THEIR PAST PRACTICE OF RECOMMENDING INITIATIVES, EVEN THOUGH THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSALS FREQUENTLY ARE NOT ACCEPTED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-460-6-1-3
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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their past practice of recommending initiatives, even though
their recommendations and proposals frequently are not ac-
cepted. In this regard, he noted, the Navy "doesn't suffer
from lack of plain speaking."
Admiral Zumwalt opened the discussion period by asking for
Dr. Kissinger 's views on the three big C's -- Cambodia,
Chile and Cuba.
Dr. Kissinger reviewed the situation in which the US found
itself as SSpring. In the face of growing enemy strength,
Cambodia was threatened from-the very foundation and our
Vier tnam nation Program was in peril. Every indicator pointed
toward a massive offensive by four enemy divisions into
Cambodia and the southern regions of South Vietnam. Still,
the wise men of our government sat back complacently and
said that we were doing so well as a result of the initiatives
taken in the November 1969 speech that we should continue
along the same course. Since this obviously was not so, the
-get. out of South Vietnam, or;
-- go into Cambodia.
NAVY and JCS
reviews completed
The decision to enter the enemy base areas in Cambodia was
made against the unanimous, recommendations of everyone in
the government except the military. Now that we are on the
brink of success, everyone who opposed the operation seems
to have a vested interest in seeing to it that the results
come out the wrong way. In reviewing the situation we faced
ten months ago, Dr. Kissinger thought we might have lasted
through 1970 had we not taken intervening action; however,
had this been our decision, we would have faced disaster in
1971. In looking to the future, the Communists obviously
see Indo-China as the key to their survival. He thought we
must take those actions necessary to get through the present
crisis, and to build the Cambodian military capability to an
acceptable level prior to the next wet season. If we per-
severe, he believes we can make it impossible for the North
Vietnamese to fight concurrently in both Cambodia and South
Vietnam. Even under the present circumstances the South
Vietnamese can operate in Cambodia with greater competence
then can the North Vietnamese. In summary, Dr. Kissinger
thought we should keep the enemy off balance in many erent
areas during the dry season, thus preventing an offensive
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/30: LOC-HAK-460-6-1-3
 Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/30: LOC-HAK-460-6-1-3
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campaign. At the. same time, we should destroy as much of
the North Vietnamese supply line as possible while we still
have the shield of US manpower in Southeast Asia. As we
look to the future, he thinks it may be possible for the US
to maintain a credible
our carrier task forces, even
based air.
Dr. Kissinger acknowledged that the situation in Cuba must
5 -~
seem m ambiguous in the light of many conflicting news stories,
but he emphasized that the White House has no doubts as to
the scope of Soviet intentions and the threat to our security
of their base in Cienfuegos. He pointed out that the Navy
had been of great assistance in identifying this threat, and
in describing what in their view constituted the parameters
of an enem base in this hemisphere. He declined to go into
significant detail as to our diplomatic negotiations on this
subject, but assured the group that there had been a private
play in addition to public pronouncements. He thought there
was no doubt in the Soviet mind that the US is fully aware of
their aims, since we had told them in precise written terms
what constituted an unacceptable base of operations.
The recent public announcement by the President (on January
4) was intended to amplify the written record; we intention-
ally used the phrase "nuclear submarines" to describe the
activity to which we objected, thus embracing attack submarines,
as well as missile submarines, in our interpretation. This
tactic prevented any semantic exercise as to what might be
considered an offensive system. We desired to make a simple,
unchallenged statement knowing full well that the Soviets also
were in-possession of our written conditions which addressed
offensive weapons. We thus have restricted several elements
of Soviet naval activity on the basis of both public and written
pronouncements. Nuclear submarines, whether attack or missile,
are covered by our pub is statement, while the written state-
ment includes the conventionally-powered submarine which carries
an offensive weapon whether it be a cruise missile, ballistic
missile or other). In summary, Dr. Kissinger thought we have
established both a public and private recor to which there
has been no challenge. Under these conditions, he feels that
we should say no more on the subject, particularly since we
accomplished a great deal in getting the tender out of Cuban
waters. In this connection, he did not think we could object
in principle to the presence of a tender; however, should a
tender provide services to either a nuclear submarine, or to
one armed with offensive missiles, then the United States Govern-
ment stood ready for an immediate showdown.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY
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 X12/30: LOC-HAK-460-6-1-3 Dw(.~~'S -' 1 i1"
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-- Can you give us a preview of the President's new
Foreign Policy message? If so, what might we expect to be the
role of U.S. Naval Forces?
-- How do naval forces fit into the Nixon Doctrirf !
-- Since you-have assumed your duties as the President's
National Security Affirs Adviser, how has Naval power served
in the national interests, (e.g. Jordan crisis, rapid rein-
forcement of the Sixth Fleet, minimized reliance on foreign
bases, helicopter platform in current operations off Kompong
Som).
-- Do you feel that the decline in the Defense budget
will level off in the next few years, and perhaps start an
upward trend? What are the tradeoffs between domestic and
defense spending?
-The U. S. Navy is vitally concerned with the
strength of NATO, not only in the Mediterranean, but the
Atlantic as well. Much of our Atlantic Fleet is earmarked
for NATO. Can we expect the continued maintenance of U.S.
Force levels in NATO?
-- With all of the recent concern over the situation
in the Middle East, do you think we are giving sufficient em-
phasis to the North Sea and the security of the Scandinavian
countries?
-- What are our intentions regarding security in the
Western Hemisphere? Is-there anything you can tell us con-
cerning our so-called "understandings" with the Soviet Union
on their naval activity in Cuba?
-- Are we exerting sufficient pressure on the Allende
regime in Cuba? What might be our reaction to the estab-
lishment of a Soviet Naval base in,Chile?
-- There has been considerable speculation concerning
Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Do you foresee the
need for greater U.S. strength in that area?
-- Assuming the continual withdrawal of ground forces
from Southeast Asia, how can we provide security to South
Vietnam should Vietnamization fail or slow to an unaccep-
table pace?
SECRET - EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/30: LOC-HAK-460-6-1-3