CABLE TO HENRY A. KISSINGER FROM GERARD SMITH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-486-10-54-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: August 27, 1971
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/20: LOC-HAK-486-10-54-2
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TO THE WHITE .HOUSE
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TO THE WHITE HOUSE EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY DR. HENRY A.. KISSINGER
-T-9 P 6 E G R F T -SENSITIVE 2715,552 AUG 71
NR CA AMB. SMITH SALT HELSINKI 0198
DEAR HE Nt Y
NO1 THAT SOVIETS HAVE i',ADE I hEIR ANTICIPATED MOVE TO TWO
SITES FOR EACH SIDE, THE QUESTION AS ,I SEE IT IS WHETHER THE US
SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR TWO SITES. IN EFFECT o THE SOVIETS ARE
SAYING THE PRICE FOR MALMSTROM IS LENINGRAD C OMSK.
THE SOVIETS SHOW NU Iii'EREST IN A DEAL ALLOWING THE US
MORE SITES OR MORE MISSILES a HAN 'I HE USSR.
I SHARE THE BELIEF. OF THOSE MILITARY EXPERTS WHO HOLD THAT
FROM A MILITARY ,STRATEGIC STANDPOINT THERE IS LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
YOU ON MONDAY.
SEE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN STICKING TO oUR PRESENT POSITIONS FOR SEVERAL
WEEKS, TRYING TO GET SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON RADAR QUESTIONS AND
ADJOURNING ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF, SEPTEMBER WITH A BRACKETED, BUT
COMPLETE, ABN1 TEXT AS THE PRODUCT OF THIS SESSION. SUCH AN
OUTCOME LIKELY WOULD MEAN NO PROGRESS HERE UN ::FFENSIVE FREEZE
D, FINIT ON
4r- UT I ' THE PRE.SIDENT WANTS MORE MOVEMENT ON THE ABM
LEVEL QUESTION HERE AND, IS DISPOSED TO ADJUST OUR POSITION, I
RECOMMEND THE FCLLOWING:
EACH SIDE TO HAVE ONE SITE WITH 100 LAUNCHER /INTERCEPTORS ANY
PLACE IN ITS COUNTRY; AND SUBJECT TO, CONDITIONS TO BE WORKED OUT IN
THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHANGE THE
LOCAT ION OF SUCH SITE. RADAR. WOULD BE AS WE PROPOSED FOR NCA.
THE RATIONALE FOR THIS PROPOSAL IS THAT SINCE IN THE SUBSEQUENT
NEGOTIATIONS WE ARE TO NEGOTIATE FOR AN AEM BAN, THE INITIAL AGREEMENT
SHOULD IN EFFECT 8E AS CLOSE TO AN ABM FREEZE AS IS PRACTICAL. THUS,
EACH SIDE COULD FINISH CONSTRUCTION ON THE ONE SITE IT IS NOW
WORKING ON.
IF -'t HE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATION FOR A BAN FAILS, THE US MAY IN
THE FUTURE WANT A NATIONAL. COMMAND AUTHORITY DEFENSE (EVEN CONGRESS
MAY COME TO SEE THE ADVANTAGES OF NCA OVER A SINGLE SITE IN AN
ICBM FIELD) ?
THIS PROPOSIT ION, WHICH SHOULD PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO
USSR WOULD. KEEP. US,OPT,IONS OPEN .F( s 1) A MINIMAL START ON
ICBM DEFENSE, 2-) AN NCA DEFENSE; OR, S) A TOTAL BAN.
I HAVE ASKED HAROLD BROWN TO RAISE THIS MATTER WITH
ONE AND TWO SAFEGUARD SITES.
I GATHER FRCP THE NEGATIVE PREGNANT OF NSDM-117, "FALLBACK
FROM TWO SITES AND 200 INTERCEPTORS IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNLESS APPROVED
BY THE PRESIDENT", THAT A LNE-SITE DEAL IS NOT RULED OUT.
HOWEVER, THE PROSPECT OF NEGO`1IATING A ONE-FOR-ONE ABM
AGREEMENT WHICH WILL BE LABELLED AS GRAND FORKS IN EXCHANGE FOR
MOSCOW WILL DRAW CRITICISM FROM SOME MILITARY AND POLITICAL QUARTERS.
BUT THERE IS A WAY TW IMPROVE A "ONE-FOR-ONE" DEAL.
IF IT SQUARES WITH PRESIDENT'S TIMING CONSIDERATIONS, I
WARM REGARDS.
CRY 4 IT H
500-
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/20 : LOC-HAK-486-10-54-2