LETTER TO DAVID KLAUS FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

/' J mod
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3f
I have your letter of April 1, 1975, appealing the denial of
your request for the release of NSC 10 and NSC 10/2.
As you know, you have the right to seek judicial review of this
denial of your request under the provisions of 5 U. S. C. 552.(a)(4).
also eze~npt under 5 U. S. C. 552 (b)(5)
the,,documents are exempt from compulsory disclosure under
5 U. S. C.. 552 (b)(3). In this connection, we refer you to 50
U. S. C. 403 (d)(3) and 50 U. S. C. 403g.. In addition, NSC 10 is
subject matter of these documents, we have also determined that
After consulting with another agency having an interest in the
We have carefully examined these documents in light of your
request, and have determined that they are exempt from
disclosure under 5 U. S. C. 552 (b)(I). These documents are
classified and exempt from the General Declassification
Schedule pursuant to the provisions of Sections 5 (B)(2) and (3)
of Executive Order 11652, (March 8, 1972), as amended.
Dear Mr. Klaus:
Mr. David Klaus
Center for National Security Studies
122 Maryland Avenue, --N. E.
Wash gton, D. C. 20002
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SEG XGDS May 22, 1.975
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT APB L
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETA Y KISSINGER
THROUGH: GENE SCOWCROFT
FROM: Jeanne W. DavVA
SUBJECT:
Request for Documents
Concerning Covert Operations
On March 18, 1975 we received a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
.request from Mr. David Klaus (Tab A), an Associate at the Center for
National Security Studies (Mort Halperin's organization), for the
declassification and release of NSC 10 and NSC 10/2, two 1948 documents
.assigning responsibility for planning, authorizing and monitoring covert
operations.
We denied this request under Sections (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the amended
FOIA in my letter of March 27, 1975 (Tab B). As expected, the denial
has been appealed with an indication that a lawsuit will be initiated to
compel disclosure if the appeal is denied (Tab C). A final determination
was due Mr. Klaus no later than May 16, under the time requirements of
the FOIA. However, he has not yet paid the reproduction fees for a docu-
ment sent him previously, nor has he requested a waiver of the fee.
Accordingly, we have informed him by letter that, according to our
regulations, we have stopped the clock 'on this request until he pays for
the previous work. He has telephoned to say he is forwarding a check,
so we must be, prepared to act on this item as soon as his check is received.
-NSC 10. and NSC 10/2 (Tabs D and E) are 1948 documents which detail the
genesis of a coordinated effort in covert operations. They view the position
of world leadership assumed by the United States and the "vicious covert
-activities of the USSR" as factors which necessitated an organized system
,of covert activities. In paragraph six of Annex A to NSC 10 (Tab D) "covert
-operations" is defined to include "preventive direct action, including
sabotage, subversion against hostile states, and support of indigenous
anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. "
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Paragraph 5 of NSC. 10/2 (Tab E) adds "economic warfare" to the definition.
NSC 10 was a draft prepared by the ?NSC staff for consideration. It was
not adopted but was returned to the staff for revision. The revision
(NSC10/1) was considered and further revised, and became NSC 10/2
rhich was subsequently approved.
NSC 10/2 assigns responsiblity for covert operations to the CIA and creates
a new "Office of Special Projects" in the CIA to plan and conduct these
operations. At the same time, the DCI is assigned responsibility for
ensuring that, through consultation with designatedrepresentatives of the
Secretaries of State and Defense, covert operations are consistent with
.foreign and military policies and overt activities, and the U. S. agencies,
including diplomatic and military representatives overseas, are informed
of those operations which affect them.
In adopting NSC 10/2, the NSC stated explicitly that it was acting under
the authority of Section 102 (d)(5) of the National Security Act, which made
it the duty of the CIA to "perform such other functions and duties related
to the national security as the National Security Council may from time
to time direct."
QPTIONS
Based on the NSC Staff review of these documents and the views solicited
from the CIA, there appear to be three options in handling this appeal:
Option 1: Declassify and release NSC 10 and NSC 10/2, thus
granting the request.
Fro - The documents are 27 years old and are no longer in
effect.
The information they contain is primarily organizational
and administrative iin nature .
'I re ccmdd' cvoida time-consuming and costly lawsuit.
Con Current covert operations policies and procedures
,follow the patterns established in these papers, and
official acknowledgment of methods of covert operations
would be detrimental to our national security. CIA
believes that its effectiveness would be severely limited
if this information is disclosed in that it would reduce
the willingness of foreign individuals, organizations and
governments to cooperate with the US in the conduct of
these activities. h.. .
TOP SECRET XGDS
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 TOr' cIMr--R rrr xr.
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Lion Zi
The fact that the DCI is required to keep an ambassador
informed of covert operations being conducted in his
area could prompt attacks on our diplomatic personnel
as being spies and covert operators, thereby increasing
the chance of their being targets for kidnapping and
terrorism. It could undercut their denial of involvement
in every untoward event which takes place in their
country and would destroy the ambassador's standard
position of "plausible denial. "
Resulting political and propaganda exploitation could
embarrass the United States and adversely affect our
national security. The reference in NSC 10 to "impro-
vised covert operations" in the Italian elections could be
attacked and exploited in connection with current Italian
-elections.
Release of these documents would generate requests,
many of which we would have to deny, for documents
cited in them. NSC 10, for example, refers to SANACC
395 on utilization of USSR refugees, 396 on evacuation,
(kidnapping) of key personnel. 398 on demolition of oil
aciities and 304 and 304/14 on psychological warfare.
Declassify and release a sanitized version of NSC 10 and
NSC 10/2. (A proposed sanitization is at Tab Fl.
The most sensitive portions of the documents, especially
the sections which define covert operations, could be
removed and the remaining text would be essentially con-
-cerned with organizational and administrative arrangements.
This would satisfy the requirement of the FOIA for release
of "reasonably segregable portions" of a document, por-
tions of which must remain classified.
The content of these documents constitutes an:' interdependent
-body of information and disclosure of any portion of the
documents could adversely affect our national security.
The information which would be disclosed could be
exploited for political and propaganda purposes.
A partial release is no guarantee that our denial of the
=*xcised passages will not be c'rallanged in court.
TOP SECRET XGDS
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Option 3: Den the a eal and release neither NSC 10 nor NSC 10/2.
Pro -- In the interest of national security we would be protecting
the sensitive information contained in these documents.
NSC 10/2 is the charter under which the CIA conducts
covert operations for the US government and which, as
supplemented by later NSC documents, remains valid
today.
Under the statute, 50 U. S. C. 403g, the DCI is "respon-
sible for protection of intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure". Moreover, the CIA is
exempt from the provisions of any laws "which require
the publication or disclosure of the organization [and]
functions" of the Agency. To release these documents
might be a violation of the DCI's statutory responsibility.
We. can expect that a court challenge will be initiated
.and complete denial will be difficult to sustain.
STAFF VIEWS
Rob Roy Ratliff recommends Option.-I. He believes (Tab G) release of these
documents will "fuel public attacks against the foreign policy decision-
making machinery as well as our intelligence community. " He believes
release of this material would hinder our ability to conduct covert operations
and would be detrimental to our national interests.
Colonel Granger believes that there are no substantive grounds for refusing
to declassify and release these documents and that denial could lead to an
unfavorable court decision and precedent. Based on their age, the fact
that their content deals with matters of administration and organization,
and the belief that their release would not impact on any currently active
programs, he prefers Option 1: grant the appeal and release the documents.
:He does not oppose, however, withholding these items if the case for
denial is based on ther "nature, " i. e. that they are concerned with "intelli-
gence sources and methods. 1'
CIA supports (Tab H) the initial NSC Staff decision to deny declassification
of NSC 10 and NSC 10/2. In their opinion the documents are properly
.classified and exempt from release under the provisions of Executive
Order 11652 governing classification and declassification. In addition,
-they contend that by statute the DCI has a responsibility to protect this infor-
miation and that CIA is by law exempt from compulsory disclosure of this
type of information. The CIA believes that disclosure of these documents
would severely limit its effectiveness in supporting U. S. foreign policy and,
accordingly, recommends that we deny the appeal, Option 3.
TOP SECRET XGDS
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In view of the recent decision to deny declassification and release of the
NSCIDs and based on Rob Roy's concern for the possible impact of release
of these documents on 40 Committee programs, I too support Option 3.
Until we have a ruling from the Court as to how we should interpret "intelli-
gence sources and methods, " it would seem that denial on the grounds we
have chosen is not inconsistent with other determinations which have been
made.
Bill Casselman has concurred in this memorandum for the Counsel's office.
(Tab I) If the decision is to deny the documents, in whole or in part, it
will be necessary to consult with the Department of Justice before the final
denial is issued.
RECOMMENDATIONS
That you indicate your preference among these Options for handling the
request for NSC 10 and NSC 10/2.
Option 1: Grant the request and release the documents.
(Granger recommends)
Option 2: Declassify and release a sanitized version
of the documents. (Tab F)
Option 3: Deny the appeal and withhold both documents.
(ttliff, Davis and CIA recommend)
Concurrence: Col. Granger
Rob Roy Ratliff
TOP SECRET XGDS
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Center for National Security Studies
122 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.G. 20002
{202) 544-5330
National Security Council
Attn: Staff Secretary
Old xecutive Office fluii,ldi.1
Washington, D. C. 20506
tlarch 18, 1975
This is a request. under the rrreedom of Information Act as amended
(5 U.S.C. 552)
.I, write to request a copy of 11ational1 Security Action. 10 and National
Secur.ty Action 10/2. 1 am given to believe that National Security Action 10/2
was dated June 18, 1948. National Security,, Action 10 is' dated between D ce6'ber.
9, 1947 and;, the date for National S.:cutity A: tion. 10/2, June 18, 1945. My request
includes any. and all appendices, annexes, or other materials attached'to either
of the above. mentioned two documents.
As you know, the amended Act provides that if some parts of a file are
exempt from release that "reasonably seareable". portions shall be provided. I
therefore request that, . if. you determine that some portions of the requested
Documents are exempt, you provide me iumaedLately with a copy of the remainder of. the
.Documents. I, of course, reserve my right to appeal any such deletions.
If you determine that some or all of the documents is exempt from release,
.1 would appreciate your advising,me as to which e.,eaptiant(s) you believe corers
the material whichyou'are not releasing.
tun 'prepared to pay reasonable costs for locating the requested materials
'!'and reproducing it.
As you ling, the amended Act permits you to reduce or waive the fees if that
"is in the public-intergst because furnishing the information can bd considered as
'primarily benefitin; the public." Since I a-,- requesting the documents as the basis
for an article for publica.tiot, I believe that this request plainly fits' that category
and ask you to waive any fees.
As provided for in the amended Act, I will expect to receive a reply
within 10 working days.
Sincerely yours,
David Klaus, Associate
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
March 27, 1975
Dear Mr. Klaus:
I am writing in response to your letter of March 18, 1975 in
which you request a copy of NSC Action 10 and NSC Action 10/ 2.
There is no NSC Action 10/2 and we have assumed that the -
focus of your request is actually NSC 10 dated May 12, 1948
and NSC 10/2 dated June 18, 1948. The NSC Staff has care-
fully reviewed these documents and has determined that for
the present both must remain classified in their entirety and
that they are exempt from declassification under Sections
(b)(1) and (b)(3) of the amended Freedom of Information Act.
You are awai that you have a right to appeal this decision to
Mr. Kissinger, in his role as Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. Such an appeal should be addressed
to me as Staff Secretary,of the National Security Council.
Sincerely,
anne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
Mr. David Klaus
Center for National Security Studies
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002
1`.
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"2 0 -3 y
i a-U- C.
Center for National Security Studies
12ZMaryland Avenue, N.E.
,-`s Washington, D.C. 20002
[phone]
.'..anne T1 Davis
Mta- Z.ecretary
..a*?nral Security Council
Wdashinpton, D.C. 20505
kpril 1, 1975
'21-L's is an appeal pursuant to S' sec y" it (a) ( ) of he ~eeco7
of Information "Ct U.S.C. (5552).
On r.+a14R ' 28 .%, 1975, 1 rece?v4d a letter from r o;i re-) esentifg
!,e;7?*~ y rerucst for infor:rati.on an,' indicating that an appeal
should be directed to you. This letter constitutes that appeal. I am
enclosin- a copy of my exchar;;e of correspond nnce with tho "Isc so that
you can st:e exactly what files L have r,.er;uos met' and the insubstantial
:ou l'~3 oil 1'.G:i3 my request K"au i%ecn Kc j cte .
gust that po exani-%at O'. o ry request yo z - 11~_?. -a
.v a '.nfnrm"`; c?;; I have reader `e? iq nbt properly covered by exemptions
(b)(1) and (b)(3) of the amended 'ct wnc: will rya'..-:e the
Act, 1 351. e..'pfa ct to rec&ile a rapls
is prr3s.'i n i0x in the , ~
Vithi.n 70 r.-arkin3 days.
If you are unable t-o ordar r0leasi'_ of t`.e reruestc- in .5.0
7 intend to initiate a lawsuit to compel its disclosure.
Yours sincerely,
David Tclaus, Associate
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 [ 3
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TOP SECRET
NSr 10
TD
Law ? COPY NO.--2;L-
A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
on
DRECTOR OF SPECIAL STUDIES
May 12, 1948
% A:"HHNGiON
TOP SECRET
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING TEE NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE OF TIM UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANS-
MISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL STUDIES
Reference : AN ACC _304/14
TOP SECRLT
The ene?losed report on the above subject has been pre-
pared by the National Security Council Staff, with the advice
and assistance of representatives of the Departments of State,
the.Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and of the National Security
Resources Board and the Central. Intelligence Agency.
The enclosed report is accordingly submitted for con-
sideration by the National Security Council at an early meeting.
It ua este.d tho.t s ecial secu it precautions be
taken in the h:.rd~ ina of this r wort .
SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Executive Secretary
e
.
Distribution:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense ?
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of 'the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, Notional Security
Resources Board
NSC 10
TOP SECflET
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 Vaal &G, Ag-r%.
D R A F -T
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
.DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL STUDIES
. 1.
To consider measures for the furtherance of covert
operations in the interest of our national security.
ANALYSIS
2. The means employed by a nation in pursuit of its nation-
al objectives may be both overt and covert. They range in time of
peace from such overt actions as political alliances, economic
measures (as ERP), and "white" informational activities, to. such
covert . operations as unacknowledged support of "friendly" foreign
elements, "black" propaganda and en ouraganLent of underground re-
sistance in hostile states.
Air Force Coordinating Committee has considered such mattvrt' ov
operations. The United States cannot afford in tho future, in
perhaps more serious political crises, to rely upon irnprovl.sod
covert operations as was done at the time of the Italian elections.
4. In NSC 4-A -provision was 'made for the conduct of cortai.n
covert psychological (propaganda) operations. The Staato.Ar?tny-1 nvy-
afford to leave unmobilized or unemployed its resources for covert
oar" by the full-might of the Kremlin, the United States cannot
Having assumed greater international responsibilities
than ever before in our history and having been engaged in a ?cold.
3?
utilization of refugees from the USSR in the Unitud -tatca n tt?tortal
NSC10
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also recommended that covert operations be immediately instituted
interest (SANACC 395), Plans for evacuation of key foreign person-
demolition of oil facilities (SANACC 398), and
nel (SANACC 396),
psychological warfare (SANACC.:30k). In connection with psycholo-
gical warfare, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred
in by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, have
been referred to the National Security Council for consideration.
It is the opinion. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that from the mili-
tary point of vier "there should be established, as soon as practi-
cable, under the National Security Council, a Psychological Warfare
Organization, but with- its peacetime scope and activities limited
to that of a working nucleus for planning and coordination" (SANACC
304/14). The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State has
of war, of covert operations and of the overt phases of psycholo-
gical warfare. The establishment of such an organization will re
5. In the light Of the above considerations, there is a need
for an organization which is designed to, strengthen. and extend
current covert. Operations in the interest of our national security
and to provide for plans and preparations for the conduct, in time
quire the revision of i S 1._A
CONCLUSIONS
The proposed National Security Council Directive in
Annex A~hould be:approved, and if approved, the Pr'Qposod revision
of NSC 4-A in Annoy, B should bo approved.
NSC10
U
TOP SECR ;i'
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PROPOSED NSC DIRECTIVE
1." There is hereby established under the National Security
Council the position of Director of Special Studies. The Director
shall be nominated by the Secretary of State and appointed by tho
National Security Council.
2, The Director should have initially a staff of four mem-
bers assigned from the Department of.State, one service member each
from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, end' one member from the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Secretary of Defense may assign a member
if he so desires. The staff members will act both 'as assistants to
the Director, in the performance of his duties, and as liaison be-
tveen him and their respective agencies.
3. it shall be the duty of the. Director, under the direction
of the National Security Council:
will develop the details of that part of a plan covering its
To be responsible for the preparation by his own
staff or other agencies, as appropriate, of plans for all
covert operations. It is intended that each operating agency
own operations.
To review all such plans and, if he approves them,
to arrange for their execution by appropriate agencies.
iew the execution of such operations to insure
. o rev
that they aro being conducted in accordance with approved }a]:~nW
provided that nothing contained herein shall roquirc he u4.,-
closure of soc:rvt intelligence sources and methods.
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 To develop an over-all program for tho conduct of
covert operations-and overt phases. of psychological 'warfare
-in time of war or when directed by the President, to include
organizations training, equipment and logistic support, and
to arrange for-initiation of such training and preparations
in time of. peace as necessary for the prompt initiation of
TOP 3EClt~:r'
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such it program.
li. The Director is charged with:
Qiv3.ng timely-notification of intended plans and
operations to. each government agency represented on his staff
through the respective staff members and to other government
agencies which may be affected. Problems arising in connect-
ion with the formulation of plans for or the conduct of opera-
. sholl be resolved directly between the Director and the
agency or agencies involved.
t t
ducted or sponsored by this government against hostille fore Cn
Insuring that such covert activities are consis en
with US foreign policies and overt activities and that plans
for war-time covert operations and psychological operations
are consistent, with and complement Joint Chiefs of Staff
approved . plans' for military operations.
d
The ends envisaged in this paper will require unvouchcre
funds other than those already appropriated.
6. As used in this directive "covert operations" are under-
stood to be all' . activities jexcluding armed conflict by recognized
.. :=
military forces, espionage and counter-espionage) 4which are con-
4
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ification in Part 2012/05/14 LOC HAK-455-7-148-
5-7 1-8
TOP
cl;L:
TOP SF
 if trop n-CRET
bility for them. 3pecifically, such operations shall include any
covert activities related to propaganda; preventive direct action,
including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation
measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance
to underground redistance movements, guerrillas and refugee libera-
tion groups; and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in
W
if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsi
abut which are so planned and executed that any US Governmen
for them.is not evident to unauthorized persons and
risibility
-states or, groups or in support of friendly foreign- states or groups
t re
*3, itc Ad countries of the free worlde
and abroad of the status and progress of any war effort in?which
the United States may be engaged and of the war policies, activi
development of an informed and intelligent understandir.; at home
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
construed to mean information programs designed to facilitate the
ties and aims of ` the Government.
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NBC 10
 n
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The National security Council, taking cognizance- of the
vicious psychological efforts and covert operations of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and de-
the aims a activities of the United States and other West-
feat
ern powers, has determined that, in the interests of wora.d peace
and us national security, the overt foreign activities of the US
aGovernment must be supplemented by covert operations.
2. The similarity of operational methods invdlved_in covert
operations a covert intelligence activities makes. theCentral
ency an appropriate agency to conduct'suchopera-
ceA
g
Intelligen
Sec
tions tion 102 the
yi~ere ore, u' er the authority of
National Security Council:
t
he
Act of 1947s + : _
Directs the Director of Central Intelligence to
time within the limit of available funds, such covert
con , roved by
'propaganda operations as may be arranged with and app f..
the Director of,SPecial Studies in accordance with the latter'
Council.
it
S
y
ecur
.restive from the National
Authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to
nduct Such other covert operations as may be arranged by the
co
Director of Special studios in accordance with the latter's
directive from the"National Security Council. The Director of Central Intel 11genro.is ch rgcd with en
oppriatc +tigcfcie:of thc; U: Government, both at
curing g that,appr
1150 10
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 TOP SECRET
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home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives
in each area), are kept informed of. such operations which will di-
rectly affect them.
I#., Nothing contained herein shall be construed to require
the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose operational details
concerning its se,cret.intelligence techniques, sources or contacts.
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;;pp
NS 10 2
TOP SECRET
COPY NO....___ tlo . 9
(Original COPY
destroyed by fire)
A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL,
by
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
June 18, 1948
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WARNING
xmgrw
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aS.k.1.i//~~**77.`'XT9:tfyr tiLry~M~Y+4~)A.YTy.~A.?. r.1
Tins 'L':i.:T CONTAINS INFO?N:A'-''IC:a A FECTIpu THE NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE OF THE MUTED STATES WITHIN THE Mr. U11110 OF
.THE E5PIO2~ACP. ACT, 50 ^.S.C., 31 AIM 32, AS KI dDED. ITS
TRArSFSISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS COUTENTS N ANT MA J'NER
TO AIS Uw tTwmIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LA
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 )($C 1( No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1 8 F SECRET
dune 18, 19h8
Copy No. 9 of 10 coplcs
(OriginaTTopy No. 9 destroyed
by fire)
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
Re erence : Su 10/1
At its 13th Ileeting the National Security Council approved the
Directive in LISC-19/1 subject to delection of paragraph 3-d and amend--
mints to paragraphs 3-a and a and lt.
The revised Directive,, as approved, is circulated herewith to
the Council for information and to the Director of Central Intelligence
for appropriate action.
Srecial sicurity precautions are being; taken in the handling
th e
Of th- i.s r~_c ~.~ To r is r ;c
Co`~ cif. may, -isn to return his con;. T'ot' rry n the olf'ire o the
: e-cutive z)ecretar,,, whit-re it will-be bald :avtilalle ur.rf rs c~r:~.'t.
SIDULY W. SOU-2 S
Executive Secretary
Distributions
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the. I,atiy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, National Security
Resources Donrd
1 o/2 ,r, ,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 Lf0i'Y
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
DiATIC'tIAI, f;rCt^tI'CY Cnl~"t'IL ]]IR r~- ,?r yr
CFFICF Or. SPT..CIAL PROJECTS
The National Security'Council, taking cognizance of the
1. T its satellite countries
vicious covert activities of the USS,
Cauununist $.roups to discredit and defeat the aiin and tiviied ers vow *
has d ties of the united states and other eandrU5 national security, ed ' the
that? in the interests of world p lement
overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supp
by covert operations.
is charged by the National
2. The Central Intelligence Agency
d counter-espionage Council with ccnductint; espionage anrations abroad. It therefore seems desirable, for operational
reasons, not to create a new af;ency for covert operations, but in
re
time of peace to place the responsibility for ,and c them o within the
e them
structure of the Central IrtclliCence Agncyan Corr the othemall
with espionage and counter-espionage operations
control of the Director of Central Intelligence. the
under the authority of Scction 102(d) (5) of
Sect'.ritr' Therefore , Act of l: oL7, the 1ational Security Council hereby
2~ational ;:
directs that in time of peace%
a. of Special projects shah} be created
~, new off-,-Cc a~
r?~? ?yC ~ij~wci~C~ ftret'~ry to n !an and CCTtCt:.C
~.~.teit the a rte~l and in coordination with the joint Chiefs
covert ox;earat ~ one ~ , .,r
of Staff to Elan and pI epare for the conduct of such opera-
tions in wartime.
highly qualified person, nominated by the
be, A
Secretary of State, , cc eptatile to the Director of Central
Intelligence and approved by the National Security council.,
shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Pro-
Sects.
The Chief of the Office of Special Projects
shall report dirr.ctly to n 1 ~fflcxi.}aility a fli-
.c-ttce. For t ur~+ao of t;c:
1~?-? ".;.1%:~.~:51 f~cr'Teo Con:istcrit u th
oprrsationc, Ott=~ to t..
efficiency, the Office of Special Era jects shall operate jnder,endently of Other co:.r?onents of Central Int.CUiCattec
10/2
TC11 V}?('.}~?~~
_ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be
respc siblC for:
_
representative of the t oxnt uniei s oz as,a~ 4 as
_. 2 . - -4. :*U ...,d
-
the matter shall be referred to the National curl y
Council for decision.
(2) Ensuring that plans for wartime covert oper-
ctt state or the Secretary of Defense-over such plan,
Ipte21ience and the representative of the Secretary
Lives of the Secretary of State an o
of Defense, that covert operations are planned and
conducted in a -manner ccnsistent with US foreign and
military policies and with overt activities. In dis-
(l Ensuring, through designated represenT-i-
d f the Secretary
..w ww r. w,.. - r
ccmp3ementary to approved plans for wartime military
operations.
Cugort on rat; ons rt rtaininc ;.o econo.-a;.c ;r:ZRrf .re
each ar a?) , of such opera t.ions as will a_ fee L. L, t~. rte
qpprorriate channels
(3) Ina`'oi rmir,~;, tllrcu,h ,
a;enci en of the US Government, both at home and abroad
(including. diplomatic and military representatives in
win'Se conducted by the Office of Special Projects under
ibl
e
the guidance of the dcpart:~j?:nts and agencies resx o:zs
for the planning of econoiiic 'Warfare -
Supplemental funds for the conduct of the pro-
f'
?
rose( rat .o:ls for fiscal year 1:1:9 shall be i{;s,ter?iately
requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes
shall to included in nor.iml Central Intelligence Agency
Budget- requests. Y .. yP .
Et. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans
Tor covert orations :mall be coordin-ited with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. In active thcatttrs of Will- :r:fore A torioan forc;.rs are
enga,::ed, covert ,:':?ra tinn:: x-111 he ccnd?ir:tcd unr1er the direct com-
mand of the A:nerican jhcater Coiirxander and orders therefor will be
transaitted throtti-h the Joint Chief: of Starr unless otherwise
directed by tho Prc ;ii1 nt.
5 As u::( (i in tl:i.: rl t'R ~`a.7^, nt`e)Yr?t or. r i1.i(`:/.':R[ 11'1~
un.ierstoo4 t. 1,!` all r..Ct1V R. t.i(:. nut.'.1 tl?'r' 111 ' :$ir.l.Cil
, ? .~ :+:?t' ? (r?r'.:: !~(1a. ? "Iha ).:t "~? irel~(;Yt,.
pre cr?t1.1u^tt: t or
tore: ~ ;tl . L^ ? (.r rt?: t;'; c'. -j71
or ,:rVU1':i 1.'?ut. t~il'? .L ..:??' '?1' .r;: i l :t ?t !1 {:.:' . .."L:1~" -l..
4'(-VR?t'tRl.t{:tt L re:~;t:GrR: a 1. ,1. i t,;; 1'~?: L;::.;1 a n:?t. rt .i t.'?t:nt. La un-tu Llor-?
If UIL:`Cti:,?1't'e~ 1?t. (:.i li(~t? ?l'1.:'.:~`l1u e::(tl
i?td rcr:on: :t,ai I.tR:.-.
.-,?...
VSC 1n/2
2 M
ii[T' ;:::~'t ?p
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8 -?
 rnr SVCI V 'v
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
6. This ni.rective supersedes the directive contained in .
nd1itary operations.
? b T
evacuation measures; su vG
eluding assistance to underground resistance nove,nents, guerrillas
and refugee liberations groups, and support of indigenous anti-
comnunist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such
operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military
~_~ .....,..~nn_ nnr Hover and deception for
plausibly disc im any resp
cally , such operations shall include .z tY covert activities
related to: propafanda, economic warfare; preventive direct
action, Including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and
rion zt'ainst hostile states, in
onsibility for them. Specifi-
NSC Is-A, which is hereby cancelled.
NSC 10/2 - 3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
Tor ST.CRi;T
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
NSC10
TOP SECRET
Tpb r
COPY NO.??
DELETION MARKED IN YELLOW -
A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
on
DIRECTOR OF SP]XIAL STUDIES
May 12, 1948
WASHINGTON
? TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
WARNING
THIS DOCLTIENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-
TIONAL DI UM NSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF
AS AMENDED. ITS TRANS-
THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C:, 31 AND 32,
MISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS. CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHOILJZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAWV.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8-w------~-
 NSC 10
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
May 12, 19+8
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL STUDIES
Reference : ANACC 304 14
TOP SECRET
The enclosed report on the above subject has been pre-
pared by the National Security Council Staff, with the advice
and assistance of representatives of the Departments of State,
the.. Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and of the National Security
Resources Board and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The enclosed report is accordingly submitted for con-
sideration by the National Security Council at an early meeting.
I suggested that special --security recautions be
ta?:en ntho, handli~i,~, of this report.
SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Executive Secretary
Distribution:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of'the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, National Security
Resources Board
NSCI0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
TOP SECRET
 Mars No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8 TOP SECRET
I4SC 10
DRAFT
REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL STUDIES
operations in the interest of our national security.
ANALYSIS
1.
2. The means employed by a nation in pursuit of its nation-
al objectives may be both overt and covert. They range in time of
peace from such overt actions as political alliances, economic
measures (as ERP), and "white" informational activities, toEsuchJ
covert operations Cas unacknowledged support of "friendly" foreign
uaemeuts, "black" prupaganda and elivourag6hient of underground re-
sistance in hostile state
3?
THE PROBLEM
To consider measures for the furtherance of covert
Having assumed greater international responsibilities
than over before in our history and having been engaged in a "cold
war" by the full-might of the Kremlin, the United States cannot
afford to leave unmobilized or unemployed its resources for covert
operations. The United States cannot afford in the future, in
perhaps more serious political crises, to rely upon improvisod
covert operations as was done at the time of the Italian clecticno.
4. In NSC 4-A 'provision was made for the conduct of certain
covert psychological (propaganda) operations. The Stuto4 r'my-N:wy-
Air Force Coordinating Committee has considered such tru~t,t~~x?csCti.;
utilization of refugees, from the USSR in the United %ato.-) Y3'~L t c>rl,ti
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 V_ 0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8 TOP SECRET
[intorest (SANACC 395) , plans for evacuation of key foreign person-
nel (SANACC 396), demolition of oil facilities (SANACC 398), and
psychological warfare (SANACC 3011. In connection with psycholo-
gical warfare, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred
in by the state-Array-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, have
been referred to the National Security Council for consideration.
It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that from the mill-
tart' point of view "there should be established, as soon as practi-
cable, under the National Security Council, a Psychological warfare
Organization, but with, its peacetime scope and activities limited
to that of a working nucleus for planning and coordination" a SANACC
30k/l2)3. The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State has
also recommended that covert operations be immediately instituted
wider unified directi.or).
5. In the light of the above considerations, there is a need
for an organization which is designed to-strengthen and extend
current covert operations in the interest of our national security
and to provide for plans and preparations for the conduct, in time
of war, of covert operations and of the overt phases of Psycholo-
gical warfare. The e3itablishment of such an organization will re-
quire the revision of rSL 4--A.
CONCLUSIONS
6. The proposed National Security Council Directive in
Annex A should be approved, and if approved, the proposed revision
of NSC k-A in Annoy. B should be approved.
ti.
1) NSC10
-2
T 0 P SECi
'"> No Objection to Declassification in Part 2U12/Ub/14 : LUG-HAK-4bb-/-1-8
 U
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8 TOP SECRET
ANNEX A
PROPOSED NSC DIRECTIVE
1. There is hereby established under the National Security
Council the position of Director of Special Studies. The Director
shall be nominated by the Secretary of State and appointed by the
National Security Council.
2. The Director should have initially a staff of four mem-
bers assigned from the Department of State, one service member each
from the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and one member from the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Secretary of Defense may assign a member
if he so desires. The staff members will act both as assistants to
the Director, in the performance of his duties, and as liaison be-
tveen him and their respective agencies.
3. It shall be the duty of the Director, under the direction:
of the National Security Council:
To be responsible for the preparation by his own
staff or by other agencies, as appropriate, of plans for all
covert operations. It is intended that each operating.agency
will develop the details of that part of a plan covering its
own operations.
To review all such plans and, if he approves them,
to arrange for their execution by appropriate agencies.
To review the execution of such operations to insure
that they are being conducted in accordance with approved
provided that nothing contained heroin shall require the dis-
closure of sc;creot intelligence source: and methods.
'j'01' 6S}"X'1:I.;'I'
WO-P
- 3 --
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8 TOP *BC101'1'
d. To develop an over-all program for the conduct of
covert operations and overt phases. of psychological warfare
in time of war or when directed by the President, to include
organization, training, equipment and logistic support, and
to arrange fore initiation of such training and preparations
in time of peace as necessary for the prompt. initiation of
such a program.
1. The Director is charged with:
. Giving timely notification of intended plans and
operations to each government agency represented on his staff
through the respective staff members and to other government
agencies which may be affected. Problems arising in connect-
ion with the formulation of plans for or the conduct of opera-
tions shall be resolved directly between the Director and the
ducted or sponsored by this government against hostile foreini]
military forces, espionage and counter-espionage) which are con-
stood to be all activities-(excluding armed conflict by recognised i
c6. As used in this directive "covert operations" are under--
5. The ends envisaged in this paper will require unvouchore:d
funds other than those already appropriated.
are consis en w
approved plans for military operations.
for war-time covert operations and psychological operations
t t ith and &-^-m 1c, Ant. Joint Chiefs of Staff
with US foreign policies and overt activities and that plans
agency or agencies involved.
Insuring that such covert activities are consistent
TOP ST?t' f; E'i'
"~??-~.. No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8 TOP SECRET
'states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups
but which are so planned and executed that any US Government re-
sponsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and
if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsi-
bility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any
covert activities related to propaganda; preventive direct action,
including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation
measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance
to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee libera-
tion groups; and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in
7.. "Overt psychological warfare" referred to herein shall be
construed to mean information programs designed to facilitate the
development of an informed and it telligent un dcrsturd { ng at home
and abroad of the status and progress of any war effort in which
the United States may be engaged and of the war policies, activi-
ties and aims of the Government.
threatened countries of the free world
TOP CZ :C~:i:T
~~ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14 : LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8 TOP SECRET
ANNEX B
DRAFT
REVIVISION OF NSC 4
1. The National Be curity Council, taking cognizance of the
vicious psychological efforts and covert operations of the USSR,
its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and de-
feat the aims and activities of the United States and other West-
ern powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace
and US national security, the overt foreign activities of the US
Government must be supplemented by covert operations.
2. The similarity of operational methods involved in covert
operations and covert intelligence activities makes the Central
Intelligence Agency an appropriate agency to conduct such opera-
tions . Therre ore, under the authority of Section 102 (d)(5) of try
National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council:
a. Directs the Director of Central Intelligence to
continue, within the limit of available funds,Csuch] covert
rpropaganda) Operations as may be arranged with and approved by
the Director of Special Studies in accordance with the lattor's
National Security Council.
directive from the
Authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to
conduct such other covert operations as may be arranged by the
Director of Special Studies in accordance with the latter's
directive from the National Security Council.
3. The Director of Cu;ntral Intellizence is charged with Qn-
suring that appropriate ttigc:il(:ice of thy-, U:3 Govcrnriiont, both at
NSC 10
CA -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 W TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives
in each area), are kept informed of such operations which will di-
rectly affect them.
11. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to require
the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose operational details
concerning itssecret.intelligence techniques, sources or contacts.
1NSC 10
N. 7 N
TOP S ECE'ET
~"---- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
TOP SECRET
wax "46*01A
Mlagx
NSC_O/
F
COPY NO._?
(Original COPY No. 9
destroyed by fire)
DELETIONS MARKED IN YELLOW
A. REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
June 18, 1948
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8 _
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
WARNING
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TP wr':S INFORMATIO AG THE N't-
J.S 1,0CUF DOC ""LF1'T VV CC a~ +
ii44
TIONAL DEFENSE OT` TIM UNITED STATES WITHIN TIM MEANING OF
.TilE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U.S.C., 31 AND 32, AS JVIV mED. ITS
TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS N ANY MANNER
TO, All U2+AUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LA! .
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14 : LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 NSC 10/2 L"'A TOP SECRET
r *.; No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
June 18, 19t48 Copy No. 9 of 10 coplc
(Origin `'`opy No. 9 dc:~ t rayed
NOTE BY TILE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
Re ereric e : SC 10/1
ments to paragraphs 3ia aka a and lt.
At its 13th 2leeting the Rational Security Council approved the
Directive in NSC 10/1 subject to dclcction of paragraph 3-d and amend-
The revised Directive, as approved, is circulated herewith to
the Council for information and to the Director of Central Intelligence
for appropriate action.
SnFcial security.precautions are being, taken in the handling;
of this 'r-ori?: tis ri,;,;-,c'f . t, i s ;:l' '7- 1 -i e'. ^.n7 `c r c}i thO
Council may u ..s a to return his cagy for iflinrr in the ot'f'i.,-e o the
.Lxecutive oecretar1, k11-?1e it wia.? lac. n. id avail blc 'uron Tr t c, t.
Distributions
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, National Security
Resources Board
SIDI:LY W. SOU1d:S
Executive Secretary
1c 1n/2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
on
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
1. The National Security, Council, taking cognizance of the
vicious covert activities, of the USM, its satellite countries
and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activi-
ties of the United States and other western powers, has determined
that, in the interests of world peace and US national security, the
overt foreign activities of the US Government must be supplemented
by covert operations.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the National
Security Council with conducting espionage and counter-espionage
operations abroad. It therefore seems desirable, for operational
reasons, not to create a new agency; for covert operations, but in
time of peace to place the responsibility for them within the
structure of the Central intci]..it-erice Agency and correlate them
.with espionage and counter-espionage operations under the over-all
control of the Director of Central Intelligence.
3. Therefore, uncer the authority of Section 102(d) (5) of the
National Security Act of M7, the rational Security Council hereby
directs that in.time of peace:
a.. A new office of Special Projects shall he created
1r;ithia, the C:-1,^t=:l ina c I l; gem^o A"er'cy to n inn and conduct
covert operations; and in coordination with the joint Chiefs
of Staff to p1an and prepare for the conduct of such opera--
tions.. in wartime. v
b,? A highly qualified person, nominated by the
Secretary of State, acceptzble to the Director of Central
Intelligence and approved by the National Security Council,
shall be appointed as Chief of the -'ffice of Special Pro-
jects,
co The Chief of the Office of Special Projects
shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelli-
Cence. For I.urpo: es of cec:urity and of flexibility of
operations, and. to thi-: -mnx i nur dc?r-rec consistent with
efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate
independently of other corsponents of Central. Intelligence
Agency
o Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
NATIONAL ST Ct^IITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
TOP SECRET
d. The. Director of Central Intelligence shall be
re spci sible for :
(1} Ensuring, through designated reprosenta-
t
r
S
th
y
a
ecre
e
tives of the Secretary of State and of
of Defense, that covert operations are planned and
conducted in a manner ccneistent with US foreign and
. ailitary policies and with overt activities. In di.s-
ations are also drawn up with the assistance of a
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directed by the Fi?esictr. nt.
agreements arising betweer, the Director of Central
Intelligence and the representative of the Secretary
of State or the Secretary of Defense over such plans,
the matter shall be referred to the National security
Council for decision.
(2) Ensuring that plans for wartime covert oper-
representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are
accepted ly the latter as being consistent with and
complementary to approved plans for wartime military
operations.
4 11 r,-, thrcu;h appropriate. channels,
(3) Info" .
e';encics of the Us government, both at hone and abroad
(including diplomatic and military representatives in
each a-ea), of such operations as will affect them.
(iC}UR?x'ti U :FS I' :.v d.l:i j,(rtaininC to
ts?
will to conducted by the Office of Special Projects under
the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible
for the planning of econotaieLvarrfare.)..
Jr, Supplemental funds for the conduct of the pro-
r+osa opera4ioaw for fiscal rear 1;19 shall be imm;;?;diate1y
requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes
.shall to included in norrial Central Intelligence Agency
Budget requests. .
!t. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans
for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. In active th:'atc r of war -.;:}:ire` Lneri,.-;an forc?s are
enga;;e'd, covert r-orntirrns v-1.11 1-e Ct'?ndhic%.ted under the direct com-
mtand of the kmerican 'L'hcater Commander and orders therefor will be
tram.-mitted through the Joint Chief,.-. of Staff unlc ,s of erwise
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 Tor ; r;CIV.-.T
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
-. 3 -
to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
Cplausi:bly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifi-
cally, such opor itions shall include arty covert activities
.related to: propAganda, economic warfare,' preventive direct
action, - including, sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and
evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, in-
cluding assistance to underground resistance iaove;nents, guerrillas
and refugee liberations groups, and support of indigenous anti-
cowmnist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such
operations shall not include ar:nod conflict by recognized military
forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for
. military . oparati ohs
6. This nirective supersedes the. directive contained in
NSC 14-A, which is hereby cancelled.
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
PREPARED BY ROB ROY RATLIFF
1 t'l
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 .t
a? p
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
TOP SECRET
GTr - f /47bP
ANALYSIS OF NSC 10 AND 10/2
NSC 10 -- a 1948. proposal by the.NSC Staff to name a "Director of Special
Studies" under the NSC to be responsible for planning, authorizing and
monitoring the execution of covert operations.
? Covert operations were deemed necessary because of our greater
international responsibilities and the fact that the "Kremlin" was
employing its "full might" in a "cold war" against us; we could
no longer rely on "improvised covert operations as was done at
the time of the Italian elections. "
Paragraph 6 of Annex A defines "covert operations" to include
"preventive direct action, including sabotages " "subversion against
hostile states" and "support of indigenous anti-communist elements
in threatened countries of the free world. "
Annex B is a revision of NSC 4-A which authorized the CIA to conduct
covert psychological operations. It cites the "vicious psychological
efforts and covert operations of the USSR" in declaring that our overt
efforts "must be supplemented by covert operations.'" It directs the
DCI to continue covert propaganda operations and to conduct other
covert operations subject to approval by the proposed "Director of
Special Studies,
Mentioned are NSC 4-A and State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordination
Committee documents 395 on utilization of USSR refugees, 396 on
evacuation' of key foreign personnel, 398 on demolition of oil facilities,
304 and 3 J4/ 14 on psychological warfare.
NSC 10/2 -:.- a 1948 refinement of NSC 10 (and 10/1) which assigns responsi-
bility for covert operations to the CIA and creates a new "Office of Special
Projects" in CIA to plan and conduct these operations.
Covert operations are necessary because of "vicious covert activities
of the USSR" and its satellites against us.
The DCI must ensure through designated representatives of the
Secretaries of State and Defense that covert operations are consistent
with our foreign and military policies and overt activities; and must
inform U. S. agencies at home and abroad, "including diplomatic and
military representatives in each area, " of those operations which
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
? Paragraph 5. defines "covert operations" substantially the same as
in NSC 10; it adds "economic warfare" to the definition.
NSC 4-A is rescinded.
Would declassification of these documents affect national security?
Declassification could certainly fuel public attacks against the foreign policy-
decision-making machinery as well as our intelligence community. For
example:
References to "vicious" USSR efforts against us in a "cold war" as
the reason for engaging in covert operations might be exploited to
adversely affect our current relations with the USSR.
? Since the "cold war" is over, critics could challenge the continuation
of covert operations.
Official admission that we "improvised covert operations" in Italian
elections could be attacked and prompt demands for specific information.
It could be exploited in connection with current Italian events.
personnel--("Since 1945 it has been official U. S. policy to exploit
tetnam refugees, as could the document on evacuation of key foreign
assassinations. Sabotage and subversion would be officially acknowledged
as part of our national policy. Our support of threatened indigenous
anti-communist elements could give new life to the "Chile debate" and
generate a new wave of authoritative speculation about what we are doing
in Portugal, Italy, etc.
Requests for documents cited in the released material would be
generated. The study on "demolition of oil facilities, " for example,
could generate adverse publicity linked with the current oil crisis and
our "official sanction" of such action-("Since it has been official U. S.
policy since 1948 to destroy oil facilities, now we know who started
that fire or who placed that bomb.''). The report on "utilization of USSR
refugees" could be linked with our efforts to encourage USSR policy to
allow Jews to emigrate, and generate charges that our interest is in
exploiting these "refugees" for political, psychological and intelligence
purposes. The same arguments could be used in exploiting our handling
f V.
"Preventive direct action" as one of our authorized covert operations
actions could be interpreted as the "official stamp of approval" for
refugees, to "kidnap' key foreign personnel. ")
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14 : LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
TOP SECRET
The fact that the DCI is required to keep an ambassador informed
of what covert actions are being conducted in his area would prompt
attacks on our diplomatic personnel as being spies and covert
operators; undercut their protestations of innocence and denials
of involvement in every untoward event that takes place in their
country; and increase the chances of their being targets of kid-
napping and terrorism. The ambassador's standard position of
"plausible denial" would be destroyed.
Economic warfare as an acknowledged official covert tool would
open the U. S.. for blame for every adverse economic event in the
world.
Classified information disclosing a system, plan,,project or specific
foreign relations, the continuing protection of which is essential to the
national security, may be exempt from declassification under E.O. 11652.
Based upon the points raised above, arguments could be made that declassi-
fication of these documents would disclose 'a system and plan, and reveal
elements of our foreign policy which could adversely affect our national
security.
Are these documents exempt from declassification because of statutory
protection?
The DCI (50 U. S. C. 403g) is "responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures. "
NSC 10 and 10/2 discuss methods of intelligence operations, especially
the paragraphs which define covert operations. Exemption on these
grounds is acknowledged in E. 0. 11652.
CIA (50. U. S. C. 403g) is exempt from provisions of law "which require
the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names,
official titles, salaries, or number of personnel employed by the
Agency.''
These documents contain information about the organization and
functions of the Agency.
Arguments can be made that law prohibits the release of at least a portion
of these documents because such release would reveal information on methods,
organization and functions of the CIA.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
OPTIONS:
There are three major options:
1. Release NSC 10 and 10/2.
Pro -- They are 27 years old and no longer in effect. Whatever
they may have represented, they have been superseded. They
describe policy and procedures for a "cold war" era while we
are now in the age of "detente.
Con. -- Political and propaganda exploitation could embarrass
the U. S. and adversely affect our national security. Laws pro-
tecting intelligence methods and CIA organization and functions
might be violated. Current policy and procedures follow patterns
established by these documents.
Release portions of NSC 10 and 10/2.
Pro -- Protect the most sensitive portions of the document
(especially paragraph 6 of Annex A of NSC 10, and paragraph 5
of NSC 10/2 which define covert operations).
Can be challenged in courts. Would reveal some
information which could be exploited for political and propaganda
purposes.
Deny declassification of NSC 10 and 10/2.
Pr o - Protect sensitive material and observe statutes prohibiting
dislosurre of intelligence methods or of CIA organization and
functions.
Con -- Can be challenged in the courts.
sustain complete denial.
intelligence methods or CIA organization and functions.
Probably be difficult to
Option 2 appears to be the most feasible if denial of declassifitat?ion of
portions of these documents can be sustained on a legal basis by the arguments
that national security would be affected and/or statutes prohibit disclosure of
CONCLUSION:
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/05/14: LOC-HAK-455-7-1-8
WASH INC;o:., L.C. 20505
25X1
No Objection
T}ais ?otter rc c , t e cl :ztis'if i ation of NSC 10 acid 10/2, per your
~Cttll.s ` of 10 April,, -ndi casting that the NSC 1-ias &nied declassification
-of "t" -~rrw?, rltl'::i t . under (b) (1t3) of th? ended ii01A, which ens a1. is
11L?:?' ? ti.e s;.l. i A`C'C 0l?. V-~ P
The CIA h in accorcancc with your request.'reri;c:ycd the classifi-
cation o t t4--se doc rLcnts and. COnCU rS in the. decision that the protects o n
of the n.?tional ec.uri_ty of the 1FI ite~i States reaui res that. they remain
classified TOP SF.CRP 1'.
staff ry
ha-L.1011 .1 Security, ncii
walla .l.g;ma, D.C. 2050
Dear. r~.':rs . Davis :
.N'CRAL H%V .= L{3 'CE AGENCY
'mar-s. 3":'.nne K. . '1'ayts
~:SC 10/2 .t~ b cFi. the charter t cler.which covert action has been.
corchict^d by the Cc tral Intelligence Agency for the U.S. ? Government.
?ltho w :Z 5tr ple .rated by later NS'C doctmien-t_S, , NSC 10/1" rerm i.ns Valid today.
Trot the date of.its issue, NSC 10/2 has always been regarded as highly
.sensitive aml. 1 as been h1 md1ed with special security precwit:i_oaS.
D15C?osure of these docunents it the NSC 10 series would severely
lira.. -' eE ;:e ivcness of tha: cl.A. in su ,?ortin;; U.S. foreign lea : is:+ ;
_l.l'V1etIalS. O's'-gc"IS31..aX7.011" and
-.~^-r rnrn-i mn 'fri:
ational security CA)u: L I:`.way fl flail t;1111e t-'i I '
These cccurl ants also c.l_rec'.ed trig as a
U.S. (;t;'+ Nl'tlli'ient t o C rry out Chi 5 policy. and } 1't3~T'r.C'iCG3 or a it ear " S to
ceordi_na te covert action with other aspects o U S. ore n 'Policy.
adc tin ; these directives the JLSC St stated explicitly that it was actin
c } .~ of Section I.t) . (d) (.5) of the i`.atio.la i Sew _lr ity Act,
' rti
l'.i`1"LC:~1 I'a