INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SALT TALKS IN GENEVA, JULY 2, 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-485-3-1-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 12/12/ 9 : LOC-HAK-485-3-1-9
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20546
National Secur Decision Memorandum
TO: The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, U. S. SALT Delegation
SUBJECT: Instructions for the SALT Talks in Geneva, July 2, 1975
The President has approved the following instructions for the Strategic
Delegation should indicate willingness to consider the Soviet proposal
to ban the development, testing, and deployment of systems for placing
nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction into
earth orbit if the provision is broadened to include present and future
fractional orbit bombardment- systems (FOBS). Prior to discussing
treaty language for dealing with this system, alternatives to the Soviet
language should be submitted to Washington for approval.
2. With respect to the effective date of the 2,400 aggregate limitation,
while it is the US view that both sides should be at this level by
October 3, 1977, the US is prepared to consider a reasonable proposal.
(a few months) from the Soviet side as to what mutually agreed period
of time after that date might be required in order to attain that level.
The agreed period of time should reflect an expedited program of
dismantling and destruction of those. strategic delivery vehicles in
excess of 2,400.
3. In connection with discussion of the effective date of the 2,400
aggregate limitation, the Delegation should note that the US believes
the other obligations in the agreement, which are not inconsistent with
the Interim, Agreement, should become effective upon entry into force
(i. e. , exchange of instruments of ratification) of the new agreement.
1. At an appropriate time, and in a manner of its choosing, the
instructions supplement those contained in NSDM 285.
Arms Limitation Talks beginning on July 2, 1975 in Geneva. These
XGDS
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4. On the question of impeding verification by national technical
means contained in Article XVII of the joint Draft Text, paragraph 3
should be reworded as follows:
to avoid measures or practices which result in unintended
interference with national technical means of verification
conversion, or overhaul practices. The parties undertake
Each Party undertakes not to use any measure or
practice, including measures and practices associated
with testing and development, which deliberately impedes
verification by national technical means of compliance
with the provisions of this agreement. This obligation
shall not require changes in current construction, assembly,
of the other party.
5. The following language should be substituted for the current US
version of Article XVI of the Joint Draft Text:
and resolution of this issue is left to the Delegation.
b. Article II: The phrase "capable of ranges" should be substi-
tuted for '.'with a range" in the US definition of ICBMs, ASBMs, and
limiting strategic offensive arms to become effective upon
,
such expiration.
in advance. of the expiration of this Agreement, on an agreement
of strategic arms at the earliest possible date. The Parties
shall also have the objective of concluding negotiations, well
one year following entry into force of this agreement, with
the objective of achieving further limitations and reductions
"The Parties undertake to. continue active negotiations
for limitations on strategic arms, beginning no later than
6. The Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that the unbracketed
portions of the JDT are acceptable to the US Government with the
exception of Article VII and paragraph 3 of Article XVII which should
be modified as described above. Concerning some issues contained
within the bracketed portions of the JDT:
a. Preamble: Either bracketed formulation would be acceptable
any subsequent definitions based on range.
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provided the negotiating record reflects the understanding of both
sides that "" is defined as the total internal distance from the
top to the bottom of an ICBM silo launcher. In connection with
discussion of this Article, if the Soviet side continues to reject the
c. Article IV : The term "depth" may be used in place of "length"
US formula stet forth in the JDT the Delegation should explore alterna-
f- *WV
ienryA issinger
cc: The Chairman, joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/19: LOC-HAK-485-3-1-9