VIETNAM AD HOC WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 15, 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-488-19-11-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 18, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-11-8
MEMORANDUM
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
September 18, 1970
USAID review completed
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-11-8
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES
SUBJECT: Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group, September 15, 1970
'Sullivan noted that we hadn't seen anything from Saigon about the GVN
Senate convening this week on the Program Law. Nooter said that his
information was that the Senate would meet next week. Sullivan declared
that he would have a message sent to Mr. Shultz and Mr. Ehrlichman-
on this issue before they went to Saigon to inform them of the status of
.the Program Law.
Sullivan, referred to a "passionate" memorandum from Secretary Laird
on the need to go to Congress promptly for supplementals. He pointed
to the fact that in this memorandum there was a recommendation for an
additional $100 million in economic aid for Vietnam presumably for FY 71.
This was contrary to the NSDM on economic support for Vietnamization, and
was also not needed, particularly if the GVN's reform package went through.
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-11-8
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE 2
Sullivan referred to the NSSM-99 study, which in Strategy 3 called for
ARVN intervention in Cambodia if necessary. He felt that Thieu would
be reluctant to open a large-scale ARVN military campaign in Cambodia,
and would keep a close watch on the situation there.
Sullivan asked Carver if anything new had come up on the number of groups
in the infiltration pipeline. Carver stated that there were four groups on the
way, but that we had to be careful of our assessment of strengths and
destinations
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J No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03 : LOC-HAK-488-19-11-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-11-8
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
Nooter said that the Japanese loan of $4. 5 million to the Saigon Power
Company had opened the whole question of loans to the GVN, which could
constitute a new field of assistance. AID was drafting a cable giving guidance
to the field on this. AID was reluctantly going along with the Japanese terms
for the loans after having been assured by those who knew the Japanese that
this was about the best deal which could be expected. Nooter also said that
the Vietnamese had agreed orally to increase the required bank deposit rate
for CIP imports from 30 percent to 100 percent, and for non-CIP imports
up to 300 percent. This move would be very important in holding down the
rate of inflation.
Carver brought up the functioning of the NSC PSYOPS Committee. I-le
personally was very upset over the way this committee had been functioning,
or more properly not functioning. It seemed to have bogged down in a
whole range- of minor operating details and was failing to focus on the policy
decisions needed for conducting a PSYOPS program. General Smith agreed,
and produced a folder containing a series of questions which had been considered
but on which no decision had been made. I noted Mr. Smyser had much the
same impression about the PSYOPS Committee. The representation had
become very low-level, with the result that every item requiring decision
needed to be referred back to principals. This had not been the intention
when the Committee was set up; the original concept was to keep the member-
ship at a high-level so that decisions could, in fact, be made. Sullivan said
he would speak to Henry Loomis on this matter, and attempt to move the
PSYOPS Committee along toward producing decisions.
Captain Scott concluded the meeting by giving the group a rundown of a meeting
which Ross Perot had with the Chiefs. Perot had been very impressive in his
presentation and had come through as a fairly altruistic and motivated man.
Many of his suggestions had seemed realistic and practical for handling the
POW issue. Defense was considering them. (Note: Up until recently Defense
has been Juke-warm toward Perot, and this marks a real change.)
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-11-8