CIA WORKING PAPER: "MEASURING STRATEGIC POWER: A POSSIBLE SOVIET VIEW"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-449-2-1-0
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 4, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/10/25 : LOC-HAK-449-2-1-0 ~
MEMORANI3UM F'OR'
~Tanuary 4, 1971
THE I~-IRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SCTBJEGT: CIA Working Paper: "Measuring Strategic Power: A
Possible Soviet View"
Your Deputy Director for Intelligence, R. T. Smith, recently sent
e a worlcimg paper entitled "Measuring Strategic Power: A
Possible Soviet View. " It provided .some useful insights into the
possible Soviet viewpoint on the strategic balance. Like any good,
study, it also raised .new questions. I would hope that the next
draft of the paper or a complexx~entary study would seek to answer
these questions:
(1) E~cpaxxd the. discussion of what we actually know about how
Soviet planners ax~,alyze the strategic balance. The article refers
to the SALT experience and unspecified Soviet articles to show that
many Soviets have a sophisticated view of strategic force policy.
Only orate article--byya Soviet general of unspecified influence--is
discussed in detail.
_- .Who are the more influential Soviet planners an,d what
do we know .about. their views
-- Haw much weight do Soviet planners give to dynamic
models over static xxXeasures ?
-- Besides the now obvious scenarios of massive first or
retaliatory stxikes, what other scenarios do the Soviets foresee as
especially cxi:tical for planning? Do they believe certain lirnited-
exchange scenarios offer the possibility of favorable results?
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/10/25 : LOC-HAK-449-2-1-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/10/25 : LOC-HAK-449-2-1-0
.~ ~.
TOP SECRET
(Z) What do we actually know. about the strategic views of
Bxezh~a..ev Kasygin., and. other top decision-makers in the Soviet
'CT'r~i.vn? (.Their pxeconceptions might only be rn~arginally affected
by the analy~.cal work of Soviet planners.
Are they farniliax with dynazxzic models and the .concept
of assured destruction capability?
What possibility do they assign to a lirn.ited strategic
exchange and what results do they expect?
-? What influence do the strategic planners have on them?
- What importance do they attach to limiting strategic
arms either through SALT,, informal agreements, or unilateral
decision? What motivates .their views on limitation--need for
resources elsewhere, recognition of the possibility of a renewed
arms race, etc. ?
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/10/25 : LOC-HAK-449-2-1-0
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/10/25 : LOC-HAK-449-2-1-0
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/10/25 : LOC-HAK-449-2-1-0