YOUR STATEMENT ON VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-447-9-7-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 10, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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T1-r~ WIiIT~ i-TOUSE
WASXiINC7'Y'ON
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVVE
EXGLUSxVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM; Henry A. Kissinger ~~
SUBJECT; Your Statement on Vietnam
~~'r`L~?~~~~~
Since we have been cxiticized fax not being serious about negotiations,
I have added a section which states our position on negotiations and
makes cleax that the enemy, not we, is the obstacle to progress. In
this section, I have included some of the general principles that I
have mentioned in private to Le Duc Tho fox whatever impact this
might have on the deliberations now going on in I3anoi.
Qn page 7 I have cited the low level of American combat deaths
during the first quarter of this year compared to previous years
without m.entiox~ing specific figures. (Thera were 1, 108 deaths the
first throe months of this year compared to 3, 1$4 in 1969 and 4, 869
in l96$.) x believe the point is bettex handled in this way, for we
don't want to appear to be satisfied that there were "only" 1, 10$
deaths the first three months of this year.
Attached is a draft of your statement on Vietnam.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
'1'QP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLLI`SIYELY EYES .ONLY
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TOF; SECRET/SENSIT1VE
As in the past, I wa. 1 xelate both .the exacouraging and disc~c rag g
in a series of my pe
to the American people on our efforts~o brio.g peace to Vi.etn
devexoprnents that have taken lace. I can state at the outset ~iat the
mixed picture I have noted in recent reports pe~sists. In short, there
is continued bleakness on the negotiating front anal continued progress
on the Viet:naxnization front.
I regret that I can r~oxt to ~rou a`i~.~na progress in the
formal discussions in Paris.
The reason far the stalemate is simple. And it is note
distxessingly familiar to all who yearn for genuine negotiations and a
fair settlement. The other side continues to make 'its two totally
unacceptable demands. We axe told that;
-- we rn.ust unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw all our
farces from South Vietnam.
- on our way out, we must overthrow the existing go
of South Vietnam..
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIZTE
Furtherrn~re, these demands are laid down as conditions far
begiizniri negotiatio s. The other side seeks guaranteed political
pre oxninance before a1 bargaining even takes place. If we acceded
to their dexx~.ands there w~uld, be nothing left to negotiate. We will not
accept this transparent capit~latian.
While Cornrr~unist spokesmen continue to obstruct progress iia
Paris, Communist troops have made ominous moves in Indochina.
n xecen.t months, Hanoi, has sent thousands more of its soldiers
to Laos. to launch new offensives. The North Vietnamese threaten the
oath Vietnam.
continue to pour men and supplies dawn the Ho Chi Minh .Trail iota
n recent weeks, Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces have
very government that they proposed and helped establish eight years
ago. They blatantly violate the 1962 Geneva Accords .which reflected
ammunist formulations for a Laotian political settlement. They
increased their pressures against Cambodia. This small country has
40, 040 strong, have fox years occupied Cambodia to attack South Viet-
strugged to maintain its neutrality and territorial integrity since the
Geneva Conference of 1954. Vietnarx~ese Carrux~unist traaps, naw alxx~.ost
narnese. They are now fighting. Cambodians as we11.
TOP SECRE'T' /SENSITNE \ ~' ~~ (, ~W`f -Q,,;/
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in South Vietnam itself.
In recent days, the Communists have ste
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Hanoi and its allies thus not only block the search for a negotiated
peace in Vietnam. They trample on past i?.riterir~ational agreements for
Indochina and make us question the validity of possible future ones.
Vietnamization
Enemy ,intransigence has given us n ice but to pursue our
Vietnamization r .gam .
have emphasized from the beginning of thi~~inistration that
we seek a rapid settlement of the Vietnam. nflict through negotiation.
We have also made it clear that will move forward with Vietnami--
.nation so long as the e y prevents negotiating progress.
I have described this pxogram in preceding reports and noted its
primary objective of tuxning over to the Government of South Vietnaxn
the responsibilities for its awn self-defense. For the American people
this process offers the prospect of a steadily diminishing U. S. involvement
in Vietnam, even with a negotiating stalemate. Far the South Vietnamese
it assures continuing U. S. suppoxt while they progressively strengthen
themselves. Far the other side it should underline our determination to
sustain our commitments and demonstrate that it is in their awn self-
interest to negotiate. .
Our.VietxYamization plan does not guarantee success. There ar
many xisks as well as opportunities, As x told the Amexic
TOP SECRET [SENSITIVE {y~ Q;.~r~" ~~;G~"
`` 7 (`~ .~.u/~
pp ~~ ~"~~
~t' N
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TOP SECRETiSENSTTI.VE
Navembe.r 3, we inherited a very difficult situa ?'c~n when we took office.
We did not, have the luxuxy of starting f xn scratch. We had to work
with what we found. We judge at the transfer of responsibilities to
the South Vietnamese s the best possible option available to us.
I can re art to ou today that we continue to make
progxess in aux Vietnamization efforts.
'Let me briefly review what we have done and then project what
we will da.
We have based the timing and pace of Amexican troop withdrawals
on the three exiteria of the level of enemy activity, progxess in nego-
nations, and the increasing ability of the South; Vietnamese people to
defend themselves,
As we set out on the V3~:tnarrxization cours~there were xn.any
uncertainties.
How .rapidly could the South~Viet~a.amese axxned forces operate on
their own? Could the govexnxn.en
We were confident that we were~eading ~ the right direction,
had long-term sched~.les fox planning rposes, w ave been required
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TGP S RET/SENSITIV"E
in. the opening ,stages of Vietnamization to feel our way carefully""b_~~
specifying levels of reductions.
These uncertainties caused us to announce shore
plans at three month intervals. After careful ~essments within our
goverra.ment and consultations with our allies, I announced in June,
September and December successive withdrawals which xepresexz~ total.
reduction. of some l 15, 500 men in the authorized ,troop ce
~ 3 ~~ -
In past stateme s I have .stressed the careful stu~s that we
have made on; this pxogr as it has progressed, No other problem
facing ,this Administration. h sreceived closer attention or more thorougYi
I took office. - ~"''~
examination. In addition to ou regular. reporting from. the field and
trips by agency, analysts;. I asked ecretaxy Laird and. General Wheeler
to take afirst-hand look. We have also talked to independent
observers from. outside the govexnnca.e~t and other countries.
Here in Washington we estab ishe t e Vietnam Special Studies
Group which I have described before. raying on experts throughout the
government, this group continues o provo e questions,. measure progress,
identify problems. Ta provid~a basic founda~on fox its assessments
we have sent special What ,House teams to Vietna
military and .pacificati n situation in depth.
TOP SECRET {,SENSITIVE
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TQP SECRET/SENSITIVE _ 6 _
W~ 'axe determ.~.aned to know, and to let the Arrxerican people know,
as plrecisely as possible the progress of the Vietnamization. program.
ill not fool ourselves.
We can not fool the enemy.
findings, which T highlighted in zny Foreign
-- There has been steady pr gress in improving, equipping, and
training the Soutla Vietnarrrese armed forces. Their numbers have
.grown,. particularly in the .1oca1 and to ritorial forces. Their effective-
xxess has incr~;ased in many areas, aLth ugh substantial prablerx~.s remain.
-- We have seen a particularly a couragixxg exaxx~.ple of Vietnarz~.i-
zation in the southern delta .area whexe. large portion of .the pap~.lation
lives, American ground combat forces ere withdrawn from this region
last. year and its defense is now a South V etnamese responsibility. The
Worth Vietnamese have sent several crac regiments izxta this area to
test the results. To date, the South Vietn rn.ese forces have given a
good account ~of them,selves in meeting this threat.
T'he pacification program has n~aa a significant advances and the
government has; extended its authority in th countryside. The percentage
of rural poptti.lation living irx secure areas h s grown substantially while
that under .Viet Cong control has dropped. sh rply, Solid success in.
pacification is especially difficult to measur Sustained political and
military efforts by the government will sti11 e required.
TC2P SECRET /SENSITNE
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the first quarter of this year were about one-third those far the same
pexiod"in 1969 and less than one..fourth those in 1968.
-- One of the x~ost signific ~.t elements in the total picture is the
share the objectives of th~~etnamization program and axe displaying
p
p
.
ere a
e
c
,
setbacks. The enemy will score to cal successes whose ixxzportance
should neither be inflated nor i ored. Serious political and economic,
as well as rriilitaxy proble remain. Neithex we nor the South Vietnamese
Many unknowns in the Vietnamizatian program remain. We will
continue to make comprehensive assessments. However, .after several
months of experience we now have a good feel bath fox the rate of .progress
and for the xxxany remaining problems. We need no longer restrict
ourselves to short-term projections.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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-- There has been an o tall decline in enex-ray farce levels and
attacks, although we still. see at ti es disturbing signs of heightened
enemy activity. Increasingly, North Va amese fillexs are needed to
-- Casualties for all forces in Vietnam have been dropping. Duxing
,X~ the past thrgg months Axnexican combat deaths declined to the lowest levels
bolster Viet Cong units.
fox comparable periods in the last five years. A ~g~-
ect some temporary
can ex
ourse soft s
ots
of
r
Th
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TOP SECRET/SENS.ITTVE
We believe that we have now reached the point where we can
chart a longer term course for our troop v~rithdrawals. We .can set a
target that we should meet under foreseeable conditions while allowing
'for adjustments if intervening events dictate.
I am therefore announcing today that we plan to withdraw an
additional 150, 000_ American troops from Vietnam. by lie spring of
next year. Wheat added to our previous withdrawals, this will mean a
total reduction of 265, 500 men in our authorized farces. in Vietnam below
the .level existing when this Administxation tank office in January 1969.
The pxecise timing and pace of these withdrawals over the coming
months will - ly be keyed to the circumstances and aux .continuing
best judgxnea7,ts.
We believe this long-tErm projection .represents a .prudent rate
of turnover of responsibilities to the South Vietnamese,. based an
reasonable expectations of progress in Vietnamization.
~"urther tra xeductions~are not ruled out.' a would like nothing
better than to b ble to speed up this p ocess because of progress in the
negotiations. If the other side had responded constructively to aux offer
of May 14, 1969, most U. S. and foreign troops could already have
.~~
left South Vietnam.
.TOP. SECRET/SENSITIVE
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.TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE ~ 9 --
--
concerned at the recent increases in theix attacks an South. Vietnax~..
We will also watch the level of enemy activity. We have been
Let ~xx~.e repeat: the Government of North Vietnam. could make no greater
i
mistake than to assume that it would gaixi by an increase in violence.
We will not hesitate to take strong measures if the level of enemy
activity and the threat to remaining American forces in Vietnam requires
us to do sa. It would be a costly error to test our resolve or exploit
the withdrawal af. U. S. troops with an escalation of the fighting.
' Tn this connection, we take a very gxave view of developments
i
~ the neutrality of those nations. Such actions come against the long
background of Hanoi's flagrant use of the territory of those countries
to puxsue its aggression against South Vietnam.
We :continue to support the neutrality and integrity of Laos and
Cambodia. We wi11 expect the North Vietnamese and theix allies to
start doixzg the saxxa.e.
Negotiations
Hanoi's implacability forces us down the road of Vietnamization.
There is a better way to end this wax. We prefer the shorter road of
negotiations.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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For we take no satisfaction in the prospect that as American.
presence and casualties drop, Vietnamese continue to kill Vietnamese.'
Or that the Comrr~.unist forces continue to be killed in much greater
numbs than allied forces. We value all human life. We want to see
ombat stil ~~
--several occasions I have reviewed the general approach and
specific proposals that the Government of South Vietnam and we have
made to bring about genuine negotiations far a .peaceful settlement.
~ have explained also our understanding of the other side's perspective,
our willingness to be forthcoming once there is true give and take.
We recognize that a political settlement is of course the heart of
the matter for the Vietnamese, xt is what the fighting has been about
.for, some thirty years in that part of the world. Let me briefly list a
few principles that govern our viewpoint of a negotiated settlement.
First, our single basic objective remains to seek a solution which
allows all South ~7'ietnamese to determine their future without autside
interference.
. Second, this requires the withdrawal of all outside forces from
South Vietnam. I hereby reaffirm our acceptance of the principle of
total withdrawal of American troops. In turn, we must see the with--
drawal of all North Vietnamese forces and reliable assurance that they
TOP SECRET /SECx~~t'~fitVE
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shi of olitical forces. ~e-~~
equires agreement on a procedure which forecloses no outcome and
gives every significant group a free chance to participate and contest the
political issues, We axe prepared to do this. We want to shaft the
struggle in Vietnam from rnilitaxy to political competition.
Fourth, the political process must reflect the will of the South
Vietnamese .people. Our proposals have included the concept of free
lections under international supervision.. We recognize the complexity
not in that Hanoi,
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Third, a fair political process xnust register the existin~relation-
ietnam; our suggestions have not been presented on a.take-it-or-leave-it
shaping a process which would fairly apportion political power in South
basis. We have stated repeatedly that we are prepared to be flexible once
genuine negotiations begin.
~~ `"
we will abide b the outcome of the olitical process. President
Thieu and' I have said that we will accept the free decision of the South Vietxa.a-
mese people -whatever the outcome. We wi11 not, howevex, agree that the
Pre>sident and other leaders of the Government of Vietnam should be
averth~own before real negotiations are joined. This arrogant demand
TOP SECRET /SENSlTIVE~
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - 1Z r
would prevent a fair political pxacess and prearrange the political
i
results. It suggests that the other side feaxs the outcome of genuine
political competition.
That is the essence of our approach. The contrast between the
negotiating at 'tudes of the two sides is sharp indeed.
They say, 'take out all your side's foreign forces from South
ietnarn while we lave ours thexe. " We say, "let us remove all
outside forces and ent ust the future of South Vietnam to its awn. people. "
gives evexyane a chance to cam ete far political power. "
sides search. fax a political p ocess that reflects pxesent stxengths and
They say, "toss o the present government of South Vietnam. and
guarantee in advance that e will rule the, country. " We say, "let bath
T da not knave haw we could ffer a fairer position. or a maze open
~attitud.e. We fail ~Ea understand why the nthex side persistently refuses
to enter into.meaningful discussions. We regret it sticks to its
unreasonable demands. We wondex ~uvhy 't pxefexs the continued costs
and anguish of battle to the genuine acco odation of negotiation.
X pledge once again to seek a negotiate settlement despite
.enemy intransigence.
At the same time, X pledge that we will not ~axticipate in the type
of sham negotiations that the other side demands to ~aznouflage an allied
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If negotiations fail, our conscience will, be clear. History will
xecard that it was not our fault.
Prisoners of War
No statement on .Vietnam would be complete without my underlining
ante again ,our deep concern for the fate of American pxisoners. One
can perhaps speculate, upon, even if not fully undexstanding, Hanoi''s
motives in refusing to negotiate seriously for a Vietnam peace, What
is frankly incomprehensible is its attitude an prisoners of war.
This is not a political nor a bargaining issue. It involves the
anguish of a wife or mother not knowing whether her loved one is alive
or dead, It concerns children growing u.p without even being able to
conltnunicate at long-distance with their fathers.
North Vietnam gains nothing by using these prisoners as political
pawns. On 'the contrary, its callous positions have prompted a rising
tide of international condemnation. Far simple humanitarian reasons,
we once again ask Hanoi to provide infoxmation an the whereabouts of
all prisoners of war; to allow them to wxite and receive packages fxom
their families; to permit inspection of prisoners of wax camps by
impartial axganizatians; and to provide far the .eaxly release of at least
the .sick and wounded captives ,
TOP SECRET./SENSLTIVE
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conclusion
What is the significance of what I have said today?
On the disappointing side, the enemy still shows no signs of
negotiating sexiously. On the positive side, the Vietnamization program.
continues to make steady progress.
If these trends o time ey suggest a declining but still substantial
;.
American involvement i ietnaxn ovex the coming year. I am confident
the Am.ericari peo w'. 1 support this course sa long as the enemy
remains unreasonable.
I deeply hope instead that by next spring we will have witnessed
,genuine. negotiations and the building of a jixst peace. The other side
holds the key to that hope. We will not be found wanting.
were told repeatedly in the past. that our adversaries would
negotiate se ously if only we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam.. .
if only we begs withdrawing our farces from South Vietnam.... if only
we dealt with the N tional Libexation Fraxit as one of the parties to the
negotiations... if only a agreed in principle to remove all our farces
from Vietnam.
We;h~~re taken all-.these steps. Yet'the enemy still refuses
genuine negotiations.
TOP SECRET /.SENSITIVE
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'The ather side indicated hat it would take serious note of large
American withdrawals, srxch as 100, 000 xnen. We have already
removed mare than that,
They have then, said we sho ld comxxxit ourselves to withdrawing
this many in a single announcemen Today, Tam projecting a reduction
of sti11 anothex 150, 000 American tr aps.
I have repeated aux willingness to be farthcaming in negotiations
and sketched the general principles which guide our approach.
~e are prepared to act on these principles and to seek a settlement
in which the other side's interests as we11 as ours are xecognized and
protected. Bath: sides have shown at a terrible cost that they can
make war. Yt is now time for the enemy to turn their proven corarage
and. determination to making peace.
We are. ready to da just that. We want a peace in which both
sides can find same repayment for the price they have paid,
I can only hope that the other side will at long last respond to our
initiatives so that peace and political competition can replace the
military struggle in Southeast Asia.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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