MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-9-1-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 3, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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ME
0 AN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS ifINGTON
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MEMORANDUM 0F CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS Secretary of State *try A. Kissinger
Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winston, Lord, NSC Staff.
Charles Wo Freeman, Jr. (interpreters
DATE:
PLACE;
Chtiao Kuan-hua, Vice Iorelgn Minister
of the PRC
Ambassador Huang Hua, Permanent Repre-
sentative of the PRC to the United Nations
Chang Han-chih, Alternate Representative
to the United Nations General Assembly
(interpreter)
Kuo Chia-ting, Second Secretary PRC Mission
to the United Nations (notetak )
Wed
8:30
Waldorf Tower
New York City
tober 3 973
0 po
5-A
[The Chinese arrived at 8:30 p.zm After the press had left,
the conversation turned to substance.]
The $ecreary: I want to congratulate the Vice Minister on his election
to the Central Committee. Ambassador Huang Was also elected and that
makes three members of the Committee here in this country.
The Vice inister: What are you thinking f?
The Secretary: I
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g that d hold a Party Congress here.
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The Vice Foreign ster: First let me convey the reg.arcs of Foreign
Minister Chi Veng ei to you and al
those of Premier Chou En-lai,
[There was then a brief discussion of the origin of
Ambassador Hummers name in Chinese.
The second thing is I would like to say that we ye
to Peking on your next trip to China.
The Secretary: I look forward to it very much.
The Vice Foreign Minister: One persona.l rnatt
you Mr. Doctor and you called me Mr. X. Nos
Mr. Excellency, or we will at least use the abbre
tech
You have been very busy, imagine.
elc
ore ihad to call
be calling yoe
on Mr. Ex,
The Secretary:Yes* I have been busy running back and forth between
e and the State Dep
the White
The Vice Foreizz, Minister: I can, imagine this. I s
. Bruce just
before I left. He came back to the United States for a very short time
and then he went back to Peking. We were very happy that he was here
for just a short time.
The Secretary:, I saw him
Department He is o
friend of mine.
et his advice on how to organize the State
of our most respected diplomats and a very good
The Vice Foreign Minister: I also saw Ambassador Bruce when your
Philadelphia Orchestra was in Peking, when Chiang h'ing, Madame
Mao, viewed the orchestra.
The Se9etaryt We greatly appreciate tl receptionthe Philadelphia
Orchestra received.
The Vice Foreign Minister:This Is an expre
between the peoples of our two court -
ries.
n of the
ie dly rel
o.
The Secretary: I am looking forward to my visIt.One reason we had
problems so often was that we were negotiating to get Mr. Lord back on
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the staff. I made a deal with your people not to give either Mr.
or his wife a visa for China until he returned to the staff.
The Vice Foreign Minister; He is not a free man. [looking toward Mr.
Freeman:] You are not either.
Mr. Lord: The blackmail worked, for I am row back on the at
The Vice Foreign Minister: I read with great care your speech at the UN
and I saw that in your speech you quoted from Kant.
The Secretary: You are a Hegeian scholar.
The Vice Foreig Minister: I was going to tell you that I was a Hegelian
scholar.
The Secretary: Did you read Hegel in German, or Chinese? I didn't
understand him in German and I have read him in English.
The Vice Foreikrt Min ter: I read it in German. Ws a. bit clearer.
When one is young it's a bit easier to read such things.
The Secretary: I find him almost incomprehensible in German.
The Vice Foreign Minister: When one is young one has a kind of thirst
for knowledge and a deep desire to understand philosophy, and even if one
does&t completely understand, one keeps on reading.
The Secretary: Whether or not one agrees with the details of his osition,
I think Hegel is one of the most profound philosophers.
The Vice Foreign Ministe ? Your speech was relatively easy to under-
stand,
The Secretary; And not Hegelian.
The Vice Foreign Mini t r: It was Kantian.
The Secretary: He is not
easy to understand either.
The Vice Foreign Minister: Kant is easier to understand than flegel.
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The Secretary: I read your speech,
I agree with. There were some thing on. Which there was some disagree-
ment.
r. breign Minister Many things
The Vice Foreign. Minister: Perhaps Mr. L?itlomitted so.re things from
the version he gave you.
The Secretary,: That must be t. There was nothing an Cambodia or
Korea in what he gave me.
The Vice Foreign Minister: ether you agree or not, I am sure you
c ould understand what / was saying.
The Secretary* I understood.
The Vice Foreign Minister I have a suspicionperhaps. some of your
colleagues did not completely understand.
The Secretary: Not all my colleagues have read the tr
conversations with you and the Prime Mint
It La a pity you spoke today. We could have quote
debates. You said that "The U.S. would not take
buildup] lying down". You were quite right.
during the Senate
Soviet military
The Vice Foreign Minister: I am sure you have some colleagues who
do not understand why I wrote that way.
The Secretary: That is true. The complexity and subtlety of the Chinese
in.tcllect i always understood. On the other hand, I think under the new
organization of our government there will be a greater unity of conception
and execution than before. We consider the normalization of relations with
the People's Republic one of the absolutely key elements of our policy.
f The party then moved from the sitting room to the dining
room for dinner. As they were sitting down there was
further discussion between the Vice Minister and the Sec-
retary concerning Hegel and philosophy.]
The Secretary: How long do you expect to stay in New York?
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The Vice Foreign Minister: About or three more weeks. It has not
yet been decided.
The Secretary: So you will be back in Peking when am there.
The Vice Foreign Minister: I believe so.
The Secretary: It would not be a trip to Peking without you to oppose me
The Prime Minister is tough enough by himself. And with you, the two
of you together are really too much for me. I am very happy that you
will be there. We area.lready very good friends. I always enjoy talking
with, ynu.
The Vice Foreign
Yes, we have had many good meetings.
[Ms. Chazig took over as interpreter for Mr. Freerna
The Secretary: When I came to China the first time, who would have
thought that our relations would have developed so hat? Maybe you
on the Chinese side knew. I telly= quite candidly that I did not foresee
all the developments that have taken place.
The Vice Foreign Minister: Chairman Mao foresaw them. Among the
Chinese people he stands the highest and sees the farthest. Already in
1969 we wanted to make a big change in our relations. But afterwards
things happened in not quite the way we had expecte& so the change in
our relations was postponed. Now the things that ought to have happened
have indeed come to pass.
The Secretary; I always wondered..We sent a message to you in 1969
through the Dutch Ambassador to Peking. Did you take our ne ssage
seriously? Did it get to you?
The Vice Foreign Minister: We did give serious con
our circumstances were not right.
The Seer
you.
; I don't think he was a good channel
eration
cornm
0 it but
ation to
The Vice Foreign Minister: No, it was not that. But our objective
situation at the time was not suitable.
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The Secretary: But in the end
e ciio
The Vice Foreigp Minister: Yes, we
President of Pakistan.
-6-
reliable channel of all
our gratitude to the
The Secretary: I tell you frankly. What he did for us still affecth
policy toward Pakistan and toward the region.
The Vice Foreign ter: How did your talks go this time with the
[Pakistani] President? I have not met Mr. Bhutto since he saw you.
The Secretary: Has he left, or is he still here? Pm ot sute.
The Vice Foreign Minister: I believe he la s left. One point which I wish
to raise with you, among two friends who really know each other very well,
and that is, could you not be a bit faster in giving aid to the Pakistani
Th,e Secretary: We have difficulties with Congress on this, as you know.
But we are doing two things. The first is a massive aid and debt resche-
duling program. And the second is the supply of military aid.
The Vice oreign Minister: Did you notice the part of my speech
which I spoke o the question of our friends the north?
The Secretary:. I noticed it.
The Vice Foreign Minister: Yes.
,TirSecret . We will be making some arrangements through Iran to
help Pakistan with the military aid. I will talk more about this on my
trip to Peking. In a week or two we will be sending our Ambassador
to Iran to Pakistan in this connection.
The Vice F
ign Minister: What is the situation in Afghanistan?
The Secretary: We think the Prime Minister is a neutralist, pro.Soviet
in some respects. But the younger officers are completely pro-Soviet.
We told your friends to the north that any outward movement by Afghanis
tan would be considered inconsistent with the detente between our two
countries. We also told the Indian Foreign Minister the same thing in
Washington today.
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The Vice Foreign Ministe As we all know, open talk in an open forum
by a country is one thing. But the actual policy of a particular country
is not necessarily the same. For example, today the Afghanistan Foreign
Minister made a policy speech in the UN General Assembly. The speech
was in many respects quite a naked one.
The Secre y: About Pakistan?
The Vice Foreign Minister: About Pakistanwith particular reference to
M"
the Baluchistan and Pashtunistan problems. I should also tell you that
this Afghan Foreign Minister is one of my Aki friends. We have been
acquainted for a very long tin. And, actually when David was Prime
Minister before, he was very friendly to China, But even at that time
his focal point In his policy was on our northern friends, Nevertheless,
at that time, that is when he was in power before, he was not -ttoo ratilOal
in that respect. His speech today canoed me some worries.
The Secretam: Speaking frankly, I can assure you that if the Afghans
put pressure on Pakistan will see to it that Iran pats pressure on
Afghanistan.
The Vice Foreign MinI ste r. SpeAting of the Middle East, I believe you
understand the steps which we ar e taking and see them in the context
of the whole situation. But some of our Arab friends have misunder-
stood,
The Secretary: I regard the steps which you are taking in the Persian
he Arabs.
Gulf as in the long-term interests
The Vice Foreign Minister: We do not blame our Arab friends. We
understand that they have some misgivings among themselves and con-
tradictions among themselves. And the Soviet Union has attempted to
deepen these contradictions.
The Secret_ry: Yes, in fact, Iraq particularly Is a very large recipient
of Soviet arms aid,
The Vine Foreign Minister: Among old friends I would like to ask you
what is your estimate of the abortive coup which took place in Iraq in
June or July of this year?
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The Secretary; We really don't have very good information. We have
some reason to suspect that perhaps Iran was involved.
The Vice foreign Minister: We also are not very clear on what happened
ther e but we suspect involvement by our northern frie ds.
The Screjary: Youtre speaking of 'the coup? We jus
this question.
The Vice Foreign Minister: I just thought you might have
information on this subject.
ure about
The Sec e y; I will try to get more information for you tomorrow.
(To Mr. 1,aord;1 Weald you see that we get some information on this
tomorrow for our Chinese friends?
The Vice Foreign Minister; What I have said is only a suspicion. There
is perhaps no sound basis for this suspicion, but the reason I mention
this is because Iraq is in fact ander a large degree of influence from our
northern friends.
The Secretary; That is true, Also, your northern friends b
a lot of pressure to bear on the Kurds to unite with, the Iraqi
The Vice Forel/on Minister: Quit
often used by our northern friends in that case.
rue. This is also a. facto
g quite
0 Ve ranler) t.
which is
The Secretary; Right now I should say that Soviet military inline
Iraq is the greatest in the entire Arab world.
.The Vice eign Minister:You re right. We agree.
The Secretary; We are selling Iran our two most modern aircraft.
:The Vice Fore&n Minister:I hope you will be able to give the
military equipment very soon.
The Secretary: The Phantpm aircra t wi
And F-1,4 and F-15 aircraft will be deliver
in production. The F-14 arid F-15 are a'irc
equivalent.
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be
in
elive &elm?
1974 and 1975 w
for which the So
ce in
this
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they are
s have no
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The Vice oreLg,Miniater: The Chinese side gives this arm, that is
the Persian Gulf the Bay of Bengal, very great notice and attention.
In our last talk in Peking in February we talked a lot about this.
The Secretary: I have noticed a certain parallelism our policies.
It is a great pleasure to talk to serious people.
The Vice erelgrt Ministe ? Let me propose a toast
friendship.
hine A e an
{All toast.)
About the [Afghan) Foreign Minister's speech this morning in the LIN
General Assembly, it has crossed my mind that perhaps he was deliber-
ately speaking for our northern friends to hear. I was engaged in talks
with other friends at the time, so I wasn't present and didn't hear his
speech. But I certainly did not expect so naked a speech.
The Secretary i I must read the speech. [to Mr. Lord:) Would you get
it for me? [to the Vice Foreign Minister;) But if my impression is the
same as yours, we will certainly make our views known. We will defin-
itely resist any attempt to dismember Pakistan.
The Vice Foreign Minister; That is fine! The situation in Pakistan is
not only worth our attention, but I believe it is worth yours as well.
The ,Sec etary: I agree. We have problems with Congress, and under
these circumstances we favor an indirect and somewhat gradual apprca ch.
The Vice Foreign Minister: I wish to ask, between two friends, to what
extent you have managed to improve your relations witirCongress, since
President Nixon's nomination of you as Secretary of State.
The Secretary; I'm working hard on this. I intend to improve them to
the point where Congressmen will ask me to leave them alone. In fact,
they will invoke the separation of powers against me. Seriously, we are
on the way to a substantial improvement in our relations with the Congress.
For example, I am taking Congressmen to the UN whenever I come up
here, and whenever I meet with foreign visitors I include them as a matter
of course.
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The Vice Foreign Minister: I have noticed what you are doing about
Congressmen and I think that what you are doing is correct. And there
is one other thing which I also appreciate, and that is the information
which you told as through our channels ? that you. would stop in Japan
coming and going on your way to Peking.
The Secret y: You remember Chairman Mao suggested this to me very
strongly. He scolded me for not spending enough time in Japan.
The Vice oze Minister: I don,t know how you look on the situation
n Japan. I think it is a good thing for both of us to do things to support
Prime Minister Tanaka. Give him capital with which to work. You may
have noticed that in the policy report that Mr. Chou En-lai delivered to
the Chinese Communist Party Congress, he mentioned the return of the
four northern islands to Japan. And in my UN speech I also supported
this because Prime Minister Tanaka is soon to go to the Soviet Union.
The Se reta.py: We also support retu,rn of the four northern islands
Japan. I had a good talk with Tanaka during his visit to the U.S. I
understand that this helped him at home. However, I noticed that some
of our Chinese friends appeared concerned that we have included Japan
and Europe together in orte general approach. This is, of course, done
for symbolic reasons.
The Vice Foreign Mini e ? As a friend, I niay be permitted.,I hope, to
make
e very frank comments and sugge
The Secretary,i I would appreciate hearing them.
The Vice ro eijp. Minister: In your [April] speech you mentioned that
the Europeans were concerned only with their own region and not with
the interests of the entire world. This hurt them. The way that you
put it hurt them greatly. I tell you this as one person who has studied
Hegel to one who has studied Kant.
The Secretary:. I hope' get some points for studying Spengler! Although
what I said about the Europeans being prirnarly concerned with their own.
region and not with the world is true, it may not have been the best way
to put it.. I v.rouid like to say, however, that the leaders whom you have
seen recently in Peking from Western Europe are not the most farsighted
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statesmen in the world. When the world changes they are terrifiedand
paralyzed. But I believe that they are beginning to understand what we
are after. There has been some progress in recent weeks. You know
that we are trying to stop the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe from having a bad influence in Europe. And we are trying
to stop our European friends from harboring the illusion that there is
no longer a distinction to be drawn between friends and adversaries.
We are forcing the Europeans, despite themselves, to think in this
direction.
The Vice Foreign Minis er: This mozning I had a talk with the Foreign
,
ster of Ireland. The I rish Foreign Minister told me that, in his
view,as far as Europe is Concerned, the defense of the area cannot be
separated from the United States. I told him that I agreed with this
statement.
The Sec etary Very realistic.
The Vice Foreign. i ter: Bat some of our European friends are
too clear about this matter which we are discussing.
The Secretary: The Ft ench are quite good, although they have quite a
few differences with us on specific matters. Their overall orientation
on this issue is all right. We are also trying to help them in some of
their military programs without any publicity.
The Vice Foreign Minister: We have noticed some changes in their
public statements. We also note some changes in French-American
relations and especially in the defense sphere. I think you will believe
me when I tell you we have urged them in this direction.
The Secretary; Yee, I believe completely in what you . I often
think that the French policy is to make it appear that they are obtaining
by blackmail that which we are already willing to give them. It has
not been announced, but today the French put up a strong paper on NATO
defense in Brussels. The French are quite good; the Etitish are good;
West Germany is not so certain.
The Vice ForFignMinister: Your friend, Ambassador Pauls, the West
German Ambsador to Peking, had just got back frornA. holiday in West
Germany before I came to New York. He wanted to meet with me but I
did not have time.
The Sec
tary: His el
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easily minded, you 1cn,o
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The Vice ForeiMinister: I wantedto tell him that West Germany's
attitude was the most dangerous to Western Europe?
The Secretary: Ambassador Pauls is really very sensitive. When he
was in Washington I offended hi mat least once every 'ae ek. But I think
if you speak with him frankly, he wi I agree with you privately,despite
whatever ?instructions he has.
The Vice Foreign Ministert My relations with. him are about the best
that I have with any of the European diplomats in Peking. He and I often
invite each other to go out to eat together. When we eat alone we can
speak freely without restrictions.
The Secretary: That is very good.
Vice Foreign Minister
ally free exchange o
as you ay.
When there are no others around we can have a
views. But I have not noticed that he is as sexist.
The Secretary; But I did not invite him to din r.
The Vice Foreign Minister: Yo
are too mi
y b
The Se etary: No, t is that I get bored too easily.
T.
The Vice Foreign Minister: You do not have enough patience. It is not
easy to talk to others who have different views and do not accept what you
have to say. And I should say that I am a man who is known as very rude
and quite blunt. I have made quite a lot of criticism of your agreement with
the Soviets on the prevention of nuclear war. But although I hit you hard
on this point, I always leave the door open for you to get out.
The Secretary: That is very intelligent.But, of courses you knew how
we plan to use that agreement.
The Vice Foreign Minister,: You know, I quoted two sentences from your
speech in my own speech to the UN General Assembly. That is, I quoted
from Mr. Excellency, but not from Mr. X.
The $ ecretary: I understand that if you did not speak the y you did
there would be others who would not understand. In fact, I rode up on the
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plane today with Senator Mansfield, He had read your speech an
said you definitely must be very angry with me.
-13-
The V)ceForeign Ivlinister: No no.
The Secretary: You know that we will not violate the basic interest
of China. If the Soviets plan some sort of military action against you,
we will demand urgent consultations rat, of course, we will first talk
to you about this.
The Vice For eio, &piste We have this understanding. But we told
you before that we must make some c rnment about this areernent.
The Secretary: We know.If you had not made such a comment it would
e 7
have been considered strange.
The Vice Foreign Miriistert You knew, after I delivered my sp
the UN General Assembly, I thought to myself that you might b
the few of our American friends who und erstoOd my speech.
in my speech I rendered you quite a bit of help.
The Secretary: Not everywhere.
The Vice Foreign Minister: If I rendered you help everywhere
could not do it anywhere. That's Hegelian.
The SecretaFy: It would be useful to have you talk to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
The Vice Foreign Mini et': What do you think about he Korean pr
:The Secay As I read ur speech.Iclered if perhaps you were not
hinting at some compromise. I know that in principle your stand is very
strong. But in practice you may be somewhat flexible. We seem to be
ed on the dissolution of UNCURK. But you disagree that the two
areas should be admitted simultaneously to the UN. seems to me
that it should be possible to envisage some sort of compromise. We
could refer the question of the LIN Command to the Security Council at
this session, but not push the question of the two Koreas corning into
the UN at this General Assembly. We should seek to avoid confrontation
on this issue. You. recognize, Mr. Minister, that we have in fact moved
Korea in the direction thatlhad agreed we would with the Prime Minister.
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Perhaps the movement has not been as rapid as he might have hoped, but
developments are proceeding along the direction we had agreed. If we
attempt to push this issueinn fast, we may run into difficulties,
The Vice Foreign Minister: You understand our style, I am sure. In
principle we must take a very clear stand. But with regard to the
realization of the principle we may take certain steps.
The Secretary: I quite understand, And.I saw evidence of this in your
speech How do you think we .sti ould proceed?
The Vice Foreken Mi.nister: Concerning this problem I rn not nearly so
qualified to speak as Ambassador Hug Hua.
The Secretary: We talked about it at our meeting last Wednesday. When
he doesn't have clear instructions, he can be very tough.
The e Foreign Minter: I feel that we have agreed on the process,
which we should now y out quickly by agreed steps*
The Secretary: I also think
The Vice Foreign Minister: Can you take some measures tc
about the Kim Dae-jung case? I assume, that you did not4re
in which this case occurred.
do something
with the way
The Secretary. We certainly did not agree. We are talking to our South
Korean friends in an attempt to prevent a reoccurrence of similar cases
in the future.
The Vice Fo eig inistet: Isn't there something which you can tell yo
South Korean friends which would move them a little farther on this sue?
Couldn't they have done something to avoid what has happened and to prevent
it from happening again?
The Secrel
The Vice
concrete o
y: Do you have any concrete suggestions?
reign.Minister: This is
his matter.
feeling. It is hard o be
The Secretary: We have spoken very strictly to the South Koreans on
this matter. If Kim Dae-jung is alive today I believe it is in large measure
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due to us. This was a very stupid matter indeed. About the Korean UN
resolution, should Ambassador Scan get in touch with. Ambassador Huang
TdOtalk about this? I could also send Ambassador Hummel up here
to talk about it. He knows my thinking on this subject And then we can
go in the direction that I told you we would.
The Vice Foreign Minister: All right.
It is very wrong, this mhole matter of Kim Dae-jun
The Secretary This is, of course, a working dinner, arid we will not
have a formal toast, but I should like to raise my glass in a. toast to
the friendship between the American and Chinese peoples, to our rela-
tionship with the People's Republic of China which we, I assure you,
mnsider very central to our whole foreign policy. I would especially
like to refer, in this context, haying worked with you on the Shanghai
Communique language on this point, to our joint commitment to oppose
hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region. Finally, I would like to drink
to your health arid to the health of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-
lat.
[After the toast the party moved to the sitting room. The
Secretary expressed a hope that the Vice Foreign Minister would
visit Washington and also that he would see that Ambassador
Huang Hua came down to Washington. He remarked that he
had had a meeting with Ambassador Huang Chen on Saturday
morning and that he would be eating lunch with him on Thursday,
at the State Department.
[The party was then seated in the sitting room
The Secret I think that the two Liaison Offices are working quite
well.
The Vice ForeignMinister: There
are major.
but
think they
The Secretary: I agree. We very much appreciate the manner in which
the Government of the Peopl&s Republic has helped us to get our Liaison
Office in Peking established and working.
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The Vice Foreign Minister: Speaking of this issue, I have some complain
As you know, our Liaison Office in Washington is still in the Hotel. Can't
you think of some way to help them?
The Secretary: We are trying to help them on the purchase of the hotel.
As you know, they have bought two houses in Washington. We are trying
to get the price on the hotel down. But, of course, we have little leverage
on this subject, Perhaps you have a comment on this, Ambassador
Hummel. You have been working on it.
Ambassador Hu I don't want to make any promises, but w are working
hard on it and we hope that we will resolve it. The owner are re-considering
the price.
The Secretary: Is the price the only- p oblern?
Freeman: There is another problem involving title insurance for
the hotel.
Amkssa4or Hummel: I think we ca.
Grit these things out.
The Vice Foreign Minister: The reason I mention this is that Ambassador
Huang Chen has spoken to me several times when he was back in Peking
about the inconvenience of living in the Hotel.
The Secretary: We are also very greatly embarrassed. ut the U.S.
Government has no direct control over private property in Washington.
We did help out in getting a zoning change for the hotel. We hope that
the owners of the hotel will reconsider the price which they have asked.
Pm afraid that you did much better for us in Peking than we have been
able to do for you in Washington.
The Vice Foreign Minister: Our two social systems are not the same,
and there are different problems in the two cases. Nevertheless, we
hope that given the present circumstances you can help us to solve these
problems.
The Secretary: You can be sure that we will do our best. We want the
Liaison Office of the People's Republic to be established and working
smoothly in Washington.
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The Vice ,Fo : When I talked to David Rockefeller in Peking,
I mentioned this problem and he offered to help. But I did not go into the
details of the problem.
The cEet, y We approached Mr. Rockefeller, but, of course, he con-
trols more ew York than in Washington. I mast say, when it
comes to New York, your Ambassador Huang Hua used David Rockefeller
as a very effective kind of smokescreen to buy the property up here.
Ambassador Huang Haw Actually an Italian student found the property
for us. "
,The Secretary: But your dealings with David Rockefeller helped quite a
bit. The Rockefeller lawyer told us this, and that you were interested
in this property and that property and, but actually all the time you were
dealing with a completely different; piece of property.
The Vice Foreign Minister: But I hope you will See what you c
the Liaison Office.
10
The Secretary: I will look into the matter again
[There was thett. a discassi n of Ambassador liumxnel's probable
participation in the Secretary's trip to Peking.
The Sec ry: Speaking of my trip to Peking, we have again received
several communication s from Prince Sihanouk suggesting that we hold
conversations in Peking. Among these communications are those through
Senator Mansfield. With regard to Senator Mansfield, I would like to say
that while we favor Senator Mansfield going to China, we do not favor him
negotiating with the Prince. If he wishes to talk to the Prince, that is
all right, but if Sihanouk wishes to make serious proposals, he must talk
to a member of the Executive Branch. I have also told Senator Mansfield
this. We take Sihanouk seriously. We would seriously examine any
proposal which he might make. You are, of course, familiar with the
various proposals which we have made tolim.
The Vice :Foreign Minister: We are very clear about Senator
and Prince Sihatiouk's personal relationship. We are also very, clear on,
the US,, Government position n this point.
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..11141r..10,evotaxy.t.: not bor).,:?good either of us ,.ein,coar..,age the
. ................ .....,..
on the xecutive
The. Legtslative,...,...13ranch vOtit come p witt*:....0dinposititircs. which Would
not accord with our common concepts oi the. way..we should proceed.
The Vice Foreign Ivinisters We have talked a lot about the Cambodian
problem before. We do not need to go into details tonight but I think I
might express my opinions on this as a philosopher.
The Secretaryj You mast understand thatildori t understand anything
about philosophy after the beginning of the 19th century.
The Vice Foreign Minister; But I Would like to speak to you as a. Hegeli
rathern than as a Kantia.n. ?
The Secretary: Please. As a philosopher.
The Vice Foreign Ministers It is clear. that the best thing for both of us
would ha?ve been that neither of us got inroived in this situation but, of
course, the actual situation is not so. I believe that the best way to
handle this is to leave the matter to the Cambodians themselves. Let
them work it out. I believe that when we discussed this last year, when
we met, probably you. did not accept the viewpoint Which I put forward.
As I said last year, the present international situation is so complicated
that it is not worthwhile for either of us to get involved in a basically
minor question like Cambodia. And the situation in general in the area
has progressed. For example, the Vietnam problem is basically solved,
on your side. And Laos, likewise. Of course, the questions have not
ceased to exist, but the fighting has stopped. I cannot understand why
youtspend so much of your energy and so much of your attention on this
Cambodian question, and by doing so, divert your attention from more
important problems.
The Secretary: Our domestic opponents on foreign policy have used this
Cambodian question to paralyze our other policies. So that is why, Mr.
Minister.
The Vice ForeignMinister: I see your point.
In fact, one might compare your current Cambodian problem to the problem
you faced with regard to the Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1971. Actually, 1
should say that you were in rrtich greater difficulty in regard to that problem
than in Cambodia. Is that right?
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The Secretary: No In 1971 we faced problems which were tactically
more difficult, but strate?ally not as difficult as this one. We were
involved in that sItua.tinn for only a few weeks, and it was a containable
problem. Bat the Cambodian issue is used to attack our whole foreign
policy. I think that it is of the utmost importance that we maintain our
credibility on this issue, since I believe that we must, in the future, make
decisions that will perhaps be very surprising to our public opinion.
The Vice Foreign. Minister: The Cambodian question is a very long story.
T11 Secretary I don't want to argue about Cambodia, If we could do it
ver again, in 1%4 we would certainly not have tied the entire U, S.
eign Policy to a country of 15 million People so far away from, our
shores. It is not important to our overall strategic position. Therefore,
we can afford to be very flexible in the solution of the problem. As long
as there a real solution.
The Vice Foreign Minister: I should like to tell you something very ridi-
culous. As you know, China and Vietnam have a relationship which goes
back 2, 000 years. VII tell you a joke. It wasn't until as late as 1954 that
we were told by Ho Chi Minh about Cambodia. But our whole concept of
Cambodia dates only from then -- that is, from 1954, And yet, China. is
so close to Cambodia. Isn't that ridiculous?
So perhaps from long-term view we shouldn't take such a minor issue
so very sexisway and turn it into a major issue. We didn't even know there
was a Cambodia until after 1954.
The Secretary!, When I discussed Vietnam with the Prime Minister, it
in i0-.C'41 arnajor loreignpolicy issue fot us. Cambodia is not. It
domestic problem. We can live with Sihanouk. That is not irn.po
We can be flexible and live with any reasonable result.
The Vice Foreign Minister: I did
about Cambodia..
to talk in er detailed fashion
The Secretary: We've not asked for your help in the Cambodia question.
The Vice Foreign Minister: The Cambodian problem is in some respects
the same to both of us. You have not asked for our help, and we have not
asked for yours. What I wish to emphasize is that, considering the overall
situation, the Cambodian issue is very definitely only a side issue.
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The Se tary: From the U.S. point of 'view it is indeed a side isstie.
You are not involved there and I am sure that you will not become
volved.
The Vice Foreign Minister: Yes hut there is a question as to how you
interpret our\ degree of non-involvement. For example, we are not
involved to the extent that we do not ask how the Cambodians will solve
the problem. But both of us are in fact involved to some extent,
The Secretary: This s anexarrle of your Hegelian dialectic. Once we
agree that both of us are not involved, you explain how in fact we are
involved.
The Vice ForeignMinister: f both sides riously agree that neither is
involved then perhaps we could genuinely t1ot be involved in any issue.
That would be very good. For example, you. should stop giving any aid
to Phnom Penh.
The Secretary: You can always give aid?toHanoi, and Hanoi will give
to the Cambodians.
The Vice Foreign Minister: Your interpretation is not correct on this
point.
The Secretary:you very frankly, Mr. Vice Foreign Mini
that as I lee it, your i
in this issue.
erests and the interests of Hanoi are not the same
The Vice Foreign, Minister: I wou.ld not say that it is a question of our
interests being different, but rather that our circumstances are not the
same. I could tell you a good many stories. You do a good many things,
but as you look back the objective result does not conform to your sub-
je ctive motivation. I think that one of your best contributions is that you
can connect your policies to your philosophy.
The Secretary: Only you Chinese understand this.
,
The Vice Forewi Minister: Going back to Cambodia.for a minute. L
understand that you face domestic difficulties on this issue. But looking
at it from the point of the overall situation, it is simply not worth it to
either you. or to us.
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The Secretary: L do not plan to talk about this with the Prime Minister
unless he raises the issue. Of course, if he raises it, I will talk about
it. I am not going to Peking to talk about this.
The Vice Ireirei:gn Minister: Our attitude, as I have explained it, is that
we should let the flames burning in Cambodia extinguish themselves, by
themselves.
The, Secretary. As longas the flames are in fact e nguished, we can
live with the situation.
The Vice F
ign Ministe ? I advise you to read Hegel.
The Secreta rt Which one of flegel's many book
The Vice Foreign. Minister. Hegel' "Philosophy of Ristory" There are
many points which are absurd in Hegel but there are also great insights.
I'm sure that we can discuss these problems effectively but we have very
different backgrounds. In China we look more to long-term problems. I
think you haste come toounderstand this after the Meetings you have had
with Chairman Mao. Now that you are Secretary of State, perhaps it is
more difficult for you.
The Secretary: One thing is easier, and that is that I don't have to go
through planning two separate meetings With you in. Peking. I thank you,
for your patience with that arrangement in the part.
The Vice Foreign Minister: la ten years we can look back to see whether
what we have said tonight is true or not.
The Secretary: As a philosopher, I would agree. But I believe that the
result in ten years will be the same regardless of what we talk about here.
I even have some good idea of the way things will turn out. Perhaps we
should write our predictions on a piece of paper, seal the paper and then
open it up in ten years. I think we would come out fairly close to the
actualities. As far as we are concerned, we see the road ahead but there
is a big obstacle on the road, and the question is how we can get around
this obstacle. Of course, Cambodia is not the problem. We understand
your views on Cambodia.
The Vice Foreign Minister:I think it is remarkable that in the past th
this country you were so afraid of the Communist Party and the Soviet
Union. Perhaps fear iS not the right word.
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The
agen
ec et v;
.ght all members of the Com
The Vice Forel,
an ideology. Bat now you.do not appear to be so afraid
or the USSR) The Soviet Union is a country of vtiti
people* China is a country of, I suppose, well over 700
Together they are at least 900 million people. But you
of us; this I know.
-22-
unist Party were
ter; What I mean is fear in the sense of fear of
of either [Communism
over ZOO million
million people.
are not afraid
Now about the Cambodian issueWhether Cambodia turns red, pink
_
black, white or what, what difference will this make in the end for world
history? The best way out is for neither of us to get involved in Cambodia.
You have some difficulties which we do not have, I know. Your difficulties
with Congress and with the press. I wonder whether there is not a spy
for the press in our midst today!
Ambassador Rumnel. I ued to be a newspaperman
Vice Foreign, Minister: I was also a newspaperman. Anyway I notice
that you, have been improving your relation with Congress and improving
your relations with the press. What is your own assessment of the situatio
The Secretary:, My own personal relations with the press are very good.
But, you know, talking of the press, the Prime Minister really betrayed
me on this issue.
The Vice Foreign Minister: You have some sense of retalia
I suppose. First you spoke in a joking way and then the Pri
talked with someone about what you had said about the press,
ge,
The Secretary: The Prime Minister told visiting pressmen that he was not
as gifted as I, that he could not talk for half an hour without saying anything.
,The Vice Foreign Minister: You must understand that we had been talking
about the Shanghai Communique. Thad been chatting with the Doctor
about how we would handle this with the press, and he said there was no
problem, he could talk to the press for half an hoar without saying any-
thing at all of substance. We were very happy at that time, having finished
our negotiation of the Communique, and the Doctor said this to me purely
as a joke. Afterwards I told the Prime Minister the joke and then, of course,
he repeated this joke to the press.
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But I am pleased that you are Improving your r.etatiOn8 with the Congress
and the press.
The Se?j Whatyou say is right. Our relationsith both Congress
and the press are quite good.
The, Vic I know that it is very diificult to deal with
them in a c
ry lilt
Now Iw?ld like to ask you about the Middle East.
about the Middle East situation?
.,The Sec y: The newspapers say that I have a plan. I assure you that
I do not hate a plan. It woiUd be childish indeed to pat forward a plan
without a strtegy. Vire must have a strategy first. Speaking very
candidly, Vice Foreign Minister, I should like to say that in my
opinion the Israelis want to stay where they are because they see no
solution more advantageous than their present situation. ,And, of course,
the Arabs want the Israelis to lve, But the Arabs are not looking for
a policy, but rather for a. miracl
a do you. have
You are very sarcastic
The Secretary: Let me speak candidly to you as a friend. The Arabs
make speeches; they make tremendous speeches It is easy to see why
o many prophets have come out of the desert/ But they lack all realism.
The Arabs are in a most curious position. They lost the war, but as a
condition for negotiations -- indeed as a precondition for taIks not for
a settlement -- they demand that the victorious army withdraw from the
territory it has occupied. Now, if we and you and perhaps someone else
could agree on something we could do now about this Middle East sitmation,
something that Israel could do about this, then we would be prepared to
put pressure on Israel to do it.
Just look at our own relations: Suppose that on my first yisit to Peking
when I was speaking to the Prime Minister I had demanded that we
establish Liaison Offices in eighteen months and that we achieve all the
other progress that we have made in these past eighteen months. What
would have been the result? That was not the way we did it. We agreed
on the general direction in which we would proceed, we have been moving
in that direction.
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We would like to d the same thing with the Arabs, but the Arabs want
ach a settlement before the basic direction in which we are going
a even been fixed. This is impossible. I do not intend to produce
a plan on the Middle East. If I were to put up a plan it would only unite
both the Arabs and Israelis in opposition to my plan, and they would
start shooting at me and my plan. We would like to arrive at the same
sort of understandings with the Arabs which we have with you.. And we
always keep our word.
The Vice Foreign. Minister: Speaking very candidly, t tel.l you that
we worry that you. may suffer losses in the Middle East if you continue
a long the same policy lines that you now are. You are givirg the Soviets
a big chance by your present policy.
The Secreta y: That is partly true. But the.
so badly that they do nothing. They are waiting.
The Vice Fore ga Minister: I don't think that you should take the
rigidity of their positions so much granted.
The Secretary: What should we do about the MiddleEast? We want to
do something.
Soviets
at big chance
The Vice Foreign Minister: Well, may speak personally for a mom
and give my personal views ? and let me say at the outset that I do no t
represent my government when I speak to this question ? it would be
much the best course for you quietly to seek to improve your relations
with the Arab states, even including Iraq. I do not think that the Iraqis
are so much under Soviet influence that this could not be accomplished.
The Secretary: .1 agree, and any suggestions you have to put forward we
will listen to most carefully. I have told the Prime Minister that I have
already met secretly several times with Mr. Ismail, who is Adviser to
President Sadat of Egypt.
.The Vice Foreign Minister: I really have no concrote suggestion to
put forward,but we really are concerned. We don't want the situation
to slide in the direction of the Soviet Union
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The Secretary: I can tell you that we will not accept.a Soviet attempt
to carve out a sphere of influence in the Middle ta
The Vtce Foreign Minister: I should like to say to you that you should
not take the accusations made against your government and against you
by Egypt, Iraq and Syria and the other Arab states too seriously.
The Se e ry: I appreciate that.
The Vice Foreign Minister: Meanwhile, I think it would be highly
desirable for you quietly to improve your relations with the se states,
You Americans have a major drawback. Whenever you set about doing
something you always make propaganda about it and announce it to the
world. Of course, I except present company.
The Secretary: I often think that the State Department is like an. African
tribe a piece of news gets out and pretty soon it's on the drams and
the drums are beating and carrying the news all over the building. We
will organize the Department to improve this situation. If I did not
trust those who are here tonight they would not be here.
The Vice Foreign Minister: I hope you will understand that the Arab
nations, the Arab people, have special characteristics. I hope that you
understand these characteristics. If you don't, you will find it impossible
to work with them. Perhaps I am being too frank.
Th, Secretary: No, we are friends.
The Vice Foreign Mi ter: My personal view is that if the present
situation s allowed to continue it may develop in a way which is favor-
able to the Soviets and not to you. We Chinese are always candid, but
I must say that we have no specific suggestions for you in this arena.
When Shafi visited China what could we tell him? We just advised him
that he should not look on the Soviets as absolute friends and the Americans
as absolute enemies.
The Secretary: That is very good.
The Vice Foreign Minister: We also talked about you personally. They
have their views on you. There is, as you know, a big hue and c
the Arab press, a big clamor in the Arab world about you and your
appointment. I told them that Marx was Jewish also, and that we beli
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in Marx. You see, we look at the whole problem. We are not utopian
We are realists.
The Se ary; We are anxious to improve our relations with Egypt,
Syria, Iraq and the other Arab states. Tomorrow in fact I will be
seeing the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and I hope that I can speak very
frankly to him.
Vice r reign Minister.: We are not looking for a miracle. But as
'Hegel said so well, "repetition produces nothing. " We mast make pro-
gress on this issue but what comes out cannot be too surprising.
The Secretary: We willdo our best. If the Arabs were willing to do
something concrete, we would put pressure on Israel to respond,
The Vice Foreign Minister You have two hands, why do you not follow
a two-handed policy toward the region? You could support Israel with one
hand and deal with the Arabs vith the other.
The Secretary: That ?in fact our policy. We wish to talk to the Arabs.
The Vice Foreign Minister: You must understand the Arab character;
otherwise it is useless to talk. And I have to say that what I said about
the Middle East is my own opinion and not that of my government. Anyway
we have been friends now for quite a number of years; we can talk frankly.
The Secretary: It is very helpful. I can tell you that very few statesi
that I have met are capable of taking a global view. Most talk only in
of trivialities. The one exception is our Chinese friends.
en
terms
he Vice Foreign Minister; I should like to say that I don't disagree
with the open speech which ,p a made in the UN General Assembly. I
very mach appreciate what you said. It is in fact true that the Arabs
and the Europeans lack a global view, as you said. You. must not be angry
with me. I also must offer some criticism of your position in public.
The secretary; I hope you don't mean tb
Vice Foreign Minister: No, w
I will accttse you by narne, perhaps
Taiwan question I understood what
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you. will criti
e by name.
have a personal non-aggress t.
private, but not in public. And o
said.
Yo
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The Secretary: I know what you un stand. We are proceeding along
the direction which has been agreed with the Prime Min ter. We are
now carrying out our military withdrawals as I discussed th the Prime
Mini stet r
The Vice Foreign Minister: We understand, but of coarse we wish that
this could be accomplished faster. You know there is a question in their
mind of the world's people -- if Japan and China can establish diplomatic
relations, why not China and the 'U.S.? The world's people wonder about
this.
The Secretazy: You seem to be t inki.
in term.s of the same modalities as wit
of diplomatic relations with us
Japan.
[The Secretary then took the Vice Foreign Minister
aside for a ten minute conversation with him alone
with Ms. Chang as interpreter. After this conver-
sation, the meeting concluded at approximately 1l30
The
The Secretary escorted the Vice Foreign Minister to
the elevator to see him off.
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