YOUR MEETING WITH SECRETARY ROGERS TUESDAY, MAY 25, 1971, 9:30 A.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-478-3-4-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 25, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/18: LOC-HAK-478-3-4-4
MEMUKANDUM t
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
SUBJECT:
. Your Meeting with Secretary Rogers
Tuesday, May 25, 19'V+ 9:30 a. m.
In addition to the China issue and the Bunker cable you should be
prepared to discuss with Rogers the following:
-- He may want to know why we have held up the British computer
issue. You should tell him that the President just wanted to rec ec
status of it and that it is now cleared to proceed in accordance with the
President's original decision.
-- He will ask you why we have not cleared instructions on the
MBFR. The package is on the left flap. Rogers' approach is generally
co tent with the guidance which you sent to State last Friday. In the
package is a memorandum telling him that the message is approved
although it should be made totally consistent with the President's guidance
memo. There are no substantive differences that are worth a hassle on
this issue.
~- You may wish to rai se with him the French transistor issue.
Halls memo is at Tab E. The simple problem on the Frenc ransistor
issue is that Defense and Commerce non-concur. Sonnenfeldt had
recommended that you call Packard as soon as possible and tell him
that the President intends to overrule Defense's objections. Actually
State should have taken care of that problem themselves, but apparently
opted to let you adjudicate the issue.
You may wish to discuss the Middle East situation. As you
know, over the weekend Bergus saw Heykal. Heykal told Bergus yesterday
that Sadat wants Bergus to come to Washington to deliver a message
directly from Sadat to the President and to return to Cairo with the
reply. This would probably be followed by a visit from Fawzi. Reportedly, Sisc
thinks this wo uld be troublesome and is planning to parry this move. State
has indicated that it will send over a cable for your approval today. At Tab F
is the summary of the latest situation from this morning's Information Items.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/18: LOC-HAK-478-3-4-4
May 25, 1971
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/18: LOC-HAK-478-3-4-4
MEMORANDUM r
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD May 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY,A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Mid-East Situation
The following items should bring you up to date on breaking
developments:
-- Interim Canal Agreement: Bergus saw Heykal over the
weekend in line with his instructions to smoke out
the latest and harder UAR position on reopening the
Canal which Foreign Minister Riad presented late last
week. After a preliminary meeting, Bergus concluded
that (1) Sadat may have given some kind of undertaking
to the Foreign Minister to handle the canal negotia-
tions, and (2) he believes the Russians are exerting
pressure to lift the canal negotiations out of the
purely. American context. Then yesterday Heykal in-
formed Bergus that Sadat wants Bergus to come to
Washington and deliver a message from him directly,
an 1?ersonally to you and to return to Cairo with
replies. Fawzx s visit could follow this move. Sisco
feels the attendant publicity would create problems
for you; they are planning to parry this move.
In a separate conversation with Foreign Minister Riad,
Riad (who "bared his personal feelings to an unprece-
dented degree," including mentioning that he wanted
to resign) made the following points: (1) Sadat
"really wanted" to work with the U.S. (2) Sadat had
to go to Moscow last month because,of strained UAR-
Soviet relations (implying they remained so). (3)
It was his personal opinion that Sadat would last
only about a year unless there was visible progress
towards peace.
On the same matter, the Israelis clarified their
position on a canal deal. KEEa Eban summoned Ambas-
sador Barbour to say that the Israeli proposals, as
presented to Secretary Rogers, remained valid in
spite of Sadat's tough speech outlining his require-
ments last week. Eban said he thought there had been
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/18: LOC-HAK-478-3-4-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/18: LOC-HAK-478-3-4-4
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD
.more progress than that speech had indicated, that he
was willing to concede it may be just a speech rather
than a formal diplomatic position and that he would
appreciate having the U.S. assessment of Sadat?'s posi-
tion. He stated that the ball was clearly in the
Egyptian court at this point. He also expressed the
Israeli view that the canal agreement was a pilot
project for an overall agreement, i.e., it would set-
tle the question as to who would move into the area
from which Israel withdraws. He said he believed the
U.S. might be backing away from its initial position
that the whole of Sinai would be demilitarized.
--- Soviet Aspects: Podgorny is aiZriving in Cairo for
Talks with Sadat this wpek.- Sincd-the advent of
Sadat's purge within the UAR, we have been watching
for signs of the private Soviet reaction. (They have
taken the public posture that it is a purely internal
UAR affair.) The net impression of our reporting is
-that the Soviets were not forewarned and that, although
they recognize the purely power struggle aspects of
post-Nasser politics, they appear concerned about the
long-range implications of Sadat's move since those
purged were publicly and privately associated with
pro-Moscow leanings. In short, we read that the
Soviets are not certain about how Sadat intends to
.behave (although their military and economic assis-
tance relationship will automatically define a heavy
degree of reliance) at a time when much public atten-
tion has been given to UAR moves towards the U.S. It
would seem that the Podgorny visit to Cairo would fall
in the "reassurance" category on the part of the Egyp-
tians and fact-finding, or as Ambassador Beam calls
a "fence-mending"mission for the Soviets.
-- The Israelis are pressing on the question of an air-
craft ec~ Sion. Eban told Ambassador Barbour yester-
day -- following press publicity that the U.S. was in
no rush to make up its mind -- that Israel would like
to know the status of its requests. The Israelis would
like to be able to say that our military relationship
is proceeding normally and that the U.S. is making no
attempt to link it to any other questions.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
CONTAINS CODEWORD
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/12/18: LOC-HAK-478-3-4-4