SECRETARY LAIRD'S MEMO ON RVNAF IMPROVEMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-449-6-17-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 19, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

-T - LL41 L. %ye
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/02/25: LOC-HAK-449-6-17-9
MEMORANDUM W
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT INFORMATION
CROP 0;.;:T.* May 19, 19711
SUBJECT: Secretary Laird's Memo on RVNAF Improvements
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSI~N~G/ER
FROM: K. Wayne Smith WW
A A
Secretary Laird has sent the President a memorandummon
RVNAF improvement and modernization that could serve as
the epitaph for Vietnamization. On the other hand, because
the Secretary's memorandum contains the basic elements of
the MR analysis, it provides you with an opportunity to mold
the Secretary's thinking.
The problem at this juncture is that the Secretary does not
understand the analysis in his own memorandum. If he
understood it, as his own analysts who wrote it understand
it, he would be far less sanguine about the prospects for 1972
and might even be willing to contemplate making the changes
the situation demands. Your problem is tomove the Secretary
to dig deeper into the analysis.
Secretary Laird's General bonclusions
The Secretary's general conclusions are scary and ha`re no
foundation in the analysis in his own memorandum.
These conclusions are:
OSD and JCS reviews
completed
The RVNAF I&M program has given the GVN the capacity.
Whether they cope with the threat depends on their national will.
-- Only minor adjustments are needed. he Secretary's own
analysis is evidence that ARVN needs to add a division in MR 1
in addition to the reserve forces that could be sent to MR 1 in
the event of a major offensive.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/02/25: LOC-HAK-449-6-17-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/02/25: LOC-HAK-449-6-17-9
TOP SECRET ES ONLY
-- The "ultimate" reduction of the RVNAF force structure is
"essential." 1 cannot get worked up over this Nutter/Pursley
rhetoric. Laird used it last year. The issue is when and Laird
does not seem to be saying now. We are suffering from a plague
of DOD economists.
"The risk of negotiating a date for total U. S. withdrawals
in exchange for actual return of POWs now appears acceptable. "
How the Secretary reaches this conclusion is beyond me. What
date? What withdrawals? If this gets in the press it will be a
bombshell.
The Analysis
Page 3 of the Secretary's attachment contains the analysis which
the Secretary has not fully understood.
I strongly urge you to go over it with him and encourage him to
understand it fully.
The points I make below have been fully checked with the OSD/SA
analyst (Lt. Col. Eddins) who put the table together. He has
worked closely with us in the MR studies. Unfortunately ISA has
filtered his analysis to Laird and ISA does not understand it fully.
(1) The analysis is based on the following assumptions:
-- The most probable threat to South Vietnam in 1972 is an
MR 1 offensive. This is what is termed by Laird "CIA's estimate
which we consider maximizes both the size and supportability of
possible VC/NVA offensive operations. 11
remain in MR 2 until FY 73.
-- A "desired" main force ratio (MFR) of 1. 1 for MR 1 and
2. 5 for MR 2 would maintain the main force balance in these
areas with the risk of only slight control losses.
TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/02/25: LOC-HAK-449-6-17-9
50, 000 U. S. forces in South Vietnam at mid-72.
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V
TOP SECRET /EYES ONLY 3
-- There is no requirement for the permanent stationing of
RVNAF forces in Cambodia or for operations against South Laos
of long duration, i. e. ARVN forces would be withdrawn from
Cambodia.
These assumptions are reasonable. In combination they represent
a best probable outcome. Most and worst probable outcomes
need to be estimated as well.
But even accepting Laird's best probable assumptions, the RVNAF
improvements called for by the analysis far exceed what in the
Secretary's view are required. For example, there is a 44 battalion
deficit in MR 1 that can only be filled in part with ARVN's present
31 battalions of mobile forces (marines, paratroopers, and the
9th Division). Thus another division must be added in MR 1.
Other assumptions would considerably magnify the task of
restructuring RVNAF to meet the 1972 threat. I state below the
key assumptions in the best, worst, and most probable variants.
Best (Laird)
Most Probable
Worst
Threat ._....: _....
MR 1 Offensive
MR -1 and 2
MR l [Cambodia
Desired MFR
MRl
1. 1
1. 5
2. 0
MR 2
2.5
3. 0
3. 0
Main force require -
meats for Laos and
Cambodia . 0 bns 10 bns 15 bns
All cases would assume the ROKs remain in MR 2 and the U. S. force
level is 50, 000 in mid-1972.
TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/02/25: LOC-HAK-449-6-17-9
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/02/25: LOC-HAK-449-6-17-9
TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY 4
Recommendation
That you urge the Secretary to examine best, worst, and most
probable cases before arriving at a final judgment.
Points you could make to convince him of this are;
-- His analysis assumes there will be no requirement for
RVNAF forces in Cambodia or Laos in 1972. Ask him if this
assumption is consistent with the findings of the DOD team.
-- The CIA and JCS/DIA analysis of the threat make it
probable that the enemy can exceed an MR 1 offensive in 1972.
More likely is a MR I and 2 offensive. Wor'st probable but
within Hanoi's capability is a MR 1 /Cambodia offensive.
... The MFR's used in the analysis for MRs 1 and 2 are below
what to date have been considered necessary to maintain the
main force balance. In the most probable case they should be
increased from 1. 1 to 1. 5 for MR I and from 2. 5 to 3. 0 for MR 2.
You can illustrate this by asking the Secretary if he believes the
GVN will be able to take 8 battalions (almost a division)-from
MR 2 in 1972 as the analysis indicates.
If these modifications are s zade in the Secretary's analysis, all
within the best, worst and most probable framework, the country-
side RVNAF 4 battalion surplus will vanish and the fixes required
will become of a ~gre.ter and more realistic magnitude.
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/02/25: LOC-HAK-449-6-17-9