VIETNAM AD HOC WORKING GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 8, 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-488-19-9-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 14, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-9-1
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MEMORANDUM
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
September 14, 1970
SUBJECT: Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting, September 8, 1970
Ambassador Sullivan began by referring to the proposed visit to the U. S.
by Vice President Ky. Sullivan had wanted to let the South Vietnamese
themselves take the responsibility for deterring Ky, but Thieu's adviser
had come in with a request for the U. S. to get out in front and Bunker
had endorsed this request. Bui Diem was of the opinion that Ky now would
go to Paris and stay there until early October, or after the McIntire rally,
and then transit the U. S. This would be a face-saving way for Ky to get
out of the situation. Sullivan said that he would draft a cable to Saigon
saying that we did not understand why the U. S. should get into the business
of turning Ky off.
Concerning what Ky might do if he visited the U. S. Sullivan surmised that
it would be possible for Ky to visit centers in the U. S. where South Vietnamese
Air Force personnel were receiving training; he might also go to the Air Force
Academy. According to General Dunn, it might be possible for the Vice
President to meet Ky at the airport (which hopefully would be Dulles -- far
enough out of town to avoid demonstrations).
Sullivan mentioned the statement by a Cambodian spokesman to the effect
that Sihanouk had made a broadcast from Peking admitting the presence of
North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia.
Sullivan brought up the subject of a reported Cambodian peace initiative,
that something along this line was being contemplated
by senior Cambodian officials. This report had spoken of the Cambodians
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having received a letter from a "senior foreign official" on what might
be done by them diplomatically to get in touch with North Vietnamese
representatives. Even though they had evidently seen little prospect
of success, they had charged Sonn Sann with conducting diplomatic initiatives
in Europe. Sonn Sann had already called on Habib concerning this subject,
as Habib had reported b tele hone.
Sullivan stated that Secretary Laird continued to be interested in getting
GVN to release 500 more sick and wounded NVA prisoners, though it seemed
unlikely that there were this many presently in GVN hands.. Secretary Laird
had also said that both Ambassador Bunker and President Thieu had given
him a commitment that large numbers of NVA prisoners would be released,
but Sullivan knew of no such commitment. General Karhohs agreed. He had
been present when Secretary Laird had discussed this matter with Ambassador
Bunker, and felt that Bunker had been very noncommittal about further POW
releases. He doubted. also that Thieu would have given any commitment.
Sullivan remarked that GVN Foreign Minister Lam had come up with a plan for
reconvening the Djakarta Conference in an effort to get world opinion focussed
again on the Communist presence in Cambodia. This matter was discussed
at length by the group, and a consensus emerged that while a reconvening
of the Djakarta Conference might not be a bad idea, it would be inadviseable
for the GVN to take the initiative.
Sullivan asked Carver about the prospects for the GVN Senate's passage of
the Program Law. Carver replied that the Saigon station felt there was no
early prospect of passage. The problem was that Thieu would argue against
submitting it to the present lame-duck Senate but that the new Senate would
not come in until October 15 and might not get around to considering the
Program Law until sometime later. All agreed that this was regrettable..
Sullivan thought that it would then be necessary for us to urge Thieu to take
action by decree. He would talk to the White House about this. This was
some reprieve in time in that the U. S. AID bill would not be coming up
before Congress until after the elections. One alternative to action by
decree on Thieu's part would be for us to take the GI payroll to the open
market and take bids on piasters to be paid for dollars. This would be very
drastic, however.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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Sullivan noted that there had been a broadcast by South Vietnam Liberation
Radio on August 30 reviewing the 19-month history of the negotiations. He
had been intrigued at the discussion of the overall PRG solution, which made
a distinction between problems involving "ourselves and the enemy, " which
had to be settled now, and "ourselves and the people, " which could be settled
later. The withdrawal of U. S. troops was put in the first category, leading
Sullivan to wonder if the PRG was becoming more flexible on a political
solution. The implication was that a political solution might not be tied to
the U. S. troop withdrawal.
General Karhohs informed the group that Admiral Moorer would be visiting
Southeast Asia between September 29 and 30, and would be visiting all four
Corps in South Vietnam and going to Bangkok and Phnom Penh as well.
General Karhohs would be accompanying Admiral Moorer.
General Karhohs reported that with the closing down of USAF operations from
Chu Lai and Tuy Hoa Air Force bases, the bases would still be operated
under U. S. control. Transport squadrons would continue to use them, and
also U. S. Army activities would also be conducted from them.
General Karhohs also reported that an economist was being assigned to the
MACV staff. The only problem was that there were very few senior officers
in the armed forces who possessed economic training, while those with
economic training were presumably too junior to carry enough weight.
Mr. Nooter called attention to the fact that the Washington Post had printed
an article from AID replying to the Manciewicz and Braden article. He also
noted that questions were beginning to come in from the field on implication
of the NSDM on economic assistance to Vietnam. He assumed that these
questions could be dealt with without undue difficulty.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-9-1