WHO INVITED WHOM?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 13, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 201?07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4 WL.
MEMORANDUM ,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE INFORMATION
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY October 13, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: PETER RODMAN t\IX
SUBJECT: Who Invited Whom?
The attached chronology gives the full record of public and private
statements relevant to the question of which side took the initiative
to, propose a Presidential visit to China. The record suggests that
the invitation evolved out of initiatives on both sides:
-- The U.S. took the initiative and pressed for the idea
of sending a U.S. special representative to Peking
or receiving a Chinese special envoy in Washington.
(This began in the Warsaw talks in January 1970, and
we later raised it in special channels. The Chinese
responded positively on December 9, 1970.)
? Aside from a casual comment by the President in an
October 1970 TIME in;erview, the first mention of
a Presidential visit came from the Chinese on January 11,
1971. (They repeated it on April 21, 1971, following the
? President's public remark about his daughter's honeymoon.)
-- Chou En-lai's message of May 29, 1971, treats the idea. of
a Presidential visit as Mao's "suggestion" which the President
"accepts.
-- Chinese ploymanship about our seeking the invitation seems
to have begun in Chou's talks with you in Peking. (Chou told
you the President's honeymoon remark in April prompted the
invitation.) He has been getting the sequence wrong, too:
Last week he told a group of Americans that the special-envoy
idea was agreed to after the Presidential-visit idea was broached.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
The key steps in the process are 6arked in red on the attached chronology.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
State Dept., DIA, review
completed
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
WHO INVITED WHOM?
Date
Jan. 20, 1970
Feb. 20, 1970
May 3, 1970
June 15, 1970
Oct. 5, 1970
Oct. 25, 1970
1 Amb. Stoessel at Warsaw meeting tells PRC
Charge' that U.S. "would be prepared to consider
sending a representative to Peking for direct
discussions ? ? ? or receiving a representative
from your Government in Washington." PRC
Charge' expresses interest. (Tab 1)
At next Warsaw meeting, PRC Charge' states that
"if the USG wishes to send a representative of
ministerial rank or a special envoy of the U.S.
President to Peking for further exploration of
questions of fundamental principle between China
and the United States, the Chinese Government.
will be willing to receive him." (Tab 2)
U.S. assures Chinese following Cambodia operation
(thru Winter and Walters in Paris) that U.S. has
?
Ino aggressive intentions, and that "Dr. Kissinger
is prepared to talk to a person of stature on the
Covmunist Chinese side if this can be:done secretly.
(Tab 3) 1 7
U.S. (thru Walters) suggests creation of a regular
channel thru Walters, and states our readiness "to
send a high-level personal representative of the
President to Paris, or some other mutually con-
venient location, for direct talks on U.S. -Chinese
relations." (Tab 4)
1 President, in TIME interview followin Jordanian
crisis, says: "If there is anything I want to do
% before I die, it is.k__,) go to China. If I don't, I
want my children to." (Tab 5)
?
?
President asks Yahya in Washington to tell Chinese
in Peking that U.S. is willing to send high-level
personal representative (e.g., Murphy, Dewey, or
HAK) to Peking or other convenient capital to open
direct secret communications. (Tab 6)
TOP SECR,ETLSENSIVIELEXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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0 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY - 2
Oct. 26, .1970
Dec. 9, 1970
Dec. 16, 1970
Dec. 24, 1970
Jan. 11, 1971
Ceausescu tells President he believes PRC wants
to improve relations with U.S. President declares
U.S. readiness for talks with PRC and exchange
of high-level special representatives. (Tab 7)
PRC replies to oral message delivered by Yahya:
Chou En-lai, after coordinating with Mao and Lin
Piao, states that "in order to discuss this subject
[U.S. vacating Taiwan], a special envoy of Presi-
dent Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking."
Chou notes that this was first U.S. message sent
"from a Head thru a Head to a Head," and Chinese
attach importance to it because Pakistan is a great
friend of China. (Tab 8)
U.S. replies thru Pakistani channel welcoming
Chinese willingness (as expressed at Feb. 20, 1970
Warsaw meeting) to receive U.S. representative
to discuss outstanding issues. U.S. therefore
"believes it would be useful" to begin discussions
at an early convenient moment on bringing about a
higher-level meeting in Peking. (Tab 9)
?
HAK, in end-of-year backgrounder, says: "We
remain piepared, at Warsaw, 9r elsewhere, to
talk to the Communist Chinese about differences
that divide us." (Tab 10)
Amb. Bogdan delivers message from Chou En-lai
declaring that "if the U.S. has a desire to settle
the [Taiwan] issue and a proposal for its solution,
the PRC will be prepared to receive a U.S. special
envoy in Peking." ..Chou added the comment that
since President Nixon had visited Bucharest ex'
5 1
Belgrade, he would also be welcome in Peking.
(Tab 11)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 3
April 16, 1.971
April 21, 1971
April 27, 1971
April 29, 1971
April 30, 1971
May 10, 1971
President tells American Society of Newspaper
Editors of a recent conversation he had had with
his daughters on the possibility of their going to
China someday. "I hope they do. As a matter of
fact, I hope sometime I do." (Tab 13)
Message from Chou En-lai delivered April 27
"reaffirms [PRC} willingness to receive publicly
in Peking a special envoy of the President of the
U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S.
Secretary of State or even the President of the
U.S. himself for direct meeting-M discussroniis."
(Tab 14)
U.S. message dispatched via Walters proposes set-
ting up reliable channel and says that HAK would be
prepared to come to Paris for direct talks on U.S. -
Chinese relations." (This message dispatched
before receipt of above; received by Chinese April
29.) (Tab 15)
President in news conference says: "I hope, and,
as a matter of fact, I expect to visit Mainland China
sometime in some capacity -- I don't know what
capacity'. But that indicates what I hope for the
long term." (Tab 11))
LIFE publishes Edgar Snow report of Dec. 18, 1970,
interview with Mao. The PRC foreign ministry,
Mao had said, was considering the matter of ad-
mitting Americans, including the President, to
China. "He should be welcomed because, Mao
explained, at present the problems between China
and the U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon.
Mao would be happy to talk with Mm, either as a
tourist or as President." (Tab 17)
President, replying thru Pakistani channel to Chou's
% message of April 21, says he "is prepared to accept
the suggestion of Premier Chou En-lai that he visit
Pekilig for direct conversations with the leaders of
the People's Republic of China." President proposes
preliminary secret meeting between HAK and Chou
to exchange views and explore possibility of Presi-
dential visit. (Received by Chinese May 17) (Tab 18)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVW,LY r.V-17S ONT.IT
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY - 4
May 20,1971
May 29, 1971
June 4, 1971
July 9-11, 1971
July 15, 1971
U.S., in note informing PRC of May 20 SALT
announcement and pledging to make no agreement
directed against PRC, suggests arms control as
agenda item for proposed preliminary secret meet-.
ing. (Received by Chinese May 22) (Tab 19)
Chou En-lai, in formal response (received June 2),
sayshas reported with much pleasure to Chair-
man
1tIao Tse-tung that President Nixon is prepared
to accept his r_eLtips to visit Pekin & for direct
conversations with the leaders of the People's
Republic of China. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has
indicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit
. . . Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger
to China as the U.S. representative who will come
in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with
high-level Chinese officials to prepare and make
necessary arrangements for President Nixon's
visit to Peking." (Tab 20)
President, in reply, says he "kooks forward with
great pleasure to the opportunity of a personal meet-
ing and'discussions with the leaders of the People's
Republic of China," and he "appreciates the warm
wel?come'extended by.Preniier Chou En-lai to his
personal representalive, Dr. Kissinger." (Tab 21)
Chou En-lai tells HAK in Peking that "from the very
beginning, tthe President] took the attitude that he
was willing to come to Peking." He says President's
remark about daughter's honeymoon prompted
invitation. HAK tells Chou that "this idea resulted
first from your initiative which we are happy to
accept." (Excerpts from Peking MemCons, Tab 22)
Joint announcement of Peking summit: "Knowing of
President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the
PRC, Premier Chou En-lai . . has extended an
, invitation to President Nixon. . [who] has accepted
? this invitation with pleasure." (Tab 23)
411 TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY - 5
July 16, 1971
July 19, 1971
August 5, 1971
October 5, 1971
HAK,asked at San Clemente backgrounder if he
knew before his trip that President would be in-
vited, replies: "Essentially, yes. I knew, and of
course the President knew that there was an interest,
a mutual interest in a visit." (Tab 24)
Chou En-lai, in interview with delegation from
Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, explains
Nixon visit by saying that "at the present date, in
contacting your government to normalize relations
we must contact those who are in authority in your
country. But in your country, your system is that
you have a president, and your president said that
he wishes to move towards friendship and he also has
said that he hopes to visit China. And of course,
naturally we can invite him. . . "(Tab 25)
Chou En-lai tells James Reston, in interview
published August 10: "He [the President] expressed
a desire to come and we have invited him to come,"
(Tab 26)
Julian Schu.xnan, in UPI dispatch from Peking, quotes
Chou En-Jai as saying: "He [the President] publicly
expressed his willingness to come to China and
negotiate. We had made no response. It would not
have been proper for a state so antagonistic.
Therefore we agreed to Kissinger's coming." (Tab 27
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HANDLING INDICA TOR
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TO Department of State
lb;
FROM Amembassy WARSAW
SUBJECT : Stoossel-Lei Talks:
January 20, 1970
REF
FILE DESIGNATION
A-25
NO.
DATE: January 24 1970
Report of 135th Meeting,
r NO DISTRIBUTION
The American side was met at the front door of
the ITC EmbaSsy by staff members and led to the second
floor where the Charg6, LEI Yang,. and his staff were
:waiting. Both sides introduced themselves and there
ere:handshakes all around.
Participants on both aid
United States
c?
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr
Paul H. Ir.reisberg - Advisor
'Donald M. Anderson - Interpreter
Thomas W. Simons, Jr. - Scribe
People's Republic of China
Charge d'Affaires Lei Yang
-Li Chu-ching - Advisor
Ch'ien Yung-niea Interpreter
Yeh Wei-lan Scribe
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29 : LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
Mann?Charg6. d!Affaires. ?If?? as these: talks ?
.to be useful and your Government wou1so? de'sx'a my ? Government would ? ?
ecIng :or ?anent. ???
scussions rernelv n en -esentnti...ve-TrO7?n_
our G 'n Ilashinriton for 'mare ? ti
of the sub ects T rve
IsMalag
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on? of any:,:s
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on which we might agree.
. _
In any event, in cloS1n9:, r Charg5 dtAffaires, I wonld like
to restate once again my Government's hope that regular contacts
between us can take place at frecuent intervals and that these talks'
will enable us to .move toward a new phase in Sino7Lnerican relations
'based on mutual respect..
This concluder my statement.
it le 4'
Ur. Ambassador, the talks between China and the U.S. have gone
on for over tea years. In the course of these talks, the U. S.
Government has invariably advanced an evasive attitude toward the
questions of fundallental principles between the two countries and
has confined itself to side issues, thus preventing the talks achiev-
ing results on flindamental issues between the two countries. Now
that the U.S..Governmont wishes to increase the dialogue with our
country and improve Sino-US relations, presumably the nunstion of ,
how to deal with the fundamental principles of the relations of 017
two Countries is already under your consideration. The Chinese
Government has always stood for the peaceful settlement of disputes
between China, and the U.S. through negotiations; it has done so in
the past and is prepared to do likewise in the future. We would
velcoine studies vnd explorations on the fundamental question of how
to settle relations between the two countries. We are willing to
consider and discuss whatever ideas and suggestions the U.S. Govern-
ment might put forInard in accordance with the five principles of
peaceful coexistence, therefore really helping to reduce tensions
between China and the U.S. and fundamentally improve relations
between China and the U.S. These talks may either continue to be .
conducted at the ambassadorial level or may be conducted at a higher
level or through other channels acceptable to both sides. I have
carefully listened to the staterAent the Ambassador just made.- We
will study it and sot forth our views at the next meeting.
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? 7?
Lei said:
Mr. AmbaSsador, I would only like to :add a few points. With
regard to Mr. AMbassadoris proposal regarding sending a representative
ma the-7Tro,)osal to
ru2vernment. A point.e.a ou p o my overn-
ment on the question of Taiwan is very c3ear and known to everybody.
The so-called treaty concluded by the U.S. and the Chiang shek
clique is not recognized by the whole Chinese peoole% And I must
point out that Taiwan is not a state; it is part of the People's
Republic of China. Mr. AmbasJador must be aware that there is only
one China: this is the People's Republic of China. If Mr. Aqlbassador
has nothing more to say, may I make a proposal for the date of our
next meeting?
-I have heard with attention what you have said. I understand
your views concerning Taiwan, and I hope that you have understood
the point of view that I have presented in my statenent. I will
0keport to my Government everything you have said today, including
hat you mentioned regarding meetings at a higher level. I believe
.he Charg also mentioned that the meetings might be in anotTler channel,
and I would like to ineuire what might be involved. Any explanafton
from the Charge would be useful.
_
Lei said:
Concerning tae question of the Chinese territory of Tai n,
which L:abassadol' has mentioned, I have already e:cplained in clear
terms the position of my Government. Therefore I would not like to
repeat them. Mr. Ambassador also mentioned the question of talks
at a higher level or throug:1 other channels. If the U. S. Govern-
ment is interested in talks at a higher level or through other
channels, you may Int forward your draft proposal, or a draft
proposal may be worked out through consultation of the two sides at
these neabassadorial talks. If Mr. Ambassador has nothing more to
say, may I make a proposal for the date of the meeting? I
Propose that the date of the next meeting be decided on later
through consultation via the liaison personnel of our two sides.
Mr; Chlien will be liaison officer of our side.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
DEP1.011Tmr,NTIO1 i
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FROM AmembasSy WARVAW
RS/AN
Ani.t.Y4SIS SIM:4C1-1
DATE: February 21,
SUBJECT : Stoessel-Loi Talks: Report of 136th Meeting,
relxruary 20, 1970
REF :
.110 DISTRIBUTION
. ? .?The American side met tho?Chinese?side.in?the
lobby of the.. American. Embassy.. ?The two principals.
..";hook hands and, after the two sides had stood briefly
to allow press photography, proceeded together by.. *
elevator to the EmbrIssy:fourth.floOr and to thei
conference ?room. '?..? ?
Participants on both sides were:
United States
Ambassador Walter 3.. Stoessell
? Paul H. Kreisberg Advisor
Donald.M. Anderson - Interpreter
Thomas: - Scribe
Pe021.9:11112,11121.224142f_chilla
? Chargo d'Affaires Lei .Yang.
Li Chu7ching - Advisor
Chien Yung-nien - Interpreter
Yeh Wei7lan Scribe
(;)ST ROUT 1N_Q
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n? order to resolve this important contradiction "more
-thorough eNploration is indeed necessary", as said by :4r.
(Ambassador at the first m:ioting. There are certain difficulties
in undertaking this tas%* in the ambassadorial talks between the
two ,countrios. It appears that our two sides have both foreseen
'this situation. At tho first mooting both clIme forward separately
..ivith'tho same view that taLks at a higher level mireht be held,
Pou wen- even furtlor uce ng orwar AO ) oa oc sendino. a
, _ ..
.1Eg.-21=ntative to Pek.ing or to as.a4nc,ton 4or discussion. 1 le
S. Government ashes to. s;znd 4 .rep;esentat.tv1115tor-ial
717.7k or a s)ecial envoy of the United States P.obaidont to PArrig'
_
-..7:07_ :__?___.. further oxors,o ' ? u - c Ions , 0 unuamen a prkncip O.
bTRRT:1FTM7Ta-Ti--a-thi-United States, he Chinese.-Governmen. 11
lug ..o race ve aim;
-,-?
)W8) P4io7i4F.at
Chn..r0.d!Affairesi I. would like. to express ?
?My. Coverix;ent9s..plcaure that this. series Of ambassadoTial-level ?
Ja$ctiu:ss?has been rkizud void that we havemet:again after. only
-ono month. f I indicated in our-previous meeting, the United
-States is prepa'red to?conider? with you the possibility of sending.
?o?reprdontative? to your country orrocCivingyourHreprescntative-..
in the United States, should. progress at these. talks?indicate
that this would be .useful in improllig.relations-betwoon our
.countries. X' h:we noted?yourSpecifid statement today, about ?
-.receiving ?a representative in Peking, rind Twill transmit it to ?
??.uy GovbrnMent. As you la.low0. it :is. my Govermontls view that ?
th&se exchangeS can .make a valuable ?contribution toward the gradual
-resolution of the .problems ? between our two cbuntries. I?beliove
wq have.mada,a?usefUl'start, and 1-hope that we wi).l be able to
? Make further-progresS.?based on'A'spirit of mutual understanding,.
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? 13 - e -0/ 'iro ?
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET /NODIVEYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Henry A: Kissinger
Communication with the Communist Chinese
As I mentioned to you at the time on the phone, Professor Ernst Winters,
a naturalized. American working with UNESCO in Paris, and an old ac-
quaintance, called me on May 3 to relay the reaction of personnel in the
Communist Chinese Embassy in Paris to your decision on the Cambodian
? sanctuaries. This reaction was obtained on April 30, i. e., before your
speech. Thus, the Chinese were aware of only South Vietnamese ground
operations in Cambodia, not our own.
? On hearing the gist of his information, I asked Professor Winters to come
to my office right away. We met at 2:00 p.m. that afternoon for ale,L
fifteen minutes.
- I asked Professor Winters what had transpired in Paris. He said that on
Thursday, April 30, at 11:30 a. m. (i.e., before your speech) one of his con-
tact people with the Chinese, a Frenchman who arranges exchanges between
Chinese and French students, called to say that the Chinese wanted to see
Professor Winters. He went to the Embassy for a two-hour lunch.
He met with several young low-echelon personnel, such as the chauffeur and
a switchboard operator, who are imbued with the cultural revolution and in a
sons.,p run the Embassy. The Ambassador and a young man from.the Foreign
Service were also there but, as usual, were not very articulate.. The Chinese
immediately asked Professor Winters what he thought of the President's
decisions on Cambodia.
Professor Winters replied that he supposed that the United States thought that
its national interest was at stake and was acting accordingly. The Chinese
immediately began to harangue him with invective, a marked depaure from
their previous polite dealings, and lumped him together with ell other
Americans. They claimed that the U.S. wished to conquer Chipa , that
were considering preventive war, that we were in collusion with the Soviets
in a pincer movement on China, and that our Vic.tnam withdrawan Were a ruse,
TOP SECRET/NODIVEYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET/NODIS/EYES ONLY -
Professor Winters was struck by the enormous, un-Chinese intensity of their
reaction. Clearly, a nerve had been touched. He took the Chinese reaction
in stride and asked how the United Statbs was to know how the Chinese felt
without any contact. The Chinese did not allow American visitors and the
Warsaw meetings were not really productive.
The Chinese asked Pfofessor Winters who in America they could talk to and
trust, the significant.groups. In his only intervention, the Foreign Service
officer said, "Don't say the student movement." Professor Winters replied
that the President and his Cabinet were the policy makers and the ones to talk tc
He left the Chinese Embassy very depressed, with a feeling of hopelessness
..,After seven years of cultivating the Chinese. Since he was going to New York
That afternoon anyway for a meeting, he thought it would be useful to go to
--Washington and give me his information in case it fit into our overall strategic
moiale.
Iasked Professor Winters whether they would see him, and he replied that
. they never refused to do so. They did not know that he had been in New York
0 _ * .or that he knew me. i? ?
-
- _
I then asked Professor Winters to see the Chinese the next day on May 4 and
tell them that he.had.seen me, and had put their questions to me. - I asked -
I
Professor Winters to pass a message to the Chinese along the-lines of the
. -- --attachment at Tab-A.-rum him to contact General -Walters as soon as he
----'?)lad seen the Chinese-and give him, any Messake-froin them...-. - .--_-_----- --- - ---
. - .
Professor Winters added that he had observed during the past few weeks that
the Soviets in UNESCO circles were moving away from the U.S. and that there
was a growing Soviet-U.S. tension. '
Mr meeting closed with Professor Winters assuring me that he would act on
this'the next day and my observing that if the Chinese refused to receive him,
this would be an interesting development also.
We have not heard back from Winters or Walters on this subject.
TOP SECRET /NODIVEYES ONLY
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10j1-4
Message to be Passed to the Chinese
The United States has no aggressive intentions concerning
_Communist China. On the cdntrary, we Would like to establish
egular relations with her, recogniz
We have no interest in
ng our differences in ideology.
establishing military bases in
?
Vietnam, and we believe a peace that takes into account everyone's
Dr. Kissinger is prepared to talk to a person of stature
on the Communist Chinese side if this 6.n be done secretly. The
Chinese can reply by getting in touch with Major General Vernon
_Walters, Senior U.S. Military Attache, American Embassy, Paris.
No one but the President is aware of this message and the Chines'e?
reply should be through General Walters and nobody else.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
ii70
C.
No Objection to Declassification in Part ioici/b7/29 : LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
- ? s
Juno 15, 1970
? TOP Sr.CTZET/NOD/S
?SEWSITIvx,:iryrs ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL' VEB.NON WA /aims
FROM: rsrigadier General Alexander M. I-laig
SUBJECT: Sensitive Message to Chinese Communist Government
Pursuant to your dif...oussions with my friend, attached is the text you
should use in your discussion's in Paris. As Iunderatand it, you will
not hand this text to the other :Ado but: wit], follow it literally in your
discussions. ? ?
'Jim Fazio, who is carrying this, memorandu.n and its enclosure, will
also pro...--/dc you with an additidnal supply of one time pads.
TOP SwCRrTiNODIS/S3:'.NSIT/VP FY17.S ONLY
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
TOP SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
? MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED BY
MAJOR GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS
TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT
The United States Government wishes to continue the exchanges that
are taking place through the Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. However, it
is difficult to maintain complete secrecy in these talks due to their formal
nature, the large number of officials involved and the great public interest
that they have generated.
Republic of China desires talks that
are strictly confidential and not known by other countries, the President
is ready to establish an alternative channel directly to him for matters of
the most extreme sensitivity. Its purpose would be to bring about an im-
provement in US-Chinese relations fully recognizing differences" in
ideology.
We are prepared to activate such a channel through the bearer of
this communication Major General Vernon A. Walters, the U. g. Defense
Attache accredited to the French Governn-ent in Paris. We are also
rea.dy to send a high-level personal representative of the President to Paris,
or some other mutually convenient location, for direct talks on U.S. -Chinese
relations.
Knowledge of these talks would be confined to the President, his
personal advisors and his personal representative unless otherwise agreed.
TOP SECRET/NODTSthENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
F?ri-TIITTZ11-
?
No Objection
I V I?
to Dcla,ssifiatiovn tn Par! 10II ?017/129 : LIOI-,.1-..?1AIK-41164y-11Z1-1%) 4
S of Tv"
And Other Presidential Reflections in a Crisis Week
RICHARD NIXON did not watch televi.;
sion once during the Middle East
crisis. He scanned the morning newspa-
pers, hut he did not dwell on them. Lin-
gering too long in the headlines, he
feared, would raise his blood pressure.
"There is an old Quaker saying: he said:
" 'The most important quality in a crisis
is peace at the center.'" -
,For those eight clays the center was
the White House warren? where he
roamed in the cool and very calm cor-
ridors from his hideaway in the Exec-
utive Office Building to his small study,
to the Oval Office, into the Rose Gar-
den, to the staff quartPrs. on over to
the mansion. But the outskle world was
Jet in only in controlled doses. He had
the reports and memos of his men on
the crisis itself. He relied on his own
Special news summary, "I did not want
the hot words of television. - Anyone
watching television would have thought
that war was declared eight times. Just
so the Man here doesn't think that"
In 20 months of stewardship, the Pres-
ident has grown some deeper; crevices
around his eyes and his hair is a shade
more Silver. Those who watched Nixon
during this time found him calm and
onfident, still with that element of con-
ing that has always been part of him.
Nixon ordered that neither his time
nor his mind was to be cluttered with
the details of how many ships should
go where. "It is very important to take
the long 'view." he cautioned. "That
has to be conveyed to everyhody. I am
not going to get bogged doWn in de-
tails. Look clown the road. I want to
pound that into the whole bureaucracy."
?
In the aftermath he credited his strat-
egy with cautious success. It was a cri-
sis, but not, perhaps, as great as reck-
oned earlier. It was like others before
it. It will not be the last of its kind. "Rus-
sia is going to continue to probe." '
Nixon stands face-to-face with his
old adversary, again. In a way, it is some-
what of a comfort to grapple with naked
power, to hear the namevof men he
has known for more than a decade. He
has laid all the pieces of this crisis out
around him for deeper study. The So-
viet cooperation in the later stages Itk-
rated better than their actions in pre-
vious times of tension. But their initial vi-
olations of the cease-fire is another mat-
ter. The issue will come: up again, the
President believes. "It will not be over-
ked," he told one of his visitors.
.S. foreign policy, the President re-
led, has long been "provincial rath-
er than global. They talk about two.
isolationism. That's not new. We've al-
ways been isolationist. The role we have
is not a role we would have preferred.
The .Marshall Plan and other acts of
help were. ?reactions to problems rather
than calculated move in .a master plan
of world .dominance like those devised
in other..generations??by ? Germany ? and
France.. The Peace Corps touched the
heartstrings of America." But more than
?idealism is. needed. The U.S.. ?must ? make
certain that other nations have the
chance to develop as they wish, "wheth-
er it be left, right or Center." ? ?
... ? ? ?
He sees the world .as five key .areas
--7-the? U.S., a Western Europe grouped
'When .dealing with Russia, "it doesn't
serve the cause to say ?that if only we
get to .know each other better our dif-
ferences will ? disappear.. Great nations
are going to have. different ? views." The
President is keenly conscious of dif-
fering political and economic ? systems,
but the fundamental difference he sees.
is that while the U.S. seeks peace, the ?
U.S.S.R. seeks dominion.
? When .Nixon talked of these gigantic.
gulfs between the two powers, he did not
grow excited and angry as he did years
ago: It is a fact of his life now. His job, as ?
he sees it, is to convince the Soviet
15'4..tf CARI. SrlrfrE,
r
i 5
PRESIDENT NIXON PHOTOGRAPHED FOR
around Germans'. the Soviet Union, Red
China, Japan. "Whether we have a world
war will depend on how we go about de-
veloping the programs and the leadership
now to defuse the problems of these na-
tions." Nixon is troubled .about the
sit-
uation of Japan and West ?Germans'.
both ? denied nuclear weapons and thus
a major role in their own defense'. "What
do you say to them? ? That we won't
help? If we don't, it is inevitable that
they will have to make arrangements
someone_etic "
. ? The President hopes to impiove rela-
tions with China. A dialogue, essential if
Peking is ever to assume a.normal. world'
role, r'fas ?begun. "Maybe that role won't
be possible for live years, maybe not even
ten years. But in 20 years it had better he,
or the world is in. mortal .danger. If? there
.is anything I %saint to do before I (Ii, it is
to go to China. If I don't, I want My.chil:
? ??
tete ? remains the problem c.lf the So-
viet Union,.. "the big one?currently.?
"TIME" DURING miDDLE EAST CRISIS
Union that it can still have its goals but.
must compete. for them in the peaceful ?
ways of commerce. ideas, even diploma- .
py. Bringing this about is not a matter of
verbal persuasives, however; American
power must be used to make it impossi-
ble for ? Soviet expansionism to ?succeed.?
other than in peaceful contention.
. In the ? uncluttered minutes .Nixon
looked out the windows ? of his office
down the south lawn, In sonic ways it is
unchanged since Thomas Jefferson, but
beyond those serene acres almost every-
thing has changed.. Nixon som?etimes
brooded out loud. about the United Na-
tions and NA'tc.) and the other institutions
that now must be replaced or altered to
it reality. Reading history, he has? been ?
impressed by the fact that "we are always
ending wars ? hut never winning the
peace." His fervent hope was -to On now
what we didn't do then: I would rather be ?
known not for the fact that I ended a war
but for the .fact that I won a .lasting
peace."
tl
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. 4,....46.tio4)4044384 44-10C"?"3".".t.F."
No Objection tarDsLlafiss_ificf flifoors4 in jp,casrttio4(?/07/2:-9 :10C-HA,K, L Fyi
MEMORANDUM.
SUBJECT: Meeting Between the President and Pakistan President
Yahya
President Yahya was in the United States on the occasion of the 25th
anniversary of the United Nations. Yahya is tough, direct, and with
&good sense of humor. He talks in a very clipped way, is a splendid
product of Sandhurst and affects a sort of social naivete but is P:ILLE-G-IB
much more complicated tkan this.
The President said, "I understand you are going to Peking. '1 ?Yahya
explained how it came about. He said Chou En-lai bad originally been
slated to go to Pakistan and had said he would make .no other foreign
visit until he had visited Pakistan. However, he had had to go to North
Korea for a ceremonial visit and had communicated with Yahya before
leaving, telling him. that he was aware of his promise and apologizing
for not keeping it. He had, however, hoped that Yahya would pay him
4
a visit and therefore het-As going to Peking. The President said 3t is
? essential that we open negotiations with China. Whatever our relations
? with the USSR or what announcements are made I want you to know the
following: (3.) we will make no condominium against China and we want
them to know it whatever may be put out; (2) we will be glad to send
Murphy or Dewey to Peking and to establish links secretly."
Yahya said be had once been told to establish seeret links and had
communicated j.t to the Chinese who. had replied whether this meant
that the United States Was thinking of a hot line to Peking similar to the
one that existed to Mbscow. The President said, no that Wasn't what
be 3neant; he was with to send,ambaSsaders.:.
iqr.NSITIVE
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29 :? LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
interrupted to say when we talked about secret links we meant a form
? of communication less visible than Warsaw. One more susceptible to
enabling the parties to say what was really on their minds and yet have'
? absolute discretion. If we could find some mutually convenient capital
such as, for example, Rawalpindi or conceivably Paris, the Prost-Int
alit consider sendin oulci
be prepared to send me. or since I was too busy he might send somebody
"MT;-"lut at an I'a-777 ?
? $
? Yahya said he would explain this to the Chinese. He continued, "The ?
Chinese are going to change with affluence. Mao talked to me on my
previous visit to Peking of permanent revolution; he had said 'Americans
hope we will die out, but no, I will teach every child from the day he is
born to be a revolutionary. ' And I must say he kept his word in the
cultural revolution." Yahya,said he had been fascinated when he was in
China, but when he left Canton he said, "Thank God. " It was an
oppressive experience.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
MEMORANDUM
NoObjection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
4110 VY L11 J. L. Elk/ UO..
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
TIME: 12:30 1:00 p.m., October 27, 1970
PLACE: Blair House
PRESENT:
Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Council of State
of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Sergin Celac, Interpreter
David R. Young, Notetaker.
Dr. Kissinger: President Nixon was very pleased with the discussions
yesterday. He has asked me to come over and to clarify three specific
points to be sure that there is no misunderstanding.
My third point relates to your conversation with President Nixon on
the Peoples' Republic of China. The President wanted me to reiterate that
we have great interest in establishing political and diplomatic communications
with the Peoples' Republic of China. We do not believe that we have any
long-term clashing interests. We are prepared to set up channels to the
Peoples' Republic of China which are free from any outside pressures and
free from any questions of prestige.
If the leaders of the Peoples' Republic of China want to tell us something
through you and your Ambassador brings the communication to me, I can
assure you that such communication will be confined to the White House.
(Or if you wish to communicate with us through any other emissary, that is
also acceptable.)
President Ceausescu On the subject of Vietnam, I must regretfully add that
the last part of your communication is not very helpful. It adds a threat
while proposing negotiations and this does not leave much room for an
acceptable solution from the other side's point of view.
With regard to China we will inform the Chinese leaders of our
conversation and if there is any communication we will pass that to you
as we have in the past.
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...?
to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
Ambassador 'Maly dictated the following in Mr. Kissinger's office at
6:05 pm, December 9:
The message was duly conveyed and Prime Minister Chou En
reply given after throe days of deliberations was as follows:
"This (meaning the reply) ie not from me alone but from Chairman Mao
and Vice Chairman Lin Piao as well. We thank the President of Pakistan
for conveying to us Orally a message from President Nixon. China has
always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful means.
Taiwan and the Straits of Taiwan are an inalienable part of China which
- have now been occupied by foreign troops of the United States for the
last fifteen years. Negotiations and talks have been going on with no
results whatsoever. In order to discuss this subject of the vacation of
I
Chinese territories called Taiwan, a envoy of Tijii7S
will be most welcome in Peking."
---...
Lai's
fp
? Chou Fax-Lai said in the course of the conversations
"We have had messages from. the United States from different sources in
the past but this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head,
through a Head, to a Head. The United States knows that Pakistan is a
great friend of Chir.e. and therefore we attach importance to the message."
"I think it is significant that Chou En-Lai did not accept or reject the
proposal as soon as it was made and that he consulted Mao and Lin Piao
before giving the answer. This in itself reflects a trend which holds
out some possibility. Further, at no stage during the discussion with
the Chinese leaders did they indulge in vehement criticism of the United
States. The banquet speech of Vice Chairman Tung Pi-Wu ale? made no
reference to the United States by name. These are additional indications
of modification of the Chinese approach in their relations with the United
Ststes.gt
AMH:wgh:10 Dec 70 Retyped for original copy)
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? .
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? C. I.' -
?
TO srcilr:T/SrtzsrrivE
MEMORANDUM or RECORD
FROM: ? Co/. Richard T. Kennedy
Deter)aber 16 1970
Dr. Kissinger gave the original of the attached memorandum
to Ambansador Maly of Paldatan for delivery to President
Yahyn I-Man.during a meeting vrith Ambassador Hilaly itt Mr.
Kissinger's office on December 16, 1970.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
The U.S. representative at the meeting between the two sides
,in Warsaw on January 20 1970 suggested that direct discussions be
held either in Peking or Washington on the broad range of issues which
lie between the People's Republic of China and the U.S., including the
ue of Taiwan. This proposal was an outgrowth of the consistent
policy of .the United States Government to seek opportunities for
negotiating the settlement of outstanding issues between the two
governments. The United States. therefore welcomed the remarks of the
representative of the People's Republic of China at the Warsaw
meeting of February 20, 1970; in expressing the willingness of the
Government of the People's Republic of China to receive in Peking a
U.S. representative of Ministerial rank or a special Presidential
envoy.
In the light of the remarks of Premier Chou En Lai to
President Yabya, as well as the continuing United States interest in
-China discussions at a higher level, the 'United States Government
believes,tt would be useful to begin discussions with a view of bringing
about a higher-level meeting in Peking. The meeting in Peking would
not be limited only to the Taiwan que6tion but would encompass other
d to improve relations and reduce tensions. With
respect to the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, however, the policy
of the United States,Govermnent is to reduce its
lilitary presence
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29 : LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
-2-
- in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region
The United States therefore proposes that representatives of
the two Governments meet together at an early convenient
moment in a location convenient to both sides to discuss the
s---
nfla.,11t_i_.es of the _..r-lejag_..?. These modalities would
include the size of the delegations, the duration of the meeting,
the agenda and a clear understanding on the status and amenities
?
which the T..f. S. delegation would enjoy while in the People's
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
This Copy For
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
CONTENT OF THIS
BRIEFING IS STRICTLY
EMBARGOED UNTIL
6:00 P.M. EDT
DECEMBER 26, 1970.
IT MAY BE ATTRI-
BUTED TO ADMINIS-
TRATION OFFICIALS.
DIRECT QUOTATION
IS NOT PERMITTED.
AT THE WHITE HOUSE
WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
AT 10:25 A.M. EST
DECEMBER 24, 1970
THURSDAY
With respect to Communist China, and other of the
major Communist countries, our position has been quite
similar to the one that I have just described towards
the Soviet Union.
Early in the Administration, the President ordered
an examination of the possibilities of easing some of the
irritations in the relationship, especially in the field
of trade and travel. And we, therefore, took a number of
steps which removed some of these restrictions and which
beyond that made clear to the Communist Chinese that the
United States was prepared to talk seriously and to enable
them to re-enter the international community.
We are in the process now of again reviewing the
still existing restrictions. We remain prepared, at Warsaw,
or _elsewhere to talk to the Communist Chinese about differences
that divide us. There were some talks n Warsaw last year
that were interrupted, but we stand prepared to resume them,
applying the same principles that I have indicated govern
our relationship to the Communist world, which is to seek,
on the basis of equality, to remove the causes that have
produced the tensions.
MORE
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE INFORMATION
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
January 12, 1971
ZEE) PRESIDENT HAS SEEN..
THE PRESIDENT
HENRY A. KISSINGER
Conversation with Ambassador? Bogdan,
Map Room, January 11, 1971
Ambassador Bogdan told me that after the conversation with the President,
Ceausescu sent his Vice Premier to Peking and Hanoi. In Peking he had
extensive talks with Chou En-Lai. Chou En-Lai handed him the following
message:
"The communication from the U.S. President is
not new. There is only one outstanding issue between
us -- the U.S. occupation of Taiwan. The PRC has
attempted to negotiate on this issue in good faith for
15 years. If the U.S. has a desire to settle the issue
and .a proposa or its so u ion, ii- .. Vsll ?e
FeTs-Mno receive a U.S. special envoy ifi7raing.
This message has been reviewed by Chairman Mao and
by Lin Piao. "
Chou En-Lai added the comment that since President Nixon had visited
Bucharest and Belgrade, he would also be welcome in Peking.
The Vice Premier found nothing new in Hanoi.
4
Comment: (a) The Chinese note indirectly refers to the Yahyra cornmu-
nication. It also validates it because it is almost the same.
.,(b) It is free of invective.
(c) It strongly implies that the war
to U.S. -Chinese rapprochement.
(d) It remains to be seen whether Peking will accept a
proposal for a solution with a long time-fuse.
(*-a144..4)
n Vietnam is no obstacle
11
(e) If they answer our communication through Yahya, we
may get a clue.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Lor
44-fb""1"."?. 6;-01444-
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29 : LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
Ambassador Hilaly dictated the following in Mr. Kissinger's office at ?
6:05 pm, December 9:
The message was duly conveyed and Prime Minister Chou rn-Lai's
reply given after three days of deliberations was as follows:
"This (meaning the reply) *a not from me alone but from Chairman Mao
and Vice Chairman Lin Piao as well. We thank the President of Pakistan
? for conveying to us orally a message from President Nixon. China has
always been. willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful moans.
? Taiwan and .the Straits of Taiwan are an inalienable part of China which
?- have now been occupied by foreign troops of the United States for the
last fifteen years. Negotiations and talks have been going on with no
? results whatsoever. In order to discuss this subject of the vacation of
Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's
will be most welcome in Peking."
Chou En-Lai said, in the course of the conversation:
."We have had messages from the United States from different sources in
the past but this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head,
through a Head, to a Head. The United States knows that Pakistan is a
great friend. of Chiaa and therefore we attach importance to the message."
? President Yahya s comments:
"I think it is significant that Chou En-Lai did not accept or reject the
proposal as soon as it was made and that he consulted Mao and Lin Pia.o
before giving the answer. This in itself reflects a trend which holcls
out some possibility. Further, at no stage during the discussion with
the Chinese leaders did they indulge in vehement criticism of the United
States. The banquet speech of Vice Chairman Tung Pi-Wu alce made no
reference to the United States by name. These are additional indications
of modification of the Chinese approach in their relations with the United
States."
AMH:wgh:10 Dec 70 (Retyped for original copy)
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
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25X1
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
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25X1
JJA, 91c3 h-3
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?
i. J(). C.1 C1121'03 VC C1101-1 A Ito rs
U. S. At.tze4-: he
r J raric e
APO New York 09777
Dear "ILtrnon:
Mc:VI:anis of Dr. Zinsing,er's staff deliver to you,
Log he with this letter, t,,,vo documents. 'The first (at Tab A)
a letter ii em Dr. Kissinger to Mr. jeo..n, Sainteny and asks him
to asSist us in a sensitive 'Matter which ypu will, in turn,
to him -when Y U (1(1 iver?ttle letter. You :3hould, the eon
tact. Sa.inte.ri,y, show Uenry's letter to hi;nx and ask him Co arran,go
a private meeting bet,,veen you and the ,A-mbassador to France of
the People::s, Repu'clic of China or with S!cnne otho r appropriate
Senior chinese representi:Itive41 1th-c:
time, Dr. Eissinger vaJ fort ,$ainteny by telephone. It is
pO,rtant that Mr. SzLintony merely read Henry's letter to him and
that you reclaim. it after he has read its contents. Hopefully,
sainteuy will then arrange a private meeting between you and a de-
signated representative of ale ChineSe.
Tho Second document (at Tab Blis a note which, you should subse-
quently deliver to the designated representative of thk. Peoples
Republic. The contents of this note should, under no circumstances,
be divulged to Mr, Sainteny and you shOuld. Merely toll Sainteny that
you have been ittStructed to deliver a note, without Ityrther e
tion' of its nature or cOntent.
In stun, we
alerted b
v.tsualize the scenario as follows:
You are to contact Mr. ?Sainteny who will have been
Henry.
Allow Aim to read Henry s letter Co him, being sure
to re claim the icttoi. at the end of the meet ing nut being sure not to
'TOP SECRET
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
111/0
At
by 1;11zii:\vo, an,t
1T(. tiflLal(tle 1)et,v.ieett. yvo ;t1.1. =3. pl),Vr)i, p1 n.t . the
Pet)! s Repuhl.ica;-..sied.
?..? :,Saiut.c..).y., ? in t?,1r1),:. arr.o.r.o:),?,,-.. ,appr Op r
securo-rwAciev.vio?l.s.bc...tweon you arta tho
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Please. keep 113 posted oi the scenario as it unfold3,
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Brigadier Ge..11.eral,
Duty As .istan to tilePr .i.den
for i.?iat:lorial Secu rityA.ffairs
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2
010/07/29 : LOC-HA K-464-10-1-4 xtion rather than your
second?
THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Dedmon, since you have been so
kind to me, I will be kind to you.
Let the record show?and some of you will remember
that time I was here in 1968?that Mr. Dedmon was the
one that asked me the question about the People's Re-
public of China or Mainland China, if you want to call
it that, and also let the record show, as you may recall, that
at an editorial conference at the Chicago Sun-Timm last
year you asked me the question again.
The first two times I struck out. The third time we got
a hit. That is all we can say.
Let me put it all in perspective, however.
What we have here is the result of a long process that
began in my own thoughts even before 1968, the spring
of 1968, when I answered that question at this conven-
tion. I wrote an article for Foreign Affairs?as a matter
of fact, I think your question played off of that article at
that time?in which I pointed out that we could not have
what will be by the end of the century a billion of the
most creative and able people in the world isolated from
the world and that whoever was President of the United
States had to develop a policy which would bring the
isolation of a billion Chinese from the rest of the world to
American Society of Newspaper Editors
The President's Remarks at a Question and Answer
Session With a Panel of Six Editors and Reporters at the
Society's Annual Convention. Ap7i116, 1971
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CIIINA
MR. DEDMON. Mr. President, when you last appeared
before this convention prior to becoming President, you
mentioned that laying the groundwork for future rela-
tions with the People's Republic of China would be one
of the primary goals of your administration.
In light of recent events, as well as the trade review
which you have ordered, it looks like this is one area
here you are considerably ahead of schedule.
Do you think that we can anticipate an establishment
of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of
an end.
I also pointed out that that was a long-range goal. T:h.s
long-range goal of this administration and of the next one.
whatever it may be, must be two things: one, a_norrnal-,
ization of the relations betu r."'" t"/:: overnment of the
United States and the Government of the People's Re-
public of China, and two, the ending of the isolation or
Mainland China from the world community.
Those are long-range goals.
Let's begin with what we have done then. We can't go
that far that fast in one jump. We cannot do it now. I
will not speculate on it now, because it is premature to
talk about either of those subjects, either recognition or
admission to the United Nations.
But I can point to the goal and what we have done to
get toward that goal and what it can mean to the future.
Over a year ago we relaxed, as you know, our travel
conditions with regard to going to China, and also we
made some relaxation with regard to trade.
Finally, we had a response from the Chinese, as you
know, last week. Then, on Wednesday of this week, I
announced an additional relaxation with regard to trade
restrictions and a relaxation with regard to Chinese who
wanted to come to the United States.
Now it's up to them. If they want to have trade in
these many areas that we have opened up, we are ready.
If they want to have Chinese come to the United States,
we are ready. We are also ready for Americans to go
there, Americans in all walks of life.
But it takes two,of course. We have taken several
,steps. They have taken one._We_are _prepared to take
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
other steps in the, trade field and also with regard to the
cxehanige field, but each step must be taken one at a time.
I know that as editors and as reporters, looking for
that, you know, that hot lead or headline for the morn-
? ing, this is not a satisfying answer. But from the stand-
? point of policy, it is the right answer. Because to try to
make a headline by saying that tomorrow we are going
to do this or that or the other thing would be misunder-
stood among many countries of the world where this
matter has to be discussed and also might have exactly
the reverse reaction with the Chinese.
think the steady ordered process that we have engaged
on now begins to bear fruit. I will just conclude with this
one thought:
The other day was Easter Sunday. Both of my daugh-
ters, Tricia and Julie, were there?and Tricia with Eddie
Cox?I understand they are getting married this June?
and Julie and David Eisenhower.
? And the conversation got around to travel and also,
of course, with regard to honeymoon travel and the rest.
They were asking me where would you like to go? Where
do you think we ought to go?
So, I sat back and thought a bit and said, "Well, the
place to go is to Asia." I said, "I hope that some time in
your life, sooner rather than later, you will be able to
go to China to see the great cities, and the people, and
all of that, there."
I hope they do. As a matter of fact, I hope sometime
I do. I am not sure that it is going to happen while I am
in office. I will not speculate with regard to either of the
diplomatic points. It is preinature to talk about recog-
nition. It is premature also to talk about a change of our
_policy with regard to the United Nations.
However, we are going to proceed in these very sub-
stantive fields of exchange of persons and also in the
field of trade. That will open the way to other moves which
will be made at an appropriate time.
Mr. Risher.
MR. RISHER. I just want to follow up on that if I
cc2uld. Do you think that this might lead to a resumption
of the meetings in Warsaw that were broken up about a
year ago, I think?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Risher, as you recall those
meetings were resumed after we came into office. That,
again, was a result of an initiative that we took. And
then they were broken off again. We are ready to meet
any time they are ready to meet.
I cannot?I don't have any information indicating that
they want to resume them at this time, but we certainly
have the door open. We are not pressing them, although
we would welcome them opening them.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
Message from Premier Chou En Lai dated April 21, 1971 (Delivered
to Mr. Kissinger - 6:15 P.M., April 27, 1971).
Message from Premier Chou En Lai
Premier Chou En Lai thanked President Yahya for conveying
the message of President Nixon on 5 January 1971. Premier Chou En Lai
is very grateful to President Yahya and he will be grateful if President
Yahya conveys the following verbatim to President Nixon:
"Owing to the situation of the time it has not been possible to
reply earlier to the message from the President of the U.S.A. to the
Premier of Peoples Republic of China.
"At present contacts between the peoples of China and the United
States are being renewed. However, as the relations between China and
the U.S.A. are to be restored fundamentally, the U.S. must withdraw
all its Armed Forces from China's Taiwan and Taiwan Strait area. A
solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions
between high-level responsible persons of the two countries. Therefore,
the Chinese Government reaffirms its willingness to receive publicly
in Peking a special envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance,
Mr. Kissinger)or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of
the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions. Of course,
if the
U.S. President considers that the time is not yet right the matter may
the modalities, procedure and other
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4 /Y
details of the high-level meeting and discussions in Peking, as they
are of no substantive significance, it is believed that it is entirely
possible for public arrangements to be made through the good offices of
President Yahya Kahn."
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/07/29: LOC-HAK-464-10-1-4
Once again, the President and 1 v.ould like to imoosoon
" your invq1.1wAble :good offices to ts iSt USi.t . rlatter of
the gre.atest sensitivity." rrh,_ bc-m.rer or. this y/osaag-e.,
Major General Vernon Walters (our Defense Attachc: in
Paris), will explain to yipu our Specific need for your
intercession. The pebject is one rec.:lull:J:11g the kind of
and delicaey which have cbaracterized yoUr earlier
efforts in our behalf and 110 0110 , Other thall the Pre;;ident,
rilyself and General WalterS ii c' of -it. Therefore;
iI is important that after tz'