VIETNAM AD HOC WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 11, 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-488-19-10-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 17, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOOT C1 CIWT t EW,4TIVE
INFORMATION
September 17, 1970
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
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SUBJECT: Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group, September 11, 1970
Sullivan stated that the big news of the day was that the Program Law was
apparently about to be sent to the GVN Senate. There had been two conflicting
versions of this information, though, and Sullivan felt that he should go back
with a cable to Saigon saying we were delighted to have the information but
would remain skeptical until we actually saw the event happen. Sullivan
thought, too, that it would be a good idea for the "Executive Branch" to
pin this one down. If the news was correct, he hoped that the Law could be
enacted by the time Mr. Shultz and Mr. Ehrlichman got there so that it would
not appear they were making the visit to put the pistol to anyone's head.
Sullivan reported the gist of a briefing session which he had had with
Mr. Shultz, who had been unaware of the problem of where the money is
to come from for Vietnam in FY 72.
Sullivan wanted AID to do a paper on the current
economic package for Mr. Shultz, covering the Program Law, and outlining
the financial dilemma which we face for FY 72.
Sullivan noted that in economic aid to Vietnam, the Australians had undertaken
to increase their military and economic assistance by $30 million over the
next three years. Sullivan had asked the Country Director for Australia
and New Zealand to draft a cable of appreciation from Secretary Rogers to
Minister of External Affairs McMahon and also to draft a memorandum from
the Secretary to the President. 25x1
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-10-9
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE 2
Sullivan said that Foreign Minister Lam wanted to come to Washington
from the UN General Assembly in New York. Sullivan had suggested a
delay of one week to accord with the Secretary's own schedule. Mean-
while, Tran Van Don would be here the same week. State would give Don
a lunch, and. he would also see Nutter in Defense on September 23. He had*
no real mission here.
On the Ky visit to the U.S., Sullivan reported he had sent a message telling
the Embassy not to try to influence Ky. Bui Diem was still of the opinion
that Ky would not come for the McIntyre rally, but would pay a visit later
on.
Sullivan remaiLked that we might wish to renegotiate the overseas allowances
which we were paying the ROK troops. Ambassador Brown had agreed, and
State would go ahead and look into this matter, clearing it with Brown. / 25x1
Sullivan mentioned that Habib had reported that in his judgment there had been
"wistful anxiety" on Xuan Thuy's part at the last Paris meeting concerning
Bruce's presentation. Xuan Thuy had apparently expected Bruce to rush into
private meetings, but Bruce had not done so. Xuan Thuy thus appeared rather
disturbed.
Sullivan and Carver referred to the fact that there were no new infiltration
groups on the trail despite a report as of September 6 that one group a day
was about to enter the pipeline. If this had happened, we would have had
reports .
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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General Karhohs brought up Phase V redeployment in Vietnam, saying that
Secretary Laird had been upset over a request from the NSC asking him to
go over again the grounds for his approval of the withdrawal rates before and
after Tet 1971. He said he could bring this subject up, since he was aware
that Secretary Laird had talked to Dr. Kissinger about this -- he had been
present during the telephone conversation. In any event, the response was
due back to the NSC on September 11. Continuing on this subject, he stated
that we were "up to speed" on the withdrawal of 50, 000 troops by October 15,
but that the real issue would come with the next increment. The Secretary
had downgraded the risk of a rapid withdrawal prior to Tet, despite the fact
that the JCS had been upset. He went on to say that the Army had worldwide
manpower problems and wanted withdrawal to proceed at a rapid rate. In
Secretary Laird's opinion, if the infiltration of the NVA forces was not stepped
up, this could be safely done.
General Karhohs informed the group that General Peers was pushing for
some kind of a medal for General Lu Lan, outgoing CO of MR II. General
Abrams was opposed to decorating General Lu Lan not so much over the
fact that Lu Lan was corrupt but strictly on the grounds of his military
inefficiency.
Sullivan mentioned that Habib had both telephoned and cabled concerning his
meeting with Sonn Sann on a possible Cambodian diplomatic peace initiative.
Sonn Sann had appeared to be concerned over the possibility that a cease-
fire could take place in Vietnam and Laos but not in Cambodia. Habib had
not said anything in particular to Sonn Sann, and Sullivan was not planning
on going back to Habib with any further instructions. We would simply
stand fast.
Sullivan and General Smith touched upon the problem of the redeployment of
A- I s from Thailand, saying that a telegram was going out on this which would
ask Unger and Godley for their opinions. I reminded them both of the strong
White House interest in this issue.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/04/03: LOC-HAK-488-19-10-9