PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-447-10-20-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: April 29, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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T
MEMORANDUM )* HSNRY A.
YROM:
Winston lwar4
SUBJECTS President's Sppeeh
April 29, 1970
Attached are suggestion. for to President's speech from Alen
Johnson, (Tab A), Mr. Rebus ('d'ab B) and Mr. Karawessiaes (Tab C).
I have side ed and clipped those sections which seem to me to con-
taim material that is both, saw and appropriate, and n4gbt therefore
be worth considering for inclusion in the speech.
In addition, shed at Tab D is some suggested language tro Hal
d~waaa v eldt for handling the Soviet saaalr.
may,, i the President uses your s gestion about citing reduction
of air opus in Vieb (page 5), he should any that air sorties
(ass well as 3#S2 eedeersetion*) have been reehnud by over ZO percent,
rather than 30 percent as t draft now states. This was what he
said November 3 and the autherised levels rem-'s the cain a although
there have been A tustioas for various reasons.
MORI/CDF C03319307 pages 1-9, 11-18
C03232965 page 10
Atts Chmenta
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
TOP A
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60
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
NOD IS /KHMER
a
April 29, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject : Cambodia
Attached are some thoughts of Marshall Green on
the subject and a copy of a draft "Diplomatic Scenario."
The first item on the message to Pompidou is entirely
our own and if the President wants to really get some-
thing special across to him, this seems to me the only.
way of doing it. It is, of course, up to the President
whether he wants to do so. Otherwise, we can treat him
substantially the same as the others and have Blake go
around to the Foreign Office the morning after the
speech, if there is anything special at that time.
The Secretary has not seen this--if, after he
has done so, there are any additional thoughts or
modifications we will pass them on to you.
Enclosures :
1. Paper from Mr. Green
2. 2 copies of "Diplomatic Scenario"
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
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I.
During the past several years, North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong forces have used sanctuaries in Cambodian territory
immediately adjacent to the border of South Viet-Nam. In these
sanctuaries, they have built up extensive caches of weapons
and have developed sophisticated base complexes which are used
as springboards for attacks on U.S. and other allied forces
in South Viet-Nam.
In the last few months, the Vietnamese communists have
adopted new strategies to cope with our policy of Vietnamiza-
tion. These strategies have involved the break up of their
forces within South Viet-Nam into smaller units devoted to
the tactics of protracted warfare.. Their main force units,
on the other hand, have been largely drawn back into the
Cambodian sanctuaries, where they are building up their power
for launching massive attacks at any time against our forces
in South Viet-Nam.
This development has meant that the sanctuaries, which for-
merly were used primarily for transient purposes by the
communists, have become permanent zones of occupation and
invasion by these alien forces on Cambodian territory. It
was this development which has led to mounting emotional
resentment of Cambodians against Vietnamese communists. This
n~r+nx'~r
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was not an issue amongst Cambodians. Even Prince Sihanouk,
you will recall, was on his way to Moscow and Peking to urge
the removal of the Vietnamese Communist forces when events in
Cambodia brought about his downfall.
Now, in recent weeks, the Vietnamese communists have also
used their forces from the sanctuary areas to attack westward
into Cambodia. In these attacks, they have operated out of
the bases and used the supplies cached in the areas adjacent
to the South Vietnamese border. The apparent communist purpose
in launching these attacks is to destroy Cambodian forces,
to overwhelm the authority of the Cambodian government, and
to replace it with a Hanoi-controlled regime.
Were Hanoi to succeed in this purpose, it would pose a
far graver menace than before to the lives of United States
soldiers in the area. This danger could become so acoute
that we would have to reconsider our troop redeployment
schedule. In short,. Vietnamese communist military successes
in Cambodia would not only widen the war, they would also
prolong it.
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it is for this reason that w4 have endorsed all efforts
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that have been sponsored by various world leaders to seek
the removal of these Vietnamese communist invaders from
Cambodia by negotiation. In the hope that these diplomatic
efforts would succeed, we have counselled patience to our
Vietnamese allies and have enjoined the utmost restraint on
our own military commanders. But this patience and restraint
have been in vain. Rather than agreeing to negotiate, the
invaders have brazenly struck out westward against the
Cambodians. Rather than withdraw, the communists have sought
to consolidate'their positions, to augment their supplies and
to expand their control.
Moreover, during the seven weeks that b~AGovernment
has been in power, it has made repeated efforts to negotiate
with the Vietnamese Communists regarding the presence of their
forces on Cambodian soil. All these efforts have been rejected.
During that same span of time, international efforts have also
been made with regard to some form of action by the United
Nations or by the Geneva Accords machinery, including the
International Control Commission, to promote the cause of
Cambodia's neutrality and territorial integrity. These moves
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have been rejected by Hanoi.
On the contrary, "The Indochinese Peoples Summit Conference"
of April 24-259 sponsored by Hanoi, pledged the delegates to
fight to "total victory" and condemned all proposals for an
international conference on Cambodia.
It is increasingly evident that a principal tactic of Hanoi
is to maximize US casualties and to use its sanctuaries in
Cambodia to that end. An unusually candid exposition of
Hanoi's belief that US withdrawal can be hastened by increasing
American casualties was recently spelled out in Hanoi's official
Army paper which said:
"The southern revolutionary armed forces continue to
attack U.S. troops; to direct vigorous and painful
blows at them; to inflict heavy casualties on them;
to undermine their morale so they will be unable to
provide a prop,for the puppet troops and for the
Vietnamization policy; to annihilate their strength
very extensively; to increase their casualties far
beyond the 100-a-week level, which the U.S. ruling
clique has considered bearable; to extensively destroy
U.S. war equipment; to shoot down aircraft, especially
helicopters; to attack enemy tanks and armored cars;
to fire at and sink enemy riverine craft; to destroy
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U.S. troops' storage facilities so as to create many
difficulties in logistic supply movement; and to
restrict their strongpoints."
III
In the face of harassed peas for help from the Cambodians,
and in the light of increasing concern expressed by the
South Vietnamese and our own military commanders, we could
be patient and restrained no longer. We had to accept the
need for action by our allies in their own defense and by our
own commanders in the defense of our men's lives.
This action has been carefully taken against limited
objectives, employing limited means. Every effort has been
made to assure the safety of tie few Cambodian civilians who
LET
were `in the area of operations. Every step has been used to
direct the military force against the bases and the cashes which
are the objective of the operation: forces will with-
" A P- 140
draw from cross-border Cambodian territory upon completion of
the operations.
It is our aim that the successful execution of this action
will eliminate,Csupplies and key bases which have supported
the Vietnamese communists. With the destruction of these
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facilities, the communist force will be at least reduced and
may be forced to disperse and withdraw. The Cambodians will
be able once again to regain control of their own territory.
There will be a reduction in the threat to South Viet-Nam as
well as to United States forces. As a result, we expect
the war to be limited rather than widened, the fighting to
be shortened rather than prolonged, and prospects enhanced for
our Vietnamization program.
At the same time the door to peace is open. We hope that
our adversaries will, at long last, see the wisdom of
engaging in serious negotiations with us and with the Govern-
ment of South Viet-Nam to bring this tragic war to an end.
For our part, as I have said before, we are ready for a
settlement fair to everyone, The time to agree on that settle-
ment is at hand.
In sum, our decision to move against some of these sanctuary
areas was reached only after the most painstaking and prayerful
thought. The deciding factor was our concern for the lives of
American soldiers in South Viet-Nam and our determination to
proceed with Vietnamization. No final decision has been
reached with regard to our response to Lon Nol's request for
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military hardware, but I propose to keep you informed of
our actions, in the same way that I am speaking to you
frankly this evening.
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WNTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENc
WASHINGI-oN, D.C. 20505
29 April 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
.SUBJECT: The President's Forthcoming Speech
1. I submit the following suggestions for possible consideration:
25X1
a. A hint or an allusion to the fact that "sanctuary" has been
used by the enemy to our considerable disadvantage not only in
Cambodia but in North Vietnam also. The forbearance which has
stayed our hand has now come to an end with respect to Cambodia.
b. A simple, easy to read map, which would particularly
point up the proximity of the Cambodian sanctuary to the city of
Saigon if nothing else would be effective with an audience which
is probably not entirely- familiar, with the geographic location
of Cambodia. I recall that President Kennedy made very effective
use of this kind of map in connection with Laos.
. C. Madame Binh was quoted yesterday on the radio as having
said either yesterday morning or the day before that the time had
now come fax __a_-g', eneral offensive against the Americans in all
the Indo-Chinese countries. A reference to her statement might
be useful.
.. 2. The only. other suggestion, and I make it even though it may
seem presumptuous, is that the Presidential statement be imbued with,
--and be made in, a spirit of quiet confidence in the justice of our position
and our actions rather than in a spirit of anger or desperation.
MORI/CDF
C03232965 page
10
Thomas H. Karaxnessines
Deputy Director for Plans
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FORM NO. REPLACES FORM.. 10.101
I AUG 54 ~O ( .. WHICH MAY BE USED.
2 9 DATE)
MEMORANDUM FOR.:* Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Here is part of a briefing which I gave
yesterday to the CIA .Subcommittee of House
_Aried Services (Rivers, Arends, Philbin, Bob
.Wilson, Mel Prices etc.). Perhaps some of the
language would be-useful in the Pre sident e s
speech.
Richard Helms
Director
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 ~~.!~ .. C...ti 25X1
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7.
! .. t:. 4 -C'_ ' :?~ _ (fir..
Recent developments in Cambodia have added a new
dimension to the war in Indochina. The 18 March depo-
sition of Sihanouk set in motion a chain of events whose
final outcome is still uncertain. What is clear, however,
is that the situation is changing and that in these changes
Hanoi sees both new opportunities and the potential for
major problems,
A. Over the past several years, and particularly
since-l96S, Cambodia has-become increa-s-ingly
important to Hanoi's war effort in South Vietnam.
Cambodia has been a source of food for Communist
`forces in the South and a secure route for the ship-
ment of military supplies. It is obviously much easier
.to-send heavy supplies such as weapons or ammuntions
by sea via Sihanoukville and thence by truck or barge
to Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army depots in
South Vietnam than to carry these supplies overland
via Laos under continual aerial harassment.
:._$. -:Can bodia's most important contribution to the
Communist war effort, however, has been that of
DECLASSIFIED
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As InstruCtien5 on doW
By
25X1
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 T
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~wany.r1a IMP
er, ins uctlons en douum
By matt
providing sanctuaries to Communist forces. By
using Cambodian territory, the Communists have
been able to set up an elaborate set of bases largely
immune to allied attack. These bases house supply
depots, -hospitals, training camps, troop replace-
ment centers and the major command elements
through which Hanoi runs the war in South Vietnam.
C. Over the past two years, -the role of the Cambodian
-sancaries-hasTbecome--increasingly important. Since
Tet 1968, the allied military effort has progressed
to, the point where the Communists have no base
areas in South Vietnam that are not vulnerable to
ground sweeps as well as aerial attack. Furthermore,
The Communists cannot now mass large forces any-
where in South Vietnam without running the severe
risk of taking heavy casualties from allied air strikes
and ground operations. Thus the Cambodian sanctu-
aries have become Hanoi's indispensable safety valve.
Whenever Communist units in South Vietnam get too
hard pressed or begin to take losses, the Communist
high command considers unacceptable, these units
can be -~ and are -- pulled back in Cambodian sancta-
-- t l .r
25X1
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 . As per i str ctions on deoume
By Date ii
aries where they are virtually immune to further.
harassment. In these sanctuaries, Communist
units rest, refit, pick up fresh personnel and equip
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anent and are readied to sally forth to fight again
in South Vietnam at times and places of Hanoi's
choosing.
D. The Cambodian sanctuaries also play a key role
in; Hanoi's response to the Vietnannization and pacifi-
---cation programs. Because of their existence,
especially the sanctuaries in southern Cambodia along
the III and IV Corps frontiers, Hanoi can always mass
large hostile forces in close proximity to major South
Vietnamese population concentrations. -This ability
enables Hanoi to pose a continuing threat to South
Vietnam's internal. security that no amount of progress
in pacification or Vietnamization can ever eradicate.
D. In short, Hanoi's whole present manner of fighting
the war makes great use of the availability of sanctuary
areas in Cambodia relatively immune to serious
hostile attack. Current events in Cambodia thus present
I ianoi with the deeply disquieting prospect that these
-essential sanctuaries may no longer remain inviolate.
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 25X1
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' :- W DECLASIEIED.
As per i rNctiOflS on dooume t 1/'
7FI ate
E.
E. The Communists also face new uncertainties in
the logistics field, but these.are probably of some-
what lesser importance. Communist forces will
almost certainly be able to sieze, requisition or
even purchase enough food stores or supplies in the
Cambodian countryside to meet their major require-
ments. Hanoi can also eventually develop new supply
channels to replace the extremely useful, but not
absolutely critical, port of Sihanoukville - - either by
augmenting the overland routes through Laos and/or
by capturing a part of the southeastern Cambodian
coastline for some continued resupply by sea.
F. Because the final outcome of current events in
Cambodia is so uncertain, we must avoid either
exaggerating or minimizing the implications of
Cambodian developments or jumping too quickly
to judgments about their ultimate impact on Hanoi's
overall strategy.
1. The new situation in Cambodia means that
at least for the time being, the Communists will
now have to concern themselves with protecting
their bases in Cambodia -- that they have lost
this element of sanctuary.
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DECLAS;fir .hi.;
w , As per jnstructions on doi. a r
It also means that they cannot'_coun.t-on.
the unimpeded movement of supplies through
ki 0 %A V,
Cambodia, this supply line, of course,
Was challenged or disrupted on occasion
even before the Lon Nol government took
Over.
XI Despite the new difficulties, it is clear that the
Vietnamese Communists hope to turn the events in
-Cambodia to their own advantage. The Communists
have already used sufficient military force to
drive the Cambodian armed forces back away from
the border, and they have made a number of pene-
trations into the interior of the country, strik-
ing at road junctions, provincial towns, and gov-
ernment installations.
A. Over the long run, if the Vietnamese Commu-
nists should overthrow the Lon Nol - Sirik
Ratak government and install a Communist-con-
trolled regime in Phnom Penh, Communist pros-
pects in South Vietnam would certainly be en-
aancec .
. Insofar as sanctuary and unimpeded sup-
ply are concerned, they would be even
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 f f ~~, .. o.... 25X1
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better off than they were in 1966 and 1967, when
they had to depend on the whims and stratagems
of the mercurial Prince Sihanouk and operate
under at least tenuous restraints.
-2.. Over the long run, the prospects for success-
ful Vietnamization would be sharply curtailed by
:-the permanent presence on South Vietnam's
-.-borders of a Communist marshaling area pro-
vided by a cooperative Cambodia.
3. Furthermore, a Communist political victory
in Cambodia - - i. e. , the cowing of Lon Nol into
pliable submission or the installation of a puppet
...-government in Phnom Penh, with or without
Sihanouk -- would have a very adverse effect on
South Vietnamese will and morale.
_B. The Communist position could be complicated, never-
theless, by the actions of South Vietnamese ground and
-,:air forces, which have been inspired by the Cambodian
events to increasingly aggressive attacks against
Communist forces across the border,
There is also the likeliliaod-that the
Vietnamese Communists would have to divert
talent and energy away from the main battle area
in South Vietnam for a prolonged period in order
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 As per ins ructions on doounie
By e
On balance, then, the Cambodian crisis ap~
pears to hold out many difficulties for the
Communists, and the promise of great advantage
only after much.time.and.effort has been ex-
pended in guiding and nourishing a new client
_-Insurgency.
1. 'The Communist problems in Cambodia can
be magnified by the intervention of South
Vietnamese forces-So far, these raids
probably have caused only moderate and
temporary damage to a few Communist units
and base areas, but there are signs that
--the South Vietnamese may soon become more
adventurous.
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in- about six months.
hi le , the Communists re~-
III, In S ut.h Vietnam, m %,
Gently carried out r most widespread attacks
A. The rkcent enemy oper`.tions-carried out
-mainly sappers, gue illas, and artillery-
men while the big infant units continued
to lie low- were similar t the periodic
-surges of act\vity mounted 'b' the -Communists
during the spring and summer of 1967.
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Soviets and Cambodia -- The President's Speech.
In terms of your exchanges with the Soviets. I think
it would be desSSrable to include a line such as the
following in the speech. This. may, incidentally, be
desirable for Chinese r,sasons. It is admittedly only
a line and may or may not affect what the Soviets
do and say; I realize it also resembles.what the Soviets
.-said at the time of Czechoslovakia and Hungary but that
may get the point across to the Soviets that much more
effectively.
The actions I have authorized today are sololy
mar the protection of American forces in Vietnam.
-They will be terminated immediately when that
mission has boon accomplished and effective
neutrality has thereby been restored in Cabodia.
These actions are in no way directed at the
security interests of any other nation. Any
governmcn-t--that chooses to use these actions as
a tretext for exacerbating relations with the
United States will be doing so on its own res-
ponsibility and at its own initiative and we will
draw the appropriate conclusions."
Sonnenfeldt.
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