SITUATION IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-490-3-31-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: March 19, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/02: LOC:FIAK--498:3-3.1T0
March 19, 1971
INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
THE PRESIDENT
HENRY A. KISSINGER
Situation in Laos
Attached is a report from General Haig of his meeting with President
Thieu. The meeting tended to confirm General Haig 's earlier assessment
of the battle situation, but some favorable modifications on a tentative
basis were made to plans previously outlined. President Thiel' indicated
that:
State Dept. & OSD
review completed pgs
3-5 only
-- he agreed to a suggestion by General Abrams that he consider
conducting a raid operation in Musing Noes (see attached map)
prier to the departure of ARVN units from Laos. This would
be similar to the attack executed against Tchepene and woad
ievolve heavy air preparation foliovred by a helicopter assault
with troops staying an the ground for about 3 or 4 days. This
would tend to terminate the operation in Laos on a positive note;
he anticipates his troops will be in Laos until 5 to II April.
General Haig cautions that pressure from local commaaders
may cause an earlier departure;
? he would also like to attack the southeast tip of Base Area 611
but only after his troops had left Laos and had experienced a
period of rest. General Haig doss not believe that this
possible operation should be toasidersd a part of the Lam Son
719 political package;
hie troops would not leave western South Vietnam but would
renweia in the Kb. Sash area for 3 or 4 weeks after hie forces
left Laos, to keep the enemy under threat and to avoid the
infereece that they had been driven out of the area. General
Abrams confirmed that the US 5th Mechanised Brigade would
also remain in Khe Sash through April.
[MORI C05076855, pgs 3-5.1
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
HAK:371-1:ms: 3 / 19/ 71
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/02 : LOC-HAK-490-3-31-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-3-31-0
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY -2-
Presi4ant
reseed regret for the wed to modify plans and
oxplained that two factors had made changas mandatory:
The nnexpectod strength of the enemy which excaedad all
axpectatiena.
The heavy casualties axperienced by his troops.
President Thies stated he had not expacted such sowers contacts and
that he had reinforced with his entire strategic reserve as well as
with cavalry elements from II Corps.
General Haig observed that President Thies is very sensitive about
the casualties suffered by the airborne and probably fools that this
snit as well as ths mambos have received loss than manhandled
treat:neat as guests in I Corp..
Attachment
TOP SECRETJSENSITIVE/ExCLUSIVELT EYES ONLY
111111111
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/02 : LOC-HAK-490-3-31-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-3-31-0
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE 191515Z MAR 71
FROM: General Haig, MACY, Saigon 641
TO: The White House, Exclusively Eyes Only Dr. Kissinger
Accompanied Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams during extended
meeting with President Thieu. Discussion tended to confirm my
message earlier today although we were able to obtain some favorable
modifications on a tentative basis to Plan 1 outlined previously.
During meeting I stressed to President Thieu difficulties which changes
in plans caused in Washington. lie replied that he too regretted need
to modify plans but that two factors had arisen to make changes
mandatory:
1) The unexpected strength of the enemy which exceeded all
expectations ? Thieu stated his intelligence had predicted heavy
AAA, difficult terrain and marginal weather but that none foresaw the
degree to which the enemy would reinforce his defenses.
25X1
2) The heavy casualties experienced by his troops ? Thieu
stated he had not expected such severe contacts and that he had
reinforced with his entire strategic reserve as well as with cavalry
elements from II Corps. He pointed out that he would not in the future
commit his general reserve to corps operations except to overcome
emergency situations which might develop or to put out critical fires
in Cambodia. Comment: It is apparent that Thieu is very sensitive
about casualties suffered by airborne and probably feels this unit as well as
marines have received less than even-handed treatment as guests in
I Corps.
Thieu agreed to suggestion by General Abrams that he consider
conducting a raid operation in Maang Nong prior to the departure of
ARVN units from Laos and of the type executed in Tchepone. The
operation would involve heavy B-52 preparation followed by tacair
and gunships and finally helicopter assault. Troops would stay on
ground destroying supplies and material for about three or four days,
thus ending operation on psychological upswing. We urged Thieu to
insure that is done so that operation in Laos can terminate with positive
thrust.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-3-31-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-3-31-0
TOP SECRET/SE ITIVE/EYES ONLY
Thieu went on to say that he anticipates that his troops will be in
Laos until 5-8 April. Comment: I believe General Lam will try
to shorten this period however events may intervene. I told Thieu
that in my view retrograde must be conducted in an orderly, pro-
fessional manner making full utilization of our firepower. We
must however, be prepared for earlier departure since local
commanders may move more quickly than either President Thieu or
General Abrams would prefer.
Thieu stated he would also like to attack southeast tip of Base Area 611
but only after his troops had left Laos and had experienced some rest
and refitting. He pointed out that this operation could be conducted later
this spring without public fanfare similar to other border operations in
Laos. He stated that he would inform General Abrams of the support
he felt might be needed from the US at later date. Comments This
confirmed my earlier speculation on the 611 phaee of the operation.
President Thieu may ultimately do it but I would not consider it any
longer to be a part of the Lam Son 719 political package.
Thieu stated he would not leave western South Vietnam after his troops
Left Laos in early April but rather would remain in Kb. Sas* area to
keep enemy under threat and to avoid inference that he had been driven
out of area. He stated he would welcome an enemy attack on Kb. Sanh
where the battle would be. taught on our terms and would be costly to the
enemy. He asked General Abrsuas whether the U.S. 5th Mechanized
Brigade would remain in Kb. Sanh through April. General Abrams
confirmed that it would. President Thieu stated he believed Ithe Sanh
would assume a political significance after his forces left Laos and that
we should therefore remain there for three or four weeks. Comment:
I agree with this assessment.
Contrary to comment in my earlier message, President Thieu then stated
he would leave airborne in coastal areas of I Corps after they are
withdrawn so that they will not return to the city with gloomy tales of
the battle.
President Thieu stated people of South Vietnam are pleased with
Lam Son 719. They know that although the battles have been costly,
they are bringing trouble to the enemy and no waiting for the battles
in their own provinces. He insisted that he will have no problems
about the "victory" in South Vietnam. Comments I noted from your
cable to Ambassador Bunker that President is planning on Monday press
conference. U you feel this is necessary, he should be aware of possible
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/02 : LOC-HAK-490-3-31-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-490-3-31-0
TOP SECRET/SENSIT1VE/EYES ONLY
future difficulties and limit his comments to what has been accomplished
thus far. He should not repeat not comment on duration of the operation
other than to reiterate Thieu's original statement that it would be
limited in space and duration. I will compile as complete a list of
accomplishments as is available here and cable them to you tomorrow.
In any event, I do not feel we need to be in the least defensitffe about
Lam Son 719. It has achieved most of what we had hoped for and those
involved here all are confident that it was well worth the price of
admission - albeit a high one.
Beet regards.
TOP SECRET/SENSITWE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/10/02 : LOC-HAK-490-3-31-0