INSTRUCTIONS FOR SALT TALKS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-488-6-4-0
Release Decision:
RIFLIM
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
December 19, 2012
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 3, 1973
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
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? No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-488-6-4-0
r -t-A-& F I
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASI INGTON. D.C. 2050G
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
TOP SECRET /SE1*,1S1TIVE
May 3, 1973
National Security Decision Memorandum 213
TO:
The Secretary' of State
The Acting Secretary of Defense
The Acting Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Chairman, U. S. SALT Delegation
SUBJECT: Instructions for SALT Talks
The President has approved the following instructions for the U.S.
Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks beginning on
May 4, 1973 in Geneva.
L The overall U_ S. objective ronti_mir-.c to he- a nerrnanent
agreement limiting strategic offensive arms which provides a high
degree of equivalency in cents -t1 strategic systems ICBMs, SLBMs
and heavy bombers.
2. The U. S. Delegation should emphasize again that such a
permanent agreement must incorporate equal aggregate limits on the
number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. The Delegation should
take the position that the U. S. would be prepared to accept an equal
level for both sides of 2, 350. There would be appropriate provisions
to permit the substitution of SLBMs and heavy bombers for ICBMs and
for each other. In this context the United States would be prepared to
consider:
a. qualitative limitations on strategic offensive ballistic missile
0
forces;
b. prohibiting the development, testing and deployment of air-
to-surface missiles with a maximum range greater than 3, 000 kilometers;
co measures to assure that the agreement would not be circumvented
through deployment of non-central systems;
TOP . Classified by Henry A. Kissinger
S
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19 : LOC-HAK-488-6-4-0 Schedule
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-488-6-4-0
?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
deployment of:
d. the Soviet proposal to ban the development, testing and
cruise missiles of intercontinental range;
strategic ballistic missiles on water-borne vehicles
other than submarines;
strategic ballistic missiles on airborne platforms;
fixed or mobile devices for launching ballistic missiles,
which could be emplaced on the seabed or ocean floor
or in the subsoil thereof, including the territorial sea
and internal waters;
es a program for achieving a reduced level of strategic forces.
3. At a meeting subsequent to outlining this position on a
permanent agreement, the U. S. Delegation should state that the
United States is prepared to move ahead promptly to conclude a
provisional agreement freezing ICBM MIRVs to accompany the Interim
Agreement. This provisional agreement would prohibit the development,
testing, production, and deployment of new and modified IvMIRV/MRV
systems for ICBMs. Deployment of other ICBM MIRV/MRV systems
would be limited to those operational and under conversion as of
July 1, 1973, and confidence testing of such ICBM MIRV/MRV systems
would be permitted.
In presenting this proposal, the U. S. Delegation should emphasize the
importance of controlling MIRVs on ICBMs promptly in order to preserve
the survivability of deterrent forces, enhance strategic stability and
reduce the risk of nuclear var. The provisional agreement on MIRVs
would remain in force until supplanted by a permanent agreement. In
this connection the Delegation should make clear that the provisions of
a permanent agreement regarding MIRV could be modified to reflect
the degree of permanent equivalence achieved in the overall levels of
strategic forces.
4. In elaborating on this, proposal, the U. S. Delegation should
present the following basic provisions and collateral constraints:
. No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-488-6-4-0 `
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-488-6-4-0
?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
?m The development, flight testing, production and deployment
of new or modified ICBM MRV/MIRV systems (either dispensing
mechanisms or RVs) is prohibited. . New ICBM MRV/MIRV systems
are defined as those ICBM MRV/MIRV systems which had not been
flight tested as of January 1, 1973.
.... The deployment of other ICBM MIRV/MRV systems is
limited to numbers operational or under construction/ conversion
as of July 1, 1973.
The flight testing of ICBM MRV/MIRVs is limited to
confidence testing of the MRV/MIRV systems currently deployed
and only in association with missiles with which they have been flight
tested previously. I '
?.. The development, flight testing, production and deployment
of endoatmospheric penetration aids and new or modified dispensing
mechanisms for exoatinospheric decoys is prohibited.
w.. The development, flight testing, production :end dpni.oyment
of maneuvering re??entry vehicles for ICBMs is prohibited.
5. On the question of restraint, the U.S. should put forth the
view that restraints should support specific agreements limiting
strategic offensive arms, and should be aimed at developments which
threaten the survivability of the deterrent forces of the other side. It
is not possible to deal with the restraints question in specific terms
until the terms of a possible concrete agreement become clear.
6. On the question of throw weight, the Delegation should take the
position that in the context of adequate controls on MIRV a ceiling on
further increases in ICBM throw weight would be acceptable. (Such a
proposal would be pursued in the context of paragraph 2a,above).
The President has asked me to emphasize once again the ins, ortance
of avoiding leaks on this subject.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Qentral Intelligence
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19 : LOC-HAK-488-6-4-0