MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-9-18-0
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: November 26, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-462-9-18-0
MEMORANDUM V
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
DOS, ARMY reviews
completed.
49
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Mr. Han Hsu, Deputy Chief, PRC Liaison Office
Mr. Chi Chiao-chu, PRC Liaison Office
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Commander Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff
DATE AND TIME: Monday, November 26, 1973
3:00 - 3:15 p.m.
LOCATION: The Map Room
The White House
General Scowcroft began the meeting by briefly noting that Mr. Han was
in charge in the absence of Ambassador Huang. Mr. Han observed that
the Ambassador had arrived in Peking about last Friday.
General Scowcroft then handed the Chinese the message attached at Tab A
concerning Vietnam. After reading the message, there was a brief
whispered conversation in Chinese between Mr. Han and Mr. Chi.
Mr. Han: We will report this to our Government, We, of course, reserve
the right to comment.
General Scowcroft: I think the note is self-explanatory. We simply wanted
to let you know of our concerns.
Mr. Han: With regard to housing, you probably know that we have already
signed the contract on the 15th of this month. We plan to move in on the
4th of December.
General Scowcroft, That is good news.
TOP CRET/SENSTT
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w
TOP SECRET
SENSITIVE
Mr. Han: We want to take this occasio
you offered in this matter.
o thank you for the help which
General Scowcczf I wish we could have helped to the extent that you
would have been able.to move in months ago.
Mr. Han: One small problem is the direct phone connection.
General Scowcroft: Yes. I believe it would be a good idea to still retain
that.
Mr. Han: So, . at the appropriate time after we move in, we will let you
know in what room we wish to have it placed.
General Scowcroft: We will have it taken care of at that time.
There was then a brief discussion about the pleasant weather on that day
and the temperatures which could be expected during the winter. In taking
their leave, Mr. Han commented that they: would let the State Department
know when they were actually moving. General Scowcroft offered any
assistance we might be able to give in connection with the Chinese move.
TOP SECRET /SENStTlV,.-r
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1. With reference to the conversation between Prime Minister
Chou and Secretary Kissinger regarding the prospects in Vietnam, the
U. S. side would like to bring to the attention of the Chinese side the
following information:
A. The United States Government is deeply concerned
over what it sees as unmistakable signs of.North Vietnamese
preparations to resume armed conflict on a large scale in
South Vietnam. The United States side regards the present
situation with the utmost seriousness, and cannot stand idly
by if North Vietnam continues its present activities.
B. The following evidence has convinced the United States
side that North Vietnam is in fact preparing to launch a major
offensive. (On each point below, the evidence is strong and is
fully accepted by the U. S. side. )
(1) The North Vietnamese have sent more than 22, 000
military personnel south since 1 September of this year to.
strengthen their armed forces in South Vietnam and adjacent
border areas. Since 1 January 1973 they have sent a total
of over 75, 000 troops to the south.
(2) The U. S. side has been reliably informed that the
North Vietnamese are planning to send almost an equal
number of additional troops into various parts of South
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i
Vietnam during the 1973-1974 dry season -- starting
in December 1973. The U. S. side can see no reason
why the DRV would.plan-to dispatch these additional
troops. to South Vietnam, in complete violation of the
Paris Agreement and Protocols, except to assemble the
manpower and reserves necessary to launch a major
military offensive.
The North Vietnamese have moved into South
Vietnam and adjacent border areas enough stocks of
munitions and military equipment to sustain heavy combat
activity for at least eight months. (Some of these stock-
piles were already in position when the Paris Agreement
was signed last January, but they have been greatly expanded
since that time.) They are now preparing -- as the weather
improves in southern Laos -- to bring still more munitions
and military equipment into South Vietnam.
(4) As of mid-November, North Vietnamese Army units
in all of southern Laos were preparing to move large
quantities of war materiel further south. Such activity, as
well as the very presence of North Vietnamese military
units in Laos, is a clear violation of the Paris Agreement.
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(5) The North Vietnamese have augmented their
logistic forces in northern South Vietnam by some 15, 000
men in recent months. They would not need these logistic
forces unless they planned to expand the support to their
combat units in this area.
(6) The North Vietnamese are making major improve-
ments on roads in southern Laos, and have nearly completed
a parallel road from North Vietnam through western South
Vietnam frorxi the DMZ to South Vietnam's Military Region 3.
These two road nets have no discernible civilian purpose
but they obviously make it much easier for the North Viet-
namese to prepare for and support an offensive than was
previously the case.
(7) The measures whicYthe North Vietnamese are
now taking can be compared with those they took in the
months prior to March 1972, when they launched their
last offensive. The military capabilities of the DRV in
the south are now at least as' great as they were at the
end of March 1972, and in some areas they are greater.
The South Vietnamese government since that time has
also improved its capabilities, and would be in a better
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position to withstand a North Vietnamese offensive without
U. S. air support. Under a heavy North Vietnamese attack,
however, U. S. air support might again prove necessary.
(8) It'is 'impossible to interpret this North Vietnamese
buildup as prudential, as a response to South Vietnamese
provocations, or indeed as anything but preparation for
25X1
major North Vietnamese offensive action.
C. In addition to the evidence above, the U. S. side in
recent months received repeated reports that new artillery
pieces, tanks and other .armored vehicles have been observed
at various points inside North Vietnam along the major rail
lines from China. These reports are of great concern because
if true they would indicate that North Vietnam is receiving
additional military equipment from China and the Soviet Union.
2. These unmistakable signs that the DRV is planning a military
offensive in South Vietnam cannot be ignored by the U. S. side. Such a
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development would raise problems of another diversion of attention
which could only be of value to hegemonial powers. Under these
circumstances, the U. S. side sincerely hopes that means can be
found to avert a development which would have such adverse conse--
quences.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/14: LOC-HAK-462-9-18-0