THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-459-10-10-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 1, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE WHITE HOUSE f~h''~j ~N~~
-rO1~~F~It.rT~~t~~~~'~'~Y~ Septeinb~r 1, 1970
MEMORANDUIvI Ft7l~. THE. PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: The Current Military Situation in Carnbadia
In response to your xequest of August 25, 1974 fax an urgent assessment of
the Xnilitary situation in Carnbadia, I tasked the JCS, the CIA and Mr. Ladd
at oux Embassy in Phnom. Penh for their estimates of the situation.. The
JCS response includes a CINCPAC assessment. All are. agreed that the
Cambodian Government is in no dangex of being toppled by Communist
military attack. They da.not believe the enemy intends to launch a major
military attack an Phnom Penh in the near futuxe. In sum, they believe the
military situation in Cambodia to be no worse., and perhaps somewhat better,
than at ,any time in the past few months. Mx. Ladd states that the military
situation is better fog the Cambodians today than it has been since he has
FROM:, ~Ienxy A. Kissinger
been thexe. The xCS memorandum is at Tab A; CIA's is at Tab B and
Mr. Ladd's views ~ar~ at Tab C.
The Chrerall Mi~:7ttaxy Situation
ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY.
The JCS and CTA note that the Communists' main. immediate objectives are
to xe~establish a secure LOC system in Cambodia,. to. re-establish. border
bas~:s far sustaining the struggle in South Vietnam and to develop a Khmer-
based insurgency. They both agree that at least through the rest of the
'rainy season, which ends in October-Novamber, the Communists will
pxabably try to keep FANK forces tied down in defending key population
centers in. an of#ort to maintain their own relative freedom of movernen.t
in rural areas. The JG5 note that FANK does not have 'the capability to
conduct sustained. offensive operations but that it does have a limited defensive
capability to defend key population centers and lines of communication. CIA.
'and the JCS, however, stress the importance of allied milit~.ry support,
particularly cross-baxder operations and tactical air strikes, to dais
FANK capability.
It is CTA! s view that the Cambodians are holding their awn in most populated
areas of the caurxt~y and that the situation is not like~.y'to change greatly in
the near futuxe. The JCS and C7.A axe agreed that the Communists are
.practicing a protracted: wvar strategy in Cambodia. They believe the enemy
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TOl- ~~;c~xc~ ~. i ~:~;jva.~r ~ ..~
hopes to wear dov~tn the Cambodian army and gavernxr~.ent aver a long. period
of time during which they intend to develop a Cammuna.at infrastructure to
control the pc-pulation. They do not believe the Communists can. or intend
to destroy th? Lon Nol Government by direct. military attacks in the near
future.
The Situatioxx Around Phnom Penh
Neither the JCS, Mr. Ladd nor the CTA believe a. major en,erny ground. attack
on. Phnom Penh is likely in the next few months. All three, however,. pate the
possibility that the Communists could. harass Phnom Penh without warning
with small, scale ground probes and mortar nr rocket attacks.. They agree
that one of the enemy's major aims is to isolate Phnoz~. Penh bath to facilitate
Communist control aver the countryside and to intensify pressure on the
government.
The' .Caxx~,badian Gavernsnent's LOC's
Mx. Ladd est3.mates that if the enemy chooses to use his forces in sufficient
'strength, he cam probably block any of the LOC's for two to six days.. He
Hates, however, that FANK or FANK/ARVN would be able to reopen them.
The JCS state that it is clear that the enemy is willing to spread his forces
thin in order to maintain pressure~an provincial capitals and key route
junctions. The enemy, .however, does not appear to have sufficient. as sets
to enable him to keep key LOG's closed-
Enemy and F.~:NK Military Stren th
There is general ~:greement that the enemy combat force in Cambodia and
algng th.e bottler totals approximately 24, 000 men, with an additional 25, 000 -
30, 000 administrative service troops. There are an additional. ~, 000 to 10, 00.0
Cambodian dissidents. Arrayed agaixxst this enemy force, FANK has amain
force of better than 110, 000 pexsonnel, up from 35, 000 in. March 1970. .The
Cambodian Air Force has 80 qualified pilots and 25 more in pilot training
status. FANK. ha.s shown improvement in sevexal areas, ,according to
CIIVGPAC, and Mill further improvement is anticipated as the combination
~sf coYxibat experience, improved coxnnnunications and logistics and the
infusion of newly trained troops take effect.
Attachments
TDP SECRET /SENSITIVE --
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/06/28 : LOC-HAK-459-10-10-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/06/28 : LOC-HAK-459-10-10-0 ~~ ..a ~-~'`
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY.
August 2T, 1970.
FROM; Mx. Ladd, Phnaxn Penh
TO: Sxig. Gen. Haig, White House
1. Many individual journalists in private conversations with xne have
expressed their admiration for the surprisingly good jab FANK has done
to hold off the enemy and its organized approach to its pxcablerns. Most
of the journalists are neither professionally qualified to make sound
military assessments nor do they have access to the information
statistics, planning factors or tactical situatioxi~ data necessary to form
a basis for a sound military assessment. Some axe simply totally
irresponsible so far as factual reporting is concerned and I expressed
,thin opinion to Maynard Parker at luncheon just day, before yesterday.
2. I realize the press reports are serious factors with which you
xYau.st deal and X do rr,.y best when with them to present the picture in its
true prespective. I also always point out that my views are only.
impressions as_ I axn not directly involved in anything other than logistical
situation,. It is my conviction that three major factors influence the
gloomy press presentation of the military situation in Cambodia.
First is the inability of the journalists to make a responsibly sound
and professional assessment. In many cases over here, this is tied
quite closely with a certain degree of immaturity, Second is the
.probability that their publishers ox editors pressure them to find and
report upon any weaknesses (Cambodian or US).that can. be used to
reflect unfavorably on any aspect of the situation sa far as the US
effort is concerned. Third is the fact that many of these journalists
have pxeviotisly predicted that the present government didn't have
a chance far survival and they seek. to find ox create any evidence
whatsoever that wi11 lend credence to their previous predictions.
3. I was in Saigon when I received your message and was working
with MACV/CINCPAC to assist them in responding to a JCS requirement
far an ass~:ssment of the situation and friendly and enemy capabilities.
I concurred in their rather lengthy report and assume you will have
access ta. it ar a JCS version of it.
4. There are saxxxe factors I consider particularly pertinent .and'
which I feel might be helpful to you. The first. is the intangibly but
mast important fact that the. Cambodians have the will and desire to
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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fight and defend their country. Secondly; T do not believe there is any
significant threat of ,the development of a Khmex infrastructure which
would constitute a challenge to the GOC in the imanediate future.
Thirdly, a careful analysis of the MACV/CTNCPAC message will, T
am sure,. uphold my conviction that fox the next few months the prospects
look quite good for Cambodia. The enemy has many problems to include
the wet season and flooded areas hampering him seriously in bath the
logistical and tactical areas. This condition will, of course, abate
with the end of the monsoon season but in the meantime, FANK accrues
assets such as experience, almost 14, 000 additional newly trained
anal equipped forces from the Vietname"se training centers, improved
logistical capability and the development of a phased plan to comxn.ence.
limited offensive operations against enemy forces now within the defended
axea of Cambodia.
5. Lon No.l and the FANK staff are developing theix national military
strategic plan along the fallowing lanes:
A. Phase T (current): Defensive operations and preparation
_~for._ini,~i,al: offensive. operations. -. - .., . .
B. Phase TI; Continue defe~ase and conduct offensive operations
in coordination with the South Vietnamese to destroy the enemy in the
axes between the South VietnamesefCaxnbodian border and Route 4.
C.. Phase TIT: Continue defense and conduct coordinated
offensive operations to destxoy the enemy ar drive him out of the
area r,~oxth and east of the Mekong Rivex to a line from Kampong Tham
to Pr~k Kak thence generally eastward to the boxdex (xubber
plantations ).
D. Phase TV: Offensive operations against the enemy east-
ward from Siern Riep and noxthward along the Mekong to recapture
Kratie.
E. Phase V: Offensive operations to recapture Stung Treng
and the l~ortheast area along Route 19.
6. I realize the concept of the stxategic military plan is quite optimistic
but T da consider. that Phase TI could be undertaken possibly two or three
m.oxiths from now with a reasonable chance of success. My concern is
that with the end of the wet season, at about the turn of the year, the
enemy will be able to substantially increase the flaw of both men and
supplies into Cambodia from Laos. This however is not the time for me
to go into greater detail on that consideration.
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7. In suxximary, I consider the zxsilitary .situation is better today
than it ever has been. for the Cambodians since Ihave been here and I
believe their capability to defend themselves against the current enexny
threat will increase far the duration of the wet season as the trained
troops strexngth grows. I do not believe there is a serious military threat
against Phnom. Penh at this tirn.e but the enemy is capable of haxassing
Phnom Penh outskirts with ground probes and rnaxtar. ar rocket attacks.
$. The I..OC's, both ground and water, will remain subject to inter--
diction and if the enemy chooses to use forces in sufficient stxength he
can probably block any~of the LOC's for two to six days. FANK ox
,FANK/ARVN operations against such enemy courses of action would be
able to open the LOC's.
9. This is the situation as T see it now. We .have many problems
but things at this time are getting better for FANK. The enemy also has
many px~blencas but for the time being things are not getting better for
him.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY.
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