CHINESE REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 28, 1970
• Content Type: SNIE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
SANITIZED
COPY
FOLLOWS
MORI/CDF C0179922
pages 24-43
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
25X1
Click her No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
CIA FOIA - Browse Document in Full
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
Turitesmax
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense1
and the NSA.
CONCURRING;
Or. R. J. Smith, for the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence
George C.. Denney, Jr, for the Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State
Lt, WM. Jammie M. Philpott, for the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency
Or, Louis W. Tordella, for the Director, National Security
Agency
ABSTAINING;
Mt. Howard C. Brown, Jr., the Assistant General Manager,
Atomic Energy ComFission and Mr. Fred J. Cassidy, for
the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
the subject being outside of their Jurisdiction.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
!If 1 MI4.
CO* SONE
101.14011,*1010004
441,wrt Mn.S*IL..I.HI,,ST.n
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
TS 186127
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 114y 1970
SUBJECT: SN IE 13-9-70: CHINESE REACTIONS TO POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS
IN INDOCHINA
Caibodlsts Involvement hi lyea a aett sMpc to the struggle in
Indochina. thit paper .considers how Chine and North Vietnmainght view
fetwoohypetheticel developments* pirticularly in the military field*
Which might compel then to consider. a sisnificent change in their
strategy* and esttneteS what their reactions adnht be if such develop-
ments do take plaoe. Insofar as these %vole* mdlitery or other moves
by the VS and its allies, they sr 0 to to regerdedas actions which the
CavemnIsts night possibly eaticipate* eat is courses of actioo being
entertidned by the Allied side.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07 LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
THE ESTIMATE
PEKING'S VIEW OF THE STRUGGLE IN INDOCHINA
1. Peking has viewed events in Southeast Asia during the course
of the war in Vietnam mainly in the light of its aspirations for
political dominance in the area. its perspective is long term,
involves no fixed time schedule, and is an aspect of its pretensions
to lead a'world-wide revolutionary movement. More Immediately, Peking
sees the war in Indochina as a continuation of a lengthy liberation
struggle; first against the French, and now against the US. Peking's
advice to the Communists in Indochina has been repetitious and consis-
tent. They are to persist in self-reliant and protracted struggle
until they can destroy the enemy or his will to fight. That this may
Involve occasional defeats and considerable losses is a foregone
conclusion. Only by a prolonged and costly struggle can they hope
to :achieve eventual victory, and they must carry on this struggle
themselves, without reliance on outside forces.:
2. On one hand, the Chinese view the fighting as a test of Moo's
theory of 4people's war." Thy believe a victory would enhance
China's political prestige in Asia and would support their claims for
ideological pre-eminence over the Soviet Union. On the other hand,
2
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07 LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
Peking .has had to consider the possibility that an adverse turn in the
war might lead to a security-threat on China's southern border and
therefOre a possible direct confrontation with the US. In practice,
this has meant militant advocacy of "people's war" for others, but
careful maneuvering to ensure that China stays safely out of the line
of fire.
3. In defining its role in this struggle, Peking has been both
cautious and prudent. Thus far the policy has been to rule out any
direct use of Chinese troops in the ground fighting and to reduce the
risks of even an accidental confrontation with the OS. There is
evidence that the Peking leadership reaffirmed these basic ground rules
after a long and bitter debate during 1965, This conflict, which pitted
Minister of Defense Lin Pim against his Chief of Staff, was concerned
with the assessment of, and possible responses to, the large-stale US
intervention in Vietnam then under way. Lin Piao ended the debate with
an authoritative endorsement of Mao's theories on "people's war?"
emphasizing defense, in depth rather than-moving across China's borders
to meet the threat.
4. This decision not to, intervene overtly in the Vietnam War was
consistent with Peking's policy, at least since the Korean War, of not
risking major hostilities with either the US or the USSR. There is as
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
yet no indication that the acquisition of nuclear weapons has changed
this bask stance. Indeed, it may have had a sobering effect. When
hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 threatened to ,
escalate into a nuclear conflict, the Chinese moved to calm the situation.
We Judge that China's troubled internal situation and its unresolved prob.
leas with the USSR incline its leaders to continue making the same cautious
calculations of risk that have marked their conduct of recent years. This
means that China's 4016 in Southeast Asia should be pursued by subversion,
revolutionary activity, and diplomacy rather than by the open use of its,
own military forces.
S. Butolewz_Lmions. Recent events in Indochina are not likely
to change this basic approach. As long as the ttS/GVN move into Cambodia
does not critically affect Hanoi's ability to continue the war, Peking
Is likely to minimize the threat posed by the current Allied actions.
Moreover, Peking probably Sees immediate benefits from the political
reaction aroused in the US against the Cambodian involvement. And if
the US should not withdraw from Cambodia, Peking would assess the situa-
tion as one in which the OS WAS getting more and more bogged down in an
expanding war that would guarantee growing opposition both at home and
abroad. In this sense, at least, it would make little difference to
Peking whether the US kept to its schedule and withdrew or whether it
continued its involvement in Cambodia.
- 4 -
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
6. In Peking's view, the US is fighting a losing war in whith
Hanoi has only to be patient and persevere in order to outlast the US.
In order to preserve that patience, China will continue to supply
North Vietnam with economic and military aid. More important, Peking
Is probably now better prepared to furnish steady and dependable
political support than it was during the Cultural Revolution.
Relations with Hanoi have improved considerably since last fall,
and.:. recent events in Cambodia have brought Peking and Hanoi closer
together. The remarkable turnout in Peking for i.e Duan 's recent visit,
in which both Mao and Lin made one of their increasingly rare
appearances, is evidence of Chinese concern to strengthen tits with
Hanoi at Moscow's expense. Peking's careful campaign to exploit
Sihanouk, recently emphasized in a major pronouncement by Moo himself,
is also Intended to diminish Soviet influence in Indochina.
7. In short, Peking has moved promptly to exploit the Cambodian
developments for its own ends. The Chinese leadership has seized the
opportunities presented to reduce Soviet influence on Hanoi and to
Increase its own capability to influence Hanoi without, for the present
at least, exposing itself to greater risks or markedly higher costs.
8. At the same time, Peking may have some concern that an
Intensified and enlarged scale of hostilities could weaken,Hanoi's
- 5 -
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07 : LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
will and capacity to continue. Against this possibility Peking i
probably prepared to render increased aid to Hanoi, increase the level
of threat in its propaganda, perhaps stimulate insurgency and tensions
elsewhere in Asia, or attempt to unsettle the US by moving troops about in
southern China. Judging by its past actions, however, Peking is likely
to calculate carefully the risks of these moves and to prefer gestures
and actions that will worry but not provoke the US.
9, The Soviet _Factor. Peking's reactions in Indochina are
conditioned by the terms of its bitter rivalry with the USSR. At
critical points during the course of the war, the Chinese have sought
to project an image of militant devotion :to "people's war," partly at
least to outflank politically the Soviets; the latter are constrained
in Southeast Asia by geography and by some concern to avoid complicating
relations with the US or offending potentially friendly non-Communist
Asian regimes. Peking calculates in these situations that Moscow's
position is certain to be relatively "soft," providing ample 00001 for
Chinese posturing without a requirement for risky commitments.
Nonetheless, this stance carries the risk that the Soviets might be
able to expose the gap between Chinese rhetoric and performance.
10. Moreover, so long as large and hostile Soviet forces threaten
China's northern and western borders, there Is added reason for avoiding
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
"reffe-6413GRIR
direct mdlitary involvements In Southeast Asia. In sum, the Soviet
factor reinforces other considerations which make Peking want to avoid
precipitate and risky action even though it continues to discourage
compromise settlement of the war.
PEKING'S REACTICIIS TO POSSIBLE MORE DEVELOPMENTS
11. The paragraphs above outline what has been China's
fundamental position on the situation in Indochina. At this Juncture,
the Chinese may be preoccupied as well with future developments, partic-
ularly in the Military field, which might compel them to consider a more
direct Involvement. In this section, we estimate Chinese reactions to
each of several such possibilities. Peking's reactions to the possible
umulative effect of these various actions are discussed in paragraphs
23 through 26.
d Mil iv In a
12. Peking probably anticipates a continuing and substantial
Allied effort to exploit the political turnabout in Phnom Penh -- to
include sustained operations by ARVN in strategic border areas and
occasional deeper forays, all with US air and logistical support, and
a naval blockade in the Gulf of Siam. Peking may also expect to see
- 7 -
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07 : LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
continued employment of US edvisory personnel with ARVN units in
Cambodia and would not be greatly surprised at reintroduction of
US combat units subsequent to 30 June 1970. Such developments,
411 our view, would not lead Peking to undertake any radically new
commitment to the struggle in Indochina. Cambodia is relatively
remote from the Chinese border. Moreover, despite concern over the
immediate impact of the Allied operations, Peking would probably
not conclude that longer term prospects for the success of the
liberation struggle in Indochina were critically affected.
Nliegtjhe Lon Nol GOvernpant
13. Though apparently willing to bargainron Hanoi's behalf
with Lon Nol only a month ago, the Chinese are now committed to the
destruction of his regime. In their logic, there is little doubt
that the US will provide support to Lon Nol. China almost certainly
expects continued and increased shipments of US (and other) arms
to Phnom Penh and, perhaps, the dispatch of US advisory personnel
on the Laos pattern. Even so, the Chinese almost certainly, give
little weight to the capabilities -- present or future -- of the
Cambodian Army. The Chinese might attempt to counter the US move by
establishing some sort of political-military advisory presence with 4
?liberation government" on Cambodian soil -- on the pattern of its
8
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07 LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
mission at Mang Kbay in northern Laos, The Chinese will even draw
some political comfort from the Soviet diplomatic presence In Phnom Penh
as a situation which the Chinese can exploit as evidence of Soviet op-
position to the forces working for Sihanouk's return.
Thai NilitaLLConmitment to Cambial!,
14. The entry of Thai forces into Cambodia would further
complicate the Communist military position there, but it would be
actually significant, in Peking's view, as a sign of Bangkok's willing-
ness to commit itself more firmly and overtly to an active military role
in the Indochina area. The Chinese reaction would be designed as a
clearcut warning to Bangkok of the perils of its course: the Thai
'liberation movement' would be elevated to a more prominent position
In Peking's revolutionary propaganda and insurgent forces in Thailand
would be directed to increase their pressures on the Thai Government.
But China would almost certainly see no need tolwing its own forces
to bear.
Renem0 Bombing of North Vietnam
15. Additional and sustained US bombing raids on North Vietnam's
panhandle area -- on SAM sites and other military targets -- would not
surprise Peking which, as before, would stand aside while Hanoi coped
9
Nn Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07 LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
with the problem of maintaining the southward flow of troops and
materiel. If the US resumed bombing of North Vietnam on the
pattern of 1965-1968, the Chinese would probably, as before*
provide engineer troops and MA units to supplement North Vietnamese
air defenses.
Ground Tr000s 1n Southern Laos
16. The Chinese might think it possible that the Allies will
try to challenge Hanoi's control of southern Laos by sustained ground
operations into that area. While small Allied military units hove
operated in Laos for years, their impact on the war has been relatively
slight and their nudiers have been small enough to permit their presence
to remain largely unacknowledged -- in deference to the 'neutral"
status of the Lao Government. Crossing this political threshold would
be read in Peking as US willingness to contemplate a far more activist
course in Indochina in search of a military decision.
17. Presumably, the Allied forces in southern Laos would be
targetted against VC/NYA sanctuaries, logistical bases, and infiltra-
tion routes to South Vietnam. The Chinese concern would depend on
the degree of success these operations had in starving the flow
of men and supplies from North Vietnam and on the nationality of the
forces involved.
-10-
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
18, The Chinese would probably view Thai entry Into Southern
Loses part of a longer range US plan to place the defense of the
Mekong Valley in Thai hands. Although Chine (and North Vietnam)
would be inclined to doubt that effective Thai troops in sufficient
numbers would be available to have a decisive impact on the situa-
tion, the Communists might see the move as portending the eventual
commitment of US ground forces to the area. The entry of US ground
forces into southern Laos would raise concern in Peking because of the
military effect on Hanoi's logistic system and because it would raise
the spectre of later US ground operations in northern Laos.
Nonetheless, so long as the deployment of US forces were confined
to southern Laos, the Chinese would probably feel no need to introduce
their own forces in the area. They would probably move ground forces
to the Laos border, however, and might reinforce their units presently
In northwestern Laos in order to signal their concern over the safety
of their borders.
ground Troops n Northern Laos
19, orthwes tern Laos borders China, and Peking would be most
sensitive to military activities in that region. Moreover, to help
supply PL/NVA troops in the region, China is building roads from its
own territory, and some 10,000-14,000 troops in engineering, AAA, and
-11-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
security units are in northwestern Laos in connection with this
a t,y
ctivi.-1/ lip to now, other Chinese security requirements in
northwestern Laos have been met by PL/NVA control of the region.
20. Any direct effort-. by US, Thal, or Lao bombing or by
Thai/Lao ground harassment -- to force the withdrawal of Chinese
troops from northwestern Laos would be resisted. The Chinese
ready have AAA in place to defend against air attacks and, with
PLAVA fOrces, sufficient ground strength to meet small-unit probes.
if necessary, they might also reinforce their own troops in the
region on a limited scale or encourage WAWA troops to undertake
diversionary moves for political and psychological effect -- e.g.,
feints against Luang Prabang.
21. This is not to say that the Chinese would push ahead on
their road construction under any and all circumstances. The road
Itself -- at least the segsent south of tong Sal -- is not critical
to the Communist position in the region. Thus, if PL/NVA forces
proved unable to remove any Thai/Lao blocking force south of the
present terminal at Nuong Noun, the Chinese might choose to stop
construction rather than commit their own combat forces to action in
See ono of North Laos.
- 12 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
ittfLaliCILErr_
the area. The presence of Thai forces well south of Nuong How in
the area of Pak Bong or south of the Mekong (in Sayaboury Province)
-- would probably not result in offensive military action by the
Chinese.
22. Northeastern Laos and the area of the Plain of Jars is not
as sensitive 83 northwestern Laos from the Chinese point of view. But
the dispatch of sizable Thai ground force; into this region would be
viewed very seriously by Peking. If this should happen, the Chinese
would probably move quickly to bolster their forces in border regions
adjacent to northwestern Laos, but the initial burden of meeting the
buildup would probably remain on Hanoi. If such a Thai force was,
In Hanoi's view, formidable enough to threaten its vital interests
in the area, the North Vietnamese might feel compelled to request
direct assistance from China. In these circumstances, Peking might
respond to Hanoi's request.
23. Thus, in a developing situation in Indochina, Peking's
first concern would be the possibility that an adverse turn in the
war might lead to a security threat on China's southern border or a
direct confrontation with the US. This makes military moves in Laos
- 13
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
particularly sensitive. In addition to primary concern over the
direct threat to Its borders in northwestern Laos, the Chinese
would be apprehensive over any actions in northeastern Laos which
posed a threat to the security of North Vietnam. In contrast to its
direct security interest in northern Laos, actions in southern Laos
and Cambodia are of concern to the Chinese primarily in terns of the
way in which they affect Hanoi's capacity to prosecute the war. For
Peking, Laos plays a more significant role In this respect than does
Cambodia.
24. In general, as in the past, we see two circumstances in
which actions such as those discussed above might provoke Chinese
reactions beyond the limits of what they have done in Indochina since
1966. The first would be a situation in which military forces
approached areas in northern Laos in such a way that Hanoi found it a
threat to the security of North Vietnmn, or Peking a threat to its
own borders. The second would be a situation in which Allied actions.
singly or in combination, seriously threatened 1Iar001"s will and ability
to continue the struggle in South Vietnam.
25. In the first case, Peking would probably Introduce ground
combat troops to northwestern Laos to prevent the establishment of a
-14.
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
.? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0
strong military presence on its borders. Peking mlt undertake
deployments elsewhere in northern Laos if persuaded that North
Vietnam's own security was threatened. Such a case might arise
If large non-Lao forces overran the Plain of Jars and moved east-
ward.
26. In the second case, where Peking sensed that Hanoi's will
and ability to persist in the stmggle in South Vietnam were failing,
the Chinese would attempt to encourage Hanoi to persevere and would
offer generous material assistance. They would loudly threaten the
Thai, the Cambodians, the South Vietnamese, and the WS -- and attempt
to step up guerrilla warfare in Thailand. Out if Hanoi, nonetheless,
concluded that it had no choice but to postpone the armed struggle,
the Chinese would probably feel compelled to accept the decision. We
do not believe that China would wish to alienate Hanoi by further
demands that it actively continue the war. nor would Peking choose to
commit its own forces to the Indochina struggle so long as territories
critical to its own security or that of North Vietnam were not threatened.
15
No Obiection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/07: LOC-HAK-464-5-1-0