MEMO TO ALEXANDER M. HAIG FROM THOMAS H. KARAMESSINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 26, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

Luc 14 2 1:1
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
L. I U,A II
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Attached are two messages received early this morning
addressed to you from Ambassador Godley.
Z Attachments
Thomas H. Kara.messines
Deputy Director for Plans
MORI/CDF C05076876
DOS review oompleted
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
IC?
C...7.1?:711111E
lAY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
TO BE DELIVERED TO GENERAL HAIG FROM AMBASSADOR GODLEY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
FROM: AMBASSADOR
FOR: GENERAL HAIG
I HAVE JUST TRANSMITTED TOP SECRET EMBTELL 470
NOD IS/A SHAU WHICH FOLLOWS:
FOR THE SECRETARY
1. PURSUANT TO STATE 013312 I DELIVERED LETTER QUOTED
THEREIN AT 1640 TO PRIME MINISTER. I EMPHASIZED ITS
SECRECY AND CLASSIFIED IT TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY,
DESCRIBING TO HIM WHAT THIS MEANT FOR OUR SECURITY
REGULATIONS.
2. HE READ THE LETTER WITH GREAT CARE.
HIS FIRST QUESTION WAS "WHY DON'T YOU HIT THE TRI-
BORDER AREA (I .E., DOWN ROUTE 110) AND OCCUPY THE
HIGHLANDS SOUTH OF ROUTE 1107" I TOLD THE PRIME
MINISTER THAT AS FAR AS WE WERE AWARE THERE WERE
NO REPEAT NO ENEMY STORAGE AREAS IN THAT AREA
AND THAT ALREADY THERE WAS AN SGU CAMP LOCATED
SOUTH OF ROUTE 110 WHICH WAS OCCASIONALLY RAIDING
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
ROAD.
3. WE THEN RETIRED TO HIS MAP ROOM AND
1E EXAMINED MINUTELY THE TCHEPONE AREA HIS NEXT
QUESTION WAS "HOW LONG WILL THE OPERATION LAST?/
I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW BUT WOULD QUERY WASHINGTON
POINTING OUT THAT IT HAD TO TAKE SOME TIME REALLY TO
CLEAN OUT THE ENEMY INSTALLATIONS THERE. HE ASKED
SPECIFICALLY THAT WASHINGTON'S THINKING BE CLARIFIED
ON THIS POINT.
4. HE THEN ASKED THE SIZE OF THE FORCES
INVOLVED. I TOLD HIM I COULD NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY
BUT I THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE SIZABLE FOR WE KNEW
THAT THE ENEMY HAD AT LEAST TWO DIVISIONS IN THAT
GENERAL AREA AND THAT IT WOULD BE FATAL TO SEND
A WEAK FORCE IN AGAINST THEM. THIS DID NOT CAUSE
TOO MUCH TROUBLE TO THE PRIME MINISTER BUT HE DID
POINT OUT THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM POLITICALLY
WITHIN LAOS DUE TO THE PRESS REPORTS OF THE EXCESSES
F THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN CAMBODIA. I TOLD
HIM I UNDERSTOOD THIS PREOCCUPATION BUT THAT AS FAR
Lf)
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
AS I WAS AWARE THERE WERE NO LOYAL LAO ALONG ROUTE 9
WHICH HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO HEAVY BOMBARDMENT,
INCLUDING B??521S AND THAT THE PICTURES I HAD SEEN OF
THIS GENERAL AREA INDICATED NO CIVILIANS, I ALSO
RECALLED TO HIM THAT WHEN HIS TROOPS OCCUPIED
MUONG PHINE IN FALL OF 1969 AND GOT WITHIN EIGHT KILOMETERS
OF TCHEPONE THAT ONLY SOME THREE THOUSAND CIVILIANS
CAME OUT. THE PRIME MINISTER NODDED IN ASSENT*
5. I THEN DREW UPON PARAS 4Ap 480 4Cp AND 4D OF STATE 012344.
THE ONLY LIBERTIES I TOOK WITH THIS TEXT WAS TO ADD SOUTHERN
LAOS WHENEVER IT SPOKE OF THE SAFETY OF FRIENDLY
FORCES IN PARAS 4A AND 48. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSA-
TION I MENTIONED MY CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION IN
THE BOLOVENS AND STRESSED THAT A RAID AGAINST
TCHEPONE WOULD BE OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO RLG FORCES
TV.
6, WE THEN DISCUSSED THE PUBLIC POSITION HE
SHOULD TAKE ON THIS OPERATION. HE SAID HE WOULD OF
COURSE HAVE TO PROTEST AND ASKED THAT THE SOUTH
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
VIETNAMESE TROOPS WITHDRAW. I THEN SUGGESTED THAT
if MERELY EXPRESS HIS REGRET, INDICATING AN UNDER-
_
STANDING WHY SUCH AN OPERATION WAS NECESSARY
AND CITING THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS
IN LAOS AS A REASON FOR THE OPERATION. HE DEMURRED
AND ASKED IF THE OPERATION COULD NOT BE KEPT SECRET.
I TOLD HIM THAT IN ALL HONESTY I DID NOT SEE HOW AN
OPERATION OF THIS SIZE COULD BE KEPT FROM THE
PUBLIC. HE THEN ASKED IF IT COULDN'T BE KEPT SECRET
FOR A WEEK OR SO. HE POINTED OUT THAT AFTER HE
FROTESTED HE DID NOT EXPECT THE sourFt VIETNAMESE
TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY BUT THAT THEY SHOULD LEAVE
WITHIN A WEEK, TEN DAYS OR MAYBE EVEN TWO WEEKS.
HE WAS SPECIFICALLY THINKING ALONG THE LINES THAT
IF THE OPERATION COULD BE KEPT SECRET FOR A WEEK
HE WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO LIVE WITH THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE TROOPS REMAINING IN LAOS FOR, SHALL
WE SAY, A TOTAL OF THREE AND POSSIBLY FOUR WEEKS.
KEPT SHAKING HIS HEAD AND SAYING THIS RAISED
SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS FOR HIM AND THERE-
jection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03 : LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
?
FORE HE MUST PROTEST. I EXPRESSE-If -UNDERSTANDING
FOR HIS POSITION AND SAID IT WAS PRECISELY DUE TO THIS
UNDERSTANDING THAT I HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO CONSULT
WITH HIM.
7. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY THINKING ABOUT A
FDSSIBLE ATTACK ON SOME PI HER AREA: FOR STILL AT THE
MAP HE ASKED IF THE ATTACK COULD NOT BE MADE IN
NORTHEAST CAMBODIA. I TOLD HIM THAT I -DID NOT
THINK THIS WAS WISE BECUASE (I) THERE WERE NO
KNOWN SIZABLE ENEMY TROOPS OR CONCENTRATIONS
OF MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT IN THAT AREA AND
(2) AN ATTACK THERE WOULD NOT HELP HIS FORCES
IN MR IV. HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS AND WE WENT
BACK TO LOOKING OVER ROUTE 9 ON HIS MAP.
S. RETURNING TO WHERE HE HAD RECEIVED ME,
hE KEPT REPEATING THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO PROTEST.
I KEPT INJECTING THE IDEA THAT WHILE I ACCEPTED
HE HAD TO PROTEST, HE SHOULD ALSO CITE THE
FRESENCE OF SIZABLE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
ON LAO TERRITORY AS THE REASON FOR THE OPERATION.
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
AT ONE TIME HE SAID THAT 'IF HE DID NOT PROTEST
VIGOROUSLY THE CHINESE WOULD AtT_IN THE NORTH.
I DODGED THIS ONE.
9. WE FINALLY LEFT IT THAT
Cl) I WOULD QUERY WASHINGTON ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY
OF A TRI-BORDER OPERATION, (2) I WOULD QUERY
WASHINGTON ABOUT THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION
AND (3) I WOULD INFORM WASHINGTON THAT ONCE THE
OPERATION WAS PUBLIC THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD
PROTEST SOUTH VIETNAMESE ACTION IN LAO TERRITORY
AND ASK THAT ALL REPEAT ALL FOREIGN TROOPS BE
WITHDRAWN FROM LAO TERRITORY.
10. THE ONLY PORTION OF MY INSTRUCTIONS THAT I
DID
NOT
COVER WAS TO ASK HIM TO REPLY IN WRITING
TO MY LETTER. I FELT THAT SUCH A REQUEST WOULD BE
EXTREMELY UNWISE. AS THE CONVERSATION DEVELOPED TO DO SO WOULD
INDICATE A LACK OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN US AND
IF HE PUT HIS THOUGHTS ON PAPER IT MIGHT RAISE
GREATER OBSTACLES. I NEVER ONCE IN THE CONVERSATION
MENTIONED OUR PRESIDENT FOR IT MIGHT BE
DESIRABLE TO USE OUR PRESIDENT'S NAME IN FUTURE
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER
U. AS I WAS WALKING OUT TiLE_ROOR THE PRIME
MINISTER SAID HE WOULD SLEEP ON WHAT I HAD TOLD
HIM AND THAT WE SHOULD KEEP IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH
ON THIS MATTER. HE OBVIOUSLY WOULD LIKE FURTHER
WORD FROM WASHINGTON. IN CONCLUSION I EMPHASIZED
ONCE AGAIN THE SECRECY, POINTING OUT THAT MY
SECRETARY AND I WERE THE ONLY ONES KNOWLEDGEABLE HERE.
HE GRINNED AND SAID HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT HE
WOULD HANDLE THIS PROBLEM IN THE SAME MANNER.
GP- 1
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/03: LOC-HAK-477-18-6-7