ARVN IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 19, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20 LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
November 19, 1.971
MEMORANDUM
TOP SECRET
FROM: K. Wayne Smith h h
SUBJECT: ARVN in Cambodia
MEMORANDUM. FOR DR. KISSINGER
Attached at Tab A is a back-channel message for Ambassadors Bunker
and Swank as requested by you (Tab B).
John Holdridge and Dick Kennedy concur.
RECOMMENDATION.
That you approve the back-channel message for dispatch (Tab A).
NSS, DOS
Reviews
Completed.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
BACK-CHANNEL FOR AMBASSADORS BUNKER AND 3 WANK
Henry A. Kissinger
I am pleased that the GVN is launching attacks into the Cambodian
base areas. I? know you and General Abrams will continue your efforts
such that this attack provides second front, perhaps drawing enemy
forces back from their present positions where they are applying
considerable pressure on FANK.
Beyond this operation I am concerned that we move toward full
meeting of minds among the GVN, GKR and ourselves on the role of
ARVN in eastern Cambodia.
We should not be expected to train, supply and equip duplicating
ARVN and FANK forces targeted on the three NVA/VC divisions in
eastern Car bodia, leaving it to the enemy to choose which he fights.
Our assistance to the GKR should build up FANK's capabilities to
supplement ARVN efforts against these divisions, but not to replace
ARVN. Our assessment here is that ARVN has sufficient forces in
MR-3 to apply steady pressure on the eastern Cambodian base areas
rf
without undue risks to security in MR-3. These ARVN forces should
be the primary allied forces keeping pressure on the NVA in eastern
Cambodia so long as Hanoi continues the deployment of these main force
units thhere. These actions hopefully will preempt a movement of these
forces either back into MR-3 or against Phnom Penh.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
It seems to us there is a priority requirement for the FANK to
secure its roads to the west and south so that its economy can return
to normal production and supply of the capital. The GYN should have
an interest in economic normalcy in Cambodia as our support for the
Cambodian and Vietnamese economies must come from the same
limited appropriations.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
w
- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
.."MEMORANDUM
November 10, 1971
SUBJECT
ARVN in Cambodia
During his current trip Admiral Moorer has encouraged Lon Nol to
seek early ARVN participation in a timely major operation against the
NVA/VC base camps in eastern Cambodia (Tab B).
President Thieu told Secretaries Laird and Connallyhe plans to continue
destruction of enemy bases in Cambodia. However, ARVN has not
followed up the losses it inflicted on the NVA 7th Division when it made
a preelection move into western MR-3 by contifiiai,ng pressures on the
Cambodian base camps where the 7th is refitting.
We should not be expected to train and equip duplicating ARVN and FANK
forces targeted on the three NVA/VC divisions in eastern Cambodia,
leaving it to the enemy by his geographic choice of operating area to
choose which he fights.
Our assistance to the GKR should build up FANK's capabilities to
supplement ARVN effort against these divisions, but not to replace ARVN.
The MR-3 ARVN forces are not needed against the small other threats
in MR-3 and are not likely to move north unblocking Saigon from the NVA
forces in Cambodia. Thus these AIEVN forces should be the primary
allied force keeping pressure on the NVA in eastern Cambodia.
The enemy has now corricnited his 9th division against FANK to the west
of his base camps. Tiis move could be a temporary shift of attention
away from Vietnam in an effort to hand FANK a decisive defeat and
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
SECRET
discourage further FANK advances toward. the enemy bases and
supply lines. It is also possible that the enemy is discouraged
about his possibilities of mounting major successful operations in
-aauthern Vietnam .during the next several months and intends to
concentrate on FANK before U. S. efforts to strengthen TANK are
fully effective. In either case the deployment of one of the three
divisions against TANK giver; the ARVN an opportunity to exploit
the opportunity against the NVA base areas.
The U.S. view that ARVN MR-3 forces should keep up the pressure
on NVA forces in eastern Cambodia to preempt their return to
South Vietnam and that FANK should, supplement, not replace,
ARVN in eastern Cambodia apparently has not been forcefully
communicated to the GVN and GKR.
The possibility of reduced U. S. MAP and supporting assistance
availabilities increases the importance of stressing to both the
GVN and GKR, that nothing but the best cooperation between them
can be supported. The GVN should realize that its MR-3 main
forces cannot afford to leave the NVA to the Cambodians merely
because they are temporarily in Cambodian sanctuaries. The
Cambodians should give priority to securing their key roads and
populated countryside while leaving the main 'burden of the fighting
in the east to ARV-N.
Shouldn't this view be communicated to the GVN and GKR?
If you agree, I recommend it be handled in a phone call or a
ck--channel message from you to Aix ssad6r-Bun e`r,:
I will tell Bunker
Prefer regular telegram
cc: Mr. Holdridge
Mr. Kennedy
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/12/20: LOC-HAK-450-6-11-3
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