U. S. DENIAL OF NORTH VIETNAM'S IMPORTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-448-1-11-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 7, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

MEMORANDUM
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INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Laurence E. Lynn,
A-4
,May 7, 1970
SUBJECT: U. S. Denial of North Vietnam's Imports
Last fall, I participated in an effort to evaluate the effectiveness %
of various campaigns aimed at denial of North Vietnam's imports.
This memo summarizes the findings.
North Vietnam's Import Requirements
North Vietnam is highly dependent upon imports to maintain its
economic and military activities. For example, during FY 1969
North Vietnam's 2. 2 million tons of imports provided:
- - 890, 000 tons of foodstuffs or one fifth of North Vietnam's
total food consumption;
-- 333, 000 tons of petroleum products; North Vietnam's only
supply of gasoline;
-- 50, 000 tons of military equipment and munitions; prime
source of supply for the NVA/VC forces in North and South Vietnam,
These imports are provided in roughly equal volume by the Soviet
Union and Communist China (40 percent each) with the remainder
coming largely from Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union provides
one-third of North Vietnam imported foodstuffs, almost all of its
petroleum, and about half of its other imports. The Communist
Chinese imports consist largely of foodstuffs though China also
provides some combat material and industrial products to North
Vietnam,
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Alternative Denial Campaigns
The denial of imports to North Vietnam might be accomplished in
a wide variety of ways. For purposes of analysis, I assumed that
one of two principal strategies would.be followed:
-- A mining and naval blockade campaign that would effectively
close North Vietnam's entire coastline to seaborne traffic.
-- An air and naval interdiction campaign throughout North
Vietnam in addition to a full coastal blockade.
Under both campaigns, I also assumed that:
-- The Soviets and Chinese would continue to cooperate with
each other in the provision of assistance to North Vietnam.
-- The North Vietnamese effort to maintain their imports, in the
face of a denial campaign, would not be limited by the internal
weakness of the Hanoi government.
I am in no position to judge the present validity of these assumptions.
Moreover, the imposition of a coastal blockade in addition to interdiction
at past levels would create a situation in North Vietnam quite different
from that caused by our 1965-1968 interdiction campaign. If there
were corresponding changes in the enemy reaction, the effectiveness
of our denial campaign could be materially different from what we now
anticipate based on our past experience.
Denial of North Vietnam Seaborne Imports
Assuming that Haiphong and North Vietnam's other ports were
completely closed, North Vietnam would be forced either to divert
its import traffic to overland routes (see Tab A for map of routes)
or reduce its imports.
If they attempted to divert all seaborne traffic to overland routes,
this traffic at annual rates would consist of:
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-- the 300, 000 tons of imports, including 50, 000 tons of munitions
and military equipment, previously shipped on the overland routes;
-- the 1, 900, 000 tons of imports, principally foodstuffs and
petroleum, previously seaborne to North Vietnam.
Considering both existing and diverted traffic, the overall load
would be about 2. 2 million tons or 6, 100 tons per day on an annual
basis.
Overland Routes Within the USSR
In the first instance, the impact of this increased load would be on
Soviet transportation capabilities.
-- The 70 percent of present Soviet seaborne trade with North
Vietnam which is nowt shipped out of Vladivostok is already a part of
the established traffic flow on the Trans-Siberian railroad. Diversion
of this traffic from Vladivostok to the Chinese border would require
little additional effort for the Soviets.
-- The remaining 30 percent (1, 200 tons per day) now shipped
out of European ports would be diverted to the Trans-Siberian route
used by most existing traffic. The additional burden on the Trans-
Siberian line, which is estimated to have a minimum capacity of 50
trains or 100, 000 tons each way per day, would be relatively light.
Overall, the movement of all Soviet material provided to North Vietnam
by overland routes would require utilization of well below 5 percent of
the existing capacity of Soviet railroads. Because rail traffic to China
has declined drastically in recent years and is now well below existing
rail capacity, this additional capacity would be available at little sacrifice.
Moreover, the transhipment areas between the Soviet and Chinese rail-
road systems also have excess capacity and the reloading of cargoes on
Chinese railcars should not cause significant delays. The CIA judges
that the complete diversion of Soviet traffic to overland routes could be
accomplished in about two weeks.
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Overland Routes Within China
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From the Soviet border, the convergence of Soviet and Chinese aid
to North Vietnam on the Chinese railroads would add about 5, 300 tons,
including 1, 000 tons per day of petroleum, to its existing burden of
about 800 tons per day already carried to North Vietnam. This
additional burden would require:
-- the diversion of 1700 freight cars and 350 petroleum tank cars
to support North Vietnam's trade. - In each case, this relocation would
be less than two percent of China's existing inventory.
- - the utilization of about half of the 11, 400 ton per day capacity
of the major direct rail route, via Kwangsi Province, to North Vietnam's
border at Dong Dang. In addition, other less direct routes are also
available.
Thus, CIA and DIA agree that North Vietnam's 1969 level of imports
(about 6, 100 tons per day) could be moved entirely overland to North
Vietnam's border without significantly straining Soviet or Chinese
capabilities. While the management of the shift in traffic might be
complex, the CIA believes that the higher level of overland traffic
could be handled within four to six weeks, slightly longer than the two
weeks required for Soviet adjustment alone.
The Sea/Overland Option
While North Vietnam's allies could supply its entire import require-
ment overland, they might choose to use a combined sea and overland
route because of the greater efficiency of seaborne traffic.
The mechanics of this strategy would be to land at the Chinese port
of Fort Bayard the 3, 600 tons of dry cargo and 900 tons of petroleum
per day that would otherwise be landed at Haiphong. This traffic,
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along the cargo (700 tons per day) previously shipped from ports in
South China, would then be moved overland to North Vietnam.
This combined sea/overland route would.enable the Soviet Union and
China to meet North Vietnam's import needs with about the same
strain as a completely overland route:
-- The capacity of Fort Bayard's port is 5, 080 tons of dry cargo
per day at the minimum. The daily average of 3, 600 tons of diverted
cargo would be only about 70 percent of this capacity.
-- The 900 tons per day of diverted POL would represent only
7 percent of Fort Bayard's POL unloading capacity and an even
smaller fraction of its storage capacity.
Once landed in Fort Bayard, the diverted cargo would be moved by
rail to the Chinese border with North Vietnam. The 4, 500 tons per
day of cargo that would move from Fort Bayard would utilize less
than 1 percent of the Chinese inventory of rail cars and locomotives
and absorb about 75 percent of the daily capacity (6, 000 tons) of the
single most-direct rail line from the port to the North Vietnamese
border.
The limiting capacity would be at Fort Bayard, however, because
any shortage of rail capacity could be overcome by trucking or the
.improvement in the railways. Consequently, North Vietnam's total
imports could be easily handled by a sea/overland as well as entirely
overland routes.
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Movement from the Chinese Border
From the Chinese border, the North Vietnamese transportation
system has a combined rail, road and water route capacity of
almost 16, 000 tons per day during the dry season and 13, 000 tons
per day during the wet season. These overall capacities are, as_
shown below, more than twice the 6 000 tons of cargo per da that
North Vietnam imported during FY 1969.
Tons Per Day
Dry Season Wet Season
Daily Imports 6, 000 6, 000
Route Capacities
Railroads 9, 000 9, 000
Roads 5,400 2,300
Rivers 1, 500 1,500
Total Capacity 15,900 12, 800
The CIA and DIA agree that there is ample route capacity for North
Vietnam to carry all its imports overland provided it is able, with
Soviet and Chinese assistance, to maintain the number of carriers
required.
North Vietnam rail capacity would not be limited by the present number
of locomotives (115-130) or freight cars (2, 000-2, 300) in its inventory,
because the movement of 6, 000 tons per day would require at most
800 freight cars, about 40% of North Vietnam's present car inventory.
There is some disagreement within the intelligence community,
however, over whether throughput on the rail lines within North
Vietnam might be less than theoretically possible, given their
capacity and the availability of carriers.
-- The CIA finds it likely that China would provide rolling stock
to offset any North Vietnamese shortages and enable the rail lines from
China to operate at full capacity (9, 000 short tons daily) if necessary.
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-- The DIA determined that "traffic considerations" and
equipment availability would probably limit sustained capacity to
6, 000 tons daily.
However, the CIA and DIA agree that,- without U. S. interdiction,
the rail system of North Vietnam can 'alone carry all imports by
overland routes in spite of possible shortages of equipment. North
Vietnam's trucks and riverways would further supplement its rail
capacity.
A Combined Blockade and Interdiction Campaign
The U. S. could resume an all full-scale interdiction campaign
against North Vietnam's internal transportation in addition to
blockading its coast. This would increase the pressure on North
Vietnam by destroying a portion of its imports, degrading the
capacity of its transportation network, and destroying the carriers
used by it.
Because the rail routes from China provide about two-thirds of North
Vietnam's overland import capacity, the success of a U.S. interdiction
effort against them would be the key determinant of its overall
effectiveness. There are two main rail routes from China crossing
North Vietnam's border at Dong Dang (6, 000 ton per day capacity) and
Lao Cai (3, 000 ton per day capacity).
As DIA points out, the U. S. experience with its interdiction effort
in 1967 was that:
-- The Dong Dang line was attacked with a maximum effort
(400 to 500 sorties monthly). However, the North Vietnamese were
able to maintain traffic at night-time capacity levels with only
temporary interruptions.
-- The Lao Cai line was attacked by 200 to 300 sorties monthly.
While the North Vietnamese did not try to fully offset U. S. bomb
damage (they did not need the capacity) they were able to maintain
capacity at about two-thirds of its night-time level.
On the basis of this experience, DIA. concludes that a 1967-type
bombing campaign might reduce the railway's potential throughput
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by half forcing the North Vietnamese to use their rail lines only at
night or in bad weather. To reduce throughput below this level,
however, DIA finds that every major bridge and its bypasses would have
to be destroyed and traffic interdicted on a 24 hour basis - a campaign
not possible given current limits on the capability of U. S. aircraft to
operate at night and in bad weather.
If the U. S. interdiction campaign failed to reduce rail throughput
below its night-time capacity of 4, 500 tons per day, as DIA and CIA
expect, North Vietnam's road and waterway route could easily carry
the remaining 1, 500 tons per day of the 6, 000 tons required by North
Vietnam. For example,
-- DIA estimates that an interdiction campaign could at best
reduce North Vietnam's road capacity and truck fleet by 40% leaving
North Vietnam a capability to move at least 2, 000 tons per day by road.
-- DIA finds that no feasible interdiction campaign could reduce the
inland waterway capability from China to Hanoi below 1, 000 tons daily.
Through its rail, road, waterway networks, North Vietnam could,
even under a heavy bombing effort, probably move at least 7, 500
tons daily from the Chinese border - an amount 25% greater than its
total imports during 1969. Thus, a strong U. S. interdiction effort,
even when combined with an effective naval blockade of North Vietnam,
will not effectively deny North Vietnam its present level of imports if
North Vietnam chooses to maintain them.
Though such a campaign might well limit large increases in the level
of North Vietnam's imports, the North could in the long run:
-- Partially surmount a naval blockade through active counter-
measures and the use of large scale lightelting and over-the-beach
unloading. DIA does not believe, for example, that a total closure of
Haiphong or North Vietnam coast is possible if the North Vietnamese
use the countermeasures available to them.
- Greatly increase the capacity of its road net from China or
build alternative routes to South Vietnam through Laos. DIA and CIA
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believe that "new routes" would most likely be developed and used to
offset the effects of interdiction a,nd blockade.
Through these measures, North could probably overcome any
interdiction-imposed limit on increases in their logistical flows
though their cost in casualties and lo`st.material would be substantially
increased.
Moreover, even if increases in overall imports were limited, it
would probably have very little effect on North Vietnam's ability to
increase its military activity in Laos or South Vietnam, because:
-- the military equipment and munitions required to support North
Vietnam's war effort are only about 2 percent of its total imports.
-- the quasi-military supplies (petroleum, trucks, construction
materials) directly-related to the war effort certainly constitute
much less than half of North Vietnam's overall imports.
Because its military requirements constitute only a portion of its
total imports, North Vietnam could probably accept limitations or
even reductions in its import levels without affecting its war effort.
For example, with marginal reductions in their total imports, the
North Vietnamese could increase their military imports by reducing
their imports of goods for civilian use (food, some construction
materials, and fertilizer).
Likewise, at the margin, there is no necessary connection between
the level of North Vietnam's imports and the scale of its activity in
South Vietnam because:
-- The external supply requirements of the VC/NVA forces in
South Vietnam are about 100 tons per day or less than two percent of
North Vietnam's total imports.
-- The North Vietnamese have built up very large stockpiles of
vital military supplies in North Vietnam and Laos.
Because of the low requirements and large stockpiles of the NVA
forces, marginal reductions in overall imports to North Vietnam
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would probably have no longterm effect on the availability of
resources in North Vietnam to support VC/NVA activity in South
Vietnam.
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-HANOI- DONG DANG
AND HANOI - LAO CAI
A RAILROAD CAPACITY Liu-thou
x,000, tons each way per day.., /CAPACITY OF ROADS CROSSING CHINA BORDER%
5,400 tons each way per day dry season
; RED RIVER CAPACI'IY,
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All tonnages in metric tons
Road
-e'' - Railroad (meter gauge)
Railroad (standard gauge)
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SWORNE IMPORTS'
DURING 1968
5,400, tarts per day
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