MY TALKS WITH CHOU EN-LAI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 198
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 14, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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WASHINGTON
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July 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Introduction
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
IDENT SAS SEEN.
HENRY A.. KISSINGER
My Talks with Chou En-lai.
My two-day visit to Peking resulted in the most searching, sweeping
and significant discussions I have ever had in government. I spent
seventeen hours in meetings and informal conversation with Chou En-lai,
flanked by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, member of the Politburo and of the
Military Commission; Huang Hua, the new Chinese Ambassador in
Ottawa; and Chang Wen-chin, head of the West European and American
Department in the Foreign Ministry. Another four hours was spent with
Huang and Chang, mostly on drafting a communique. These meetings
brought about a summit meeting between you and Mao Tse-Tung, covered
all major issues between our two countries at considerable length and
with great candor, and may well have marked a' major new departure
in international relations.
It is extremely difficult to capture in a memorandum the essence of
this experience. Simply giving you a straightforward account of the high-
lights of our talks, potentially momentous as they were, would do violence
to an event so shaped by the atmosphere and the ebb and flow of our
encounter, or to the Chinese behavior, so dependent on nuances and style.
Thus, this memorandum will sketch the overall sequence of events and
philosophic framework, as well as the substance of our exchanges. For
the intangibles are crucial and we must understand them if we are to
take advantage of the opportunities we now have, deal effectively with
these tough, idealistic, fanatical, single-minded and remarkable people,
and thus transform the very framework of globil relationships.
What Happened
The Chinese treated the entire visit with elaborate correctness and courtesy.
They were extremely tough on substance and ideological in their approach,
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but their dealings were meticulous; they concentrated on essentials; they
eschewed invective and haggling over details. The atmosphere on the
human plane was relaxed and cordial, matter-of-factly; (one did not have
the sense that they were carrying out instructions to be cordial as is often
the case with Dobrynin.)
Thus Chinese hospitality started in Pakistan as we boarded the Pakistani
plane in pre-dawn obscurity to be greeted by four senior Chinese officials,
headed by Chang, flown up from Peking two days earlier along with three
Chinese navigators (they had insisted on boarding the plane half an hour
before us). And it continued right through to our return flight to Islamabad
two days later with all the Chinese officials (except Chou) at the airport
and the plane loaded with one last round of Chinese dishes, the latest
English version of Mao's works, and photo albums of our visit prepared
throughout the night.
We were met at noon at the Peking airport by the very senior Marshal Yeh
who, like Chang aboard the plane, sought to confirm that you were in
principle prepared to visit-their country and that I was there for constructive
talks between equals. Both were worried about why I had come secretly
(Yahya had told me the same thing). Was I ashamed to acknowledge meeting
them? Here, and in Chou's specific references on several occasions, the
Chinese showed extreme sensitivity to slights such as Dulles' refusal to
shake Chou's hand in Geneva in 1954.
We were whisked in Chinese-built limousines, curtains drawn, through
wide, clean streets, with little traffic except bicyles. We passed through
the huge Tiennmen Square, capable of holding 500, 000 people, to a stately,
serene, totally secluded government guest house in the Western section
of the capital. After drinking tea with our Chinese hosts, we rested,
consumed the first of a series of Chinese meals of staggering variety
and quantity, and prepared for Chou's arrival.
He came at 4:30 p. m. At our first encounter like the entire visit, he
was matter of fact, urbane, and totally at ease without any of the self-
conscious sense of hierarchy of Soviet officials. After a few minutes of
ice-breaking small talk and an official photograph, we moved to a conference
table and launched into three hours and twenty minutes of discussions.
I gave the substance of the opening statement you had approved, considerably
truncated to get to the point quickly, laying out a possible agenda which we
in fact took up point-by-point in our meetings -- the summit, Taiwan,
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Indochina, relations with major countries such as Japan and the Soviet
Union, South Asia, future American-Chinese communications, arms control,
and any other topics of interest to the Chinese. He immediately moved to
their fundamental concern, Taiwan, and I rejoined with our position on
Indochina.
We broke at 8:00 p. m. for dinner, continuing a low-keyed substantive
discussion. Indochina came up again as we finished off the last few of the
fifteen or so dishes.
Our resumed session from 9:50 to 11:20 p.m. was dominated by the subject
of great power relations in general. Chou spoke of the Chinese fear of a
remilitarized Japan, and violently and contemptuously attacked Soviet
imperialism which he claimed had learned its lessons from the U. S. I
explained the philosophical framework of U. S. foreign policy in the post-
war period culminating in the Nixon Doctrine. Chou listened raptly, asking
very probing but non-contentious questions, some based on the President's
remarks in Kansas City of July 6. (It was characteristic of Chou that when
I indicated that I had seen only press reports, I found Chou's own annotated
copy of the text waiting for me at breakfast with a request to return it since
it was the only copy he had.)
On Saturday morning, July 10, we were taken to the Forbidden City, where
the entire, enormous Imperial Palace grounds had been closed off from the
public for a half day so that we could take a secret tour. For two and a half
hours we absorbed the magnificently simple and proportionate sweeps of
the red and gold buildings, the courtyards each with its own character, and
the living quarters of past emperors. The Director of all of China's archeo-
logical museums guided us past ancient relics of China that had been unearthed
in recent years.
We then proceeded to the Great Hall of the People where we were greeted by
Chou for another four and a half hours of discussions sandwiched around a
one and a half hour roast duck lunch.
Before lunch Chou made a one and a half hour presentation, as always
without notes, responding to each of the seven points on my original agenda.
This was an extremely tough presentation, though put forward without
rhetorical flourish -- the preoccupation with Taiwan; the support for the
North Vietnamese; the spectre of big power collusion, specifically of being
carved up by the US, USSR, and Japan; the contempt of the Indians, hatred
for the Russians and apprehension over the Japanese; the disclaimer that
China is, or would want to be, a superpower like the Russians and we who
have 'stretched out our hands too far"; and throughout, the constant view
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that the world must move toward peace, that there is too "much turmoil
under the heavens." There were light touches as well, such as Chou's
revelation that James Reston was taking a slow train from the border which
would conveniently get him to Peking right after our departure. Still, Chou
ended with a challenge -- whether there was any sense in a high-level
meeting given our vast differences.
I responded very toughly, pointing out that they had raised the issue .6f a
Presidential visit and that we could not accept any conditions. I would not
raise the issue again; they had to decide whether to issue an invitation. I
then launched into a deliberately brusque point-by-point rebuttal of Chou's
presentation. Chou stopped me after the first point, saying the duck would
get cold if we did not eat first.
At lunch the mood changed and Chou's geniality returned. I gs.thered the
impression that his speech had been largely for the record.
At the end of lunch Chou launched into a moving account of the Cultural
Revolution which he continued to relate even after I noted that this was China's
internal affair. One could tell that the Revolution was an anguishing period
for him. He described China as torn between its fear of bureaucracy and the
excesses of revolution with each side claiming to speak for Mao until the
acknowledged excesses threatened to destroy the fruits of some fifty years
of struggle.
After lunch I continued my comments on his remarks, having covered Taiwan
and Japan before the break. On Indochina, as on Taiwan, I noted the need
for time for a political evolution and I re-emphasized the link between the
two questions. After moving through the other issues such as great power
relations, South Asia, communications between our governments and arms
control, we had laid a sound substantive framework. Chou, suddenly,
matter-of-factly returned to your visit to China. He suggested the summer
of 1972, indicating that they would prefer it if you met the Soviet leaders
first. He said that they were not afraid of anyone but they were not looking
for unnecessary trouble either. I said that a US-Soviet summit had been
agreed in principle but I could make no promise and would accept no
condition. I also said that a summer summit might look like a political
campaign gesture. Chou then moved your visit up to the spring.
We adjourned at six so Chou could go to another meeting (he normally works
from noon to early morning) and agreed to meet four hours later to draft
the joint announcement. We returned to the guest house for dinner and
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an evening of fits and starts, of nighttime strolls and cancelled meetings
and a complicated, occasionally, painful minuet of communique drafting.
This process is described in the section dealing with the summit.
The next morning we held a final two hour meeting which wrapped up the
summit, the communique, and final substantive comments. In the first
forty minutes we reached agreement with Huang and Chang on the Com-
munique at Tab A. This capped a drafting process that had its quota-of
tension but was marked by the other side's clear willingness to meet us
half way. Our negotiating over the language was free of the pettiness and
elbowing that we have experienced with the Russians. And once the basic
bargain was struck, the rest of our business flowed comparatively easily.
Chou, who had been waiting nearby -- so as to avoid a confrontation over
language -.. suddenly appeared after the announcement was agreed, and we
proceeded to settle all the major principles of your visit along the lines
you wished.
After bidding farewell to Chou, we and the other Chinese officials had a
final lunch. All tension was gone and Marshal Yeh's normally impassive
face was finally creased by smiles. On the way to the airport he recounted
some of his experiences M?? how over forty years ago as a division commander
of Chiang, he heard of Mao and his 2000 followers in the mountains and
joined them. And as we drove up toward the waiting Pakistani plane he
remarked that none of them on the Long March had ever dreamed to see
Victory in their lifetimes. They had thought their struggle was for future
generations.
Yet, he said, "here we are and here you are. "
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The Chinese
Two qualities in the Chinese came across with particular force during
this initial encounter: their inward philosophical tension and their inward
strength.
For us this episode is, of course, a major new turn in international relations.
For the Chinese Communists it is no less than a personal, intellectual, and
emotional drama. They have endured fifty years of the Long March, struggle
against the Japanese and Kuomintang, the Great Leap Forward, and the
Cultural Revolution.
Yet here they were, dealing with arch capitalists, while what they call a
"war of liberation" was going on at their borders, acting out a drama of
philosophic contradictions. The moral ambivalance of this encounter for
them was reflected in a certain brooding quality, in the occasional schizo-
phrenia of Chou's presentations, inthe jagged rythym in drafting the
announcement, and the tales of the Cultural Revolution and the Long March
and Mao Tse-Tung's inspirational leadership. This ambivalence showed
up also in their request during our Saturday Imperial Palace tour for an
oral summary statement to be made on tape by both sides the final day.
I suggested this idea be shelved until we had finished our discussions and
they confirmed it would be for internal use only. When Chou arrived at
the guest house late that evening he said that they no longer considered
the tape necessary. I suspect they wanted the tape for Mao Tse-Tung.
Thus these were men in some anguish. Yet their long history of past
suffering gave them an inner confidence that was reflected in a certain
largeness of spirit. There was none of the Russian ploymanship, scoring
points, rigidity or bullying. They did not turn everything into a contest.
Profoundly committed and firm on principle, they dealt in historical terms;
and once we reached basic understandings, such as on the announcement,
details fell into place without maneuvering for petty gains.
They can be expected to be meticulous in their diplomacy. Indeed they
stressed over and over again that they considered meticulous observance
of even .the spirit of our agreements the key to good future relationships.
When I mentioned the fact that the Russians had put out their own, and
different, English translation of the May 20 SALT announcement, Chou
showed obvious contempt and assured me that the Chinese would never
resort to such a gambit. Our hosts stressed that the television film and
photos of our visit would be held until we agreed to their use.
The Chinese are clearly men of deep conviction and a wide chasm of ideology
and isolation separates us. But they were nevertheless willing to paint
prospects not only of normalizing relations but moving onward to friendship
and cooperation.
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Chou En-lai epitomized these qualities. He spoke with an almost matter
of fact clarity and eloquence. He was equally at home in philosophic
sweeps, historical analysis, tactical probing, light repartee. His
command of facts, and in particular his knowledge of American events, was,
remarkable. He insisted on admitting faults in their society, and protesting
that their lavish hospitality was only "what they should do. "
There was little wasted motion, either in his words or his movements.
Both reflected the brooding inner tension of a man concerned both with the
revolutionary fire of the next generation and the massive daily problem
of caring for 750 million people, one who endured the tribulations of the
Long March and was now inviting the President of the United States to visit
his capital.
Chou was also genial and urbane, with a refreshing sense of humor. He
displayed an easy egalitarianism -- with his interpreters who had a free'
though respectful relationship with him, or with all of our party who he
consistently ushered into and out of elevators in front of him. And he.
was considerate ...p in his genuine concern when one of my colleagues wasn't
feeling well, in briefing me just before my departure of events in the world
from which I had been insulated, and in making sure that we would continue
to use the Yahya channel occasionally because "one should not burn bridges
that have been useful. It
In short, Chou En-tai ranks with Charles De Gaulle as the most impressive
foreign statesman I have met.
Of course, these people were on their best behavior. These were the
cream of their current elite; and it is inconceivable that the next generation
there will produce leaders tempered by such experiences. Almost all of
the positive qualities we saw are Chinese, not communist, and can be
found in Taiwan or Singapore or San Francisco. Much of their ideology
is distasteful, and living in China today would be a numbing, depressing
experience. They are certainly fanatically tough. They do not wish us
well. Their new society has been purchased at a terrible cost -- in
freedom, spontaneity, color, and family life. But the present generation
of leaders understand big conceptions. Our dealings will be difficult,
especially as we inaugurate a brand new relationship. The rewards and
risks will be great. But if we keep our nerve and are clear about our purposes
we can start a new historical course.
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Summit
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The summit emerged as the cause of a major Chinese ambivalence.
Even before the meetings started the Chinese were anxious to get confirm-
ation that you were in principle willing to go to China. On the other hand
they pretended that they had responded to your request. On substance
Chou took an initially hard position that the summit should be in the
context of improving Sino-US relations and that the best way to accomplish
this was by the establishment of diplomatic relations. He eventually
backed away -. only after considerable give-and-take -- by reluctantly
acknowledging that recognition was not an "absolute" precondition for a
summit, though this direction should be set by it.
This was in the earlier stages of our talks. Later on, Chou again
toughened his position by stating that the initiative for a summit had come
from you and not from the Chinese. I referred to the actual messages,
which I had brought with me, but suggested that if it was so difficult
perhaps we should drop the idea of a summit for the time being and go
on to substantive matters.
By the second day, the Chinese stand again had softened. On the way to
our tour of the Forbidden City, Ambassador Huang referred to Chou's
interest in a statement on a summit. Chou himself raised the subject in
our discussions that afternoon and after making, no headway with a ploy
that a summit should be in a climate' of Sino-US friendship to be established
by recognition, proposed at about 5:30 in the evening that a drafting
committee for a joint summit communique meet that night at about 8:30 p. m.
He told me that he had another a)pointment, but would personally appear
about 10:30 p.m.
Having gone this far, Chou was willing to look more deeply into the summit
issue. He listened to my thoughts on general principles, and insisted that
another high-level meeting between our representatives would be necessary
before the summit took place to fix the agenda and details. The U. S.
representative, he said, should be either me or someone else of similar
stature close to you. I mentioned Ambassador Bruce and in his final
statement he said that it should be either Bruce or I. This time, though,
the visit should be an open one.
Chou in addition expressed a desire to have your summit with Mao Tse-Tung
take place after any similar meetings with the Soviets. Even though he
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was willing to be flexible when I explained our problems, this was a
significant sign (and perhaps the most significant) of the Chinese worries
about their confrontation with the USSR.
Producing a mutually satisfactory communique proved to be a tense process.
Their drafters failed to appear at the stipulated time, and at about 10:45 p.m.
we were told that they would not arrive before 9:00 the next morning. I
had in the meantime been walking in the grounds of the guest house to discuss
with my associates the possible reasons for the delay, and I also had made
it plain to their protocol people that I had to leave Peking no later than
1:00 p. m. the next day whatever the state of our discussions. I also said
that as the President's representative they had to give me a precise meeting
time and could not keep me on standby. They must have sensed my irritation,
for just as we were going to bed we were informed that Chou was coming.
He arrived at about 11:15, referred to my departure time, apologized for
getting us up, and said that his drafters would appear shortly. He departed
after an hour's friendly conversation dealing with Taiwan, India, the Berlin
issue, and the Soviet Union.
I then spent several hours with the Chinese officials going over a draft by
their side which would have had the initiative for the visit coming from you,
and which would have keyed the summit just to seeking ":normalization of
relations." (Tab B). I insisted that the origin of the visit had to be put
in terms of mutual interest. They agreed after a while, although there
were differences over the exact language. Where they had trouble was over
my insistence that the summit meeting should have a broader scope than
just the normalization of relations. At about 1:40 a. m. , they proposed a
30-minute recess in which they would try to work out language on both
points suitable to us, and left the room. We took another brief walk in
the grounds and returned to await their arrival; at 3:00 a. m. we learned
that they had left the building entirely (they must have gone to Chou En-tai's
office) and would not return until 9:00 a. m.
Ultimately, at 9:40 a. m. , on July 11, Chou and the other officials
reappeared. At this point there was some confusion; Chou, it seemed,
would be strolling outside while the others came in to discuss their draft
communique with me. Our first word, however, was that all were to come
in together, and the Chinese seemed rather embarrassed at the sudden
shift in plan. In their new version of the communique they had gone very
far to meet my requirements, and their wording needed only a few minor
changes to be fully acceptable. The agreed joint communique (Tab A)
suggests a mutual desire for the summit with you accepting their invitation,
and its purpose has been broadened to "questions of concern to both sides."
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With agreement reached on the communique, Chou quickly appeared.
Presumably for "face" reasons, he had not been prepared to present him-
self unless or until there was such an agreement. Once in the meeting,
he accepted easily all the details for the summit which I then put forward.
He made the.point that Chairman Mao had personally endorsed the summit
meeting, and accepted my proposed date and time for the public release
of the joint communique, even though "this may cause us a little trouble. "
I can only account for the fits and starts in the drafting of the joint
communique by attributing them to a deep conflict between ideological and
practical considerations on the Chinese side. Ideologically, the concept
of Chairman Mao sitting down with the leader of what they call the
"imperialist camp" must be extremely difficult for some Chinese to
accept, despite the prospect of its moving forward their campaign against
Taiwan.
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On the other hand, I believe they are deeply worried about the Soviet threat
to their national integrity, realistically speaking, and see in us a balancing
force against the USSR. And, unlikely as it may superficially seem, I
sense that they actually do appreciate the balancing role we play in Asia.
Nevertheless, it is hard for life-long revolutionaries to act against their
own principles, and we must be exceptionally careful not to drive them
away.
The Chinese will undoubtedly stress the Taiwan issue as the key to
normalization of relations, but we can maintain that all issues of mutual ,
concern will be discussed for the sake of Asian and world peace. On all
other issues Chou in effect left all the other basic principles up to you,
giving us precisely what you wished:
A visit of up to five days.
, -- Probably one other city besides Peking. (He mentioned Mao
might be outside the capital for more quiet talks with you. )
-- Small official delegation, to include Secretary Rogers, myself
and a couple of aides.
Agenda will probably look somewhat like the one Chou and I had,
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with this subject to be pursued by Bruce and/or me.
-- Small press delegation; he said this could mean around ten.
They will establish the groundrules after we tell them what they should be.
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Minimum secret service; I really don't think security will be
any problem. They said security is the responsibility of the host country.
-- The PRC will not invite other U. S. political leaders before your
visit. I emphasized that it was important that our new departure in relations
start at your level and not be muddied by eager politicians in advance. This
would not rule out newsmen and cultural exchanges in the interim.
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Taiwan
This was described by Chou as the basic issue between the U. S. and the
PRG, going back to the Korean war, when we "surrounded" Taiwan and
declared -- in contrast to our previous position -- that its status was
"undetermined. " Chou maintained that this was still our position, citing
as a case in point a recent statement by the State Department press spokes-
man to the effect that Taiwan status was legally undetermined. (You ,will
recall that you took considerable exception to this statement.) I emphasized
that they might have noted that the remarks by the press spokesman had not
been repeated. There was considerable laughter on the Chinese side over
this, and frequent later references. Chou asked whether we could apply
the same method to Laird's comments about nuclear weapons for Japan.
I am sure that they were already aware that you had clamped down but
wanted confirmation.
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Chou then went on to say that to establish diplomatic relations with the
PRC, the U. S. must:
-- Recognize that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and a
province of China.
- Recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China.
-- Withdraw all its armed forces and military installations from the
area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait within a limited period.
-- Consider that the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty is invalid.
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I responded that the Chinese were going beyond what they had said to us
in their messages and in the two 1970 Warsaw talks, in which they had
requested the removal of our military presence only. I said that we had
to distinguish between what could be done immediately and what had to be
left to historical evolution. With respect to military presence there
were two components to our forces on Taiwan -- those related to the
defense of Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam, and those related to the
defense of Taiwan. The former could be withdrawn after the end of the
war in Vietnam; the latter would depend on the general state of our
relations with the PRC.
Chou asked whether I was linking the Taiwan issue to Indochina. When
I affirmed it he did not demur but turned to a discussion of Indochina,
pointing out only that it was easier for the Chinese who were not at war to
take a long view than for the Vietnamese.
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On the political future of Taiwan, I said we did not advocate a "two Chinas"
or a "one China - one Taiwan" solution but would accept any political
evolution agreed to by the parties. We hoped that this evolution would be
peaceful, and Chou said the PRC would try to keep it so.
I said that we could not accept recognition as a condition to your visit to
Peking. Chou, after much give and take, said that recognition was not
a precondition but that the visit should set recognition as the ultimate
direction of our policy. He accepted my position that some time would be
required, i.e., well into your second term.
Chou said that if China was to be patient it needed three assurances: first,
that the US would not support "two Chinas" or a "one China, one Taiwan"
policy; second, that we would not support the indigenous Taiwan independence
movement; and third, that we would not permit Japanese troops to move in.
I stressed that this would be our policy but noted that some events on Taiwan
might be beyond our ability to control. Chou interposed no objection.
Regarding the UN, I said we might support a position where the admission
of the PRC would be by a majority vote, but the expulsion of other countries,
i. e., Taiwan, would be by a 2/3 vote with the Chinese Security Council seat
going to the PRC. As soon as the PRC gained the necessary 2/3, it would
be China's sole representative in the UN.
Chou stated that the PRC did not regard getting into the UN as a particularly
urgent matter. It had lived without the UN for 21 years, and could continue
to do so. However, if others asked, the PRC would of course maintain its stand
that its legitimate rights in the UN must be restored. China would have to
oppose the US position which I had described. When I suggested that he
mute the rhetoric, he agreed smilingly. Chou added that our proposed stand
would cause more difficulty to us than to the PRC. He did not take undue
exception to it as long as we would not put it forward ourselves, but
would simply support it if proposed by others. (Significantly, discussion
of the UN issue came well before agreement on the summit and the joint
communique, showing that the one was not an obstacle to the other.)
As a final point on Taiwan, Chou noted that the agreement on your meeting
with Chairman Mao would "shake the world. " Afterwards, Chiang Kai-shek
might collude with the USSR or Japan, and would demonstrate against you.
Chiang would try to operate independently of the U. S. Chou knew this from
his previous associations with Chiang, and the US "should beware. "
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Indochina
Chou En-lai was as forthcoming as we could have hoped. His attitude
throughout reflected the ambivalance of Peking's position. For ideological
reasons, he clearly had to support Hanoi. On the other hand, it was
apparent that he did not wish to jeopardize the chances for an improvement
in our relations, especially after I explained the positions we had taken in
Paris and warned of the danger of escalation if negotiations failed. He
came back to this latter point again and again, without threat or bluster,
simply using it as an argument for the desirability of peace.
Thus Chou went back and forth between a formal theoretical defense of
Hanoi's position (though in much lower key than Le Duc Tho at Paris) and
concrete questions that sought to discover areas of agreement. He stressed
Peking's support of Hanoi while insisting that there had not been advisers
in Indochina nor would there be. He critized American aggression but
stressed Chinese interest in an "honorable exit" for the US.
From the outset, I linked the Indochina conflict and our relations with Peking:
-_ I pointed out that two-thirds of our forces in Taiwan were linked
to the war and their removal would depend on an end of the conflict.
-- I also pointed out that an end to the war would accelerate the
improvement in our relationship.
In addition, I reviewed the current situation in Paris and pointed out that
the talks were blocked because of Hanoi's insistence on the overthrow of
Thieu and- its refusal to agree to a ceasefire. I warned that a breakdown
in the negotiations would mean continuation of the war, with incalculable
consequences.
Chou addressed Indochina several times during the first two days of our
talks.
On the first day he asked a number of questions about our position, generally
in an intelligent and sympathetic manner. These were:
--- Were we really ready to pull out?
Would we close all our bases?
-- Why would we wish to leave a "tail," such as some advisers and/
or the Thieu Government?
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..w Would we be prepared to accept having the Indochinese people
determine their own future?
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Why did we wish a cease-fire?
Would we wish to continue giving aid to the present government?
It was clear that he understood the linkage between Taiwan and Vietnam and
did not object to it. He also was extremely concerned about the possibility
of escalation. In addition, he made the following points:
-- He revealed that he had not been informed about the secret meetings
we have had with the North Vietnamese in Paris recently.
-- He said that China only had two objectives with regard to a Vietnam
settlement:
There must be a withdrawal of US and Allied forces.
The peoples of the three Indochinese countries must be
left to decide their own future.
He insisted that China would keep hands off after a settlement.
On the second day Chou took a harder line. As part of a generally tough
presentation, he attacked the Thieu and Lon Nol Governments and he charged
us with having committed "aggression" in Indochina since World War U.
He warned that we should pull out completely and not leave a "tail" behind
in the fort of advisers since these would be the entering wedge for a new
involvement.
He warned about the dangers of escalation but also made clear that China
would not intervene. He explained several times that Chinese assistance
to Hanoi had never included combat forces -w there had only been some
bridgebuilding and road repair crews during the bombing.
He stressed that there were no Chinese advisors in Indochina nor would
there be.
The morning of our departure, without prompting, Chou returned to Indo-
china in an astonishingly sympathetic and open manner. He made the
following points:
.._ He hoped our negotiations in Paris would be successful and he
wished me luck.
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He would talk to Hanoi after the announcement of the President's
visit to Peking had been made.
Peking supports Mme. Binh's seven point proposal but they
were negotiable.
-- He hopes our withdrawal will be complete, thorough and honorable.
He thought that we would find Hanoi more generous than we.
This means he will talk to the North Vietnamese and may be able to exert
some influence. The mere fact of his talking to them is likely to compound
the shock of your announced visit to Peking. In any case, he knows that
the very fact that we and Peking are moving closer will have an impact in
Hanoi.
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Japan
Chou repeatedly expressed concern about the revival of Japanese militarism,
and I have no doubt that the PRC relationship with Japan is in fact a serious
matter for the Chinese. Chou maintained that the rapid development of
Japanese economic power would inevitably carry rearmament in its wake.
In this, he said that Japan's economic expansion would lead to political
expansionism. He pointed to the great budgetary increase of Japan's
Fourth Defense Plan over its predecessors as a case in point. He quoted
Sato as mentioning that Japan's rapid economic growth would permit this
plan to be completed in two to three years rather than the five originally
contemplated.
He noted also that Sato had now spoken of the defense of Taiwan, Okinawa,
and Korea being essential to the defense of Japan, and took Sato's mention
of this in our 1969 Joint Communique with him as an indication that the
US was supporting Japan's rearmament. Japanese troops might even go
to Taiwan. At one point he mentioned the possibility of Japan colluding
with the US and the USSR to carve up China, and cited Secretary Laird's
speech in Japan as a sign of U. S. interest in Japan's developing nuclear
weapons. He doubted that the return of Okinawa would be without nuclear
weapons. Chou plainly was holding us responsible for trends in Japanese
policy which appeared to threaten China.
I declared flatly that we were not encouraging, and indeed opposed, any
revival of Japanese expansionism. I agreed on the military implications
of Japan's economic growth and said that the US and PRC interests coincided
in trying to keep this growth under control. All the US supported was
Japan's ability to defend itself. Paradoxically, the presence of US troops
on Japan helped to restrain the Japanese rather than the reverse. We
would never collude with other countries in carving China up.
I strongly denied that what Secretary Laird had allegedly said was Administra-
tion policy, and pointed out that once Okinawa reverted to Japan our bases
would be under the same restrictions as now exist for those in Japan.
Chou accepted this, and later personally called attention to the State
Department spokesman's comments on Secretary Laird's speech.
Although Chou had started off with a very rigid position on Japan, I believe
that he understands the restraining role which we play with respect to the
Japanese. This came through toward the end of our meetings, when he asked
that we see to it that, as US troops are withdrawn from Taiwan, Japanese
troops are not moved in to replace them. I said that this would be done.
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Korea was cited by Chou as another area of "turmoil under heaven. "
This arose first from the fact that there was no peace treaty there despite
China's efforts in 1954 to extend the Geneva Agreements to Korea. Chou
had proposed this to get something better than a ceasefire in Korea,,: and
Anthony Eden, in the chair, had gone along until Walter Bedell Smith had
"waved his arms" and caused Eden to reject the move on procedural grounds.
Presumably, Chou was suggesting that China wanted an arrangement in Korea
which had legal status.
Chou went on to say that there was constant conflict along the DMZ; U. S.
forces were still present; and ROK troops were in Vietnam. There was
now a joint U. S. -South Korean army in which Thailand was also represented.
Park Chong-Hee was as aggressive as Syngman Rhee. Therefore, the
DPRK and China -. had a right to be concerned.
I said that what happened in Korea depended very much on the general
relationships in the area. If the war in Indochina ended and U. S. -PRC
relations developed, the ROK troops in Vietnam would return, and it was
conceivable that before the end of your next term most of the U. S. troops
in Korea would be withdrawn. Chou himself suggested that in those terms
the process had already begun with our removal of 20, 000 men, and I
agreed. On Chou's other points, I said I knew of no Thai troops in the ROK.
The joint U. S. -ROK military command was not a new policy; it was
intended to make our withdrawal easier and was not a new commitment.
Chou's remarks on alleged ROK aggressiveness gave me an opportunity
to highlight North Korean actions. I said that the FRG was opp osed to
ROK military aggression against the North Koreans, but North Korea for
its part was very harsh in its military meassures against both the US
and the ROK. We believed it would be very helpful to Asian peace if the
PRC could restrain North Korea in the use of force against the U. S. and
the ROK. Chou did not reply, but I think that his silence may be taken
as a form of assent -- he could hardly admit that an ally of the PRC was
behaving aggressively.
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South Asia
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Chou described the South Asian subcontinent as a prime area of "turmoil
under heaven. " This was because India had long ago under Nehru adopted
an expansionist philosophy, not only committing aggression against Pakistan
but against China as well.
Chou went into great detail to outline the development of the hostile relation-
ship between China and India. This began, he said, when the Indians became
aware in 1959 that the Chinese had built a road across Indian-claimed terri-
tory between Sinkiang and the All region of Tibet but how could this have
been Indian territory when the Indians weren't even aware when the road was
built?
The Indians had then attacked a Chinese military post in this region, but had
lost heavily because the Chinese position was uphill from where the Indians
were and was strongly fortified. But world opinion (including Khrushchev)
felt that the Chinese must-have st4- rted hostilities because of the heavy
Indian losses. The Indians had also used force against the Chinese in other
areas. The culmination was the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
Chou made the following points:
-- India was responsible for the pre sent turmoil in East Pakistan. It
was supporting Bangla Desh and had allowed a Bangla Desh "headquarters"
to be set up on Indian territory.
In the light of Indian expansionist ambitions, India would use any
military aid -- such as that given by the USSR -- for aggressive purposes.
Chou acknowledged that we were not giving military assistance to India, but said
that one had to keep the consequences of any aid in mind.
-- China would stand by Pakistan in the present crisis. This position
began to develop with a rather low-key remark at dinner the first night that
China "could not but take some interest in the situation, " and ended with a
request to me at the end to convey assurances of Chinese support to
President Yahya Khan.
I told Chou that we were trying very hard to discourage an Indo-Pak war.
I assured Chou that we were bringing all the influence we could to bear on
India to try to prevent a war from developing. Chou said that this was a good
thing, but he inferred that we might not be able to do too much because we
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were 10, 000 miles away. China, hpwever, was much closer. Chou
recalled the Chinese defeat of India in 1962 and hinted rather broadly that
the same thing could happen again.
The Chinese detestation of the Indians came through loud and clear.
Conversely, China's warm friendship for Pakistan as a firm and reliable
friend wa.; made very plain. The lesson that Chou may have been trying
to make here was that those who stand by China and keep their word will
be treated in kind.
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Communications
I explained that it was essential for our two governments to be able to com-
municate rapidly, reliably and secretly without the intervention of third
parties,however friendly. This had two aspects -- how to get in touch with
each other and whom to deal with in the government. I suggested three
levels of contact:
-~ A hot line between Washington and Peking for urgentmessages.
A secure direct channel between the Chinese leaders and yourself
which would not be vulnerable to the bureaucracies or developments
in a third country. This would be used for important and sensitive
matters, to agree on basic principles and to clarify misunderstandings.
It would be kept free of the bureaucracy to prevent both leaks and
formalism. I mentioned Paris, London or Ottawa as possible con-
tact points.
-- A diplomatic contact such as Warsaw for more technical issues and
implementation of agreements reached through the secure channel.
Chou's first reaction was rather cool, with a suggestion that it might be
premature. On the second day Chou returned to the subject to say that he
would let me know the next morning at our final session.
On Sunday morning he never mentioned the hot line proposal and stated that
revival of the Warsaw Talks would be a waste of time. They took more of
everybody's effort in preparing instructions then they were worth. He
agreed that we did need a secure White House /Peking channel and chose the
Chinese embassy in Paris, saying that their Ambassador there was a
member of the Central Committee and that Ottawa would be too much in
the limelight. I said that General Walters would be our contact in Paris
and would be in touch on July 19. We shall communicate either by sealed
envelopes or through messages to be transmitted by their Ambassador.
Chou added that we should continue to pass some non-substantive notes
through President Yahya who had been a good friend.
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Great Power Relations
Chou professed apprehension over the possibility that the US, USSR, Japan
and even India might collaborate to carve up China. He showed deep bitter-
ness against the Soviets and contempt for their petty tactics. The Soviets,
he said, were proceeding down the U. S. road in "spreading their hands out
too far. " While he was confident they would be ultimately defeated, he
inferred that difficult times might be expected before this came about.
Fear of revived Japanese militarism was a major theme throughout our
discussions. Japan's economic growth was to him equated with expansionism,
and he felt that rearmament to back it was already taking place. In addition,
China's historical distrust of the Indians came through strongly.
I emphasized that the US would never collude with other powers against
China and that this would be shortsighted since the US and China had no
real conflicting interests. Indeed, in the area of relations among large
countries our interests were very comparable. With respect to Japan,
we were interested in its having the ability to defend itself, but would oppose
Japanese militarism. While the objective consequences of US actions might
sometimes look like collusion, we would strive consciously to avoid this.
I assured Chou on the following:
that you were prepared to inform them in advance of major
decisions we have with other great powers that might affect
them.
-?? that you would take their views into account.
,... that we would consult on items of interest to them and try to reflect
their concerns. I offered to explain to him our approach on other
negotiations we were conducting, such as SALT. Except for a
general question on Berlin issues, he did not take this suggestion
up.
Chou several times emphasized that China lacked the economic base to be
considered a great power, but had no desire to be considered one, and indeed
wished to avoid the kind of great power rivalry existing between the Soviet
Union and the U. S. Chou alleged that even after China's economy became
developed it would still not act as a great power. The Chinese clearly like
to picture themselves as free from the vice of great power ambitions which
have only served to stir turmoil in the world and brougit problczxtis for the
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powers themselves. They prefer to be cast in the role of championing the
less powerful and fortunate countries of the world. Their attitude toward
great powers now is a mix of hostility, suspicions and fear. This may be
rather disingenuous, however, for while they profess not to envy those who are
undisputably great powers, they may be making a virtue out of a necessity.
And their very interest in a U. S. -Chinese summit has them playing a great
power, game.
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Arms Control
I asked for their views on the Soviet proposal on a five power nuclear
conference, ' reminding him that you had held up our response so as to
get Chinese views. They flatly rejected the idea as a Soviet attempt to
lasso them. I said we would be slow in our response; that other countries'
pressures might force us to go along; and that if such a conference were
held we would seek to make sure that China was not put at a disadvantage.
On SALT I assured them we would conclude no agreement directed against
them, and that we recognized that limiting their embryonic strategic
program at this time would be discriminatory. I said we were willing to
discuss accidental war agreements with them such as we were discussing
with the Russians; Chou replied that we could raise this with them whenever
we wished. I added that we were prepared to consider a renunciation of
force agreement such as Chou had proposed in 1955. He responded in low
key that Taiwan was linked to this issue and immediately went on to say he
hoped my Paris Talks with the North Vietnamese would bear fruit.
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Americans Detained in China
At the very end I said that we would be grateful for a pardon of all or some
of the four Americans still held in China when the PRC thot$ht conditions
were ripe. We were not making a request and recognized it was China's
matter to decide, but we would consider their release a voluntary act of
mercy. Chou said that their law allowed shortened sentences for good
behavior and they would continue to study the matter. (This could well
mean they might make a gesture.)
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Conclusion
I am frank to say that this visit was ,a very moving experience. The
historic aspects of the occasion; the warmth and dignity of the Chinese;
the splendor of the Forbidden City, Chinese history and culture; the
heroic stature of Chou En-lai; and the intensity and sweep of our talks
combined to make an indelible impression on me and my colleagues.
These forty-eight hours, and my extensive discussions with Chou in,:,.
particular, had all the flavor, texture, variety and delicacy of a Chinese
banquet. Prepared from the long sweep of tradition and culture,
meticulously cooked by hands of experience, and served in splendidly
simple surroundings, our feast consisted of many courses, some sweet
and some sour, all interrelated and forming a coherent whole. It was
a total experience, and one went away, as after all good Chinese meals,
very satisfied but not at all satiated.
We have laid the groundwork for you and Mao to turn a page in history.
But we should have no illusions about the future. Profound differences
and years of isolation yawn between us and the Chinese. They will be
tough before and during the summit on the question of Taiwan and other
major issues. And they will prove implacable foes if our relations turn
sour. My assessment of these people is that they are deeply ideological,
close to fanatic in the intensity of their beliefs. At the same time they
display an inward security that allows them, within the framework of their
principles, to be meticulous and reliable in dealing with others.
Furthermore, the process we have now started will send enormous shock
waves around the world. It may panic the Soviet Union into sharp hostility.
It could shake Japan loose from its heavily American moorings. It will
cause a violent upheaval in Taiwan. It will have major impact on our
other Asian allies, such as Korea and Thailand. It will increase the
already substantial hostility in India. Some quarters may seek to sabotage
the summit over the coming months.
However, we were well aware of these risks when we embarked on this
course. We were aware too that the alternative was unacceptable -- .
continued isolation from one-quarter of the world's most talented people
and a country rich in past achievements and future potential.
And even the risks can be managed and turned to our advantage if we
maintain steady nerves and pursue our policies responsibly. With the
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Soviet Union we will have to make clear the continued priorities we
attach. to our concrete negotiations with them. Just as we will not
collude with them against China, so .we have no intention of colluding
with China against them. If carefully managed, our new China policy
could have a longer term beneficial impact on Moscow.
With Japan our task will be to make clear that we are not shifting our
allegiance in Asia from her to China. On Taiwan we can hope for little
more than damage limitation by reaffirming our diplomatic relations' ..
and mutual defense treaty even while it becomes evident that we foresee
a political evolution over the coming years. With our other Asian allies
we will need to stress both our continued bonds and our hope that
reconciliation between us and the Chinese will serve the cause of regional
peace. And in India, after the initial shock, our China moves might
produce a more healthy relationship.
For Asia and for the world we need to demonstrate that we are enlarging
the scope of our diplomacy in a way that, far from harming the interests
of other countries, should instead prove helpful to them.
Our dealings, both with the Chinese and others, will require reliability,
precision, finesse. If we can master this process, we will have made a
revolution.
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ANNOUNCEMENT
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Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President
Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in
Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971.
Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the
People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of
the Government of the People's Republic of China, has extended an
invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date
before May 1972.
with pleasure.
The meeting between the leaders of China and the United
States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two
countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to
President Nixon has accepted this invitation
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DRAFT (First Chinese Draft)
ANNOUNCEMENT
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Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council of the People's Republic
of China and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Envoy of the President
of the United States of America, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11,
1971.
In order to seek the normalization of the relations between the
United States of America and the People's Republic of China, President
Nixon has expressed the wish to meet the leaders of the People's Republic
of China. The Government of the People's Republic of China welcomes
and agrees to extend an invitation to President Nixon for a visit in the
spring of 1972. President Nixon has accepted this invitation with
pleasure.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WA/HINS TON
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: My October China Visit: The Atmospherics
October 29, 1971
FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER
silence. The Chinese staff at the Guest House on the first day were
veary cool and impassive -- a fact especially noted by our Chinese-
for the people of the world to "overthrow the American imperialists
and their running dogs, " I had a member of my staff hand the one in
my room back.to a PRC protocol officer with the remark that it must
have been put there by accident; subsequently, we collected all these
bulletins and presented them to the Chinese, who received there in
Office. Their. manner seemed correct, but restrained. And in Peking
the reception committee was virtually the same as the one which greeted
us in *July when we arrived secretly, although this time the visit was
publicly announced. As before, Marshall. Yeh Chien-ying headed the
official PRC party, joined this time by Acting Foreign Minister Chi
P'eng-fei (whose presence did serve to up-grade the affair).
Our move from the airport to the Guest House (the same one which we
stayed in before, incidentally) was similarly chilly. The motorcade
skirted the city over roads which were closed to normal traffic and
heavily guarded; the sky seemed grey and threatening. We discovered
upon entering our rooms in the Guest House that each of them contained
an English--language propaganda bulletin carrying an appeal on the cover
.We began our stay in China under what superficially appeared to be
chilly circumstances.. When we landed in Shanghai on October 20 the
weather was partially overcast, and only a handful of PRC officials
were on hand to greet us -- the same four who had met us last July in
Rawalpindi plus two representatives of the Shanghai Foreign Affairs
speaking members of the party.
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A thaw began to set in later that day, when Prime Minister Chou En-lai
met my entire official party in the Great Hall of the People. Following
a photographic session of his staff and mine at the entrance to the
conference room, Chou seated us inside behind the inevitable cups of
green tea and proceeded to say a few words of personal greetings to
everyone in the. party. He was extremely cordial during the general
meeting which followed. Then at the formal banquet which he hosted
for the entire party (including the crew of the aircraft) he shook hands
with each one of us individually; he gave what I consider to be an extra- .
ordinarily warm welcoming toast (attached at Tab A); and he went
around the room after the toast to touch glasses with every American
present. Chou had done his biographic homework well on those Ameri-
cans at his table, and flattered them with references to their educational
and professional history or past experience in China.
From this point on the character of the visit was firmly fixed by our
Chinese hosts. It was in my judgment a careful, thoughtful, conscien-
tious effort, first:
- to make me and my party feel like truly welcome guests; and
second;
>- to get the Chinese public accustomed to the idea that a senior
U. S. official and the members of his party were in fact being
received as honored guests by the top PRC leadership.
The way my visit was built up by the Chinese leaders, as well as the
lengths to which they went to assure that the public and lower-ranking
PRC officials got the message, became very apparent as the days went
by.
Publicizing the Visit
reported the composition of the welcoming committee. Although to us
the composition of this group was virtually the same as before, no
politically-aware Chinese could have missed the point that I was met
had on the preceeding day carried an announcement of the arrival which
The day after our arrival we learned from foreign press reports that
the People's Daily (the official Chinese Communist Party newspaper)
by very high-ranking PRC personalities indeed.
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average Chinese could not have failed to be greatly impressed, if not
shaken, by this juxtaposition. This was the first time any American
official had been pictured in the press with PRC officials. This was
had extended to personalities who were allies or at least neutrals. The
s the representative of the President of the United States, which he
extended his personal greetings to me and all the members of the party.
These two photographs were very similar in format to those which have
been taken'when Chou has met innumerable other delegations, except
for one thing -- they showed Chou extending the same courtesies to me,
More significantly, on October 21 the People's nail carried two photo-
graphs of Chou En-tai's meeting with us the day before. One was the
group photograph of our two parties standing together outside the
conference room, with Chou by my side. The other depicted us sitting
down in the period prior to the general meeting during which Chou had
a clear signal to the populace.
he had said that morning about the PRC's anti-U.S. propaganda in
general: this was "firing an empty cannon." However, he seen-led to
accept what I had said and to take it to heart. .More about this later.
series of Chinese characters at the airport which denounced "American
Imperialism. '' At my meeting with Chou on the afternoon of October 22,
I handed him this story and pointed out the problems that language of
this nature would create for you. He responded along the lines of what
photographs until late on October 22, and in the meantime had raised
with Chou the question of offensive anti-American signs in Peking. I
had noticed a Reuters story covering my arrival which had said that
the Chinese had had their little joke; my motorcade had driven past a
I should note here that I did not become aware of the People's Daily
mately 500 cadres, or PRC and Chinese Communist Party officials,
present. We were taken to the Great Hall of the People to see a "revo-
lutionary" version of Peking Opera, and wore met there by Marshal
Yeh Chien-ying, the Acting Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister's
Secretary, and other leading PRC personalities. These escorted us
into the auditorium, where to (I am sure) our mutual surprise, approxi-
On the evening of October 22 an event occurred which I consider quite
exceptional, and which must have had the same effect on the Chinese
Informing Party and Government Officials
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whom the senior leaders particularly wanted to read the handwriting
American visitors did not exactly bring the house down, but the point
was surely driven home: these Americans were honored guests who
were distinctly personae rg atae to the PRC. The Acting Foreign
Minister told me during the intermission that the members of the
audience were hand-picked from among personnel of the Foreign
Ministry and other key PRC departments. These people were ones
a response from the audience. I must in all candor admit that the
were in attendance. Immediately upon entering the hall, Marshal Yeh
and'the other top PRC leaders began to clap their hands loudly, inviting
on the wall.
if we had joined in! While this would be inappropriate in our customs
as well as in Chinese tradition -- the PRC has emulated their despised
Soviet revisionist fellow socialists in this regard: the honored guests
are expected to join in, reciprocally -.- and simultaneously. )
(It later occurred to us that the applause might have been more prolonged
Exposure to the Public
was being recognized and that the level of my official escort was being
Peking. These ostentatiously led me up the steep inclines of the Great
Wall before a scattering of curious onlookers, and later down into the
tomb of one of the Ming Emperors before a much larger group of specta-
tors. By this time the People's Daily arrival announcement of October 20
and photographs of October 21 had been widely noted; I could see that I
If the.Peking Opera event could be taken as Chou En-lai's means of
enlightening the cadres as to the new turn in events, then my trip to
the Great Wall and the Ming Tombs on October 23 was his way of bringing
the public into the picture. When our motorcade departed at about 9:00
a. m. , I found myself escorted not just by protocol representatives, as
would have been perfectly proper (and acceptable), but by the Acting
Foreign Minister; the Secretary to the Prime Minister and the Mayor of
of the general down-playing of sloganry since the end of the Cultural
obvious that a large number of slogans painted on the rocks along the
road had been blotted out. Of course, this could have been a by-product
my remarks to Chou En-lai on signs could be noted. As we drove farther
into the mountains and the pass narrowed it became more and more
It was during the trip to the Great Wall that I believe some pay-off from
taken in.
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Revolution, but my staff assures me that at least some of the blotted-
out. slogans looked freshly done. Another point of interest about this
trip concerns security: at literally every road junction along the
entire righto?-way there was at least one uniformed member of the
Public Security Forces. This in itself was no small enterprise.
The next day, October 23, brought a further and even more ostentatious
appearance before the Chinese public. Our Chinese hosts had arranged
a visit for me. and the members of my party to the Summer Palace, about
a half--hour's drive west of Peking, and once again I was escorted by
senior PRC officials rather than by protocol functionaries. My host on
this occasion was Marshal Yeh, who saw to it that he and I were properly
-displayed together before what the Chinese call "the masses." The
Acting Foreign Minister and the Secretary to the Prime Minister were
also present. The high point of this episode was our taking tea aboard
a boat poled out onto the Summer Palace lake in plain view of literally
hundreds of Chinese spectators. The fact that a strong, cold wind was
blowing (on an otherwise perfect day) did not deter our hosts; they
clearly wanted this, boatride to take place and only a hurricane could
have prevented.it. When I waved to the. crowds of people on the shore,
they clapped loudly. Word was sinking in, but I should add,. too, that
there-appeared to be no coaching and that the applause seemed genuinely
enthusiastic.
Minister in serious substantive discussions, and found that my move-
ments as a result became rather restricted. Others of the party, how-
ever, continued to move about the city and its environs, looking at
centers of interest which you yourself might wish to visit. Significant
Apropos of our visit to the Summer Palace, Prime Minister Chou told
me later in one of our restricted sessions that a North Vietnamese
newsman had been there and had taken many photographs. The Chinese,
Chou said, had assumed from his appearance that he was one of "'them; II
they had not recognized him as being a North Vietnamese and were more
than a little disturbed to discover his true identity.
Visits to Points of Interest Around Peking
Over the next two and a half days I became involved with the Prime
impressions were:
-- Along the route to an oil refinery and chemical complex, some
40 km. west of Peking, the people appeared to be forewarned of the
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ganda exhortation, and the other of which had been splashed over,
obviously hastily, with red paint.
motorcade, and showed much interest in it. Sizeable crowds gathered
to watch the group pass in villages and major road junctions. There
were no evidences of hostility; quite the contrary -- the bystanders
seemed pleased to see Americans.
-- Near the oil refinery, an obvious job of painting over signs
had taken place. The road bent between two large brick and plaster
billboard-size signs, one of which still contained an innocuous propa-
foreigners who have visited the complex.
-- At the oil refinery itself, the authorities were correct but
friendly. Certainly our people were treated no differently from other
- In Peking, when several members of the party went shopping at
the Friendship Store (the special store for foreigners), a large crowd
of Chinese gathered quickly to watch, but with evident goodwill. The
sales personnel were extremely friendly and helpful, despite the fact
that as a courtesy to us the store had been. kept open past the normal
closing time.
stage of these operations. (I am pleased to report that all operations
were a success.) This strikes me as being somewhat beyond the ordinary
in the reception of foreigners who are not M. D. '.s.
. . -- Another stop which a number of the group made in Peking was
at a hospital where the ancient Chinese practice of acupuncture (treat-
ment of ailments by needles) was being put to modern use. What nobody
expected was that this turned out to be a display of acupuncture tech-
niques used as anasthesia for three major surgical operations; an appen-
dectomy, the removal of an ovarian cyst, and the removal of a portion
of.a diseased lung. Although none of our people had any medical back-
ground whatsoever, they were led as "American friends" through every
party our party to the temple area - - the site where the Emperors of
China prayed annually for a good year. Once again we were on public
The morning prior to the acupuncture episode a free moment occurred
for me while Prime Minister. Chou and his. colleagues discussed some of
the substantive points which I had raised. A suggestion was made that
I should visit the Temple of Heaven, south of the main city of Peking,
which I accepted. The Chinese were able to arrange this on 30 minutes
notice, and also saw to it that the Mayor of Peking was present to accorn-
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display before the people of Peking in company with leading PRC
officials.
A few other vignettes may help to characterise the spirit with which
the Chinese received us:
-- On the evening of October 24 a farewell banquet at the Great
Hall of the 'People, which was originally to b hosted by the Acting
Foreign Minister, was preempted by Chou Ei-lai. Chou did not have
to do this, but made the extra effort. As bef re, he was a most.
gracious host. He did not, though, repeat th round of toasts -- once
the dinner was over, he and I want into a nearby conference room for
further discussion of substantive issues.
As I have previously indicated, the aircraft crew was given
the most hospitable treatment. Sightseeing tours were arranged for
the crewmen, special quarters were constructed for them at the airport,
gifts were provided, and indeed they were accorded the same kind of
meticulous courtesy with which those of us in the Guest House in Peking
Repeatedly during my conversations with Chou En-lai a deep
and abiding Chinese hatred of the Russians came through. The Chinese
are concerned about Soviet power, but utterly contemptuous of the
motivations of the leaders who exercise this power.
US-PRC contact. This line of Chou's must surely be seeping through
to the members of the Chinese Communist Party heirarchy.
-- Also at frequent intervals during m conversations with Chou,
he brought in the fact that Chairman Mao Tse-tung was fully behind the
- The (to me) remarkable display of courtesy and warmth which
to transcend what might have been expected. For us, a rapprochement
that the Chinese are traditionally capable of being good hosts under
strained circumstances, but the treatment we have received appears
has been accorded us. This ranged from theidetailed and meticulous
way we were housed, fed, and transported, to the cordiality of our
social conversations and tours,to the beautiful gifts and collections of
photographs with which each of us were plied'upon departure. I realize
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is a matter of tactics, but for them it involves a profound moral adjust-
ment. This is not easy for them, but they are making it and more.
My.final observation once again concerns signs. I have mentioned the
offensive sign at the airport noted in the news reports upon our arrival
which the interpreter in my car indeed translated for me as we sped
past it on our way into Peking as something having to do with "American
Imperialism.'" When on October 26 we returned to the airport prior to
our departure, the offensive characters were, gone. The sign was still
there, but had been completely repainted; the message had nothing to
do with the United States.
There are many possible conclusions which might be drawn from the
atmospherics of this visit to Peking. In my opinion, one conclusion
Peking's Commitment to Improving Relations
stands out above all the others: the Chinese leadership is committed to
a course leading toward an improvement of relations with the U. S. The
P.eople's Dai3 announcement and photographs, the display of friendship
toward us by top PRC officials before their- cadres, the public gestures
of friendship, the toning down of anti-U. S. propaganda, and the many
instances of personal courtesies extended to us, all underscore this
commitment. Any reversal of the direction in which the PRC leadership
is moving would at this point probably involve serious domestic reper-
cussions for.Prime Minister Chou En-lai and the other senior personali-
ties who have joined with him in this endeavor.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1.7 ' ion)
October 20, 1971
Dr.. Kissinger and friends,
I would like to take this opportunity to welcome President Nixon's
special envoy Dr. Kissinger and the other American friends who
have come to'China for this interim visit. The purpose of Dr. Kissinger's
present visit is to make preparations related to the political discussions
and technical arrangements of President Nixon's visit.
A new chapter will now be opened in the history of the relations between
China and the United States after they have been cut off for 22 years,
and we should say that the credit for this should go to Chairman Mao
Tsetung and President Nixon. Of course, there must be someone serving
as a guide, and it was Dr.. Kissinger who courageously made a secret
visit to China, the so-called "land of mystery". That was quite a remark-
able thing. This is now Dr. Kissinger's second visit to a land that should
no longer be considered a "mystery". He has come as a friend, and has
also brought with him some new friends.
dent Nixon will personally come to Peking for discussions, and Dr.
Kissinger is his advanceman. We hope these discussions will achieve
As for me, although I have never been to the United States, I know quite
a fe%r- American friends, and the United States is not unfamiliar to me.
It is evident that the social systems of our two countries are different,
and our respective world outlooks -- Dr. Kissinger likes to use the
word "Philosophy" -- are totally different, yet this should not prevent
us from finding common ground. The Sine-American talks have gone on
for 16 years now, but no common ground has yet been found. Now Presi-
positive results.
era will be approached in a new spirit.
Our two peoples are great peoples. Although our two countries are
separated by the vast Pacific Ocean, friendship links our two peoples
together. After receiving the U. S. table tennis team this year, we
received a number of other American friends. We hope that this new
I propose a toast to the friendship between the great American people
and the great Chinese people and to the health of Dr. Kissinger and all
our, other -friends!
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Premier Chou En-lai's Extemporaneous Toast
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MEMORANDUM
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FROM:
THE PRESIDENT
HENRY A. KISSINGER
My October -China Visit: Discussions
of the Issues
Chronology
Prime Minister Chou En-tai and I held very intensive substantive
Communist Party, and Chi Peng -fei, Acting Foreign Minister, and
Vice Chairman of. the Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese
tional five hours of talks at two banquets that he hosted for us and I
spent many more sightseeing hours with Marshal Yeh Chien-ying,
discussions for some twenty-five hours, building on the solid base
that we had established in our' July conversations.: We had an addi-
other officials which lent greater insight into Chinese thinking.
full itinerary of our stay, including all meetings and sightseeing tours.)
(Attached at Tab A is a list of my meetings with Chou; at Tab B. is a
Minister Chi, their top American expert in their Foreign Ministry,
Chang Wen-chin, the secretary to the Prime Minister, Hsuing
house.' The opening. general session included all my substantive
assistants plus Messrs. Chapin and Hughes on our side; our other
meetings were private, with usually only one assistant on our side.
On the Chinese side, Chou was generally flanked by Acting Foreign
Chou and I met ten times at the Great Hall of the People and our. guest
Hsiang-hui, the Deputy Chief of Protocol, Wang Hai-jung, plus irate
questions concerning your, forthcoming trip. This was followed by over,
ten hours of very intense discussions in three meetings on Thursday and
Republic of China, the agenda for our discussions, and the major
devoted to general philosophy, our overall approach to the People's
preters and notetakers.
The first session on the afternoon of our arrival, October 20, was
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hours as we went through seven drafts over a sixty hour period which
included two rugged nights of drafting and negotiation, from Saturday
afternoon through the morning of our departure, October 26. This
process and the resulting tentative communique 'I have described to you
to conduct. We consumed the better part of five meetings lasting eleven
into a rigorous drafting process which Chou decided he had personally
instead and delivered a sharp speech. We subsequently launched right
the redrafting of the communique. The next morning thou showed up
his Acting Prime Minister would meet with us the next morning to begin
enable me to table a draft communique for your visit, which you had
seen, at the end of the meeting on Friday. afternoon. On Saturday
evening, in my sitting room, Chou and I settled the major remaining
issues concerning the arrangements for your trip, and Chou said that
These substantive meetings provided the background and framework to
the technical people met on arrangements for your visit.
issues such as ongoing diplomatic. contacts, exchanges, and trade. And
subjects by way of illustrations. Concurrently one of my assistants and
the State Department representative held two meetings,on subsidiary
Soviet Union, South Asia, and arms control, . as well as touching on other
that we had covered in July Taiwan, Indochina, Korea, Japan, the
Friday, at which, in addition to your trip, we explored the major issues
as the announcements concerning my visit and the date of your visit and
the communique, we resolved other outstanding technical problems such
At the last session,. in addition to clearing up the final issues concerning
in a separate memorandum. Discussions on the communique, of course,
included a great deal of substantive exchange on the draft formulations
as well as general philosophy and principles.
the general public line the two sides would take.
major surprises.
Against the backdrop of my July conversations with Chou there were no
remain. Both sides know there are profound differences but recognize
The basic premises on which we have both moved to open a dialogue.
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that domestic and international constraints demand a phased resolution
of outstanding issues. Meanwhile the very momentum of our joint initia-
tive carries inherent advantages: for them, the burnishing of their
global credentials, a general direction on Taiwan, and the prospect of
a,lower American military profile in Asia; for us, some assistance in
reaching and safeguarding an Indochina settlement, and built-in
restraint on Chinese activities in Asia; for both of us, less danger of
miscalculation, greater exchanges between our peoples, and a counter-
weignt to the Soviet union.
Chou confirmed an essential ingredient for launching this process and
moving-it forward - Chinese willingness, despite their past rhetoric,
to be patient on, solutions. . He was even more explicit than in July that
they do not require time deadlines so long as principles are established,
Several times he emphasized that the PRC?, being a big country, could
afford to wait on issues of direct concern, such as Taiwan, while the
more urgent matters were those concerning her smaller friends, such
as Indochina and, Korea, whom one couldn't expect to have a broad
perspective. This line is consistent with Peking's virtuous stance. of
championing the cause of smaller nations and refusing to be a ,'superpower
with its characteristics of bullying and overinvolvexnent.
Another consistent theme, as in July, was Chou's insistence on frankly
acknowledging that there is much turmoil in the world and great differences
between us. Both in our discussions and in the communique drafting, the
Chinese showed their disdain for pretending that peace was either near or
desirable as an end in itself; for submerging differences in ambiguous
formulas of agreement, or for discussing such subsidiary issues as arms
control, trade, or exchanges which only serve to make relations look
more "normal" than they really are.
Among the general points that I emphasized were the fact that in some
areas we could set trends but the policy implementation had to be gradual;
that we should not push the process too fast because this would give your
domestic opponents a chance to sink your initiative; and that Peking should
not try-to complicate our relations with our allies.
In brief, the essential outcome on each of the. major topics was as follows:
Your trip. We achieved all of our major objectives, thanks both
to our approach of minimizing our requirements and Chinese
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willingness to do all within their capabilities.' The basic tech-
nical and substantive framework has been established:, the
arrangements have been agreed upon in principle-, another
technical advance will flesh out the details; the substantive
discussion clarified both sides' positions; and a tentative joint
communique has been drafted.
Taiwan. Both sides understand the direction in which we are
heading nd.what the U. S. can and caxn of ?do, -but we have not
yet agreed on what can be said in the communique. We will
- - Indochina I Peking will, be beipful, within limits. Both in formal
Japanese sway over Taiwan. The PRC is in no hurry to get
all our forces out but wants the principle of final withdrawal
established; is most interested in global acknowledgment that
Taiwan is part of China and its status is not undetermined; will
try for a peaceful solution of the issue; and strongly opposes
Japanese influence or Taiwan independence.
working hypotheses are that neither side wants hostilities and
neither Korea can speak for the whole. peninsula. Chou pushed
for equality for Pyongyang, said that a permanent legal resolution
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gradually withdraw our forces from Taiwan after the Indochina
War, We urge that any solution of the Taiwan question should
'
be peaceful; and we will oppose, within our capabilities,
and informal talks the Chinese made it clear that they hope we
achieve a negotiated settlement and are saying this to Hanoi.
They recognize the desirability of tranquility in Indochina for
your visit and our relations generally (indeed they consider it the
most urgent" question in the Far East), as well as the link
between the conflict and our forces in Taiwan. In addition to
sounding these themes, I outlined the history of our private nego-
tiations; stated that Hanoi needed Peking's largeness of view so
that there could be a settlement; and warned that we have gone as
far as we can and negotiations had to succeed in the next couple
of months or we would carry through our unilateral course which
was more risky all-around.
-- Korea. We ' are both clearly sticking with our friends, but the
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eight point program from their ally. I. rejected the latter,
of the Korean war was required, and transmitted an abusive
said that we were prepared to consider a more equal status,
and warned against North Korea's aggressiveness.
temptation for the Chinese to date.
trying to complicate Tokyo-Washington relations, a seductive
take a virulent nationalist form. I also warned against Peking's
Japanese neutralism, which the PRC wants, would probably
.restraint. The latter point I emphasized, pointing out that
recognize that our defense cooperation with Tokyo exercises
but we disagree on how to prevent this. Our triangular relation-
ship could prove to be one of our most difficult problems. The
Chinese are painfully preoccupied and ambivalent on this issue
they seem both genuinely to fear Japanese remilitarisxx and to
Japan. We agree that an expansionist Japan would be dangerous,
but their dislike and concern about the Soviet Union is obvious.
-Soviet Union. The Chinese try to downgrade the Russian factor,.
I reiterated that we would not practice collusion in any direction,
,,that we would treat both nations equally, that we would keep
. Peking informed about our relations with Moscow, and that we
have many concrete issues with the USSR. Chou accepted the
last point, including the fact .that some of our negotiations with
>- South Asia. 0The PRC doesn't want subcontinent hostilities any
Moscow would work objectively to Peking's disadvantage.
more than we do.' Indeed the Chinese seemed' more sober about
assistance, we could not line up on either side of the dispute.
about Indian machinations and were giving Pakistan extensive
talks and in the communique, that while we were under no illusions
the dangers than they did in July. Chou reaffirmed their support
for Pakistan and disdain for India. In turn I made clear, in our
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-- Subsidiary Issues. The -Chinese clearly want to keep the focus
more technical questions that suggest a regular bilateral relation-
on major bilateral and regional issues and not get sidetracked on
ship. Thus they showed almost no interest in arms control, airily
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and raise the principal questions concerning the technical arrangements
the following days and secure agreement on how to conduct our business;-
toward your meetings with the Chinese leaders; lay out the agenda for
principles which guide our relations toward the PRC and our attitude
some of the rhetoric pruned. My approach was to sketch the general
I began by delivering the opening statement which you have seen, with
basic framework and tone for all the subsequent conversations.
dismissed the subject of trade, and unenthusiastically included
technical and journalistic exchanges.
a reference in the communique to facilitating scientific, cultural,
release of the two pilots linked to an overall Indochina settle-
We can expect some movement before your trip on
at least one of the two CIA agents held by the Chinese, with
meat. Premature public disclosure would, of course, be ruinous.
A brief. rundown of the opening meeting is important, because it set the
for your visit.
I described the US attitude toward the PRC as the following;
- Our policy ij based on the profound conviction that better
-" 'You are. personally committed to an improvement in relations;
relations are in our interest and is not an attempt to create
a power combination;
We are aware that our two countries have different views
and that neither the PRC nor the US would trade in principles;
We believe that our two countries share many congruent inter-
ests and that it is no accident that they have had such a long
history of friendship;
would not participate in arrangements affecting Chinese
-- Asian and global peace requires Chinese cooperation and we
interests without involving the PRC;
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-?- We do not accept the proposition that one country can speak
for all socialist countries;
- The one issue that divides us (Taiwan) is itself a product of
history and if we could agree both on the general direction
and a realistic process to resolve this issue, there should
be no fundamental obstacle to the positive development of our
relations.
instructed our whole party to stress in their social conversations.) Chou
acknowledged that the PRC also had internal difficulties<
India) really felt that way. I then emphasized the domestic problems you
faced from some of your traditional sectors of support and the courage
you have shown and which Reston had so much difficulty,in acknowledging
in his interview with the Prime Minister. (These were themes that I had
ante of new departures. I added that foreign reaction to the July announce-
ment was generally positive, but not all nations (e. g. the Soviet Union and
both at-home and among our friends. I said that while we had set new
currents in motion, we could not suddenly overturn traditional relation-
ships; the old must coexist for a while with the new. Chou, here and
later, acknowledged this but naturally his emphasis was on the import-
first implicitly by sketching the reactions to the July 15th announcement
I then set forth the case for gradual resolution of the issues between us,
guarantee that we would be successful in resolving them.
from those on which we could agree in principle but would need time to
implement, and those which had to be left to historical processes. We
would carry out scrupulously whatever we had agreed to; this phased
approach. was not a pretext for avoiding fundamental problems but a
forward the constructive beginning that had been made in July. Both the
PRC and we had been meticulous in implementing our understandings to
date and were treating each other as men of honor. Looking to the future
we had to sort out the questions which could be resolved immediately,
expected some of the adverse reactions and were determined to carry
I then became more explicit about the need for gradualism. We had
major issues such as we had discussed in July; (2). subsidiary issues
I then suggested an agenda consisting of three types of subjects: (1) the
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such as ongoing contacts and exchanges; and (3) the technical arrange-
ments for your visit, the major aspects of which I then touched upon.
(See the next section of this report.),
Chou and I then informally agreed on 'a game plan for the three types of
issues that we .had already settled in'advance through communications
and a private talk I had. with the senior. Chinese representative who had
come to meet us at Shanghai.
(This game plan was carefully followed over the next five days: On the
technical subjects, I laid out the fundamental considerations and handed
over thse books we had prepared in advance. The Chinese .studied these
and came back with questions in meetings with technical personnel headed
on our side by Messrs. Chapin and Hughes. The major issues were
referred back to me and Chou and were settled in social and private
sessions. Chou and I held a series of private meetings on the major
substantive issues and the drafting of the communique. The State Depart-
ment representative and a member of my staff held two sessions on the
subsidiary issues of diplomatic contacts, exchanges and trade.)
Chou ri ade some preliminary comments on the substantive agenda which
foreshadowed his approach on subsequent days. He termed Taiwan the
crucial issue for normalizing our relations. He called Indochina the
most urgent issue in order to relax tensions in the Far East.. He moved
Korea to third on the agenda, giving it a higher priority than in July,
citing both sides' responsibilities for settling this question which the
1954 .Geneva Conference had not treated. His fourth and fifth topics were
Japan, which he said had a far-reaching influence on reducing Asian
tensions, and South Asia where both sides were concerned. He put rela-
tions with the Soviet Union sixth and last; this was not a main issue, as
Peking was not opposed to our relations with any other country.
Then, clearly for the record, Chou once again said that they, would prefer
it if you visited Moscow before Peking.. I subsequently repeated for the
record that it was we who had set the date for the Moscow summit, and
this was based on the ripening of conditions, not on Peking's desires to
interfere with US-USSR relations. Chou eagerly assented.
Chou came back to my statement that the old must coexist with the new.
He knew that it was impossible for us to cut off all our traditional foreign
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your stands differ greatly.
expelling of. Soviet spies. Following his regular custom, he once again
put Chairman Mao's stamp on your visit by saying that when you two
meet it should be possible for you to understand each other even though
remarks about new power relationships and a speech that Prime minis-
ter Heath had just delivered concerning Britain's future role. He said
that Heath had shown courage by recognizing the necessities to adapt to
the realities of the new Europe, just as you had shown courage in your
China initiative. He noted that conservative parties were often the ones
to make bold new moves., citing as additional examples Ike's ending of
the Korean war, Lincoln's handling of the' Civil War, and Britain's
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policy relationships at once, but there was also a need to break with
some conventions. He again referenced your July 6 Kansas City
or be submerged by the tides of the times.
destroy our traditional relationships so as to resume the old hostilities
from a better tactical position. Chou once again said that times were
advancing and that we would either seize upon the opportunities presented
Chou rejoined this was only part of the story and couldnot be accepted
absolutely. Since we were entering a new era it was necessary that
some relations change; otherwise life would be as it was before. He
cited an old Chinese proverb which says that "the helmsman must guide the
boat by using the waves; otherwise it will be submerged by the waves. " 1
replied that we had no intention of avoiding difficult problems, such as
Taiwan, but until we were able to cement our friendship we should not give
domestic opponents on both sides an opportunity to destroy progress.
Many were saying that China was only using the initiative as a trick to
from which they were trying to escape.
I then sounded a warning about Peking's making trouble for us with our
allies. First, I, noted that we supported Britain's entry into the Common
Market and a more unified and autonomous Europe. I added that we
didn't seek to drive a wedge between the PRC and its friends, and it
would be shortsighted if either side tried to use the improvement in our
relations as a device to destroy the traditional friendships of the other
side, This would only cause the two sides to draw back into the rigidity
This exchange set up the basic philosophic tension in our ensuing dis-
between their imperatives for change and ours for time.
cussions as we sought, generally successfully, to strike a balance
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On the itinerary, I said that we were thinking of a five-day
trip with perhaps one other stop besides Peking.
when President Eisenhower was incapacitated.
Six Crises which showed that you had restrained yourself
. of a President, and he revealed that he had read extracts of
Vice President could take over some of the responsibilities
ground station was the easiest method. Chou asked when a
communications for the President at all times and said a
On communications, I stressed the need for secure and rapid
primary function would be for our men to serve as liaison with
that we had reduced our numbers drastically, and that the
On security, I said that we would rely on them as host country,
the Chinese security people.
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Your Trip
they would do.
You already know the agreements reached on the arrangements for your
visit through my earlier messages, our conversations, and Dwight
Chapin's separate report. Our approach was to scale down our require-
ments to the minimum in advance, present all technical considerations
in writing, let the Chinese come back to us with questions, and not try
fr tlessly.to squeeze, extra mileage out of them -once they told us what
to the maximum that their technical capabilities would allow. In each
case they met our essential requirements in terms of numbers and faci-
lities, and when we left, there remained only a few issues on the itiner-
tude, knew that we were not bargaining in conventional fashion, carefully
clarified the issues so that they knew what was involved, and then agreed
This approach paid off handsomely. The Chinese appreciated our atti-
mould not let technical issues interfere with the historic thrust of your
At the opening session I outlined our general approach, stressed that we
ary for me to check with you.
visit, and then ticked off the major issues to be resolved:
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was one to break through conventions.)
seen the movie ;Patton and believed that you admired the General because he
this exchange Chou revealed that, after hearing of your liking for it, he had
of pastPresidential visits, the reduced optimum plan for your visit to
China, and then the bare minimum plan that we had finally made. (During
(16) party.
I then explained the books that we had prepared which showed the dimensions
five that I'had indicated.
that the Chinese were thinking of a visit lasting seven days instead of the
it clear that there would be no haggling over this issue despite whatever
other differences might crop up during the next few days. He also indicated
with the summits in the order that they were announced, Chou moved quickly
to indicate that the Chinese preferred the February 21 date. He thus made
Later in this opening meeting, after I made clear that we would still proceed
between the foreign ministers., and perhaps another closing general session.
And we confirmed that neither side would say anything to the Press during or
after your visit which was not first mutually agreed upon.
private meetings between you and the Chinese leaders and concurrently
and I explored further some of the major questions concerning arrangements.
We pinned down February 21 as the date for your visit. We agreed to the
general concept of meetings during your visit similar to the ones during this
one -- a general opening session of the two official parties, followed by
During the first part of our first private meeting the next morning, Chou
principles.
present for specifics, although Mao was of course fully at home on general
but that the Chairman was always accustomed to having the Prime Minister
We then discussed the meeting between you and Chairman Mao. Chou said
that the Chairman wanted to meet you early during your visit, after greeting
the official party, and again towards the end. I said you wanted to meet
alone with Mao. He rejoined that the composition of our side was up to us,
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w- On the press,_ I explained the dimensions of the corps on other
Presidential visits and how we had cut back the numbers.
Finally I sketched the outlines of the official (12) and unofficial
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formulas, one for a five day visit and one for seven days. He said that he
would accompany you wherever you went, made clear that they would
expect you to travel on a Chinese plane, and introduced the idea of an
overnight visit to Hangchow. There was further discussion of these issues
during which I made another pitch for the ground station, and said that I
would have to consult with you on the question of the aircraft, since an
American President had never traveled on another nation's plane.
On the itinerary, we agreed that I would come back to Washington with two
and expressed Mrs. Nixon's desire. to see his country; he said. he would
check with Chairman Mao,
series of questions to clarify the meaning of our presentations.
After a private meeting 'on late Thursday afternoon, I took Chou aside
Meanwhile the Chinese technical personnel were studying for twenty-four
hours the books we had given them. On Thursday afternoon they began
two days of meetings with our counterparts during which they posed a
would increase the numbers, Chou began to back away from that suggestion.
Having heard our preference for a five day visit and that a trip to Hangchow
numbers out of respect for our having cut down the figures drastically in
advance. (Chinese acceptance included 80 press. This represents a
large incursion for them, but they explained on other occasions that
their only concern was whether they could properly accommodate all the
journalists, including having sufficient interpreters.)
At 9:00 p.m. on October 23 Chou came to my sitting room in the Guest
House and proceeded to settle the major outstanding technical issues. He
first accepted the overall dimensions of the Presidential party and support
group, i. e. some 350 personnel. He said the Chinese had accepted these
meetings between you and Mao, there could be one in Peking early in the
visit and one at Hangchow at the end. )
could go there. (Mao v,ill probably be there, for in July Chou had said
that you might be meeting him outside of Peking. However, an incon-
sistency arises since Chou has said that you would meet Mao early in the
trip and Hangchow would come at the end of it. Since there will be two
Chinese mentioned Hangchow several times, underlining their hope you
During our sightseeing trips to the Great Wall and Summer Palace, the
He said that we could compromise on a six day visit which included five
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with you. He then made clear, in typical Chinese fashion, that Mrs. Nixon
would be welcome by saying that once she saw the villa in Hangchow she
would not want to spend the night in Shanghai.
interest in Hangchow, I said that I would 'be prepared to raise this issue
days in Peking and one day in Shanghai.. Knowing of the intense Chinese
. coming as possible. Thus, this equipment was admissible so long as it
an example of their "principled" approach on technical as well as substan-
tive questions. They want to do things themselves and maintain their
concepts of sovereignty. Within their. capability, they would be as forth-
be easier to lease it. As I then acknowledged to Chou, this was clearly
processing center, and if not they would rent it. I replied that it would
said they would like to buy the proposed ground station and Boeing 747
Picking up a reference I made to the legal aspects of sovereignty, Chou
"belonged" to them.
dose of sarcasm. (The Chinese did show some genuine concern about the
security problem caused by the large press contingency.)
the host country and several times noted our requirements with a slight
references to security. He made clear that this was the responsibility of
The only comments on technical matters with an edge to them were Chou'
advance party, led by General Haig, after the announcement of the date
At the final session, I confirmed that there would be another technical
say at my backgrounder and my informing them of the upcoming Cannikin
test, we adjourned the session.
This exchange left only a few loose ends which we have since tied up.
After some further discussion, which included agreement on what I would
occasional U. S. envoy to Peking after your visit could be in the communique,
and I made a pitch for Bruce once the Indochina war was behind us. He
stipulated there would be two meetings between you and Chairman Mao.
and I said I would discuss it with you. Chou said that the idea of an
Chou then was once again very firm on your traveling in a Chinese plane,
We settled on the text of the communique for my visit and the October 27
release date and we agreed that the announcement of the date for your
visit would be in the latter part of November. After first suggesting that
the text of the latter could refer only to "late February, 11 Chou was soon
persuaded of the need to be specific about the date.
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technical details once agreement in principle has been reached. Their
acceptance of our numbers, their leasing of the ground station and 747,
and their insistence on a Chinese plane for your travel within their country
illustrate their basic attitude on arrangements.
at the outset made sense and that the Chinese do not engage in haggling over
These-discus.signs on arrangements for your -visit confirmed both that our
somewhat unconventional approach of presenting our minimal requirements
within China, we should take some more time to respond so that the
Chinese will realize that this is a major decision for us.
November 23, 1600 Washington time. On the question of your travel
of your visit. Since my return, we have informed the Chinese that
Mrs., Nixon will accompany you and that we accept a seven any visit,
including an overnight at Hangchow. We have also informed the Chinese
that we believe the date for the. announcement of your visit should be
cast by either side on the fact that your visit would proceed as planned.
Chou might have engaged in some brinkmanship by raising shadows about
your trip while we were wading through some of the difficult substantive
issues. He did not do this, partly because this is not his style and partly
because he needs the visit as much as we do. In any event, while we'had
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interests than about its own. On the other hand, the Taiwan question remains
one of fundamental principle for Peking, as it has for 22 years; Chou is
pressing formulations in a communique which we still cannot accept; and
he has made it clear that there will be no normal relations until this problem
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This remains, as we always knew it would, the single most difficult issue.
On the one hand Chou says that the PRC, being a large country, can afford
to be patient; that it is showing restraint in the language that it is suggesting
in the communique for your visit; and that Indochina, and even Korea, are more
urgent problems, because the PRC can be less generous about its allies'
is resolved.
drafting were dominated by the tension between the Chinese thrust for
that we can do more than we can say, that to push the process too fast and
too explicitly could wreck the whole fabric of our China initiative. While
Chou understands our dilemma, he has problems of his own and. he must
show concrete progress on this issue for his own domestic and inter-
national audiences. Accordingly, our discussions and our communique
Resolution of this issue in a way that allows our relations to move forward
over the next few years depends on China's willingness to accept our thesis
ing the understandings that we had laid out in July:
clarity and ours for ambiguity.
This was the first substantive issue that we discussed. I opened by review-
-- We would withdraw those forces on Taiwan related to Indochina
in a relatively short period after the war in Indochina is over.
-- We would reduce other forces on Taiwan progressively over a
longer period of time, depending on the state of our relations.
In response to Chou's query, I said that we would not set a final
date on these withdrawals but that both sides understood the
evolution.
We would not advocate a two-China or one China, one Taiwan
solution. At this point Chou said that we should not advocate
a one-china, two-government solution as suggested by our UN
position. He noted the PRC had been very restrained in its
attacks on this position.
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concern is not so much our policy but Japanese intentions and the possibility
Chou then asked a series of questions which underlined that their primary
both understood the direction in which we were headed.
and the Prime Minister in a restricted meeting. I added that this was a
painful process for us; we had worked with the government on Taiwan for
years and whatever the historical causes, it was not easy to make such
changes. , Opposition to this policy would certainly arise as it began to
unfold. We would not challenge the PRC view that this was an internal
matter, but the PRC should settle the issue peacefully.
On the UN, I noted that we had carried out the policy I had outlined in July
and that we had kept our rhetoric down. In fact it was better for both of
our countries if the Albanian Resolution did not pass this year, for then
the process would be pushed too fast and there would be a rallying point
for opponents of your China policy.
I then reemphasized that we could do more than we could say on Taiwan,
and that some things had to be left to historical evolution so.long as we
16
We would not support or encourage the creation of an independent
Taiwan movement, and we would take action on any information
provided to us that Americans officially or unofficially were doing
so. Chou interjected his concern over recent demonstrations at
UN Headquarters for an independent Taiwan which he claimed
were nationwide, even global in scope. I said that as far as I
knew the US had nothing to do with this and that' I would check into
the facts. Chou took the occasion to criticize CIA actions around
the world, and I rebutted briefly.
-- We would not support, indeed we would oppose, to the extent we
.could, the establishment of Japanese military forces on Taiwan.
or attempts by Japan to support a Taiwan independence movement.
-- We would support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and
would pose no obstacle to this.
We were prepared to move toward normalization of relations with
the PRC, keeping in mind Chinese views.
I said that you would be ready to reaffirm all of these points to the Chairman
of Taiwan independence, neither of which we can completely control.
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After a brief historical-lesson on why Taiwan is Chinese territory, Chou
revealed what the British were prepared to do in order to elevate their
diplomatic mission in Peking to Ambassadorial level: acknowledge that
Taiwan was a province of China, withdraw their consulate from Taiwan,
and support the Albanian Resolution at the UN. The British would also
agree privately that they would not promote the view that the status of
Taiwan was undetermined, and if they received inquiries the British
government. would .say. that its position was unchanged.
acknowledged that this, was a difficult question for us.
PRC would try to bring about a peaceful. settlement of this problem. He
secondary importance. He added that, as he had already said in July, the
question. How the Chinese people would solve the q estion of Taiwan was of
already returned to China and was a province of China? This was the crucial
Chou said this would be sufficient if the PRC acted expediently, but
instead they considered it unacceptable. The PRC objected to the British
reserving their position if the issue of Taiwan's status were raised; Chou
noted that Britain signed the Cairo and Potsdam declarations declaring
Taiwan belonged to China. He reinforced this by relating some more
history, including the US role, to demonstrate why the status of Taiwan
was not undetermined and to underline PRC sensitivity to this issue. He
then got to his point:. what was the US policy? Do we maintain that the
status of Taiwan is still undetermined or was it our view that Taiwan had
what our policy is. We did not challenge the premise that all Chinese
maintain there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of that China.
In that sense we didn't maintain that the status of Taiwan was undetermined.
Expressing this in a communique was a different matter, but we were
prepared to note that all Chinese maintain there is but one China. We
would also make sure that there would be no further statements by our
officials that Taiwan's status is undetermined. In response to Chou's
question about what we would say if other countries were to raise this
question, I said that I would have to check this with you. l assured Chou
that we were not encouraging any government to maintain that the status
of Taiwan was undetermined and that the UK position had not received
.our encouragement. Furthermore, if a government were to raise this
issue we would certainly not support it; I pointed to our UN position which
I responded by again saying that we must separate what we could say and
was careful not to address this question.
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the treaty illegal and that we should withdraw all our forces from the area.
I said that we understood their position, that we hoped for a ,peaceful
solution, that the evolution of events would make unnecessary any formal
the treaty would automatically lapse. Chou repeated that they considered
the Chinese to settle and not something we could actively push.
Chou then raised the issue of our defense treaty, asking whether once
Taiwan returned to the Motherland it would still have effect. I replied
?,-that if T~alwan and China were to become one again by peaceful means
I again declared that we would do nothing to promote the elaboration of a
two-China or one China, one Taiwan policy in whatever form such plans
were presented and that we would attempt to encourage a solution within
the framework of one China by peaceful means. This question was for
action on the treaty.
would like and encourage is a peacefully negotiated solution after which
which saw Taiwan and China get back together again peacefully. Chou
commented that if Chiang Kai-shek or his son wished to negotiate, the
PRC would not discourage it. I interjected that frankly what we most
suggestion of a return invitation to him as a result of your visit. It may
also influence their lukewarm attitude on other subsidiary issues which
smack of more normal relations, such as trade and exchanges.
I then pressed. further on the need for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan
question. We would place no obstacle in the way of a political resolution
was no.competing US ambassador in Peking. He pointed out that the
presence of the Nationalist ping-pong team in the US had prevented the
sending of the PRC ping-pong team.. (In other contexts the Chinese
indicated they still planned to send their team, however.) This
problerA of there being a GRC ambassador in our country underlies the
PRC position about ongoing contacts: ' i. e. they agree to our sending an
envoy to Peking butf.;do not wish to reciprocate; and Chou turned down the
Chou emphatically. stated that diplomatic relations between our countries
were not possible until our forces had been withdrawn and the defense
treaty had lapsed. They could not send an ambassador. to Washington if
another Chinese ambassador were there; it was possible for you and me
to go to China since Peking considered there was but one U. S. and there
our military relations would automatically be at an end. A peaceful
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military forces. If there were no peaceful settlement, then it would
be easier for us to withdraw our military presence in stages than to
abrogate the treaty. The latter was unlikely.
settlement would solve the questions of the defense treaty and our
encourage Japanese expansion in Taiwan would be shortsighted, but we
had to select the issues on which we were able to enforce our discipline.
Chou acknowledged these points but raised concerns about the Japanese
taking our place. I replied that we would oppose that and that we had a
common interest in preventing the military expansion of Japan. To
sure that they would not have any practical consequences$
policy, and while we could not prevent such statements, we could make
Chou cited Secretary Laird's comments which suggested increasing
Japan's military potential.. I responded that this was not official US
role that in a later meeting he said that he didn't want all US forces
withdrawn from Taiwan for fear that Japanese forces would then move
Chou then dwelt further on his fear of Japanese influence in Taiwan, not
only military but also political and economic, and he cited contacts
between various Japanese elements and officials on Taiwan. I said that
it was relatively easy for us to prevent the projection of Japanese military
presence on Taiwan while our forces were there; we would continue
to oppose these forces after we departed but this was less under our
control. If the Japanese began sending military forces outside of its
territory, we would be forced to reconsider our entire policy in the
Pacific. Political and economic expansion was more difficult to measure,
but it was not American policy to let Taiwan become subsidiary to Japan.
Chou warned that this would be most disadvantageous to the relaxation of
tensions in the Far East. (Indeed, so concerned was Chou about Japan's
then claimed that they had shown restraint toward Japan and said that
coming under attack in some quarters for giving up Japan in our initiative
toward China. There had to be some restraint on the Chinese side. He
Chou against exploiting US-Japanese differences, saying that we were
signs of Sino-American cooperation such as exchange programs, this
could affect the situation. on Taiwan as well as in Japan. I also warned
I made the point that if before diplomatic relations there were visible
they would not deal with Sato..
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we had chosen this route over one that clearly indicated a two-China policy.
Chou emphasized that the status of Taiwan was much more important to
them than the UN seat and that they would refuse to, go to the UN if our
position prevailed. He then revealed that they didn't particularly like the
Albanian Resolution either, since it did not. specifically address the question
of the.ststus.,of Taiwan. (At our final meeting, which as it turned out,
occurred at the very end of the UN debate, Chou pointedly complained that
his talking to me at this time was very embarrassing for China's friends
That afternoon, October 2 1, Chou picked up the United Nations is sue. He .
dispassionately noted PRC opposition to our position, and I explained that
at the UN.)
saying that they had not thought about the matter. He did take the occasion
to praise Hammarskjold and indirectly denigrate U Thant, a sign that the
PRC might want an activist Secretary-General.
When I invited Chou's views on a successor to U Thant, he offered nothing,
keep some forces on Taiwan for a while in order to keep out the Japanese.
drafting process which I have reported separately. Chou did indeed show
some restraint in their language formulations and attempted to meet some
of our concerns. We in turn moved toward their position by not challenging
the one-China position of all Chinese and by indicating that we would reduce
our forces in the Taiwan area. Chou's formulations, which I could not
accept, would have us actively express the wish that a one-China solution
be brought about by peaceful means and pledge that we would finally withdraw
all our forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.
Chou explained repeatedly that they were not setting a deadline on our
withdrawal and, in fact, surprisingly admitted that they hoped we would
This intensive discussion on Taiwan was. later picked up in the communique
and take no steps that were detrimental to our relationship.
Chou concluded the brief UN discussion by repeating the need to make
progress on the Taiwan question. I again pointed out that if we moved too
quickly on this issue our opponents could destroy the iraagiie relationship
that we were trying to build with the PRC. I acknowledged the PRC's need
to "show some progress, but 'repeated that if we went too fast we would
tear the whole fabric of our relationship. We thus had to establish .a
direction in our conversations, insure that every step was implemented,
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21
The Chinese will be patient but at one point toward the end Chou did
suggest that if, e. g. , six years passed without solution of the Taiwan
remaining gap between us, but I think we can do it successfully.
As reported separately, I told Chou that I would talk this issue over with
you and see whether. we could come back with a new formulation for the
communique. He indicated ll.ttle further budging on their part but said
that they might be able to change a word or two of their position if we
presented a new formula. It will prove difficult and painful to close the
issue, the Chinese would be forced to liberate by "other means, " his
single reference in our discussions to the use of force.
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Indochina
Our discussions on the afternoon of October 21 on this subject were
generally similar to those we held in July.
I underscored the reasonableness of our approach, pointing out that our
negotiating proposals had addressed every concern of their allies. I
stressed the advantages to the PRC of an Indochina settlement, on the
one hand, and the risks of.continued conflict on the other hand. 'Against
this backdrop I made a somewhat more emphatic pitch than July for
Chinese help with Hanoi, while still making it clear that we would not
embarrass Peking. Chou, in turn, emphasized the desirability of our
setting final withdrawals before your visit (without insisting on a political.
solution). He reiterated that peace had to be made with Hanoi directly,
but explicitly hoped that negotiations would succeed. As in July, he was
obviously uninformed about the details of our negotiations with the North
Vietnamese.
had in the White House we hoped that the PRC would find him acceptable
after the war.
Chou led off the session by citing Indochina as an urgent issue and the
need for final U. S. withdrawals. He asked why we had not accepted, or
at least replied to, Mine. Binh's seven points. He then explained that
they could not accept Ambassador Bruce in Peking while a war was still
going on. I interjected that we understood this, but given the trust he
with Hanoi, not Peking. He then inquired why we had not set a final date
and said that this was more urgent than the UN question or the normali-
zation of Sino-US relations.
your visit to China from being as successful as otherwise, although he
made clear that this was not a condition. He repeated the PRC's support
for the seven points and said that final decisions on a settlement rested
Chou continued that our not setting a date for final withdrawal could prevent
proposal of October 11. I did not give him either a piece of paper or all
the details on our proposal, but enough to show its forthcoming nature.
I pointed out how we had met all of the concerns of the North Vietnamese
Telling the Prime Minister that he had been misinformed about the nego-
tiations, I proceeded to give him a fairly detailed rundown of our nego-
tiating efforts over the summer, including the outlines of our most recent
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in Hanoi with the following arguments:
I told Chou that it was tempting for us to publish our negotiating proposals
since this would dominate public opinion in our country, but that we
preferred to try and reach a settlement. I then sought. Chinese influence
and the PRG, even to the point of using some of their formulations. We
had addressed ourselves primarily to the North Vietnamese nine point
proposal, which, according to Hanoi, superseded the PRG seven points,
announcement. He indicated privately that Moscow had made unspecified
elections., and the ceasefire. He frankly admitted, as he had in July,
that he had not heard a word about these negotiating proposals. He
asked whether we had sent a message with Podgorny to 1-Hanoi. When
I said that we had not, Chou laughed contemptuously about Russian
diplomatic efforts, including their extensive travels since the July
We understood that Peking didn't want to interfere in the
negotiating process. But we questioned whether one small
country; obsessed with its suffering and conflict, could be
permitted to thwart every sign of progress between the U. S.
and Peking because its suspicions were so great that it
would not make a negotiated settlement.
whole trend was toward a new relationship with Asia's
-- Why would we want bases in one corner of Asia when the
most important country?
-- If Hanoi showed Peking's largeness of spirit we could
settle the war within days.
_.. We wanted the independence of North Vietnam and the other
countries of Southeast Asia. Perhaps there were others
(i. e. the Soviet Union) who might wish to use Hanoi to create
a bloc against China.
We had made our last offer and we could not go further.
We knew the PRC did not trade in principles, but the
proposals we had made would end the war on a basis that
would not require it to do so.
. Chou then asked a series of questions about our withdrawals, the new
proposals in Hanoi. which Hanoi had rejected.
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negotiations.
Chou said that our withdrawal would be a "glorious act" for us, and I
responded that we had to find someone with whom to negotiate. We
would withdraw in any event: the only question was whether it would be
slowly through our unilateral policy or more quickly as a result of
quite excited, he termed this a "dirty act", launching into Dulles. I
replied that the guarantee for our actions in a peace settlement lay not
in clauses but in the. difference in our world outlook compared to the
Dulles policy of the 1950s.
Vietnamese had been tricked and no election had been held. Getting
suspiciousness, he recalled the "deception" of 1954 when the North
Chou made a distinction between Vietnamese and Indochina-wide
ceasefires. He expressed concern that an Indochina ceasefire would
freeze the political situation in the entire region (his main problem
being Sihanouk's status, of course). I said that we would not interfere
with whatever governments evolved as a result of the ceasefire. We
then had a testy exchange on Cambodia where I pointed out that there
would not be any need to arrange a ceasefire if North Vietnamese troops
would withdraw and let the local forces determine their own future.
Chou did not deny their presence; he said that they were there in sympathy
for their South Vietnamese compatriots. In order to explain Hanoi's
creating a pro-Moscow bloc in Indochina.)
. make it easier for Moscow to pursue its policy of encircling China by
I.again pointed out the generosity of our proposals and the temptation to
go public with them. Chou said that he could not comment on our offer
since he did not know about it in detail. (Later I said that I was not giving
him our detailed proposal since that was up to the PRC's ally to do. Chou
agreed. In a latermeeting Chou did acknowledge that our political proposal
represented a new element.) He maintained that Hanoi's preoccupation
and suspicion were understandable for a small, deceived country. The
North Vietnamese could not be expected to have a large view like the
Chinese. (Marshal Yeh on another occasion told me that Hanoi was too
proud; having as it thinks defeated the world's largest military power,
Hanoi was very reluctant to take advice. In this it was egged on by Moscow.
Peking, according to Yeh, genuinely wanted peace, but it did not want to
In any event, Chou said, the settlement was up to us and Hanoi. He again
emphasized that it was important to have this problem essentially settled
before you came to China.
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I then summed up:
- I bad made seven secret trips this year to Paris which was
not the activity of a' government seeking to prolong the war;
-- We were no long-term threat to the independence of Vietnam
and wanted to make peace;
-- We recognized the limits to what the PRC could do and the
complications of the Soviet role, but nevertheless if the
opportunity presented itself, we would appreciate Peking's
telling its friends its estimate of the degree of our sincerity
in making a just peace.
-- We could not go any further than our proposals of October 11.
Chou again commented that they hoped we could settle and get out, whereas
the Soviet Union wished to pin us down. He said it would be impossible
not to mention Vietnam in the communique if the war had not been settled.
I rejoined that there should be no misapprehension that Vietnam was an
extremely sensitive issue for us and that it was impossible to accept a
communique that was critical of us. When Chou asked why we had not
made a public pledge of final withdrawals, I said this would gain us two
to three months of favorable headlines, but we were interested in making
a settlement rather than empty propaganda victories.
he commented that the styles of various countries differed and that they
couldn't impose their will on their friends.
that the Prime Minister should teach his method of operation to his allies,
though we recognized that the PRC had to support its allies. When I said
closed with the hope that he understood what we were trying to do even
the most urgent problem with regard to the relaxation of tension in the
Far East, and saying that U. S. withdrawal would be a glorious act. I
Chou concluded by again wishing us well in negotiations, calling Indochina
In a subsequent session where Chou was bearing down on the issue of
foreign troops, I pointed to the Chinese forces in Laos. He said that
these were ordinary workers plus antiaircraft forces needed to protect
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the "neutralists" and would all leave when the job was done.
them. If peace came, the latter could be withdrawn "in a day's time. "
In any event these personnel were building the road at the request of
In our last meeting Chou made the rather remarkable comment that he
believed we "genuinely want a peaceful settlement,
its friends in inoffensive language while we emphasize a negotiated
a relatively quiet setting.. And the communique draft has Peking backing
Hopefully this issue will have been transformed by the time you go to
Peking. We cannot expectPeking to lean bard on its friends. We can
expect it to help tip the balance for a negotiated settlement if the other
objective realities move Hanoi toward a bargain. If so, Peking will
have incentives to encourage, North Vietnamese compliance. On the
other hand, if the conflict continues, Peking (and,Moscow) will not want
to see a major offensive -- and our reaction -- shadowing the summit.
Thus the situation on the ground, and our declining role should provide
settlement.
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27
Chou devoted considerable time and passion to this subject, which he
placed as number three on the agenda. In East Asia, the three princi-
pal "powder kegs", in his view, were Taiwan, Indochina and Korea,
with the last two the most urgent. (This had some quality of being for
the record to prove loyalty to allies. )
South Korea, and I pointed out that we had helped this process along
the recent opening of talks between the Red Cross Societies of North and
UNCURK only under unacceptable conditions. He noted with approval
He opened his presentation on the afternoon of October 22 by regretting,
as he had in July, that the 1954 Geneva Conference had not settled the
Korean question. . A ceasefire had been reached but no treaty had been
concluded and a serious crisis could therefore arise. He said that the
Panmunjom meetings had gotten nowhere, that North Korea had no parti-
cipation in the UN debate, and that North Korea could participate in
since the July talks.
Chou continued as follows:
U. S. military forces should withdraw from South Korea as
Chinese forces had done in 1958. He acknowledged that we
had already taken out a third of our troops and said that we
had paid a great price to do it, i. e. extensive military
- . The 1965 treaty with Japan was even more serious and there
was the possibility that Japanese military forces would
replace American ones. Officers of Japanese self-defense
troops had been going to Korea (I had checked on this since
July and Chou was indeed correct).
If there were increased military strength and hostilities after
we withdrew this could not but directly affect relaxation of
tension in the Far East.
Their Korean friends were "most tense" and this could not
but affect the Chinese government and people.
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abusive series,of demands upon us to withdraw our forces and military
support for Korea, give North Korea equal status, prevent Japanese
influence, disband UNCURK,. leave the Korean question to the Koreans
themselves, and let North Korea participate in the UN debate uncondi-
tionally. Chou reaffirmed the importance of this question and noted
that while big China could live with the problem of its divided status for
a while, the PRC could -not ask its -smaller, friends, Vietnam and Korea,
to be so patient.
28
Chou then handed over, a list of eight points from the North Korean
government, published in April 1971. This document is a generally
do and called our ally a ''puppet. " The PRC had never done this, and
we respected it for standing by its friends. But it was important for
North Korea, as it was for North Vietnam, to show some of the largeness
I retorted in extremely sharp fashion. I said that the Nixon Administra-
tion was dedicated to improving relations and easing tensions in East
Asia, but we reject the translation of this goal into a series of unilateral
demands upon us. We were prepared to set certain directions, but we
could not accept a paper which listed all the things that the U. S. "must"
of spirit of its large ally.
great importance to that statement.
Chou backed off from the abusive language, stating that it was "firing
empty guns.'' I said that the substance was more important in any event.
I informed him that we had received a communication from North Korea,
through Ro~mania, earlier this year and had responded in a conciliatory
fashion but had heard no more. I then clarified what the objectives in the
peninsula should be. We were prepared to discuss the possibility of a
more permanent legal basis for the existing situation in Korea, but we
were not interested in a legal situation that made the reopening of hosti-
lities possible (i. e. we would not scrap present arrangements so as to
invite aggression). When I noted that our ultimate objective was the
reduction of U. S. forces in Korea, Chou again raised the fear of Japanese
troops replacing ours. I assured him that our policy here was the same
as on Taiwan, namely that it was not our objective to replace our forces
with Japanese self-defense forces and that we were opposed generally to
the military expansion of Japan. Chou declared that the PRC attached
their goals were to bring about stability in the peninsula, avert war, and
I then pressed Chou further to clarify Chinese objectives. I said that if
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was interested in equal legal status for both. Koreas. Unification
American interests were quite parallel. If, on the other hand, their
goals were to undermine the existing government in South Korea and
make it easier for North Korea to attack or bring pressure upon the
South, then a different situation existed.
In response to his inquiries, ~ I made clear that we would not encourage
South Korean attacks against the North, and.in thee case of clear South
Korean aggression, our mutual defense treaty would not apply. I also
said that we were already reviewing the UNCURK question and that we
recognized North Korea as a fact of life. Chou stressed that the PRC
29
lessen the danger. of the expansion of other powers, then Chinese and
should be left to the future.
In our further exchanges I said that it was our policy:
not to allow Japanese military forces to enter South Korea
to the extent that we could control this;
as tensions in the Far East diminished the number of U. S.
-forces would continue to go down and could be expected to
be small;
in any event, we would not allow South Korean military
attacks while our forces were there;
-- as an end of a complicated process, but not as an imme-
diate objective, we could envisage North Korea as a lawful
entity in the U. N. and elsewhere;
there was merit in North Korea's having fair representation
in discussion about the peninsula;
as for final reunification, we had not studied this problem
but it should be accomplished peacefully.
in the interim. There was some agreement on general objectives although
At the end of our discussion, Chou in effect accepted our position that
the issue of Korea would take time but that opinions could be exchanged
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and that neither one had the exclusive right to unify the country.
not about specific methods and we had reached. no conclusion about the
way peaceful reunification should be effected. In addition, we agreed
that the two parties in the peninsula should treat each other as equals
Chou again emphasized that keeping Japanese military forces out was
paramount. I said that we would attempt to do this, but that if North
Korea should start aggression then one could not be sure of the conse-
quences. I made very clear that whatever we could do in Korea depended
on North Korean restraint. Chou agreed that all these issues were
mutual and that both of us should use our influence with our friends to
keep them from military adventures. He cautioned, however, that the
era of negotiations, such as the Red Cross meetings, could be the era
of "dragging out" and while they would wait on Taiwan, it was harder
for their smaller friends to be patient.
In the communique draft we agree to disagree. The Chinese back their
allies' eight points and call for abolition of UNCURK. We honor our
commitments to South Korea and endorse reduced tension and increased
communication in the peninsula. These formulations are preferable
to a formal joint position that. suggests we are negotiating on behalf of
our allies.
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Japan to rearm and to resume the outward thrust that it had shown in the
1930s and 1940s. But we disagreed on the best way to assure that this
In addition to discussing Japan's role in Taiwan and in Korea, reported
elsewhere, Chou En-lai and I talked about Japan's future in Asia in our
afternoon meeting on October 22. We. agreed that neither country wanted
reflected in his uncharacteristically lame presentation, during which
he seemed unsure of himself, his strategic arguments were weak, and
Chou suggested that we drop our mutual defense ties and that Japan
pursue a policy of neutralism, and I sharply rejoined that this was the
best way to encourage a remilitarized, expansionist Japan and that the
security we provided exercised restraint. I think Chou recognized the
validity of our arguments, but obviously had difficulty acknowledging
thevirtues of aU.S. -Japan defense relationship. His ambivalence was
would not happen.
he continued to fall back on pat phrases
At my invitation, Chou outlined Chinese views of Japan:
Japan's "feathers have grown on its wings and it is about
to take off", i. e. its tremendous economic expansion was
inevitably leading it toward military expansion;
- Its economic assistance to other countries was not to help
them develop but rather to establish Japanese economic
domination;
-- The Soviet Union was looking for Japanese investment and
markets and was encouraging it to be more aggressive;
China was not hostile toward Japan, and great changes have
taken place in both countries since the war; the PRC was
ready to conduct its relations on the basis of the five
principles of peaceful coexistence..
When I questioned Chou on what he meant when he said that the PRC
wanted Japan to pursue a policy of "peace and friendship", he defined
this as Japan's recognizing the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan, giving
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pendence and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of China.
32
up all ambitions for both Taiwan and Korea, and respecting the inde-
I responded as follows:
editorial which said that the U. S. could betray Japan at any moment.
Japan's had been traditionally tribal;
China's philosophic view had been generally global while
Japan had always thought that it could adjust to outside
.going from feudalism to emperor worship and from
emperor worship to democracy, in very short periods;
-- Japan was subject to sudden explosive changes, such as
influences and still maintain its essential character;
on those who deal with them;
These Japanese traits imposed special responsibilities
especially the PRC and the USSR, since Japan's orienta-
--.The present situation is a great temptation for everybody,
imperatives of their economic expansion;
-- We had no illusions about.Japanese impulses and the
tion has been made uncertain by the July announcement.
I then said that the Soviet Union had made a special effort to exploit the
situation and the PRC had too -- I cited a People's Daily September 18
important that both the PRC and the U. S. show restraint on this issue.
others, but rather that of Swiss and Swedish neutralism which rested
on large national armies. Both those Americans who believed that Japan
would blindly follow the American lead and those other foreigners who
tried to use Japan against the U. S. were shortsighted. It was therefore
I sharply warned that such competition could only encourage Japanese
nationalism. The present relationship with the U. S. exercised restraint
on Japan; conversely, leaving Japan on its own would be a shortsighted
policy. Someone would be the victim, for neutralism in Japan would
not take the form of Belgian neutralism which had been guaranteed by
I then repeated some of our principal policies toward Japan:
-- We opposed a nuclear rearmed Japan no matter what some
officials. might suggest to the contrary;
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was no question that if we withdrew our umbrella they would very rapidly
build nuclear weapons. When Chou asked whether we were capable of
limiting Japan's self-defense strength, I said that I could not promise
this, but that we would have a better opportunity to do this with our
present relationship than in a situation when Japan felt betrayed by us
and Japanese nationalism asserted itself. I said that we had no incentive
to encourage Japan to be dominant twenty-five years after World War II
when we had fought against this very concept. If Japan did rearm itself,
then the traditional relationship between the U. S. and China would reassert
itself.
- We favored keeping Japan's conventional rearmament to
a level adequate only to defense;
military power;
-- We were opposed to the overseas expansion of Japanese
We recognized that Japan's economic development con-
cerned the whole world and not just Japan.
I repeated that for these major principles to be effective there must be
restraint on all sides. When Chou claimed that a nuclear umbrella
tended to make. Japan aggressive against others, I said that the alterna-
tive of Japan's nuclear rearmament was much more dangerous. There
Chou noted that the Russians were cooperating with the Japanese and trying
to use them in Siberia. I commented that I thought that they would pull
back once they were-, confronted with Japanese methods and that in any
event it was dangerous for the Russians to whet Japanese appetites for
Siberia. I thought both sides would play with each other but neither would
reorient itself that completely. Chou again was skeptical on whether the
U. S. could control the "wild horse" of Japan, and I again rejoined that
while we couldn't do this. completely, we had a better chance of controlling
the military aspects under present arrangements than under the neutralism
that he was pushing.
We ended up agreeing to disagree, with my commenting that our two
countries had certain parallel interests with regard to Japan.
Chou closed by noting that we had helped Japan greatly to fatten itself,
which I acknowledged. I pointed out that we did not need Japan for our
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own military purposes and that whenever Japan wanted us to withdraw
muitary personnel we would do so. However, this would not be cause
for Chinese rejoicing.
on Japan, consistent with the general approach of the first part of the
document. This the PRC opposes Japanese militarism and supports a
neutral Japan, while we place the highest value" on friendly relations
with Japan and state we will continue to honor our mutual defense
treaty obligations. This can only help us with Tokyo and is much
preferable to artificial -- and suspicious -- agreed US-Chinese positions.
The tentative communique draft clearly delineates US-PRC differences
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South Asia
This issue surprisingly consumed much less time than I expected, and
while China clearly stands behind Pakistan, I detected less passion
and more caution from Chou than I had in July.
Chou opened up by mentioning an October 7 letter from Kosygin to
Yahya which he termed equivalent to an ultimatum threatening Pakistan.
He said the situation was very dangerous and asked for our estimate.
I made the following points;
- - At first India had a reasonable complaint about the political
and economic burden of the refugees coming from East Paki-
stan. We had moved to meet this problem by providing over
one-half of the foreign relief to refugees in India, or nearly
$2O million.
-- However, India was now trying to take advantage of the crisis
as a means of settling the whole problem of Pakistan, not just
-East Pakistan. The Indian strategy apparently is to change
abruptly the situation in East Pakistan so as to shake the
political fabric of West Pakistan.
- - I then outlined U.S. policy and the steps we had taken to support
Pakistan in the consortium, debt relief, and other bilateral areas.
I emphasized our total opposition to military action by India, the
warnings that I had given the Indian ambassador about cutting off
economic aid if they were to move, and the fact that you would
repeat these warnings to Mrs. Gandhi when she visited the U. S.
I added that we had urged the Russians to exercise restraint.
They had told us they were trying to do so, but we were not sure
whether this was in fact the case.
-- We thought there was a good chance that in the near future that
India would either attack or provoke Pakistan into action.
-- Finally, I outlined our proposal that both forces withdraw their
troops from the border and that Yahya make some political
offers so as to overcome hostile propaganda and make it easier
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to support him in the UN and elsewhere.
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36
Chou thanked me for this information and said that he wished to study
the Kosygin letter further before discussing this issue the next day in
more detail. He commented that Tito had been. persuaded to the Indian
view by Mrs. Gandhi, and this plus Soviet support would increase the
risk of Indian miscalculation,
due to the fact that we spent so much time on other substantive subjects
and that we now had the. communique drafting process in front of us.
However, there were opportunities to raise South Asia again in our subse-
quent meetings if Chou had really wanted to,
this subject nor mentioned the Kosygin letter again. This might be partly
Perhaps significantly, Chou, despite his promise never came back to
not one of the outstanding qualities of the Indian leadership.
free their hand in Asia. He thought this was "a very stupid way of
thinking. " I commented that Moscow would learn that gratitude was
Chou commented that the Soviets were exploiting the situation, as part
of their general strategy of exploiting contradictions in Asia so as to
steps on ahya in so short a time frame that it could only wreck the
structure of West Pakistan.
wanted the political solution there to reflect the will of the people. We
had made many'proposals to India to separate the refugee problem from
the political evolution in a way that would not prejudge the future. How-
ever, India had made it very clear that they were trying to force political
I then stated that we had no national interest in East Pakistan and only
on eat er side. Nevertheless he did not attempt in any way to contrast
their stand with ours as demonstrating greater support for our common
break out, is afraid of giving Moscow .a pretext for attack, and would
find itself in an awkward position if this were to happen.
Chou surely recognized from my presentation and from our communique
formulation, which urges India and Pakistan to resolve their differences
peacefully, that we have too great stakes in India to allow us to gang up
h
Pakistan's internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace
in the Asian subcontinent. 11 I believe the PRC. does not want hostilities to
In any event, China still stands clearly behind Pakistan, as reflected in
their formulation-in the draft communique which reads that "it firmly
opposes anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in
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- We had kept the PRC scrupulously informed over the summer
about our relations with Moscow.
-- The Moscow summit would now take place because `the necessary
conditions had .been met. There had been various attempts to
have the President visit Moscow first, which we had, of course,
turned down.
-- Our July 15 announcement had not changed the direction of Soviet
policy but had improved Russian manners. I had pointed out in
my opening statement that this announcement had triggered an
extraordinary amount of Soviet diplomatic activity and we were
aware that it was designed to outmaneuver the PRC.
-- We have a number of concrete issues with the Soviet Union which
we have every intention of pursuing, such as SALT and Berlin.
.The Russians were now pressing us very hard on a European
Security Conference.
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Soviet Union
Chou initiated this topic by asking our views, and I replied as follows:
the Soviet Union had made concessions very rapidly and given up all their
principles. He said indeed that the Berlin Agreement had turned out to
be much more substantive, with Soviet concessions, than we had esti-
mated in our private communications. I responded that we had fore-
shadowed that the agreement would primarily concern access procedures
and asked him what other concessions he thought Moscow had made. He
said that the Russians had conceded that West Berlin was a part of West
Germany, which they had never done before and which would embarrass
East Germany.
Chou commented acidly that in the final days of the Berlin negotiations
other hand their policy was apt to loosen things up in Eastern Europe.
to ease tensions so that they could concentrate on the East, but on the
I pointed out that the Soviet Union wished to free its hands in Europe so
as to concentrate elsewhere, and Chou admitted this possibility. There
was a contradiction in the Soviet policy -- on the one hand they wanted
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to-bloc basis and easing tensions with the West.
contradictions in Eastern Europe by at the same time dealing on a bloc-
I said that we recognized that the Berlin. Agreement increased Chinese
problems, and Chou responded "that does not matter. " 1 assured him
that we did not make deals for that purpose and that we would keep him
informed on the details concerning the- negotiations on. Berlin. The
Soviet Union wanted a European.Security Conference to solve their
was (a) an acceptance by the USSR that the treaties had in fact been unequal,
against Peking (mentioning our deflection of the Soviet proposal for provo-
cative attacks in 1970 as well as the third country aspects of the accidental
war agreement); and that anything Peking heard from other sources about
what was going on could not be true.
Chou asked if the Russians had talked to us about their border dispute. I
replied that they had made.an oblique reference to China's exorbitant
claims, but that I had refused to discuss this question. (On the way to the
Great Wall the Acting Foreign Minister explained to me the nature of the
Sino-Soviet border dispute. It was not true that the PRC wanted to regain
all territories lost by China in the 19th century. What the PRC wanted
its interests; that ;.e would conclude no agreements that would work
repeated that we would keep Peking informed of anything that might affect
I then gave Chou a brief accounting of the Gromyko talks, saying that the
European Conference was one of the topics that Gromyko had raised with
you, along with the Middle East and subsidiary questions like trade.
Concerning the latter I informed him that Secretary Stans would be travel-
ing to Moscow in November. Chou inquired about the Middle East. I told
him that if there were any serious chances for settlement I would let him
know; prospects were generally gloomy at this point. I added that Gromyko
had asked. me to tea where we went over the same ground that you and he
had covered. In addition, he had discussed U. S. relations with China with
the standard Soviet line that Moscow had no objections to our improved
relations but would object to our colluding. (On the way to the airport,
Marshal Yeh said that he thought the Soviet Union wanted to settle the
Middle' East so that it could concentrate on China. He therefore hoped
we would settle our problems with China quickly.)
I summed up our discussions by echoing some of the themes I had sounded
in my opening statement with regard to our policy toward Moscow. I
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as the Soviets claim. Also, he said, the Soviets had pushed troops into
ail disputed territories -- this was unacceptable. )
Throughout our meetings Chou often interlaced disdainful and hostile
comments about the USSR, but always in the tone that the PRC was not
afraid of any confrontation. He referred to their petty negotiating tactics,
their sticking their hands out in various places, and their complicating
of efforts for an Indochina settlement (a point reiterated by Marshal Yeh
in one of our sightseeing conversations),
and (b) a delineation of the border in minor aspects such as putting the
demarcation line into the middle of rivers instead of on the Chinese side
able when the objective consequences of such dealings have this effect.
As for our policy, the Chinese should be under no illusions that we fully
intend to pursue our interests with Moscow while we try to improve our
dialogue. with Peking, that we have a number of concrete areas of interest
with the Russians, and that while we will not conclude any agreement with
the purpose of complicating Chinese problems, we can not be held account
oppose "efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish
frontation because this would refer to our relations with Moscow. Both
our countries declare against collusion, forswear hegemony in Asia, and
In the draft communique the PRC declares it "will never be a superpower"
and opposes t,hegemony'! arx1''power politics," Chou specifically suggested
we might want to leave in some of our language (which I was prepared to
delete) about improving communication so as to lessen the danger of con-
such hegemony,'!
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Arms Control
Chow reflected the sa
were prepared to make a similar agreement with them. I mentioned also
our willingness to conclude a hot ne arrangement.
to sign an agreement on accidental war, for example, with.the PRC. Such
an agreement would mean no restraints on China's military preparations
but would provide an opportunity for each side to inform the other about
unexplained events. I made clear that we were not urging this on the PRC
or making a formal proposal, but were merely letting them know that we
theSoviet Union. I repeated that we would not participate in any agree-
ment that would "lasso" the PRC.
I said,. as I had in communications over the summer, that we were prepared
e Chinese disinterest in this subject that was so
I led into the topic when I was outlining our approach toward our relations
with the Soviet Union., and I reaffirmed that we were prepared to make
with the Chinese any agreement on arms control that we had made with
manifest in July.
Chow responded disingenuously that such agreements as accidental war
and hot line did not really apply to them, since they had said they would
never use nuclear weapons first. He said, more out of politeness than
genuine interest, that he would accept the texts of possible agreements to
look them over. I subsequently gave him the text of our accidental war
agreement with the Soviet Union.
had made a similar proposal every year and we did not.consider it very
disarmament, not just nuclear disarmament. I commented that Khrushchev
ment conference, and I recalled that we had in effect rejected this propo-
sal also. He then inquired about the new Soviet initiative in the United
Nations for a world disarmament conference. I noted that although it
was not a formal proposal, we would have to reply; I thought all countries,
whether in the UN or not, would be included. When I asked about the
Chinese attitude, he responded that he thought the Soviet proposal might
be an attempt to reply to the Chinese initiative for a world nuclear disarma-
ment conference, but pointed out that the Soviet idea concerned general
Chou referred to the,Soviet proposal for a five power nuclear disarma-
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useful. Chou then labelled the Soviet proposal unrealistic and an
Chinese propaganda against the U.S.). Nobody really needed to pay
attention to it; it would waste the time and energies of nations. I said
that we would try to deflect discussion on this initiative into specific
subjects and try to treat problems on a regional basis rather than on a
exercise in firing an "empty cannon" (a phrase he had used to describe
global one.
Chinese coolness towards arms control was further demonstrated in
the communique drafting process. I put into our drafts our willingness
to sign with the PRC any arms control agreement that we had made with
other major powers and Chou took this reference out.
I think we have made a useful record in recent months of making clear
to the Chinese that. we are not trying to conclude arms control agreements
at their expense, that we recognize their current lack of interest in the
subject, and that we are always ready to conclude with them any agreement
that we have made with the Soviet Union. . While I do not think they will
want to discuss these subjects seriously in the near future, our stand should
be both reassuring to them and a clear demonstration of reasonableness and
equal treatment.
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American Prisoners in China
As in July, I waited until the final meeting to raise this subject and did
so as asking the PRC ' a favor, not making a formal proposal.. You will
recall that the PRC holds four men: Downey (life) and Fecteau (20 years)
downed on a CIA-sponsored flight in 1952; and Smith and Flynn (no charges)
pilots in Vietnam who went over the border in 1965 and 1967 respectively.
Since July, I had checked into the actual circumstances concerning
Downey and Fecteau whom the Chinese had claimed were CIA agents.
They indeed were, and CIA, for its part, would be willing for us to admit
their activities if this were required to get the men released. In my
talks with Chou, I confined myself to saying that I had found that these
men had engaged in activities that would be considered illegal by my
country. I thus said that our plea had nothing to do with the justice of
the case, on which we conceded that the Chinese had a correct legal
position. However, if, as an act of clemency, the PRC would consider
that they had been sufficiently punished, this would make a very good
impression in the U. S.
-- They had released early this year the old man, Mr. Walsh.
the pilots were relased before the Vietnam war were concluded, this
"might give a bad impression" (i. e., Peking believes it has enough trouble
shortening of sentences if the prisoners behaved well, which
he further defined as confessing to crimes. In response to
my question, he said that they had all confessed.
-- As he had said in July, the Chinese legal process permitted a
In about two months time the PRC might consider lessening
the sentence of some of the men who had behaved well and
they would let us know later what they had in mind.
I said that we would do our best to see that anyone released
would not engage in propaganda against the PRC, and Chou
admitted that Walsh had behaved well since his release.
I then inquired about the two pilots; to my knowledge theirs were unintended
intrusions into Chinese territory and they were victims of the war. Chou
replied that Peking had to deal with these men "in a different light. " If
already with Hanoi).
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.Chou concluded by suggesting that they could move on the two agents
first, pointing out that they had already served long sentences and
that Fecteau's term was almost completed. I said this would mean a
great deal to the American people and we would treat any release as
an act of clemency.
the shortening of Downey's life sentence. If we can reach a settlement
on the Indochina war, we could get the two pilots back as well. All of
this may be possible without our having. to make any public statements
about the activities of our men. However, it is absolutely essential
to keep this information secret, for any public disclosure of Chinese
intentions would almost certainly wreck our chances for early releases.
Thus in the near future we might expect a release of Fecteau and perhaps
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ship.
talking about Taiwan and other major issues, they want to keep the
emphasis there and away from ,areas, which suggest a "normal" relation-
commercial and exchange program fields. In the Warsaw talks they
resisted our approach of focussing on these side issues, and they
made the same point in a note this summer. Even now that we are
I knew in advance that the Chinese would be cool to proposals in the
I sought to meet this resistance head on in my opening statement by
acknowlddging their attitude and explaining ours. We considered progress
in these fields not as a substitute for fundamental agreements but rather
to give impetus to them.' It would keep off balance those who wished to
see the new U. S. -China dialogue fail. Chou and I agreed that such questions
could be discussed by our assistants while we held private talks on the
major issues.
brief and low-key fashion).
and technology, culture, sports, and journalism; and bilateral trade (in
These side discussions touched upon three questions: continuing US-PRC
contacts; exchanges between the two countricn in the fields of science
such as "liaison offices" or "interests sections" in friendly Embassies on
the grounds that the liaison arrangement they had with Japan was entirely
non--governmental and that the presence of a Chiang Kai-shek Embassy in
Washington precluded their establishing an interests section here.
On continuing contacts, the Chinese reaffirmed their backing of a proposal
Chou had made in July - the sending of a high-level U. S. representative
to the PRC from time to time. On several separate occasions I emphasized
your preference for 'mbassador Bruce, whom we hoped would be acceptable
to Peking once the Indochina war was over. Chou did not ccrifirm or deny
acceptability. The Chinese were not interested in more formal contacts .
these would be strictly non-government and limited in number from the
a variety of areas, and the Chinese accepted a representative list of
possible programs. They indicated that while there would be exchanges,
explained the rationale for and outlined a broad spectrum of exchanges in
Cautious interest in exchanges was displayed by the Chinese. Our side
Chinese side.
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When we raised the subject of trade and said we were prepared to liberalize
our restrictions further, they said bluntly that they had absolutely no
interest in the matter. Indeed they were grateful that the USSR and the US
had caused them to be self-reliant.
Of' possible follow-up interest was a strong statement against hijacking-
whatever the motive -.by Chou in one of our private. meetings.
The Chinese disinterest in these subsidiary issues probably stems partly
from a wish to focus more on the fundamental issues in the US-PRC
relationship, and partly from a desire to preserve as much ideological
purity as feasible by not appearing to rush into a too-active program of
contacts and exchanges with the U. S. As for trade, they may not have
defined their goals and probably see little immediate potential in any event.
On the other hand, the Chinese appeared to appreciate our rationale for
seeking to make some progress on subsidiary issues: that this would help
make movement possible on the more fundamental questions and convince
detractors of improved relations that gains could, in fact, be made from
this course. Thus they included references in the draft co::: m rdyuc to
sending a periodic envoy to Peking and to facilitating exchanges in various
fields.
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Wednesday, October 20, 1971
Opening Statements, Agenda, President's Visit
(followed by Banquet, Great Hall of the People)
Thursday, October 21, 1971
Time: 10:30 a. m. - 1:45 p. m.
4:40 p.m., - 7:1 0 p.m..
Great. Hall of the People
Great Hall of the People
Subject: President's Visit, Taiwan, Japan
4:42 p. m. - 7:17 p. m.
Great Hall of the People
United Nations, Indochina
Friday, October 22, 1971
4:15 p.m. .- 8:28 p.m.
Great Hall of the People
Korea, Japan, South Asia, Soviet Union, Arms Control
Saturday, October 23, 1 271
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9:05 p. m. 10:05 p.m.
Guest House (sitting room)
Subject: . President's Visit
Tnv C1't T rt"/CG~7~TCT'1T'.Tt /G"~tf'r.TTCTVTi"T.St ' :VP'C C1NT.V
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Sunday, October 24, 1971
Time: 10:28 a. m.. 1:55 p. m.
Place: Guest House
Subject: General Philosophy and Principles, Communique
(Banquet, Great Hall of the People)
Time: 9:23 p. m.. - 11:20 p.m.
Place:: Great Hall of the People
Subject: Communique, Announcements of Trips
Monday, October 25. 1971
Time:. 10:12 a. M. -. 11:00 a. m.
Place: Guest House
Subjects Communique
Time: 9:50 p.m. 11:40 p. m.
Place: Guest House
Subject: Communique
Tuesday, October 26, 1971
Time: 5c 30 a. m. - 8 :10 a. m.
Place: Guest House
Subject: Communique, Prisoners, Announcements of trips,
Technical Matters
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CONFIDENTIAL
DETAILED ITINERARY OF VISIT TO PEKING
(October 20-October 26, 1971)
Wednesday, October 2.1
8:30 a.m. Arrived Shanghai. Tea and breakfast at Airport Terminal.
(Met by delegation from Peking, headed by the Director of
the North American, Western European, and Australasian
Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by repre-
ssFentatives of Shanghai Foreign Affairs Office, including
the Director)
9:3.0 a.m. Departed for Peking with Chinese delegation aboard.
11:20 a.m. Arrived Peking. Met at airport by Vice Chairman, Mili-
tary Affairs Commission Yeh Chien-ying and Acting For-
eign Minister, Chi P'eng-fei)
Motored to Guest House in Western Peking.
4:20 Departed for Great Hall of the People for group photographs
with Prime Minister Chou En-lai; Vice Chairman Yeh and
Acting Foreign Minister present.
4:40.-7:10pm Brief tea followed by general meeting with Prime Minister
Chou En-lai. Rest of group toured the Great Hall.
7:10-10:l5pm Banquet for all Americans, including the aircraft crew, given
by Prime Minister Chou En-lai, attended by Vice Chairman
Yeh and Acting Foreign Minister.
Thursday, October 21, 1971
10:30am-1:45 Meeting in Great Hall with Prime Minister.
pm
Remainder of party visited Forbidden City
Messrs Jenkins and Holdridge met with Hsiung Shih-hui,
Secretary to the Prime Minister, to discuss subsidiary
issues (10:10 a. m. - 12:30 p.m..)
4:40pm-7:17 Meeting with Prime Minister.
pm
First technical meeting on trip arrangements (4:30-7:00 p, m. )
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CONFIDENNTT1AL
Trip arrangements meeting chaired by Yu Shang, Vice-
Minister of Public Security; and included Han Hsu, Acting
Director of Protocol; Ch'en Ch'tt , Director of Information
Department of Foreign Ministry; Liu Cheng-ching, Deputy
Director of the General Administration of tele-communica-
tions, and Cheng Jui-ai, Director of the Peking Bureau of
the General Administration of Civil Aviation
S:15pm Entire group attended special performance of Peking
Opera ( "Shachiapang) in Great Hall small auditorium hosted
by Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying. Acting Foreign Minister
also present.
Friday,' October 22, 1971
8:00axn-1:00 Departed for visit to Great Wall accompanied by Acting
pm. Foreign Minister and various officials associated with
trip arrangements. Visited Ming Tombs on return trip.
4:15-8:Z8pm Meeting with Prime Minister at Great Hall. (Messrs
Holdridge and Jenkins met with Secretary Hsiung to discuss
subsidipr;r 4-or.as -rd then joined meeting with Prime
Min- ister at about 6:30 p.m.)
9:15pm (aprox.) Friendship store held open for shopping by group.
Saturday, October 23, 1971
9: 00am-noon Visit to Summer Palace, including boat trip on lake,
accompanied on tour by Vice Chairman Yeh and /in car by/
Hsiung.
3:30-7:15pm Trip arrangements meeting at Guest House.
4:00 p.m. Brief visit by Dr. Kissinger to Friendship store.
9:05-10:05pmPrime Minister Chou En-lai came to guest house for private
meeting.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Sunday, October 24, 1971
9:00 a. in. -12 noon Most of group visited Peking Petro-Chemical Factory
about 30 miles from Peking. Escorted by Mayor of
Peking Wang, Vice Minister of Public Security, and
met by Head of Revolutionary Committee of Chemical Plant.
Communications Technical discussion in neighboring guest
house.
10:28a. in. 1:55 pm Prime Minister came to Guest House for private session.
3:00
- 3:55 p. m.
8:15
9:20 p. m.
Trip arrangements group visited guest house where
President will reside, followed by brief technical meeting
(3:30-3:5.5 p.m.)
Peking Duck banquet in Great Hall for entire party hosted
by Prime Minister. Vice Chairman Yeh and Acting
Foreign Minister also attended, along with those involved
in trip arrangements.
9:23 - 11:20 p. in. Private meeting with Prime Minister in Great Hall.
Monday, October 25, 1971
1Q:00
- 11:00 a. m.
10:12
- 11:00 a. m.
Visit to Peking indoor sports arena (gymnasium) for tour
of facilities by group other than Dr. Kissinger. Accom-
panied by Acting Director of Protocol Han Hsu
Private meeting with Prime Minister Chou En-lai at
Guest House.
12 noon-l: 30 p. in. Party visited Temple of Heaven in Peking, escorted by
Mayor of Peking and Acting Director of Protocol.
3:30 - 6:00 p. ni. Most of party visited Peking hospital to witness demonstra-
tion of accupuncture anesthesiology. (These operations
witnessed: lung removal, appendix, and ovarian cyst
removal, as well as several tooth extractions). Mayor of
Peking and Acting Chief of Protocol.accompanied group.
8; 30 10:15 p. m. Group, less Dr. Kissinger, went to neighboring Guest
House for showing of film of July trip followed by movie of
ballet, Red Detachment of Women.
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CONFIDENTIAL - 4
9:50 - 11:40 p. in. Prime Minister came to Guest House for private meeting.
Tuesday, October 26, 1971
5:30 8:10 a. m. Prime Minister came to Guest House for private meeting.
At conclusion of meeting Prime Minister requested to
bid farewell to those in guest house not at meeting.
9:40 a. in. Group departed for airport, accompanied by Vice Chairman
Yeh and Foreign Minister.
10: 30 a. in. Departed Peking, accompanied by Acting Director of
Protocol.
11: 55a.m.
Arrived Shanghai. Met by Director of Shanghai Foreign
Affairs Office. Served lunch in airport lounge.
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WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: My October China Visit: Drafting the
Communique
Prime Minister Chou En-lai and I negotiated a tentative draft commu-
nique for your China trip (attached at Tab A), in the course of going
through seven drafts and eleven hours of meetings during the last two
and'a half days of my visit. During this process Chou was extremely
tough and skillful but also reasonable and broad in outlook. The result
of our efforts is an unusual communique that clearly states differences
as well as common ground between the two countries and reassures
the friends of both sides rather than ra.i.sin.g' anxieties because of the
compromise language, which would be subject to varying interpretations.
A communique along these lines should portray your conversations with
Mao and Chou as being between leaders who stuck by their principles
but had the largeness of perspective to move relations forward despite
profound disagreements.
Our position on Taiwan (page 6) is the only remaining issue. Although
we significantly narrowed our differences on this most painful issue,
including a clear effort by Chou to show some restraint, I said that I
could not accept the final Chinese compromise formulation, that I would
have to check with you, and that we would go back to them with counter-
language.. The rest of the communique remains tentative, of course,
and is subject to change because of events during the next four months
and your talks with the Chinese leaders. But we now have a working
draft which should be acceptable to both sides, though causing both
some domestic problems, and which could never have been produced
under the time and publicity pressure of your stay in China.
Tabling of Conventional U. S. Draft
As reported in separate memoranda, we spent the first three and
a half days of talks establishing the basic framework of arrangements
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for your visit and exploring in depth the various substantive topics we
had covered in July. With this backdrop I tabled a draft communique --
which you had seen -- the evening of October 22 (Tab G). It was highly
conventional, stressing fuzzy areas of agreement and using vague
generalizations. Its basic thrust was to glide over differences and.,
emphasize common ground. I purposely held back our formulations on
specific areas like Indochina, Korea, South Asia, or the military forces
on Taiwan. On the evening of October 23, Chou gave me his initial
reaction. It was that it could serve as a basis for discussion, that
naturally they would want to add their views in some places to show
differences, and that he would send his Acting Foreign Minister to
undertake the redrafting process the next morning.
Sharp Chinese Response
On the morning of October 24, Chou showed up personally instead
and delivered a scorching one-hour presentation --y as he indicated --
at the explicit instructions of Mao. His basic theme was that the
Chinese believed in revolutionary progress rather than a Metternich-type
peace that stressed stability at the expense of justice and was bound to
be short-lived because of its essential oppressiveness. Progress
required struggle not peace, or peace only after struggle. The world
is in turmoil and the small would inevitably overturn the big. We could
not continue to hang onto our old friends if we were entering a new era.
Chou dearly had been ordered by Mao to emphasize the Chinese
revolutionary dogma and reject our effort to submerge differences and
accent cooperation. He said that our basic approach was unacceptable.
Our fundamental differences had to be set forth in a communique; other-
wise the wording would have an "untruthful appearance. " Our present
draft was the sort of banality the Soviets would sign but neither mean
nor observe. The Chinese kept their promises;. they were not afraid to
state disagreements.
accept the basic approach of each side's stating its views so long as we
we started our new relationship by betraying our old friends, and that
problems had to be solved by history, not force. I said that we could
I replied very harshly, saying that Chou's position hadn't surprised
me, but that such language of infallibility and preaching was intolerable
for a communique. I pointed out that the Chinese wouldn't respect us if
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also staked out common ground so as to indicate progress. I empha-
sized that we would reject language that tended to put us on trial or
to humiliate an American President. After explaining the difficulties
with drafting a communique from scratch during your visit, I concluded
by saying that the choice was up to Chou, reminding him that he had
said to an American group that it didn't matter if your trip failed.
Chou affirmed their wish for a successful. visit and asked for a break.
He then agreed to launch into a drafting process.
This exchange foreshadowed our basic positions in the negotiating
process we then embarked upon. Chou's emphasis was on sharp delinea-
tion of our respective positions while my objectives were to dilute the
rhetoric and shorten the length of opposing views, and expand areas of
agreement.
Chinese Counter-draft Stressing Differences
The Chinese worked on a draft all day and, after stuffing us with
roast duck at a banquet, tabled their first draft that evening (Tab F).
It contained very strong rhetoric on their general approach to inter-
national affairs and sharp formulations of Chinese views on specific
issues. Despite my needling, Chou was at first reluctant to hand his
draft over. I responded that I agreed with the basic concept of both
sides plainly, stating their views and then common positions, but that
the Chinese views were phrased in the most intransigent fashion and
you would not travel all the way to China to hear propaganda that one
could read in the -newspapers.
I then voiced our principal objections. In the general section, we
could not have an American President sign a document which said that
revolution has become the irresistible trend of history or that "the
people's revolutionary struggles are just." Nor would we brook reference
to racial discrimination -- while we were equally opposed to it, mention
of it in this communique would be certainly interpreted as a critique of
American domestic problems. There was almost no mention of agreed
principles in international or bilateral relations.
On specific issues, the Chinese draft had us both stating that
Vietnam was the most urgent question for the relaxation of tension in the
Far East, It cited China as "the reliable rear area" and Chinese backing
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S
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for the Indochinese peoples' "fighting to the end for the attainment of
their goal" -- clearly unacceptable phrasing while Americans were
dying or held prisoner in Indochina. The Chinese called for the
complete withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and Japan and the
unconditional return of Okinawa. The draft had both sides agreeing
that Taiwan is the "crucial issue" obstructing normalization of bilateral
relations.. And the Chinese had linked periodic visits of US envoys to
progress on Taiwan; this I rejected too.
I stated that the total impact of their draft would be disastrous and
inconsistent with our self-respect W- the rhetoric must be toned down
and some progress shown. I delayed our scheduled departure from
the next morning to the next afternoon. Our side, then went back to our
Guest House to redraft the better part of the night.
Our counter-draft (Tab E),which we presented the morning of
October 25, took out their most offensive language, put in our own posi-
tions and beefed.up areas of agreement. On specific regional issues
we kept the structure of each side's expressing its views and then a
common position, albeit rather vapidly. I defined our objective as
being to state differences without being offensive and showing a positive
direction without raising false hopes. I again put off our departure, to
the next morning. The Chinese took our draft away, and we once again
endured a lengthy wait until dinner time that night when we got the
second Chinese draft (Tab D).
Because of time pressure we had but two hours to deal with what
remained a tough version. There was still much objectionable Chinese
rhetoric and not enough positive material. The Chinese, had also changed
the structure, lumping regional issues with general views under each
side's position and not attempting to state explicit agreed positions on
these specific questions. Chou explained his reasons:
(1) We should not state common positions for appearance sake,
but only when they in fact exist -- this wasn't really the case for the
regional issues.
(2) The agreements were so vague as to lead each side to explain
its position in contradictory manner giving rise to post-summit contro-
versy.
(3) It gave impressions of Sino-US condominium which was in
neither party's interest.
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I pointed out with melancholy that the Chinese draft still accentuated
our differences in provocative fashion. We had to decide whether we
were starting a new period in our relationship or employing new tactics
in a continuing struggle. We would be condemned for signing such a
document which still had a largely negative cast to it, appealed to revo-
lution, and spoke of supporting the Vietnamese people to the end. I then
gave them our third draft (Tab C) proposing once again reduction of
their offensive phrasing, e. g. on revolution and backing the Indochinese
peoples' struggles, and restoring some positive language of agreement.
I also was somewhat more forthcoming on Taiwan which now was clearly
emerging as the most difficult issue. Making clear that I was stretching
my instructions, I used language that said the US would not challenge
(rather than-merely noting) the views of all Chinese that there is but one
China and indicated progressive reduction of US forces on Taiwan.
During two hours of sparring Chou elaborated some of the philo-
sophic underpinning of their approach to the communique. He drew a
clear distinction between principle and policy execution, in effect
paralleling our approach that we could set a course on certain issues
but time was needed to resolve them.. In this session particularly, but
also in others, he emphasized that while they had to have principles like
troop withdrawals or sovereignty over Taiwan, they clearly could do
without time deadlines. They were in no hurry but the direction must
be clear. Chou was startlingly frank and concrete with respect to our
military withdrawal from Taiwan -- not only would they not press for
a timetable, they actually preferred that some US forces remain so as
to keep the Japanese forces out!
After very candid exchanges, the Chinese took away our draft
for revision at. 11:35 p. m.
Agreement on a Tentative Draft
At 4:45 a. m. , October 26, we were given a. third Chinese draft
(Tab B) which was a considerable improvement. It muted some of their
rhetoric in the direction of our changes and kept most of our additions
of positive language. On Taiwan, they clearly made an effort but their
formulation was still beyond what I could accept.
We met at 5:30 a. m. with four or five fundamental issues remain-
ing. I pointed to a few phrases which remained annoying and to the
deletion of our reference to our honoring our commitments to Korea.
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Chou said that it was a difficult situation because they had accepted
without change our statements of principle, such as individual freedom
and peaceful competition (this was true) while we were trying to dilute
their formulations. There was no question that the two sides have
deep differences and they should be stated. He suggested that it was
extremely difficult to reach agreed language before I left, that this
text was tentative, and that some work could be left until your visit.
I rejoined that the more we could settle now the ,better. Chou agreed
but stressed the need for confidentiality. He then again displayed
reasonableness as he made a further effort to curb some of their language
and agreed to restoration of our Korean language.
We also- had another long exchange on Taiwan during which he made
clear he could budge no further. He pointed out that they had used great
restraint on this question, had thought hard about reformulations which
could meet our concern, and were not stipulating any timetables. How-
ever, there had to be some concreteness or the Chinese people would not
understand. He agreed with me that their objective was to be explicit
on this question while ours was to be ambiguous. In turn I said I was
already operating on the margin of my authority with the formulation
I had proposed and was extremely doubtful that you would consider their
language. We left it that I would discuss this with you and might propose
a new formulation, in which case they might be able to change a couple
of words.
By 8:10 a. m, , we had reached agreement on the tentative draft
at Tab A except for Taiwan (underlined portion) as well as cleaning up
remaining technical issues such as public announcements and statements.
I reaffirmed to Chou that knowledge of this communique would be confined
to the White House. They clearly want secrecy about this document for
the same reasons we do, as well as not to derogate from Mao's authority
before he has had a chance to talk to you.
THE RESULT
The draft communique should serve us better than the conventional type
which contains contrived and ambiguous language. It is an honorable
document in which both sides vigorously and inoffensively set forth
their differing views on the world scene and specific issues. This
reflects the basic reality, which you have been stressing, that there
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are fundamental differences between us and the Chinese. The communique
then states how despite these. differences, we have common interests in
our conduct of international relations and bilateral dealings and how we
propose to further them. There is thus both realism and forward movement.
This paper should prove more reassuring to our friends than a blander
document where they would search for hidden meanings or understandings.
US-PRC joint positions on such questions as Indochina, Japan and Korea
would be all but meaningless given our differences and could only be
expressed in language that each side could interpret as it wished. Such
agreements would either be an artful exercise in semantics or suggest
we and the PRC were negotiating on behalf of third countries (which,
moreover, the communique states that we won't do).
Instead, while the PRC supports its allies, we go clearly on record as
honoring our commitments to Korea and placing the highest value on our
relationship with Japan and honoring our mutual defense treaty obliga--
tions. On the Asian subcontinent our neutrally-phrased position compares
with Peking's pro-Pakistan stance -- this should help us marginally with
India while not really hurting us with Pakistan, for whom we remain the
only real Western friend. On Indochina, we restate our standard position,
and this issue may well have been transformed by the time of your visit.
Some of the Chinese rhetoric in the document is unpleasant and this,
combined with what inevitably will be a painful section. on Taiwan, will
cause us some problems. But Chou took out the most offensive language
such as supporting revolutions and opposing racial discrimination and
generally rounded off the Chinese statements so that they are very mild
in comparison to standard Maoist expressions.
The Chinese hardly need the communique as a propaganda vehicle. They
have many other instruments for that purpose (including now the United
Nations). Indeed the language on Chinese positions, while naturally still
grating on American ears, can only look restrained to any audience
familiar with the usual public lines. In fact, it is difficult to see how
Chou could have gone much further on the language and still preserved
his international and domestic positions. He recognized the points I
made about our own domestic problems and took them into account in.
his redrafting. Furthermore while he let us edit his formulations, he
did not, attempt to change ours -- he even reinserted some language of
ours that we had dropped because we had,deleted some of their phrases.
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?
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Another positive element was Chou's restraint in terms of making any
demands onus. While there is some vigorous rhetoric on .general
principles, the Chinese do not, for example, specifically call for the
withdrawal of our forces from Korea or Japan. Indeed Chou time and
again emphasized that, while in principle foreign forces should be
withdrawn, the PRC was not specifying any time limits.
.Thus the Chinese are willing to pursue their objectives by banking on
the thrust of history. They will continue to be tough, but they essentially
accept our arguments that we can often do more than we say, that the
process must be gradual, and that some issues must be left to evolu-
tionary pressures. This involves great risks for them, at home and
abroad, given their past public demands and dissidents in their own
camp.
Furthermore, they are clearly gambling on your reelection. Chou
specifically pointed out toward the end that they could be in real trouble
if your Administration was not in power to implement our understandings.
He shares what he described as your wish that you preside over the
200th anniversary of America's birth.
All of this does not mean that Chou was easy to deal with -- he emphati-
cally was not. But nevertheless he was able to empathize with our
difficulties and he made an effort to produce language to meet our
concerns. Nor is the communique without domestic and international
problems. But it is fair to say that the problems for Chou and the PRC
are at least as great.
have a communique that is realistic., clear, dignified, reassuring to
our friends and positive for the further development of US-Chinese
In short, if we can navigate the Taiwan issue successfully, we should
relations.
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 People's Republic of China from
President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the
People's Republic of China- at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the
1972. Accompanying
the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon), U. S. Secretary of State William
JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Tentative Draft)
Rogers and Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.
FINAL. DRAFT
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President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist
and The two leaders held
conversation for hours and had an exchange o f views on Sinow
U. S. relations and world affairs.
frank discussions on the normalizatibn of relations between the United States
During the visit, further talks were held between President Nixon
and Premier Chou En.?lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and
of America and the People's Republic of China,
of interest to both sides.
as well, as on other matters
Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:
Also taking part in the talks on the U. S. side were:
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural,
industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured
where they,, continuing di s cu
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During theii meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the United
taking place and great upheavals exist and expounded their respective
States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are
positions and views.
The Chinese side stated that wherever there is oppression, there
is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the
people want progress -> this has become the irresistible trend of history.
All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the
of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according .
The Chinese. side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the
oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people
a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.
small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be
drawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the
to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression,
interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be with
peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment
Viet Nam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the
by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal put forward
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of Korea;" it firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese
militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an
the abolition of the "U. N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971 and the stand for
the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the
Indochinese Peoples; it firmly supports the eight-point programme for
internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the
anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan's
independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan; it firmly opposes
Asian sub-continent.
The U. S. side stated that peace in Asia and peace in the world
required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate
the basic causes of conflict. The U'. S. side believes that the effort to
treat each other with mutual respect and with a willingness to compete
through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should
that have different world outlooks so as to lessen the risks of confrontation
reduce tension is served by improving communication between countries
peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should
claim infallibility and each, country should be prepared to re??examine
its own attitudes for the common good. The U. S. side desires to work
with others to build a just and secure peace: just because it fulfills the
aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom
because it removes the danger of foreign aggression.
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a negotiated solution, and that in the absence of a negotiated settlement it
envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of. all U. S. forces from the region
consistent with the az rni. of true self-determination for each country of
Indochina. The existing commitments between the U. S. and Republic
of Korea would be honored; the United States would support all efforts of
the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased
supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of
the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The U. S. side stated
that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny
without outside intervention; that its constant primary objective has been
communication in the Korean peninsula.
are contrary to the interests of the people cf this region.
negotiations; all attempts to use armed force to settle international problems
The United States placed the
highest value on its friendly relationsNwith Japan and it would continue
to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. The United States urged
India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful
There are essential differences between China and the United States
in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides
agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct
territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states,
non-interference' in the internal affairs of. other states, equality and mutual
their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and
benefit. and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled
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on this basis,
without resorting to the use or threat of force.
The United
States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these
principles to their mutual relations.
With these principles of international relations in mind the two
any major country to collude with another against other countries, or
to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of
interest.
toward the normalization of relations between China
and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
__ both wish to reduce the daz ger of international military conflict;
-> neither s
ould be against the interests of the peoples of the world for
eks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is
opposed to efforts by any other =untry
ony; and
or group of countries to establish
w neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to
enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.
iewed the long-standing serious disputes between
China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position:
The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the 'normalization
of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the
People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan
is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland;
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the liberation of Taiwan is China's
ternal affair in which no other country
has the right to interfere; and the U. S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan.
The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the
creation of "one China, one Taiwan, " "one China, two governments,
"two Chinas, " an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan
remains to be determined. "
The U. S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all
Chinese on either aside of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and
that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States Government does not
challenge that p3sition; it hopes that the settlement of the Taiwan question
consistent with this position will be achieved through peaceful negotiations
and states that it will progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the
U. S. troops and military installations from Taiwan.
The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between
the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively
take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples
and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.
The two sides agreed that the U. S. Government will send a seni.orti
representative to Peking at irregular intervals for concrete consultations
to further the normalization of relations and carry forward negotiations on
issues of common interest.
0.11,
'.The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many
years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present
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frankly to one anothet
They believe .that the normalization of relations between the two countries is
their respective views on a variety of issues. The
two sides .expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit
would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries.
contributes to the relaxation of tension in.Asia and the world.
not only in. the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also
President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the
gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the .
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 First Chinese Draft
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JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Tentative Draft
President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited
the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai
of the People's Republic of China from.
, 1972.
Accompanying the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon,) U. S. Secre-
tary of State William Rogers and Assistant to the President Dr. Henry
ist Party of China on and
During the visit, talks were held between President Nixon and
Premier Choir En-lai. The two sides held extensive, earnest and frank
discussions on the normalization of relations between the United States
of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other
matters of i
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural,
industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured
where they viewed similar places of interest.
the leaders of China and the
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?
2
United States reviewed the international situation in which important
changes are taking place 'and great turmoil exists and expounded their
respective positions. The Chinese side pointed out that wherever
there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence,
nations want liberation and the people want to make revolution this has
become the irresistible trend of history. It must be recognized that
the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems
according to their own wishes and settle the affairs of their respective
countries as independent and sovereign nations. The peoples' revolu-
tionary struggles are just, and they deserve sympathy and support and
absoultely permit of no foreign intervention. The Chinese people firmly
support the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom
and liberation and against 'oppression and racial discrimination and
firmly support the people's' struggles to safeguard the independence,
and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The U. S. side
nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower,
small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong
troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. All nations, big or
foriegn aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign
sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose
declared. that
There are essential difference
in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides
agreed that relations between states should be conducted on the principles
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non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal
of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states,
settled without resorting to the use or threat of force. It would be
r s of other state s, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-
existence, and that on this basis, international disputes should be
way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of interest.
nterests of the peoples of the world for any major country
to collude with another against other countries, or to behave in such a
The two sides stated that neither was prepared to negotiate on behalf
of any third party or to enter into agreement's or understandings directed
Joint Declaration, of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples,
Revolutionary-Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the
Chinese Government fully supports the seven-point proposal for the
peaceful settlement of the Viet. Narn question put forward by the Provisional
relaxation of tension in the Far East. The Chinese side stated that the
The leaders of the two countries held that the Indochina question, .
especially the Viet Nam question, is the most urgent question for the
that the Chinese people pledge themselves to provide a powerful backing
that the Chinese people are prepared to undertake the greatest national
Laos and Cambodia, that Chinese territory
forever remains the reliable. rear area of the three Indochinese peoples and
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s and firmly support the three Indochinese peoples in fighting
to the end for the attainment of their goal. The.U. S. side stated.... .
The two sides agreed that the basic principle guiding the
settlement of the Indochina question is: All foreign troops must withdraw
from the region of Indochina,
and the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and.
should be left to settle their own questions by themselves
free from foreign interference.
the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12,
remains unsettled.. The Chinese Government fully supports the eight-
point programme. for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by
o sides noted that eighteen years have already elapsed since
the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, yet the Korean question
1971; the U. S. troops should withdraw from south Korea completely;
it is impermissible to introduce the Japanese militarist forces into south
Korea; and the "U. N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
abolished. The U. S. side stated ...
The Chinese side expressed its firm opposition to the revival and
States should withdraw all its troops and all its nuclear and military
outward expansion of Japanese militarism, maintained that the United
es from Japan and return Okinawa unconditionally, and held that
an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan may have such
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
armed forces as are necessary for its self-defence. The U.S. side
of the two countries expressed deep concern over
the tension in the south Asian subcontinent. The two sides opposed the
interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan from any quarters by
exploiting the situation in East Pakistan. - The two sides hoped that India
and Pakistan could resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations.
All attempts to disturb peace and use armed force are contrary to the
interests of the people of this region and should be condemned.
The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between
China and the United States and agreed that the Taiwan question is the
crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between the
two countries. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Government
of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China;
Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to
the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in
which no other. country has the right to interfere; and the U. S. troops
must withdraw from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any
advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined. " The U. S.
'F . side state: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side
of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China; the United States
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
Si:
.
only in the interests of the Chinese and American peoples but also conducive
to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the.rld.
States and the normalization of relations between the two countries are not
the withdrawal of all the U. S. armed forces from Indochina. The two sides
held that the settlement of this crucial issue between China and the United
U. S. troops and military installations in Taiwan after it has completed
activities aimed at separating Taiwan from China and will withdraw the
will encourage the Chinese to settle this internal question by themselves
through peaceful negotiations; it will not carry out or support any
The two sides are resolved to work for the attainment of this goal and
have,reached an understanding on certain steps that are to be taken. While
take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples
and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural
the two countries,, the Governments of the two countries would respectively
effecting these steps, the U. S. Government will send senior representatives
to Peking at unfixed intervals for concrete consultations.
The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between
fields.
The two
sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many
years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to
present frankly to one another their respective views on a variety of issues.
The two sides hoped that the gains acheived during this visit would open up
new prospects for the relations between the two countries.
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President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the
Republic of China.
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 JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Tentative Draft)
President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the
` People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou Enylai of the
People's Republic of China from to , 1972. Accompanying
the President on his visit were (Mrs. Nixon), U. S. Secretary of State William
Rogers and Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.
President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist
Party of China on and The two leaders held
conversation for hours and had an exchange o f views on Sino
U. S. relations and world affairs.
of interest to both sides.
FINAL DRAFT
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During the visit, further talks were held between President Nixon
and Premier Chou En-lai. ? The two sides held extensive, earnest and
frank discussions on the normalizati'bn of relations between the United States
of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters
Also taking part in the talks on the Chinese side were:
President Nixon and his party visited -Peking and viewed cultura
Also taking part in the talks on the U. S. side were:
industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured _
where they, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders,
viewed similar places of interest.
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
During their meetings and talks, the leaders of China and the United
States reviewed the international situation in which important changes are
taking place and great upheavals exist and expounded their
a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.
The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the
oppressed people and nations for freedom and, liberation and that the people
of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according
small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be
All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the
espective
The Chinese side stated that wherever. there is oppression, there
is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the
people want progress ..< this has become the irresistible trend of history.
positions and views.
to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression,
interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be with-
drawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to, the
peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment
of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal put forward
by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South
Viet Nam and the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
Indochinese Peoples; it firmly supports the eight-point programme for
the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971 and the stand for
the abolition of the "U. N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
of Korea;" it firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese
militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an
independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan; it firmly opposes
Asian sub-continent.
anyone exploiting the situation in East Pakistan to interfere in Pakistan's
internal affairs, provoke armed conflicts and undermine peace in the
The U. S. side stated that peace in Asia and peace in the world
required efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate
the basic causes of conflict. The U. S. side believes that the effort to
reduce tension is served by improving communication between countries
that have different world outlooks so as to lessen the risks of. confrontation
through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should
treat each other with mutual respect and with a willingness to compete
peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should
claim infallibility and each, country should be prepared to re-examine
its own attitudes for .the common good. The U. S. side desires to work
because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States
aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress, secure
with others to build a just and secure peace: just because it fulfills the
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
?
supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of
the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The U. S. side stated
that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny
without outside intervention; that its constant primary objective has been
a negotiated solutionxand that in the absence of a negotiated settlement it
envisaged the ultimate withdrawal of all U. S. forces from the region
consistent with the ai:21;. of true self-determination for each country of
Indochina. The existing commitments between the U. S. and Republic
of Korea would be honored; the United States would support all efforts of
the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of the tension and increased
communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States placed the
highest value on its friendly relationswith Japan and it would continue
to honor its mutual defense treaty obligations. The United States urged
India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful
negotiations; all attempts to use armed force to settle international problems
are contrary to the interests of the people cf this region.
There are essential differences between China and the United States
in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides
agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct
their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states,
non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states,
equality and mutual
benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United
States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these
principles to their mutual relations.
to behave in such a way as to suggest that it had an exclusive sphere of
It would be against the interests of the peoples of the world
any major country to collude with another against other -countries, or
interest.
With these principles of international relations in mind the two
sides stated that:
>_ progress toward the normalization of. relations between China
and'the United States is in the interests of all countries;
both wish to reduce the dax{ger of international military conflict;
neither seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is
opposed to efforts by any other romtry or group of countries to establish
such hegemony; and
neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to
enter into agreements or understandings directed at other states.
The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between
China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position:
The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization
of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the
People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China; Taiwan
is a part of Chinese territory which has long been returned to the motherland;
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 ?
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the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country
has the right to interfere; and the U. S. troops must withdraw from Taiwan.
The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the
creation of ':'one China, one Taiwan, " "one China, two governments, "
"two Chinas, " an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan
remains to be determined. "
? The U. S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all
Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and
that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States Government does not
challenge that position; it hopes that the u -Cie Taiwan question
consistent with this position will be achieved through peaceful negotiations
and states that it will _progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the
U. S. troops and military installations from Taiwan.
The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between
the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively
take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples
and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.
The two sides agreed that the U. S. Government will send a senior,,
representative to Peking at irregular intervals for concrete consultations
to further the normalization of relations and carry forward negotiations on
issues of common interest.
,The two sides were gratified to have this opportunity, after so many
years without contact between the leaders of their two countries, to present
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
frankly to one another their
They believe .that. the normalization of relations between the two countries is
not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also
contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.
espective views on a variety of issues. The
two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit
would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries.
President Nixon and his party expressed their appreciation for the
gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the .
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23 : LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7 hied Chi.r,esc draft
Acco ranying the President on his visit were
Republic of China from to , 1972.
rreeident L ieh rd 1 :i_xon of the Unites avctes of
America v'iti tcc he eo;:s -c ~ ;~ Republic of China at
the .tion of Premier Chou Inlay of the People's
Z~ixon, } t3.; . eretary s;:4 I.>t. to ;!illif:a;i Roc;ers -qd
Pr?~ ~ i ent iti i x. n met with Ch z rx an Tiaa 'l'f:ce til.n.g Of
natant to the esident Pr. Henry A. Kie:>ini er.
the Cci;in i.znist ?'arty of Ch i.n a on and.
two leaders held, conver,>ati.on
for
hours aw'. hr:Ld an exchx,,nc;e of views:s
. izasa~E?. relvLti_on:: and wdr.id affair
a taring the vin. it, further talks were Iheld betweefx
essidernt l ixort and Premier Chou tvo
held extensive, ea 'nest and frank dif3c-usvioI]`3 or). the
nor.naliz ition of relations between the United ;' to a
tt-1kn, 01,1
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~x.xs.r:Lc~t and the eoples Republic of China,
on other matters of interest to both ::ii;cs.
Also takin&- ;,,ri; in the tali,.s on 't~~c Cltl~aea ;e
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and
viewed .cultural, industrial and agricultural sites,
and they also toured and where
they, continuing. discussions with Chinese leaders,
viewed similar places of interest.
During their meetings and talks, the leaders of
China and the United States reviewed the international
situation in which important changes are taking place
and great upheavals exist and expounded their
respective positions and views.
The Chinese side stated that wherever there is
oppression, there is resistance. Countries want
independence, nations want liberation and the people
N
want progress --- this has become the irresistible
trend of history. It must be recognized that the
people of all countries have the right to choose
their social systems according to their own wishes
and settle the affairs of their respective countries
as independent and sovereign nations, and any foreign
intervention is absolutely impermissible. All nations,
big or small, should be equal; big nations should not
bully the small and strong nations should not bully
the weak. China.will never be a superpower and it
opposes he f;emony and power politics of any kind. Thd
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the
struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for
freedom and liberation and firmly supports the peoples'
right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity of their own countries and
oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and
subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn
to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed
its firm support to the struggle of the peoples of
Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia for, the attainment of their
goal and its firm support to the sr ven---point -proposal,
for the peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam question
put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government
of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the Joint
Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese
Peoples, it firmly supports the eight-point programme
for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by
the Government of the Democratic People's Republic
Korea on April 1 2,, 1971 and the stand for the abolition
of the "U gar loth lead
Gf 6
H 1. .4 kn b:~i .y
fi)
8'-i ppr c c iFlbL..1
-a r
, of Chin.a..
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
January 3, 1972
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PLACE: The Great Hall of the People
Peking, China
DATE: Midnight, January 3, 1972
PARTICIPANTS: Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. CHI P'eng-fei
Vice Foreign Minister
Mr. CHANG Wen-chin, Director of the West
European, American and Australian Affairs, MFA
Mr. HAN Hsu, Director, Protocol Department, MFA
Miss Nancy Tang (Interpreter)
Haig: I am very honored that the Prime Minister is seeing me
personally.
Chou En-lai: Yes, because I heard from Minister Fei and the
Director of West European, American and Australian
Affairs, who both told me that you had important
matters to convey.
Haig: Yes, Dr. Kissinger and the President asked me to
request an audience to give you, in blunt terms, a
soldier's assessments of recent events in South Asia
and discuss them in context of the President's visit.
Chou En-lai: How is Dr. Kissinger? I heard he had a slight cold.
Haig: He has had a touch of the flu but is much better today.
Chou En-lai: You have to be careful here too because it is snowing.
I don't know whether it has snowed in Washington yet.
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 ?
?
?
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Haig: We have had no snow yet. Usually by this time we
would have had snow.
Chou En-lai: This is your first visit to China, I suppose?
Haig: Yes, both myself and Mrs. Hartley. We are very
honored to be here. I said today that my father-in-
law came to China some. 48 years ago for his first
visit to China.
Chou En-lai: 48 years ago. Very interesting. I believe he is still
well? Your father-in-law? 'So you can now write
him a postcard from Peking.
Haig: Yes, his' trip was 48 years ago. Mr. Prime Minister,
I thought what I would like to do is not belabor any of
the special details that we have passed on in our
messages but the Prime Minister will recall that we
took a number of steps during that period.
Chou En-lai: Yes, I remember that you conveyed certain messages
through a certain channel.
Haig: We believe and we have very strong confirmation that
those steps were effective in convincing the Soviet
Union to influence the Indians to accept a cease-fire
rather than to proceed with attacks against West
Pakistan -- in other words to stop short of what had
been their goal against Pakistan. One of those steps
was Dr. Kissinger's reference to the possible can-
cellation of the President's Moscow trip if the conflict
continued. Since the cease-fire has gone into effect,
we have made a very careful assessment of the
overall implications of recent events on the subcontinent
and we have concluded that up until recently the Soviet
policy on the subcontinent has been, in general, to
keep the subcontinert divided. This was manifested
in their performance during the earlier conflict between
India and Pakistan but we think they have decided on a
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY - 3
rather precipitous shift in their policy to adopt one in
which they would now seek to encircle the PRC with
unfriendly states. We believe that this modified
Soviet strategy has evolved as a'result of recent
events and has caused them to overhaul their former
strategy for the subcontinent. We also noted when
the crisis developed. that the Soviets tried very hard
to divert us from the course that would converge with
the policy of the People's Republic. In short, they
sought to influence us to maintain a hands off policy.
During the period when this crisis started to develop,
they invited Dr. Kissinger to visit Moscow personally
on several occasions as guest of Mr. Brezhnev. They
also offered to reach agreements with us in the
accidental attack and provocative attack areas, all
of which we rejected. We rejected these approaches
by the Soviet Union on two grounds -- one was on the
grounds of principle. We felt we had certain obliga-
tions with respect to Pakistan and we felt we could
not tolerate use of force to dismantle that country.
But we also rejected the Soviet approaches because
we felt that the future viability of the PRC was of the
greatest interest to us and a matter of our own
national interest.
Again, speaking the blunt language of a soldier, I
would not be so naive to infer that this is a pre-
cipitous shift in our attitude which has suddenly
developed after the years of differences which have
divided us. Rather, we have arrived at these con-
clusions because we are convinced that the Soviet
strategy is first to neutralize the People's Republic
and then turn on us. Therefore, our intersts are
self interests. I would want this clearly understood.
Since the cease-fire has gone into effect between India
and Pakistan, we have carefully assessed subsequent
Soviet actions and we are convinced that they intend
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 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/07/23: LOC-HAK-467-5-1-7
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
to continue their efforts to encircle the' People's
Republic. We say this based on a number of factors.
Included among those factors are their repeatedly
announced support for the Bangladesh, and their
offer to move advisers and assistance into East
Pakistan, the recently announced visit of Soviet
Foreign Minister Gromyko to Japan and, above all,
their stepped up expressions of support for Hanoi
in its conduct of the war, as well as increased
Soviet materiel support for Hanoi. In the context
of what I have just said, I would also like to comment
very briefly on the recent decision of the U. S.
Government to launch a series of limited aerial
attacks against North Vietnam.
This was a decision that was taken only with the
most careful thought and with the greatest reluctance.
We believe that our policy with respect to the war in
Southeast Asia is very clear at this point. We have
undertaken every reasonable step to bring the conflict
to an early conclusion. On the 11th of October, we
transmitted to Hanoi the most forthcoming set of
proposals for settlement of that conflict that we could
conceivably develop, including the offer to have the
current leader in Vietnam step down prior, to a post-
settlement election. In the face of these proposals,
no one can doubt that we have any intention of main-
taining our presence in South Vietnam. We have told
Hanoi, that we would withdraw and withdraw totally
and they understand this. Despite these proposals
of October 11th, we have yet to receive any response
from Hanoi nor have we even received from them
an expressed willingness to discuss these proposals
in Paris as we have offered to do.
?
Instead, from Hanoi, we'have seen a step-up of
attacks in Cambodia and Laos. We have seen increased
attacks against our unarmed reconnaissance aircraft
over North Vietnam. We have seen the continued de-
velopment of Hanoi's supply route through the de-
militarized zone and we have seen rocket attacks
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 ?
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY__ EYES ONLY - 5
against-populated centers in South Vietnam. We have
seen increasing numbers of missile attacks from
sanctuary in North Vietnam against our air forces
in Laos. These actions we could not but interpret
as an effort by Hanoi to humiliate the United States --
a humiliation that no great power can accept. In this
context, our retaliatory strikes were launched. Also
in this context, future U. S. air activity over North
Vietnam will be directly related to Hanoi's future
actions. For our part, our strongest wish is to
settle the conflict as quickly as possible and on terms,
the fairness of which cannot be doubted. On the other
hand, we cannot subject ourselves to the kind of
humiliation which Hanoi's actions seem designed to
achieve.
?
In the context of what I have just said, we have con-
cluded that the continuation of the war in Southeast
Asia can only give.Moscow an opportunity to increase
its influence in Hanoi and to further the encirclement
of the People's Republic. We feel strongly that Moscow
is urging Hanoi in the direction of continued military
action and as such, they are forging another link in
the chain which is designed to constrain the People's
Republic. In all of these circumstances, we also
believe that President Nixon's visit takes on a new
and immediate significance which transcends its earlier
importance. In the context of the events I have just
described, i. e. , the immediate effect to the People's
Republic and the revised Soviet strategy, the
President's visit is not only one of long term historic
significance -- the original motivation and the guiding
force underlying the visit -- but now we see an
immediate significance which must now be considered
with respect to the President's visit. In the light of
our own strategic interests -= America's strategic
interests which I described earlier -- we are con-
vinced of and dedicated to the proposition that the
viability of the People's Republic should be maintained.
We have accepted this premise in full consideration of
those things which divide us. We recognize that these
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 ?
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
differences are both ideological and practical in
nature.' On the other hand, just as Dr. Kissinger
outlined to you earlier, Churchill was willing to
cooperate with Stalin in order to cope with the
greater danger of Hitler Germany. We feel that the
United States and the People's Republic must concert
at this critical juncture. We are prepared to use our
resources as we did during the crisis between India
and Pakistan to attempt to neutralize Soviet threats
and to deter threats against the People's Republic.
In sum, this is an overly generalized and soldier's
blunt elucidation of Dr. Kissinger's and the President's
views. It suffers from brevity and hence the over-
simplification which a more careful exposition would
avoid. We have considered some of the implications
of this assessment and we have asked ourselves in the
short to m what the United States could do within the
context of this assessment to deal with some of the
events which we think could occur in the future. One
of the steps we are prepared to do unilaterally and
without any reciprocity on the part of the People's
Republic -- is to provide you with our assessments
of the Soviet threat which exists against the People's
Republic to the degree that our own technical resources
are able to do so. I would emphasize that these would
be steps taken without condition and without reciprocity
and Dr. Kissinger has asked me to inform you that
when he arrives with the President he would be ready
to discuss the modalities of furnishing this information,
perhaps through a third country or through whatever
other means you might prefer.
An additional implication of the assessment I have
just provided is the fact that we have a major problem
developing within the United States which your
Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Huang Hua
can confirm, and Miss Tang has observed first hand
also. This is a strange merger of forces within the
United States -- all dedicated to either preventing the
President's visit to Peking or to contributing to its
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failure. The forces which have converged are com-
posed of first the American Left which is essentially
pro-Soviet and if it is not truly dominated by Moscow
in that sense of the word, it is at least strongly
attracted toward Moscow and future U. S. alignment
with Moscow. In this instance, the Left has been
joined in a strange wedding with those conservative
elements who are strong supporters of Taiwan.
A third area of difficulty for us in the United States
is a degree of bureaucratic haggling concerning the
wisdom of the initiative to visit Peking.
All of these factors have converged in a way which
poses a very serious threat to the success of the visit.
In the short run, these forces would hope to prevent
the visit at all in the longer run, they would hope
to prevent or deter the normalization of relations
between the People's Republic and the United States.
For this reason, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger
are all the more concerned about making President
Nixon's visit a success not only in reality but also in
the appearance of the visit itself. Thus, we feel it
must succeed in both fact and in appearance.
Unfortunately, most American journalists are shallow
idiots. They draw their editorial line from the
immediate atmospherics of the situation and from
what is essentially the instantaneous reporting of a
set of circumstances rather than from a careful analysis
of the realities and implications of these realities.
For" this reason, it is crucial that there be no public
embarrassment to the President as a result of his
visit to Peking. It is in our mutual interest that the
visit reenforce President Nixon's image as a world
leader. I have brought several journalistic efforts
of recent weeks from some of our more important
newspapers, such as the New York Times, which I
would like to leave with the Prime Minister so that
he can see how these forces have been working in
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the United States against both the normalization of
relations and the President's visit. In the light of
these trends, we would hope that between now and
Dr. Kissinger's visit that perhaps certain steps
could be taken --! one might be some strengthening of
the positive aspects of the Joint Communique which
was worked out so satisfactorily during Dr. Kissinger's
visit. We are thinking along the lines of a possible
reference to trade or something that would give an
immediate sense of accomplishment as a result of the
visit, such as increased scientific or cultural ex-
changes.
Finally, the most crucial issue in the Public Com-
munique which would be released at the time of the
President's visit is the unresolved issue of the status
of Taiwan. You will recall that Dr. Kissinger left
without this language being agreed upon. We have
looked at this problem from two perspectives. The
first is what we will actually do about Taiwan in the
future and second, is what we will say about Taiwan
in conjunction with the President's visit. In order
for us to be, very bluntly, anti-Soviet and pro-People's
Republic, we must have the support of the American
conservatives. As I pointed out, this support is
intimately linked today to the issue of Taiwan. At
this point, I would like to categorically reaffirm
what Dr. Kissinger told you about our future policies
towards Taiwan:
First,, we will do nothing to encourage or support
the movement towards an independent Taiwan. Second,
we will do nothing to encourage or to support
Japanese efforts to manipulate the future of Taiwan
either through the independence movement or a
Japanese presence in Taiwan..
And third, we will withdraw war-related U. S.
forces from Taiwan as soon as the war has been
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concluded. Also, over the longer period we will
gradually reduce our presence there.
In summary, the United States finds itself caught
between the dilemma of a Left Wing which is dominated
by forces friendly to the Soviet and by the Right Wing
which is dominated by pro-Taiwan forces. For this
reason, and in the light of all the considerations I
have mentioned tonight, we would urge you to reconsider
very carefully the language in the Joint Communique
that pertains to Taiwan and, hopefully, to agree to
a formulation that is somewhat less truthful and some-
what less precise than the language which Dr. Kissinger
carried away with him during his last visit. I have
brought another version of the paragraphs pertaining
to Taiwan which I would like very much to leave with
you, on an ad referendum basis. Perhaps when Dr.
Kissinger arrives there can be further discussion
on this subject. In -the interim, Dr. Kissinger felt
that you should have our assessment of what we con-
sider to be the overriding strategic implications of
Soviet actions and strategy. We have made some
very careful soundings since Dr. Kissinger's return
and we know that the language that was considered
during his visit would cause an uproar in the United
States. This, we feel, would only strengthen the
very forces that are working against the visit itself
and the implications of that visit for the future of
both of our countries.
That concludes the strategic assessment of the
President's and Dr. Kissinger's or rather my inter-
pretation of that assessment. I must apologize for
its bluntness but I felt that you would appreciate this
kind of candor. Candor was certainly the characteristic
of Dr. Kissinger's discussions here and especially
those with the Prime Minister.
?
I do have several minor administrative matters to raise
in this very restrictive form and in such a way that the
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rest of our party would not be privy to them. With
your approval, I will discuss them now.
Chou En--lai: Yes. Go ahead.
Haig: First, Dr. Kissinger considers that it is essential
that he attend all the meetings between the President
and yourself and whatever meetings might occur be-
tween the President and the Chairman. That is the
first item.
Secondly, Dr. Kissinger again asked me to emphasize
the essentiality of having concurrent meetings at the
level of the Foreign Ministry and the Department of
State which would occur whenever the President
would meet with you and with the Chairman. It might
pose a challenge of some magnitude to have sufficient
substantive topics to cover but we are confident that
together we can accomplish that constructively.
Next, I.would like to reiterate what I have given to
your very hospitable representatives today and that
is that the composition of our party is made up of
many technicians. Some of them are not governmental.
They are all great advocates of their particular
specialty. They may, during their visit here, be the
source of some abrasive demand or requirement which
would run counter to our mutual best interests. I
want to emphasize if there are any demands of that
kind that develop at the technical level you should not
feel obliged to accept them but rather bring them to
me so that no technical matter can be permitted to
act as a source of irritation or detract from the success
of this visit.
Each of our representatives who has been to China
before now has returned with the greatest respect
and admiration for the hospitality and for the pro-
fessionalism and skill of your representatives. I am
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determined to keep that high level of cooperation and
respect alive during this visit and I am prepared to
take whatever steps you or your representatives might
feel necessary to insure it. Therefore, I would again
urge that anything your side feels may be counter-
productive is brought directly to my attention.
One last very minor thing, Mr. Prime Minister, is
that Dr. Kissinger was concerned because just
before I left a female television personality called
him and told him she was going to contact your
Ambassador in New York and try to get him on her
show and to use Dr. Kissinger's name to get him on
the show. Dr. Kissinger wanted you to know that he had not
given approval for this and felt that this was totally
a Chinese matter as to whether the Ambassador ap-
pears or not.
Chou En-lai: We have not gotten mews of this yet.
Haig: The commentator is a Miss Nancy Dickerson
Chou En-lai: So she approached Ambassador Huang Hua about that?
Haig: If she has not already, she will probably do so soon
and she may use Dr. Kissinger's name.
I thank you for your rather clear notification. Of
course, you have said you have not gone into great
detail but we understand the general idea. And, of
course, we must report this to Chairman Mao Tse-tung
and also must consult with other colleagues. Therefore,
I am not able to give an official reply. However, I
would like to comment on what you have said. The
first thing is just as you mentioned that the coming
together of our two countries would be beneficial to
the promotion of the normalization of relations be-
tween our two countries and also to the relaxation
of tension in the Far East. We believe this will not only
be beneficial to the U. S. but also to the People's
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Republic of China and also to the peoples of our two
countries and to the people in the Far East.
The second point is that Soviet meddling in the South
Asian subcontinent and in Indochina, in my opinion,
is not due to a change in the strategic policies of the
Soviet Union but rather a necessary consequence of
reaction on the part of the Soviet Union toward the
coming closer between China and the United States.
And I mentioned this to Dr. Kissinger during his
first visit to China -- that we were anticipating to
shoulder, to bear the consequences of this coming
together of U. S. and China and that we were prepared
for this and we do not, therefore, find it to be un-
expected. For instance, the question of the sub-
continent. It was because the Sino-American Com-
munique of July 15 -- the first announcement of
July 15th, your time, was published that the Soviet-
Indian Treaty, a so-called treaty which was actually
a military alliance, came into being after having been
delayed for two years. It was finally signed in
Delhi in August and it can be said that Pakistan did
not deal with that very earnestly at that time.
Of course, this is not something that either China or
the United States could do for them as their friend.
And, therefore, when later on in December, the
situation had already become rather urgent, when
we.heard of Dr. Kissinger's information about the
policy as adopted by the United States, we considered
that although it was rather late at that time already,
we considered that that was the only possible policy
that could be adopted at that time. Of course, now,
the question of the subcontinent has become compli-
cated. And we believe that it will continue to develop.
And if the United States Government has any other
new further opinion with regard to this situation, we
are willing to hear it. Because the obstruction of
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India's advance toward West Pakistan is only a
temporary phenomenon. And with the development
of the already complex situation on the subcontinent,
will undergo still more changes. And, therefore,
in the interim period from now until the visit of
your President to China, if the U. S. Government
has any new information it would like to convey,
we are willing to exchange opinions on the situation
in the area.
?
I would like to say also, very frankly, that our
opinions differ from yours on Vietnam. We believe
that it was not necessary for the U. S. Government
to bomb North Vietnam in such a way as President
Nixon has never done since he has taken office, as
he did around Christmas last year. And, in addition,
this action wa:i taken after President Nixon had
withdrawn I believe around 400, 000 troops from
South Vietnam, and, therefore, this action made it
even more unacceptable to the people of the world,
including the people of the United States and this
was also reflected in the press of the United States.
And this also occurred at precisely the time when
President Nixon declared to the world around
Christmas that he wished to move toward relaxation
of tension and toward peace in the world. And if we
should say that Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean
and in the South Asian subcontinent have increased,
we should say that they were led into that area by
India. But if we should say that the Soviet Union
was given an opportunity to increase its influence
and its force in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
then we should say that it was assisted by the recent
action of the United States. Because as I remember,
when Dr. Kissinger was here discussing things with
us, he expressed particular admiration and apprecia-
tion of the fifth point put forth by Madame Binh of the
Republic of Vietnam. The basic spirit of that clause
was to change South Vietnam and Indochina into a non-
allied area, i. e., an area which would maintain
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peaceful and friendly relations with all sides. And
this would be beneficial to the relaxation of tension
in Southeast Asia. It would also be beneficial to the
improvement of relations between the United States
and China. However, now the U. S. bombing has
increased the Soviet influence and tension in this
area. Of course, this is not of great consequence
to us but it is quite bad for the local area. It will
make the situation in all of Southeast Asia tense and
it will also be a matter of great concern to the people
of the U. S. and the world and it will not be favorable
toward the ending of the war in that area.
Originally, we were waiting to convey these views
to President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger when they
come later on but since you have now mentioned these
matters, we think this is also another opportunity to
advance some of our opinions. Of course, this is also
just an initial exchange and I believe we will have
another opportunity to exchange opinions. And, of
course, as you said, this exchange is limited to us
two .
And as for the third factor, we have taken into con-
sideration the fact that you have certain internal problems
which we see from the press and also Dr. Kissinger
mentioned it during his previous visits and we have
also felt the three forces which you mentioned. I
would also like to ask something very bluntly and to
you as you are a military man. Is it that the Pentagon
also has differing opinions?
?
Haig: Some elements in the Pentagon have differing opinions
but those who are the most responsible and strategic
thinkers are in full agreement with this initiative and
the visit of the President.
Chou En-lai: As for the two questions -- the two issues that Dr.
Kissinger raised about the Joint Communique.
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The first is essentially a question of trade. We under-
stand this proposal and we can also see from American
opinion that they are also attaching importance to this
question and this is also an issue that carries weight.
The second is the suggestion you have brought from
Dr. Kissinger about the wording of the part about
Taiwan. In our opinion, the paragraph that we have
written down -- I am not speaking about the part
the Chinese says but the part that the U. S. side says.
We believe that in the wording of that part we have
fully taken into consideration the present dilemma
that you just now mentioned between the United States
Government and the forces you mention from the Left
and the Right because this is a force of crucial sig-
nificance to the United States but since you have
brought a new opinion, we would be willing to take it
into consideration, because as we have mentioned
before we are always willing to get the work done as
best as possible because you must work with a view
toward the future. And also Dr. Kissinger has already
given some hints about this question to the press -- five
points, isn't that so?
t
Haig: Five points?
Chou En-lai: You have not seen them? A Minister of Japan -- we
found it in the Japanese press. They were representatives
of the Democratic Socialist Party -- the leader of that
party.
Haig: He did talk to him.
Chou En-lai: And he announced these five points to the Japanese press.
Haig: I don't recall Dr. Kissinger using five points.
Chou En-lai: We have been trying to get a copy.
Haig: I will find out about that. I did not sit in at the meeting.
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Chou En-lai: We will try to get a copy and give you an English
translation. Of course, it quoted Dr. Kissinger
and these words came from the Japanese. As for
the specific questions you later mentioned (admini-
strative questions), we don't think there is any
question to that because we believe during his
second visit Dr. Kissinger mentioned these points.
I believe we can cooperate very well on them. Of
course, you can continue discussions with Acting
Foreign Minister Fei, either directly or you can
have separate group discussions with various other
people. Of course, we will not do anything to
embarrass you and if anything comes up at lower
levels, they will not be settled there. They will be
brought to you.
As for your- plans for this present visit to China,
there are two suggestions. One was that you would
spend a greater portion of your time in Peking and
then- go to Shanghai and Hangchow for a visit.
Another would be you would stay here for a short
time -- then go to Shanghai and Hangchow and come
back here. In my personal opinion, it would be
better to have all issues decided in Peking and then
go to other places. It would be economizing on the
time. But, of course, if you would like to wait for
a reply from Washington before you would like to
finalize certain details or if you have other political
matters to discuss later on, then a return trip would
be better. Either question is entirely up to you to
decide.
Haig: I think, at first glance, we would favor a longer time
here and then the trip to the other two locations and
depart from there. I think we will know that better
after we have had discussions of the schedule
tomorrow morning at the plenary sessions, after
which we could decide. But I believe that this would
be the best way to proceed.
Chou En-lai: I am sorry to have taken up too much of your sleep.
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Haig: I am honored that you have taken this time to see me.
Chou En-lai: I am also very happy to have been able to meet you.
Anyway, if you are going to contact Dr. Kissinger,
please send my regards to him.
Haig: - I will do so.
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PLACE: The Great Hall. of the People
Peking, China
DATE: 11:00 A.M., January 6, 1972
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. CHI P'eng-fei, Acting Foreign Minister
Mr. HAN Hsu, Director, Protocol Department, MFA
General A. M. Haig, Jr.
Miss Nancy Tang (Interpreter)
FM Chi: So you went to see the Palace Museum this morning?
Gen Haig: Yes, we had a most enjoyable visit there. It was just
marvelous and extremely educational.
FM Chi: The only thing -- it is rather cold in the morning.
Gen Haig: It is cold, but it serves to wake you up.
FM Chi: Yes, it is good to wake you up.
Gen Ham: It also helps the appetite.
FM Chi: That is a good thing.
?
Gen Haig_ I will do what Dr. Kissinger did while he was here -- put
on weight. First, Mr. Minister, I thought I would like to just
reiterate and reemphasize personally that I am very grateful for the
personal cooperativeness that we are receiving at every level from
your people. I am somewhat embarrassed to find that some of our
people, have come with all the answers and have not operated with as
much efficiency as I would have preferred. This has required
additional patience and assistance from your side which has certainly
not been lacking.
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FM Chi: I heard that they have had rather smooth and rather good
discussions in the groups.
Gen Haig: Everything has been superior in the exchange of views but
I find that the network people have sometimes not performed as
effectively as I would have liked.
FM Chi.: They seem to be doing alright.
Gen Haig: ? You are too kind. I did have some other followup informa-
tion to our meetings of early Tuesday morning with the Prime Minister.
I immediately reported in great detail that morning to Dr. Kissinger
the results of the discussions with the Prime Minister. And he replied
to me first that he received my report with no little nostalgia and he
felt that in replying to my message that he wanted to again extend his
personal greetings to each of you that had worked with him so
cooperatively and in such a friendly spirit in October and July.
FM Chi; We would also like to thank him.
Gen Haig: One of the first items I mentioned to the Prime Minister
was our hope that we could strengthen the positive actions of the
Draft Communique. And when the Prime Minister replied to me he
mentioned that this was primarily a problem of trade. I wanted to
reemphasize that we were thinking also of cultural and scientific
exchanges between the two sides -- that we might wish to consider
improved language with respect to these two items as well as trade.
In line with this, when Dr. Kissinger and the President come in
February, they will have some additional proposals for exchange in
the cultural and scientific area, as well as some ideas for your
consideration in the area of trade, recognizing that this must come
very slowly and it is not the kind of thing we would anticipate
immediate action on but maybe some words of future promise. And
we would welcome if between now and the visit you care to communicate
further on this, perhaps in the Paris channel or, if you prefer, to
wait until the party arrives and there could be some further discussion.
Concerning the draft alternative language I left ad referendum with
respect to the U. S. portion of the paragraph on Taiwan, we would
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welcome any additional views which your side might have before
I return to the United States and we would be prepared to accept
and consider any additional or alternate language that you might
care to give before I leave. In any event, we would.anticipate that
this subject would always be the result of direct exchanges here in
Peking between you and myself while I am here or Dr. Kissinger and
the President after they arrive.
Now, also, during the meeting on Tuesday morning, the Prime
Minister conveyed the thought that he would welcome any additional
views we have on the subject of South Asia and the subcontinent
before any meetings with President Nixon. With your side's approval,
we would like to send some additional views on this subject through
the Paris channel between now and the 21st of February. And for
now, I would like to emphasize that our policies there will focus on
efforts to buy time and to strengthen the defense capabilities of
Pakistan. We certainly share the Prime Minister's concern that
that situation is far from settled and is still in a period of dynamism
which will require the most careful watching and perhaps action on
both our parts. We have been using our influence just before and
since the cease-fire to get Turkey and France to help in the arms
situation in Pakistan.
?
FM Chi: Turkey and France?
Gen Haig: Yes. Turkey and France and this was a topic discussed
between Presidents Nixon and Pompidou in the Azores. Concurrently,
we are starting up our economic program for Pakistan at a greater
level of assistance than heretofore. Now, turning to the topic of
Southeast Asia which was also discussed with the Prime Minister
on Tuesday morning, Dr. Kissinger has asked me to reiterate our
government's view that it is Moscow which is blocking the arrival
at a peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict. He has asked
me to recount in somewhat greater detail the sweeping proposals
which we have made in search of a settlement of the conflict. We
had, as I stated earlier, a meeting scheduled for the 20th of
November with representatives of Hanoi in Paris. They cancelled
that meeting and since that time, we have heard nothing from Hanoi.
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Vietnam, as Dr. Kissinger stated in October, is an anguishing
problem for our government. In this sense, it was not the
Nixon Administration that got us into the conflict but he, of course,
has the problem of terminating the conflict.
Dr. Kissinger has also asked me to emphasize that when he met
with Mr. Le Duc Tho in Paris in July, after the visit to Peking,
he informed Mr. Le Duc Tho that the United States wished to end
the war in Hanoi aLA not in Peking. During the past year, we have
done the following specific things with respect to the conflict:
. On May 31st of last year, Dr. Kissinger met with Minister
Xuan Thuy and proposed seven U. S. points for ending the war. One
of these points was an offer on our part to set a deadline for our
withdrawal.
Then, on June 26th, Mr. Le Duc Tho came to Paris and met
secretly with Dr. Kissinger. At that time, Hanoi proposed nine points
in reply to the seven points we had proposed in May.
Then, on July 1st, Madame Binh published her seven
points and as Dr. Kissinger pointed out to the Prime Minister in
October it was very odd procedure from our perspective to be
given nine points secretly and seven points publicly.
So, on July 12th, on his return from Peking, Dr. Kissinger
met with Mr. Le Duc Tho in Paris, again secretly, and at this
meeting we inquired of Mr. Le Duc Tho which we should deal with --
the nine points or the seven points and Mr. Le Duc Tho said the nine
points were more significant -- the ones we had gotten secretly. In
view of that response, it was very difficult for us to deal publicly with
the seven points of Madame Binh when we were told that the more
significant points were the nine secret points given by Mr. Le Duc Tho.
Despite the confusion that came from these different views,
on August 16th, we made a formal eight point proposal which constituted
our reply to the secret nine points, as well as a reply to the seven points
made publicly by Madame Binh. In this reply in August, we actually
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went very far toward the seven and nine points of the other side
and even included their specific language in our proposal on
several of the key points.
On September 13th, Dr. Kissinger again went to Paris
secretly. On this occasion, as on the preceding occasion in August,
Mr. Le Duc Tho found it inconvenient to come from Hanoi to meet
with Mr. Kissinger and, instead, he met with Mr. Xuan Thuy.
Nevertheless, at this meeting, Mr. Xuan Thuy rejected two of the
eight points Dr. Kissinger had forwarded in August. As a result of
this rejection, we then reformulated those two points and submitted
eight new points on October 11. Of those eight points, six are
identical to those already accepted by Hanoi, and the other two
points constituted reformulation of the points which Hanoi had
rejected in September.
. We then requested a secret meeting on November 1. As I
pointed 'out earlier, since then we have had no substantive reply
or exchange from Hanoi. In our view, our proposal of October went
as far as anyone could possibly go. So, we were faced with intransigence
not after we struck North Vietnam in December but well before. Among
the proposals we offered in October were the following:
1. A specific offer for a fixed date for the withdrawal of our
forces.
2. The provisions for new elections six months after a peace
treaty would be signed.
3. A specific offer that all American troops would be withdrawn
one month before this election.
4. The specific offer that the President and the Vice President
of Vietnam would resign one month before the election so that they
would not run it.
In addition to this proposal, the United States reiterated to Hanoi and
reiterates here, our readiness to accept a post-settlement nonaligned
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Southeast Asia. Specifically, what we visualized under our proposal
would be the immediate signature of a statement of principles by
both sides on which a settlement would be based. We would then
withdraw all American forces except a few thousand within seven
months of the signing of these principles. And we would do this even
before the signature of a.final peace treaty. There is also the
provision for an all-around cease-fire and the resignation one month
before the election of President Thieu and his Vice President.
Therefore, in the broadest sense we feel we have replied positively
to every demand that Hanoi has made that is reasonable and does not
constitute a direct humiliation of the United States as a world power.
It is this sequence of events which has led to the conclusion on our
part that the war continues in Southeast Asia only for Soviet aims.
Certainly, no Asian power or no patriotic Vietnamese element can
fear our eventual domination. It is interesting that just this week
we have learned that New Delhi is going to upgrade its representation
in Hanoi very soon. And certainly this is an ominous further clarifica-
tion of what Soviet aims must be along the southern flank of the People's
Republic of China. I will not elaborate further on this topic during my
visit but I would hope that there could be some very frank exchange of
views on some of the more recent indications of increased Soviet
strategy of encirclement.
Now, also during Tuesday morning's meeting, the Prime Minister
raised the December 16, 1971 issue of the Japanese Weekly Shuhan
Gendai, a copy of which was furnished to me yesterday (attached).
This was an article allegedly written by the Director of Propaganda for
the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan. The article also allegedly
portrayed the substance of a discussion between Mr. Kasuga and
Dr. Kissinger in Washington. As I confirmed on Tuesday morning
to the Prime Minister, Dr. Kissinger had met with Mr. Kasuga in
Washington. However, that meeting lasted just 30 minutes, not two
hours as the article indicates. During the meeting, Mr. Kasuga raised
several questions associated with the President's visit here to Peking
and persisted strongly in attempting to get some U. S. view on Taiwan
from Dr. Kissinger. I have informed Dr. Kissinger of the contents of
this article following the discussion Tuesday morning with the Prime
Minister, and he has replied by providing me with a text of the precise
minutes of his meeting with Mr. Kasuga. Dr. Kissinger also has
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reiterated personally to me, in addition to providing me with the
minutes, that he gave no reply to Mr. Kasuga with respect to the
future status of Taiwan. My personal review of the minutes of
that meeting confirm categorically that Dr. Kissinger deflected all
questions on the subject. Instead, he referred to his press conference
which occurred on the Tuesday before the December 3rd meeting
with Mr. Kasuga and offered to give him a copy of that press conference,
with which I know you are familiar. In commenting on the Japanese
press article, Dr. Kissinger asked me to convey the following message
to the Prime Minister. In Dr. Kissinger's view, the only press which
is less reliable than our own is that of the Japanese. He also asked me
to reiterate again what I stated on Tuesday morning to the Prime Minister
and in somewhat more detail concerning our view on the future of Taiwan.
Tuesday morning, I cited three specific policies of the United States with
respect to Taiwan. Dr. Kissinger has reformulated these assurances
in terms of five specific poi-its. First, the United States will withdraw
Southeast Asian-related forces within a reasonable period after the
end of the Indochina war. Second, the United States will gradually
withdraw the reminder of its forces as tensions ease. Third, the
United States will give no support to the return of the Japanese presence
in Formosa or to the introduction of Japanese troops in that location.
Fourth, the United States will make no further reference to the status
of Formosa as being undetermined. And, fifth, the United States
will offer no encouragement to the so-called Taiwan independence
movement. This is the essence of the guidance I have received from
Dr. Kissinger and I think completes the response to all of the untended
issues which arose on Tuesday morning.
FM Chi: First of all, I would like to thank General Haig for conveying
Dr. Kissinger's message. And I will convey it to Premier Chou En-lai.
And if Premier Chou En-iai has any considerations of any other
discussions or any other messages we will further inform you. So,
there is nothing further on our side.
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Gen Hail: Very good.
(following as we were walking out)
FM Chi: After all the groups have finished their meetings, do you
think there is any further need for a meeting between us?
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Gen Haig: I am just a little concerned about the networks portion.
Everything else has gone beautifully and I think we are in very good
shape. There are some unsettled problems in terms of television
coverage. I am hoping it will, be resolved this morning. If not,
we may have to delay 24 hours. I hope this does not occur because
I know this is a terrible burden on you and I am very anxious for us
to finish on schedule.
FM Chi: I believe it may be solved very quickly. I do not believe
there is any great obstruction.
Gen Haig: That group is commercially oriented. This is business to
them. They are not conscious of the political details. I would hope
they would not attempt to play your side off against us.
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
PLACE:
TIME:
Meeting between Prime Minister Chou En-lai
and Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
The Great Hall of the People
Peking, China
11:45 PM, January 7, 197'1.
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Mr. CHI P'eng-fei, Acting Foreign Minister
Mr. HSIUNG Hsiang-hui, Secretary to the Premier
Mr. HAN Hsu, Director, Protocol Department, MF-
Mr. CHANG Wen-chin, Director of the West
European, American and Australian Affairs,
M FA
Miss Nancy T'ang (Interpreter)
Chou En-lai: We gave you too much wine today? Our hosts did not
know how to make conversation, so they just drowned
you in wine. I believe Mr. Chapin can down quite a
few cups. General Haig has quite a capacity. It is
alright -- you are quite young.
This afternoon, Acting Foreign Minister Fei con-
veyed to me the message from Dr. Kissinger that
you conveyed to him. I thank you for your informa-
tion. I already said, on the morning of the 4th, that
after I reported to Chairman Mao Tse-tung I would
discuss it with my colleagues and give you'a formal
reply. So I would like, first of all, to give a reply
to the former message you gave on the morning of
the 4th and then to deal with the latter message given
this morning -- later on.
We have studied the message conveyed by General
Haig. Your straightforwardness has helped us to
attain a clearer understanding of the views of the
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U. S. side on the current situation and Sino-Soviet
ways. We would like to express our views in a
similarly frank way.
1. The high level talks to be held between
China and the United States to seek normalization
of the relations between the two countries accord
with the desire of the Chinese and American
people and if positive results can be achieved
they will also be conducive to the easing of tension
in the Far East and in conformity with the interests
of the people in Asia and the world. As the time
for the talks draws near, certain hostile forces
have been intensifying their destruction and
sabotage. This is something within our expecta-
tions and we are prepared for it.
2. After the announcement of President
Nixon's visit to China, the Soviet Government
hastily made concessions in Europe and came to
agreement with the West on the Berlin question.
While in Asia, it concluded with India a Treaty of
peace, friendship and cooperation in name but it
was a military alliance in substance. Following
that, the Soviet Government took advantage of the
situation to support India, to commit armed aggression
against Pakistan and occupy East Pakistan. This is a
continuation, under new circumstances, of the con-
sistent Soviet policy of contending for hegemony.
There is no'shift of strategy to speak of. China
is under no commitment to Pakistan. However,
proceeding from its curretxt principal stand,
China has rendered and will continue to render
political support and also materiel assistance
within our capacity to Pakistan in its struggle
against division and aggression. The Soviet Union
has supported India to invade and occupy East
Pakistan. They appeared arrogant and unbridled
for a time but in fact they have further opened their
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expansionist situation and, in fact, have become
isolated from the entire world. The development
of events are proving that the subcontinent will be
in continuous turmoil. India and its supporter
have the nooses around their own necks. They will
certainly suffer from the consequences of their own
doing.
3. There exist fundamental differences
between China and the U. S. on the question of
Vietnam and Indochina. After Christmas, the
United States wantonly bombed the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam. This has shocked world
opinion and aroused world opposition. The self-
justification made by the United States side is
utterly untenable. As victims of the war of ag-
gression, the Vietnamese people have the right to
take every necessary action in self defense. China
firmly supports their struggle. If the United States
truly has the desire to withdraw all its forces and
end the war in Vietnam, there is no reason for
them to refuse to accept the reasonable seven-
point proposal put forward by the North Vietnamese
side. In fact, it is not Hanoi that is humiliating
the United States but the United States that is in-
sulting Hanoi. By what logic may a big country
willfully commit aggression against a small country
while the self-defense by a small country be de-
scribed as aggression? This policy of the U. S.
can in no way shape the firm resolve of the peoples
of Vietnam and other Asian countries to fight and
win. On the contrary, it has created obstacles to
the U. S. to the withdrawal of troops and to its
efforts to obtain release of the POWs. And has
also brought an unfavorable element into the visit
of the President of the United States to the People's
Republic of China.
4. China is a big country but not yet a very
strong one. Economically, we are still very back-
ward. One half a year ago, President Nixon de-
scribed China as one of the five great powers of the
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world but now in its message the United States side,
all of a sudden, expresses doubt over China's
viability, asserting that it wants to maintain China's
independence and viability. We are surprised at
this. We hold that no country should ever rely on
external forces to maintain its independence and
viability. If it does so, it can only become a
protectorate or a colony. However small a country
may be, so long as it fears no brute force and dares
to struggle, it will be able always to stay on its own
feet in the family of nations. Vietnam is a vivid
case in point. Socialist New China was born and
has grown up in continuous struggle against foreign
oppression and aggression and will continue to live
on and develop. We have long stated that we are
prepared to meet enemy invasions from all sides
and fight to the very end - - not flinching from
undertaking the greatest national sacrifice and make
contribution to the human progress. Facts have
proved and will continue to prove that all schemes
to isolate, encircle, contain and subvert China will
only end up in ignominious defeat.
5. The relations between China and the
United States have not been normal. Nevertheless,
the Chinese side will receive President Nixon with
due protocol and courtesy and will make its efforts
to seek positive results in the Sino-United States
talks. In its message, the United States side ex-
pressed the wish that the image of the President
as a world leader should be enhanced through the
visit. This we find it difficult to understand. The
image of a man depends on his own deeds and not
on any other factors. We do not believe that any
world leader can bd self styled.
6. In its message, the United States side
indicated that certain forces in the United States
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are opposed to the normalization of Sino-United States
relations and the Sino-United States high level talks
and asked the Chinese side to reconsider the
language of the Draft Communique with regard to
a certain portion on Taiwan. Of course, we do
not object to further consultations but we would
like to point out that we have already done our best
to take your difficulties into consideration in our
draft. As you know, the Chinese people feel very
strongly about the Taiwan question. If the United
States side truly has the desire to improve Sino-
United States relations, it should adopt a positive
attitude of settling this issue which is the crucial
question in Sino-United States relations. If there
is yielding to certain forces opposed to the normali-
zation of Sino-United States relations and backing
down from the former position, that will bring no
benefit to China and the United States.
So that is our comment to the oral message you
conveyed on the morning of the 4th. Of course, you
mentioned some new matters this morning. The first
thing is that of trade and I remember very clearly
that your Excellency conveyed in your message the
wishes of President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger with
regard to that matter. And I said that we had noted
the opinion of the United States side and we would
consider putting it into the Joint Communique.
There is no question that the relations between
China and the United States have not been normalized
and that the development of trade will be limited and
slow. However, we should look further to the
future and the relations between China and the United
States -- should proceed in a direction headed for
normalization and the matter of trade should be
viewed as a positive factor in this progress. And
since Dr. Kissinger has mentioned cultural and
scientific exchanges, if he has any specific idea,
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of course we would be willing to exchange opinion
on these matters during the discussions.
The second question is the matter of the South Asian
subcontinent that you mentioned in the message you
conveyed from Dr. Kissinger. We appreciate the
part of the message in which you mentioned that the
United States side at present would wish to count
on gaining time to enhance the self-defense of
Pakistan and that the United States was willing
to undertake an economic assistance towards
Pakistan. As for the other portions, they were a
sort of explanation and as I have already answered
them previously, I feel them to be redundant. And
as General Haig has in the early hours of the 4th
very straightforwardly conveyed President Nixon's
and Dr. Kis singe is message to us, I would like to
request your Excellency to report the reply we have
just given you in a similarly straightforward
manner to President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger.
Haig: I am very grateful for the very detailed and very
frank views which I will convey precisely as re-
ceived to Dr. Kissinger and to the President. As
I pointed out at the time..I gave those views, they
were views which were largely conveyed in my own
language as I understood the general thrust of my
instructions. In several instances, I believe the
simple language of a soldier might have been
more blunt than it might have been. I believe some
of my words may have been misinterpreted. I
would also like to briefly discuss your reply from
a personal point of view because I have not been
able to discuss the matter personally with the
President or Dr. Kissinger.
First, with respect to the situation in Southeast
Asia, I believe it is very helpful to exchange views
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even though it appears we basically disagree on this
subject. From our perspective, and this is a
problem I have been very very close to for the last
three years, it is not United States forces that are
in Laos or United States forces that are in Cambodia
but North Vietnamese forces. We have expressed
our desire to withdraw our forces and we have made
honorable conscientious proposals that would lead to
that withdrawal and a settlement. It is the other side
that has not responded to these proposals. I think
I explained that we were told to pay attention to the
nine points given to us secretly by Hanoi and that
is the way we have proceeded, based on advice, from
Hanoi's spokesman. Even so, this is a topic that I
think warrants more extensive exchange at the time
of the President's visit. I do believe that in the
long run our perception of the convergence of the
interests of the United States and the People's
Republic of China in the area of Southeast Asia is
the ultimate truth.
The second point is the terminology that I used
concerning the viability and independence of the
People's Republic of China. Certainly, we would
not presume to infer that we were assuming the
role of the protector or the guarantor of China's
viability. On the other hand, we did want to make
very clear, and perhaps I did it clumsily, that in our
perspective China's viability and future health is of
interest to the United States. This is a matter of
our own national interest in the context of the world
situation as it has developed.
The third point I would like to mention is the again
unfortunate language which suggests that the
imagery of the President Was an important item.
This was meant only in the context of the prepara-
tions we are making for the President's visit. I
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think it is important the : we do not afford our
enemies an opportunity to attack the President either
in terms of his motivation or his effectiveness during
his visit. The worst disservice I could do to
President Nixon would be to suggest that his public
image is a matter of concern to him or a matter
which influences his decision on any given sub-
stance. Certainly, his performance in the inter-
national arena thus far suggests that popularity
has never been, nor will ever be, the criteria by
which he makes his decisions.
With respect to the issue of Taiwan, I immediately
conveyed to Dr. Kissinger the reply that I received
from you on Tuesday morning and he is, I think,
very much aware of that reply. He did provide
this additional information today, primarily to
answer the questions that came up Tuesday and
not to elevate our discussions here to a dialogue
that would go on continuously but, hopefully, to
elaborate on those is:?iues which might have required
clarification based on the discussion of Tuesday
morning.
On the three subjects that we discussed that our
side hoped could be more positive in the com-
munique, i. e. , trade, scientific and cultural
matters, I am confident that Dr. Kissinger will
come up with some very modest proposals because
he realizes that that portion of the communique
is balanced and very well worked out. I do not
expect any drastic revision to the communique in
this respect and we recognize the issue of trade is
a long term one.
And finally, on the subject of the South Asian sub-
continent, I think recent events have confirmed one
thing to me from my humble perspective and that
is that while forces are sometimes under way
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that we would like to think our own good intentions
may somehow control, the facts are sometimes
quite to the contrary. In South Asia, certainly the
United States was slow in recognizing the dangers.
I think it behooves both our sides to be equally
cognizant of future dangers there and elsewhere
and I would hope it would not be a question of
looking back on a situation that had turned sour for
the lack of timely action which might have prevented
that.
I again thank the Prime Minister for his very
thoughtful treatment to me and my party while
we have been here in Peking. One thing has
characterized any exchanges I have been involved
in with your officials and that has been the degree
of candor and frankness which is very encouraging
to me. I think both of us have had long standing
positions on controversial issues on which we do not
agree and would hope those will not be translated too
readily into -- and to use your term -- empty
canons of rhetoric" but rather to the kind of frank
language that will minimize misunderstanding even
though the disagreement might remain at the con-
clusion of the discussion.
Chou En-lai: Your Excellency has just now commented a bit on
our reply and I think I should also like to add a few
words. Of course, the reply I gave you just now
in itself is a complete answer. And what I am
now adding, of course, is additional and it was led
to by your comment.
And on the question of Southeast Asia, our current
opinion has been, to put it simply, that the United
States is in the wrong. This is not only the words
of the Chinese but also of the other people in the
world. I have heard American friends themselves
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speak of this. And, in addition, this is not something
that was created by President Nixon himself. It was
his predecessors. And President Nixon has already
decided to withdraw his troops. And as I have said
to Dr. Kissinger before, I would wish that the United
States would withdraw completely as General DeGaulle
did in Algeria and do it in one strike and cleanly,
wholly, without any remainder and immediately.
And to find various excuses to drag on in a messy
way will only finally end up in losing the initiative.
With a subjective wish for a glorious and honorable
withdrawal while in reality there may not be such
honorable and glorious withdrawal and if you only
have the subjective wish but reality is not a glorious
and honorable withdrawal, then on the contrary, this
might give rise to difficult predicaments that are
difficult to extract ones self from. Have you read
the Soviet News? That is upon your present visit
to China, the Soviet press has done some reporting
in which they have given some special descriptions
of you as saying that you are especially in charge
of Vietnamese and Indochina Affairs. Of course, we
do not pay attention to that. It is precisely because
you may be in charge of this that I would like to
speak to you with special earnestness. That is that
your excuses will not carry over with the people of
the world. For instance, you said that it was not
the United States troops that went first into Laos
and Cambodia but North Vietnamese troops. The
question is that your troops should not have gone to
Vietnam in the first place. The sending of United
States troops into Vietnam itself is aggression.
For instance, we have a common point in opposing
the sending of Indian troops into East Pakistan.
Then, how can we agree to your sending troops into
South Vietnam, That is why the Soviet Ambassador
criticized you on the issue of Vietnam when the
question of the war in Pakistan was under debate
in the United Nations. That is the first point.
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The second point is -- take Laos for instance -- the
troops of Thailand went into Laos. That is also
foreign aggression. And your CIA has given often
air support to the Laotian bandits in the form of
ammunition or money or food. They have given
this to the Lao bandits of the minority Nationality,
the forces of Vang Pao in the area that is under the
control of Laos and this is something that is
recognized in the American press. Then, since the
United States and Thailand can give air support to
bandits in Laos, then why can Vietnam not give
patriotic assistance to the forces of liberation? For
instance, it is the same as the situation in which you
assisted South Korea and advanced your forces up to
the very banks of the Yellow River. It was only then
that we sent our volunteers to assist the Democratic
Republic of Korea and when we now cooly assess that
situation -- was that not very clear? And the case
is similar in Cambodia. If the Lon Nol - Matak
clique had not subverted Sihanouk, then how would the
war in Cambodia have come about?
Later on, your President himself decided to send
troops on an intrusion into Cambodia. That was at
the end of April 1970 and later on in the early part
of 1971, United States troops entered into Laos and
this was even further aggression and at Christmas
last year, you launched a massive air strike against
North Vietnam. Your President and your Pentagon
have called those successes but, in my opinion, they
are not successes. You are a soldier and I also have
been one in the past -- not now of course. I have
also been in military action and I know that this kind
of fighting cannot bring victory. It can only give rise
to dissatisfaction on the part of ones own people.
And these actions on the contrary are giving the
Soviet Union an opportunity. And if you want some
news, I can tell you a bit that if you do not leave
that place, then Southeast Asia which does have the
possibility of being turned into an area of nonalignment
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will become an area of contention between the two
superpowers. We are very clear about that. And
then Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East,
the subcontinent, the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia
will be linked together and how can tension be
relaxed and wouldn't that be completely contrary to
the ideals of your President. On the morning of
the 4th, you told us of the strategic thinking of the
President. And you once again rnertioned that your
President wished to relax the tension but if things go
on like that, then the situation that will appear will
be completely contrary to those subjective wishes.
And the result will be that the situation will continue
in continuous turmoil not only in the subcontinent.
Of course, the settlement of the Vietnam question
will be reached between the United States and the
DRV, either in Paris or Hanoi or perhaps in other
places. Of course, we, as the third party, cannot
meddle in this but we must state clearly our stand
and there must be no ambiguity about that. I have
dealt in rather great detail on this question in the
hope that you will convey this to President Nixon
and Dr. Kissinger. This itself, in fact, constitutes
an initial exchange of opinion. Of course, it is
probably too long to send in your cables so you can
talk about them when you get back and Mrs. Hartley
will be tired working on them until tomorrow morning.
?
As for the other two questions, there is no need to
pay too great attention to the wordings and terminology.
We would like you to know that although our country
is backward, we have our independence. In our
country, we have relied on our own initiative and
self-reliance and have relied on these to fight until
today. We have our self-dignity and so have you and
if we mutually respect each other that is equality.
So the erroneous terminology that you just now
mentioned is not" only a matter of terminology but a
matter of attitude. We are not a superpower and we
refuse to be a superpower. Your President has
mentioned that China is a potential strength power.
There is a degree of reason in that.
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The third point you mentioned was the image of
your President and our reply would be as we have
mentioned in the third point of our reply - - that the
image of a man depends on his own deeds. And
since we have invited your President to China, we
will certainly give him the protocol and courtesy
due him. I don't think there is any question of this
and do not believe we have to say more about this
because I believe you will understand this through
the technical discussions we have had. Of course,
it is impossible to go beyond that because we have
not established diplomatic relations and you still
recognize Taiwan. You must not forget that. It
is important to us. The good thing about it is that
Chiang Kai-shek also only recognizes one China.
He also says Taiwan is a Province of China. It is
a good thing because Taiwan would have long ago
become a puppet of yours and become another Thieu
or Sigmund Rhee and if such a situation had occurred
wouldn't that make it even more impossible for us
to come together and that would bring even more
difficulty in the normalization of relations. So now,
we have come to the question of Taiwan. So as to
the question of Taiwan, I have already dealt with it
in the official answer to you and if there is further
discussion -- if there is still room for individual
changes in that part -- then they should await the
arrival of President Nixon or Dr. Kissinger. As
for the present, we believe that in our draft we have
already given very great consideration to your
difficulties. As for other specific wordings and
various measures, just as I mentioned about trade,
cultural and scientific matters, they are rather minor
matters and can wait until the arrival of your
President. And my secretary has just now called
my attention to the fact that you mentioned the fact
to pay attention to the danger developing in the sub-
continent and you mentioned in the past you had been
late in recognizing the danger there. You just now
mentioned that in the past you had come to the
realization of this danger too late to avoid danger.
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As to that question, I have already answered on the
morning of the 4th and we have identical views.
Hai I am very grateful for this lengthy discussion. It is
presumptious of me to speak for President Nixon or
Dr. Kissinger. I think on the subject of Southeast
Asia there will be many useful exchanges during the
President's visit. The past history you referred to
should be a source of wisdom and learning. It does
not necessarily provide the answers to current
situations.
Chou En-lai: Of course, this answer must be given by your President.
I cannot do that for him. For instance, in the instance
of the Korean War. We entered into the war against
aggression. During that time, the President was
Truman who was a Democrat and not a Republican.
He still put forth the suggestion of negotiation, so
actually they fought one year without negotiations but
later on, with your Republican President Eisenhower,
he ended the war in Korea. I think it is useful to
recall that part of history but the situation in Korea
was different from that in Vietnam so it would not
do to dogmatically copy that. The war that began in
Vietnam has brought the whole of Indochina together,
has merged it into one but we have not entered that
war so the situation is different. And only with
determination and resolve can that situation be settled.
Otherwise, you will only lose the initiative.
Hai :
I think we are convinced that it is going to 'take bold
action and I think we have taken it by offering sweeping
proposals. It is somewhat of a puzzle that we have
not received a response to those proposals. Perhaps
that is where the trouble lies. That is why alternative
means must be pursued.
Chou En-lai: That is a question that I cannot answer because the war
in Indochina is different from the war in Korea. In the
case of Korea, on our side the Democratic people of
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Korea were the main repres
representatives were their
side, the United States was
while Sigmund Rhee was the
there were four sides and i
was easier for us to get an
discussing face to face. So,
of your time from your slee
Hai
entatives and our
eputies. On the other
he main representative
deputy, so actually
that circumstance it
pinion. Now you are
I will not take up more
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