IN PREPARATION FOR YOUR TESTIMONY NEXT WEEK I WANT YOU TO HAVE MY THINKING ON THE ISSUES BEFORE US.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-451-2-22-4
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 15, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR
April 16, 1972
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The President has asked me to send. you this directive.
Henry A. Kissinger
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
SECRET /SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY
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April 16, 1972
MMORA$DUM FOR
SECRETARY OW STATE
The 're,td+ l&s asked me to swkd you this rest ve. He has
slice aoke+d nee to read the eneloead fact *book which he dtctat d
following bin mo g wItb +> oagraxsSias*I leaders t o ewer day
snd dab r.fle1 a laic g.seral views on the s j. R
Hoary A. lsa ger
Exclossres
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rs 17(01 re
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
April 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
In preparation for your testimony next week I want you to have my
thinking on the issues before us. It is absolutely essential that we
make clear our resolve to see the current situation in Indochina
through to a successful conclusion. Our emphasis must be one of
firm determination. Under no circumstances must we show any
wavering. We must attack the enemy's invasion and his massive
violations of all agreements. I want the following lines to be taken
in your Congressional testimony and in other public statements by
you and the officials of your Departments.
With regard to our bombing, our position is that we will
cease our attacks on military targets in North Vietnam
when North Vietnam stops killing South Vietnamese and
Americans and ends its blatant invasion of South Vietnam
in violation of all the agreements and understandings
entered into by the DRV.
-- With regard to negotiations, you should follow these lines:
1. We and the South Vietnamese made a comprehensive
eight point proposal on January 25, 1972.
2. The other side has refused to discuss any part of it.
Instead they engaged in a military build-up.
3. On March 23 Ambassador Porter said that we would
agree to future meetings if the other side indicated a
desire for serious talks and would discuss specific
topics related to a peaceful settlement. We also ex-
pressed a readiness on our part to propose meetings
if events made this appear desirable.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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4. On April 1 the U. S. responding to a DRV proposal of
March 27, indicated its willingness to resume the talks
on April 13. The North Vietnamese responded by a
massive invasion of South Vietnam across .the DMZ,
escalating fighting in Military Region 1, and by attacking
in Military Region 3.
5. These attacks have deprived the war of the character of
a civil war and have turned it into a.. massive invasion by
the entire North Vietnamese Army.
6. Hanoi cynically asks us to return to the conference table
even while they are breaking all existing agreements and
understandings. Their actions belie any intent they may
profess for serious discussions. '
7. In 1968 we stopped the bombing of the North in return for
serious negotiations. Since then the negotiations have
been a sham. Hanoi has refused even to discuss any U. S.
proposal. It is time at long last not just to talk, but to
talk seriously.
8. If you are asked about private meetings, you should say
that we are prepared to negotiate in any forum that offers
a prospect of a business-like negotiation and that the
other side understands this very clearly.
9. Our position with respect to negotiations is this:
(a) We will not negotiate a surrender.
(b) We will not negotiate at the point of a gun.
(c) We will negotiate as soon as the other side is ready
to put the talks on a business-like basis.
(d) As Ambassador Porter said, at the President's
instructions, the fact of having meetings is not
the same as having negotiations.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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-- With reg4rd to withdrawal, if asked you should say that we
will reduce to the announced level by May 1 and that the
President will make an announcement before May l on his
future plans depending on the conditions existing at that
time. You should not elaborate.
Please ensure that this approach is rigorously adhered to by all public
spokesmen in your Department.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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W.
Current pacts Regarding the Situation in South Vietnam
1. The North Vietnamese Objectives:
The North Vietnamese have made clear in their negotiations that their
goal is to impose a Communist dominated government on the people of
South Vietnam. Having failed to achieve their objectives by political
subversion or military. infiltration they have now launched a massive
conventional invasion of South Vietnam. . t
a. They have committed 12 of their. 13 combat divisions fully
equipped with the most advanced weapons systems; armor, artillery
and anti-aircraft.
b. They have launched multi-division offensives across the.
DMZ, across the Cambodian border towards Saigon and across the
Laotian border into the highlands. * }.
2. The South Vietnamese Response:
The South Vietnamese are doing all of the ground fighting.
The U.S. role is limited strictly to air and sea power. Those forces
w*.ll provide whatever support is necessary to meet the following
objectives:
a. Protect American forces,
b. Assure no interruption in withdrawal schedule.
c. Provide South Vietnam the chance to defend itself against
an invader provided by outside powers with the most sophisticated
-.offensive weaponry.
r
3. The U. S. Negotiating Position:
The U.S. and South Vietnam proposed a' comprehensive $-point peace
proposal made public on January 25; it provides for a settlement fair
to both sides; it remains on the table. ?
Hanoi's current invasion wa:, a response to our painstaking and
restrained efforts to enter serious negotiations.
.
a. Hanoi has shown complete disregard for the 1954 Geneva
Accords on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
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b.. hJanoi has shown complete disregard for the 1962 Geneva
Accords tin the neutrality of Laos to which it was signatory.
c. Hanoi consistently failed to honor the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war.
d. Hanoi has now. flagrantly broken the 1968 understandings
which led to the cessation of U. S. bombardment of the DRV.
If the U.S. were to capitulate to Soviet-supported indirect aggression
in Vietnam, U. S. credibility and the prospects for preventing direct
and indirect aggression in other areas of the world would be damaged
irreparably. The U.S. will not capitulate to the North Vietnamese
demands or betray South Vietnam at the point of a gun. If the South.
Vietnamese -.ucceed in repelling this blatant aggression, the prospects
for real peace around the world will be greatly enhanced.
4.
To Answer the Critics:
There are those who argue that we indeed provoked the invasion.
This is a dishonest charge. It has been clear fot months that North
Vietnam realizing that it had failed to win politically or militarily
has planned this invasion in the desperate attempt to crush the South
Vietnamese will, inflict massive bloodshed and stir public discontent
in the U. S. during an election year.
- l
eft
Those critics are the same politicians who subscribed to the policies
of earlier administrations, which sent 500, 000 men to Vietnam
declaring, "We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival
and success of liberty." These same politicians, Kennedy, Muskie,
McGovern and others are today advocating the betrayal of an ally
who is fighting effe-tivcly and bravely. They advocate surrender
to invasion and the binding over of 17 million free people to Communist
oppression and retribution. They who sent 500, 000 Americans to
Vietnam are doing the nation a grave disservice in directly sabotaging
the efforts of a President who has withdrawn the 500, 000 Americans
giving the South Vietnamese a chance to survive with freedom.
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