40 COMMITTEE MEETING--CHILE --OCTOBER 6, 1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-460-5-4-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 5, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/02-: LOC-HAK-460-5-4-1
I ?
NIEMOikANDUM,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
----M-ELET /SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Viron P. Vaky
? SUBJECT: 40 Committee Meeting- -Chile October 6, 1970
October 5,. 1970
DOS, NSS
reviews
completed.
Your meeting will review the Chilean situation.
The meeting should concentrate on two general issues:
Action prior to the October 24 runoff, and
-- What policy we should follow for the long range;
and on one specific question:
? Korry's suggestion that he come to Washington.
i. he General Situation
Allende has continued to consolidate his position. On the political front, after
an initial rebuff by his coalition (UP) of the ,PDC's request for specific guarantees
Allende quickly reversed the UP and offered to name a committee to negotiate
with the PDC on the drafting of specific constitutional guarantee they desire. This
offer was made on the eve of the PDC governing board meeting, and thereby cut
the ground out from under the anti-Allende forces. The PDC meeting is still
underway.
All observors agree that at best there will be a split in the PDC, that there is
no chance the PDC will unify against Allende, and that Allende is almost sure
to get the 19 additional votes he needs from the PDC to assure his election.
There is no evidence that the military are even thinking about a coup. The
latest report via the Argentine Foreign Minister (see cable attached) is that
the military, in fact, declined to stage a coup.
Other scenarios which had been reported whereby some ministers would resi,
the President name a military cabinet, and new elections convoked have not
materialized.
Economic problems continue and there is some discontent. The Communist
Party is reportedly moving to consolidate its position in public media, educa-
tion and labor.
? TOP SENSITIVE/ EYES ONLY
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
. General Situation (continued)
There is, in short, confusion, much apprehension, but no cohesive anti-
Allende movement. On the contrary, resignation or acceptance of
Allende seems to be growing.
II. Preventing Allende's Accession to Power.
Immediately after the September 5 election, Korry stated that our only
chance was the "Rube Goldberg" Frei reelection gambit. By 19 September
this gambit .was dead. Korry argued in effect that now our only chance lay
in Frei inviting the Military to move, either directly or by a gambit of
entering the cabinet. By the end of September the cabinet gambit was
clearly out, and if the Argentine report is to be believed any military move is out.
Korry now argues that our only chance is to create economic deterioration
and this might stir up Frei, the military or the populace.
Korry has argued that only Frei. can pull off anything and he is moving be-
hind the 'scenes to do so. In alternate cables, however, he decries _Frei' s
lack of backbone. The fact of the matter is that Frei refuses to move or
lead anylaction:: Korry is grabbing at straws, but each one breaks when he
grabs it.
In my own view there is now no chance that anything will happen which we
can either stimulate or support to prevent Allende's election October 24.
. Maybe if things he.d been done differently over the past several months
this would n.ot be the case, but as of October 6 1 think we are kidding our-
selves to believe there are any more gambits that we can work. Not even
economic deterioration is likely to achieve such a dramatic turn-around in
less than three weeks. Economic pressure might make sense from other
points of view (see below) but notsolely as a means of preventing Allende's
election.
Unless we are prepared to intervene overtly and physically in Chile we had
better start planning for an Allende election and how we deal with that
situation.
m. Coping with an Allende Government
In my view there is some chance that within. the first year of his administra-
tion an .Allende government could be brought to collapse or that a Chilean in-
spired movement could overthrow him. Apart from that, I think that there
is at lea.st a very good chance that an Allende governmezt could be effectively
hampered, and that we could effectively limit the impact of his government
on the rest of the hemisphere.
?-?yr. ?r,rn I"
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/02: LOC-HAK-460-5-4-1
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Coping with an Allende Government (continued)
But to -do anything means we should have agreement as to concept, objectives,
strategy and a carefully orchestrated game plan. We 'nave none of these things
now. We are improvising. There is no agreement as to our fundamental per-
ception of Allende--do we accommodate, oppose, or ignore? Do we let him set
the pace or do we?
A01.0....016~1?11.M.M?1?1?111.....IMI?
Allende's game plan will be to claim legitimacy and respectability, to avoid
prematurely coalescing opposition to him, to reassure those concerned so
that he can fragment his opposition and then slice the salami bit by bit as he
is able to. Our game plan should be to frustrate that. We should strengthen
opposition, seek to coalesce it and inhibit Allende's internal capacity to effect
his program, and place pressures on him so that he either fails or out of
frustration steps up his drive to a Marxist state prematurely. Opposition and
opportunities may then well arise which could be exploited to overthrow, him;
or else he will fail.
Meanwhile, we sho.uld begin to provide some leadership to the rest of the
hemisphere to organize them against his tactics in the OAS and to limit his
influence elsewhere -- a diplomatic cordon sanitaire.
A game :plan might be devised along the following lines:
2. Economic.
Cut aid; use economic pressure to discourage further investment and
assistance by international agencies. Miscellaneous measures to put
pressure on him-.-copper marketing.
,3. Diplomatic.
Cold but correct on the surface toward Allende so we do not give him an
'excuse to escape our pressures.
25X1
Make clear quietly we do not accept Allende or his policy?he has to prove
acceptability not prove his unacceptability.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVr/rNin. ro\T-r
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
3. Diplomatic (continued)
Wind down our bilateral programs.
Initiate immediate consultations with key states--Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela--to build a de facto entente and to make
known our concerns; seek concerted action to oppose any Chilean move
to wreck OAS, recognize Cuba, or establish a third force in Latin America
opposed to us.
? But we must recognize that we cannot energize the hemisphere to support us
without some evidence that it is in their interest to do so. We may thus:.
have to consider increased military and economic aid and special trade
treatment. We cannot with one hand ask for their support and with the
other hit them where it hurts--as we are threatening to do now in prohibiting
Argentine meat imports and taxing Brazilian soluble coffee.
In my view we need a olic decision on NSSM-97 and a controlled imtdernen-
tation of that decision.
IV. Korry's Rettirn.
? In his October 1 Sitrep, Korry suggests that time has come to travel to Wash-
ington to participate in meetings to set our policy and tactics. He proposes
to meet with policy makers, to speak off the record to key congressional and
senatorial groups and editors.
oWn view is that he ought to stay in Chile for a while longer until we have
our own ducks in a row at least. I doubt that his lobbying all around in
his "unguided-missile" way is likely to be helpful right now.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY end.
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KOD IS.
FOLLOYING UP BRIEF cONVERSATIoN PREviOuS DAY wITH .
NRGENTINE FON MIN WHICH I REPORTED TO ASST. $F.Cy MEYER,
ARGENTINE ACTG PERM REP TOLD ME LAST EVFOI::G THAT MINISTER
po JUST BEFORE HIS nPARTUE FROM VEW YON REQUESTED TH;!7
FOLLOwING MESSAGE BE CONVEYED TO US:
PRESIDENT FREI HAD, AS FORECAST IN EARLIER REPORT,
.CALLED IN LEADERS OF CHILEAN ARMED FORCES AND IN EFFECT.
INVITED THEM TO TAKE OVER BEFORE EXPIRATION HIS TERM. THEY
HAD, HOwFVER, CATEGORICALLY REFUSED, STATING THAT THEY ARE-
.NOT FOUIPPED TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY AND THAT 1IN ATTEMPT TO
DO SO WOULD LEAD TO wIDESPREAD STRIKES AN DISTuR?ANcEs
BY MINERS 4.ND OTHER LABOR ELEMENTS wITH wflICH:THEY WOULD NOT
WISH TO COPE. GP-2.
YOST
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'' No Objection to Declassification in Part,2013/08/02 : LOC-HAK-460-5-4-1