TWO PARTIES.
:;?IT'S. RESPECT TO THE' THREE EQUAL SEGMENTS, THIEU STATED THAT HE
ACCEPTS ONLY THE COUNCIL AND WISHES TO SEE THE DELETION OF THE THREE
EQUAL CO :PONENTS. HE, THEREFORE, IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE ADDITION OF
THE PHRASE "'APPOINTED EQUALLY BY BOTH SIDES"' BUT ONCE THIS ADDITION IS
TrTJ
I- STATES THERE Pty NO MORE REASON TO RETAIN ANY REFERENCE TO
MADE T3
THREE EQUAL COMPONENTS.
WITH RESPECT TO TROOPS IN THE SOUTH, THIEU STATED
THAT THIS IS A LIFE OR DEATH ISSUE HE AND HIS PEOPLE CONSIDER THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE,TROOPS AS FOREIGNERS AND AGGRESSORS. WHEN,
HANOI DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE FORCES SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED. THIEU WENT ON
AT GREAT LENGTH, INSISTING THAT THERE ARE STILL 300,000 NORTH
VIETNAMESE FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM WITH. THEM THERE, THERE
COULD BE NO EXPRESSION OF (THE) FREE WILL FROM (OF THE) PEOPLE WITH GUMS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
BEHIND THEIR BACKS. IF HANOI STATES THEY NEED TROOPS IN THE SOUTH
TO G ARANTEE THE ELECTIONS AND THE CEASEFIRE THEY ARE INCORRECT. THIS
IS NO- THEIR JOB BUT THAT OF THE. COMMISSIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFE'R.E~'CE
- THIEU ALSO INSISTED THAT THERE ARE FAR MORE THAN !50fq, 0
TO 15 `,'L,-" NORTH VIETNAMESE IN THE SOUTH. RATHER THERE ARE OVER
30012'", MANY OF WHOM HAVE BEEN INTEGRATED INTO THE VC OR BROKEN
DOWN +N70 Stt:ALL UNITS., AND ARE PRESENTLY LOCATED IN VILLAGES AND
HAMLETS. FE LISTED ENEMY STRENGTH AS 17 DIVISIONS, INCLUDING 94
REGI7`NTS ADD 554 BATTALIONS, NOT INCLUDING NUMEROUS NORTH VIETNAMESE
TROOPS It' VILLAGES AND HAMLETS. FE STATED THAT THE PROVISION FOR A
ONE--TO.ONE DEMOBILIZATION WOULD NEVER BE ABIDED BY AND THAT NORTH
VTETNA, ESE TROOPS WOULD HIDE IN THE VILLAGES AND SERVE AS CADRE WITH
T )4E-" 1;1C. THEREFORE, FE WAS ASKING PRESIDENT NIXON TO DEMAN-J THE WIT11-1-
DRAWAL OF FORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM WITHIN THE SAME
TI! E FRAME AS THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL.
REFERENCE THE DMZ, THIEU STATED HE WELCOMES
,THE EFFORT OF THE U.S. TO GET THE INCLUSION OF A CLAUSE I N CHAPTER V.
REFERENCE THE QUESTIONOF THE "THREE COUNTRIES," HE
STATED HE WELCOMES THE ADDITION OF THE PROPOSED PHRASE SINCE IT
WILE BE UNDERSTOOD BY ALL-TO MEAN THE FOUR STATES OF INDOCHINA.
-- WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER CHANGES REFERRED TO I N
T H'E PRESIDET`S LETTER AS TECHNICAL, THIEU MADE THE FOLLOWING
PROPOSITION: HE BELIEVES THESE CHANGES ARE INTERRELATED TO THE
MORE IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN THE REMAINDER OF THE
ACRE'"ENT AND THAT THE U#2 . AND GVN SHOULD WORK ON THEM BY
MEANS OF A JOINT TASK FORCE BEFORE YOUR NEXT MEETING, WITH THE
VIEW/ TOWARD UNIFYING THE U.S. AND GVN PODITIONS.
- I~? S'UM, WITH RESPECT TO THE CHANGES IN THE AGREEMENT,
THIEU STATED HE WELCOMED THE 'PRESIDENT `S EFFORTS TO PRESS FOR
CHANLE.
-- CONCERNING THE PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 2 OF THE PRESIDENT'S
LETTER W RICH STATED THIEU HAS TWO CHOICES, HE RESPONDED THAT HE WAS
NOT PURSUING THE COURSE WHICH WOULD PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY
NOR WAS HE SEEKING A MILITARY VICTORY. . HE INSISTS HE WISHES TO
COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. AND PRESIDENT NIXON AND RECOGNIZES THAT
THIS IS ESSENTIAL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIEU EMPHASIZED THAT HE
MUST DISAGREE WITH THE COMMUNISTS ON AN ISSUE THAT HE CONSIDERS
TO BE VITAL FOR THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM.
T.IE'U CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THERE ARE TWO MAIN POINTS. FIRST,
THE ISSUE OF THE COUNCIL AND, SECOND, THE ISSUE OF NORTH VIETNAM SE
TROOPS IN THE SOUTH. WITH RESPECT TO THE COUNCIL, HE AGREES THAT
THE
ME! v t SNIP CAN BE APPOINTED EQUALLY BY BOTH SIDES, THAT IT HAS
O GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS AND IS ONLY AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGAN' WHICH
is CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH THE ELECTIONS WHICH THEMSELVES ARE TO
BE DETERMINED BY THE" TWO PARTIES.
ON THE TROOPS IN THE SOUTH, THIEU
ASKS THAT PRESIDENT NIXON JOIN HIM IN DEMANDING THE WITHDRAWAL
OF THE TROOPS, EMPHASIZING THAT THIS IS A MINIMUM AND JUST DEMMAND.
THIEU CONCLUDED HIS FORMAL STATEMENT BY CRITICIZING THE COMPOSITION
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
W
OF THE ICCS, STATING THAT THERE ARE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE
CON'':UNIST AND TWO OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT COMPLETELY ON
THE SIDE OF THE GVN. HE SINGLED OUT INDONESIA AS BEING INTERNALLY
AN.TI--CO?MUNIST BUT EXTERNALLY INFLUENCED BY THE SOVIETS AND A
COUNTRY T,?HICH HAS RELATIONS WITH HANOI. CONCERNING THE
INTERN~ATION.-^..L CONFERENCE, THIEU STATED THAT ALL OF THE COUNTRIES
IN INDOCHINA AND SOUTHEAST. ASIA, AS WELL AS ASIA, SHOULD BE
INCLUDED. SPECIFICALLY, HE MENTIONED LAOS AND CAMBODIA., OPPOSED
FRANCE AND RECOMMENDED THE INCLUSION OF JAPAN.
CONCERNING THE DISPATCH OF A REPRESENTATIVE TO PARIS TO
WORK WITH YOU DURING THE NEXT MEETING, THIEU STATED THAT WE SHOULD
USE HIS PARIS DELEGATION AND AMBASSADOR LAM. HE STATE THAT
AMBASSADOR PHU*O^'G IN WASHINGTON CAN BE THE LINK BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND PARIS AND THAT NHA CAN SERVE AS A MESSENGER
BETWEEN SAIGON AND PARIS.
FINALLY, THIEU STATED THAT WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
SOUTH VIETNAr'ESE INTERPRETERS IN ASSESSING THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENTS.
HE STATED THAT THE CURRENT -TEXT USES A TERM TO DESCRIBE UNITED
STATES FORCES WHICH IS VERY DEROGATORY IN VIETNA4ESE.
AT THE CONCLUSION . OF HIS PRESENTATION, I STATED TO THIEU THAT
VMS NOW APPARENT THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE GVN HAVE
TW E?CFE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
'OR. ECTED COPY
TOP ST~~
1973 DEC 6 i p;i 8 57
T 0 P S E C R E T SENSITIVE 111453Z NOV 72 VIA CAS CHANNELS (BU ER).`
FINAL SECTION "OF '2
FROM: GENERAL HAIG SAIGON 0263 FLASH .
TO:: DR. KISSINGER, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
HA IG TO S
NOVEMBER 11, 1972
FUNDAMENTAL'DIFFERENCES ON THE ISSUE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS
IN THE SOUTH. I REVIEWED IN GREAT DETAIL ALL OF . THE CONSIDERATIONS
WHICH YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED SO OFTEN AND CONCLUDED WITH A VERY
STRONG STATEMENT TO.THE EFFECT THAT WITH A FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT
OF THIS KIND IT WAS NOW APPARENT THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULDLQAVE TO
CONSIDER ALTERNATE COURSES AS OUTLINED IN HIS LETTER. MORE
IMPORTANTLY, I STATED THAT IT WAS VERY OBV
OUS THAT THIEU - WOULD
SURFACE VERY QUIGNLYAS THE OBSTACLE TO WHAT MOST ANALYSTS.
CONSIDER A REASONABLE AGREEMENT. THIS BEING THE CASE 9 THE
ESSENTIALLY DEMOCRATIC SENATE CAN BE EXPECTED TO PROMPTLY CUT
OFF THE PROVISION OF FURTHER AID AND ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF SOUTH VIETNAM.
I POINTED OUT THAT HIS UNCOMPROMIZING AND UNCONDITIO JL
DEMAND FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
COULD NOT BUT HAVE THIS EFFECT, EVEN IF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WERE
INCLINED TO AGREE WITH THIS PRINCIPLE. THIEU AND HIS ASSOCIATES
WERE OBVIOUSLY SHAKEN BY MY RESPONSE, NOT SO MUCH BECAUSE THEY
ACCEPT THE ASSURANCES THAT WE HAD PROVIDED IN THE AGREEMENT FOR THE
MEANS TO REDUCE THE THREAT OF 'THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES BUT RATHER
BECAUSE THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR POSITION COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF
DEPRIVING THEM OF FURTHER U.S. SUPPORT. THIEU THEN SOFTENED HIS STANCE
CONSIDERABLY WITH RESPECT TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES, STATING THAT
HIS REAL PROBLEM WAS THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT TP AMBIGUOUS STATEMENT IN
THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WITH RESPECT TO THE ONE-FOR-ONE WITHDRAWAL.
IN A SOMEWHAT EMOTIONAL WAY, HE ASKED THAT WE GIVE HIM SOME
SPECIFIC CLARIFICATIO
Oil HE STATED HE MUST HAVE THE ANSWERS TO
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS-
1. IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WILL GO HOME, WHEN WILL THEY
DO THIS?
2. HOW WILL THEY GO HOME? AND HOW WILL WE VERIFY THAT THEY
HAVE DONE SO? AND HOW MANY DO THEY ADMIT ARE IN THE SOUTH?
3. WILL THEY TAKE THEIR WEAPONS WITH THEM OR BURY THEM TO USE
LATER?
THIEU THEN. SHIFTED TO TOUGHER ARGUMENTATION AND STRONGER
DEMANDS, BEING JOINED BYHTHE VICE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER
AND MR. DUC. THERE IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND HOWEVER THAT HE WAS
ATTEMPTING TO ARRIVE AT A COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE A. TOTAL
BREAK WITH US. WE THEN WENT ON AT GREAT LENGTH AND I ATTEMPTED
TO ACHIEVE ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS FROM HIM ON THE TROOP ISSUE. IN
THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED, THIEU STATED THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY
RELEASE ALL PRISONERS AS; SOON AS HIS HAD BEEN RELEASED, INCLUDING
THE POLITICAL PRISONERS'IF THEY WOULD GO NORTH, HE STATED THAT HE
HAD NO PROBLEMS WITH AN AGREEMENT THAT KEPT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE'
COMMUNIST FORCES IN .SOUTH'VIETNAM BUT COULD NEVER ACCEPT THE
PRINCIPLE. THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD THE RIGHT TO PERMANENTLY
STATION FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS IS PRECISELY
WHAT THE ADDITIONS DESCRIBED IN THE PRESIDENT'S .LETTER WERE DESIGNED
TO` PRECLUDE.. HE REPLIED THAT WE TN
N HAD SOMETHING TO WORK WITH
PROVIDING HE COULD HAVE THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS CITED ABOVE
AND PROVIDING THAT THERE WERE . PROVISIONS IN THE AGGSEMENT THAT WERE
CLEAR WITH RESPECT TO THESE OBLIGATIONS,. HE STATED THAT HE COULD NOT
ACCEPT SECRET UNDERSTANDINGS ON THIS. ISSUE. THE PRINCIPLE
MUST BE CLEARLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENTCM .
THE MEETING' DRAGGED ON WITH CONTINUAL EXCHANGES BY
MEMBERS OF THE NEC, SOME OF WHICH WERE EMOTIONAL AND IRRATIONAL
.AND WHICH ADDED NOTHING ONE WAY OR THE OTHER TO THE CENTRAL PROBLEM.
I PATIENTLY TRIED TO ANSWER EACH QUESTION WITH VARYING DEGREES OF
SUCCESS. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, I TOLD THIEU THAT WE
SHOULD NOWHHORK JOINTLY TO PREPARE FOR AN Ot1TCMVE WHICH COULD
BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE IN THE REAR FUTURE. HE' AGREED, STATING
THAT WE SHOULD WORK AT EVERY LEVEL, USING THE POINTS OF CONTACT
D T-rTa~ --
HE H
A
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5 _
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, THIEU STATED THAT HE
FELT THE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN VERY CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL TO
BOTH SIDES., I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS GOING TO PHNOM PENH TOMORROW
AND SEOUL ON MONDAY AND THAT WE WOULD BE IN CLOSE TOUCH AS SOON
AS I HAD CONVEYED HIS RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT NIXON.
IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE WE HAVE LARGELY OVERCOME ALL
OBSTACLES WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE TROOPS IN THE SOUTH. HOWEVER,
ON THIS SUBJECT, TH.IEU HAS MADE EVERY EFFORT TO PREVENT A COMPLETE
BREAK AND, IN MY VIEW, WOULD ACCEPT SOME REASONABLE TERMS
WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR. THEIR ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL UNDER CONDITIONS
WHICH OFFERED SOME MEANS FOR VERIFICATION. I RECOGNIZE
THAT IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET SUCH ASSURANCES FROM HANOI AND
THAT WE MAY, IN EFFECT, MEET AN UNACCEPTABLE IMPASSE. NEVERTHELESS,
THIEU SHOWED SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE FOR ME TO NOT PUSH
THE ISSUE ANY FARTHER AT THIS MEETING. IN MY VIEW, TO HAVE DONE SO
WOULD HAVE HARDENED HIS POSITION. AND CONFRONTED HIM WITH A TEST OF
MANHOOD IN FRONT OF HIS ADVISERS THAT HE COULD NOT HAVE GONE BACK FROM.
THE ISSUE IS NOW CLEARLY DRAWN. IF WE ARE TO BRING THIEU ALONG,
WE WILL HAVE TO ENLARGE SOMEWHAT ON THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO THE
ONE-FOR-ONE PHRASE BY THE ADDITION OF SOME KIND OF A TIME FRAME AND THE
PROVISION, OF SOME KIND OF SUPERVISION ALTHOUGH THIEU'S DEMANDS
WERE SOMEWHAT STIFFER 'THAN THIS. I BELIEVE WE COULD GET HIM ON
BOARD WITH THIS KIND OF A CHANGE. THIEU KNOWS I HAVE N WXUTHORITY
TO NEGOTIATE THIS AND, THEREFORE, I' SEE NO REASON TO DELAY ANY FURTHER.
THERE HAS BEEN THE MOST INTENSE PRESS INTEREST HERE AND SINCE
ALL EXPECT ME' TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY, I WILL PROCEED TO PHNOM PENH
DEPARTING SAIGON AT. 0900 SUNDAY MORNING AND FROM THERE PROCEED
TO SEOUL, ARRIVING LATE SUNDAY NIGHT, WITH THE VIEW TOWARD MEETING
WITH PARK ON MONDAY. THIS WILL ENABLE ME TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON
ON MONDAY AFTERNOON. PLEASE GIVE ME A DESIRED ARRIVAL TIME SO
.THAT I CAN ADJUST MY SCHEDULE ACCORDINGLY.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/17: LOC-HAK-490-9-12-5