MESSAGES FROM KINTNER ON OUR FORCES IN THAILAND
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
Release Decision:
RIPLIM
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
24
Document Creation Date:
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date:
December 20, 2012
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 4, 1974
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 415.63 KB |
Body:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
,~
469-X
SECRET/SENNSITIVE/EYES ONLY
February 7, 1974
TO: AMBASSADOR KINTNER, BANGKOK
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE
I appreciate youx letter of January 24 and your cat+le coxraxnents
our PARA statement:
~3a:decisionhas been made on the OV-l~0's, and we are we11 aware
of your cax~.cerns. I cannot promise that ixx the end they. will be availahle~
because .ofi the need for them. in our awn active fozces. We will do ~.v: eve
ICaxi,,. $o~cvever, and keep you posted, I will also get your phatagraphs.
-,fie. for. our parojeeted troop levels iJa. 'Thailand, Z appreciate the
dress you are putting on the developing Thai internal situation ancl. on the
might mire must now give to this factor. As you know, it is nc~t the only;
~a.Ctor we are considexing, but we are sensiticre to all i.ts implications.
~e axe gaixag to -x~:Srlew all these issues in greater detail ovex the
ce~3z~ ~areeks. I' understaxr~d you are returiaing here for a vi.sit~at
should give us the ogpe~rtuasity to talk ovear these matters and to get tha
b+ex~efit of your views fi.rsthaxrd.
'Farm. regaxda,
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
...
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/L,YES ONLY ACTION
February 4, 197~k
IvTEMORANDLTM FOR
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FR QM: W.R. Sxnys,er;~.
'SUBJECT: Messages from Kintner on Our Farces in
Thailand
You have .recently received two communications. from. Ambassador
Kintner regarding our traap levels in Thailand.
about the adeguacy of our consultations with the Thai' on base planning and
The first is a letter (Tab C) in which Kintner reports Doolins' claim
that the transfer of OV-l0 aircraft to Thailand has been ruled out --
contrary to KintnerTs earlier understanding. Kintner asks you to
look. into this. He also encloses some mexncons of marginal interest
and asks. for signed photographs, which I can handle separately.
The second is a telegram, provoked by our PARA policy statement, that
argues that we should reduce our forces faster than we have been planning
because of the Thai internal situation (Tab B). Tt also raises questions
These issues are so messy that there is no sense going into them. right
now. But we want to be polzte to Kintner and underscore our awareness
of his concerns.
[F'YT: We now have about 36, 000 troops in Thailand. These are
to be reduced to 32, 200 by the end of FY 74, and to 24, 700 by
"latter" 1975. DOD is now presenting plans for the dxawdown .over
the next few months, and we have some questions about those .plans
that we are handling in separate memoranda to the Secretary. ]
R ecornmendation
That you sign the attached telegram backchannel to Kintiner at Tab A.
APProve Disapprove
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY -GDS
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
******* S E C R E T #*****#S COPY
^ aslznnz
FM BANGKOK
FM AMBASSADOR KINTNER, BANrKOK b45
T[1s TwE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR
GENERAL 5CLIWCROFT
REFS Wt~ITE HDUSE 40354
1. I V>=RY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR DRAFT STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY
TpWARD THAILAND. THIS STATEMENT FILLS, A LOr!G FELT NEED AND. .WHEN
FINALLY APPRnvED~ WILL GIVE US A 9ASIC FRAMi--WORK FOR OUR Pf1t,`ICY
T~IWARD THAILAND WHICH NAS THE Ct7NCURRENCE O'* THE HIGHEST LE~IEL5
^F THE U.S. G~IVERNMENT. T~+E FOLLOWING ARE MY COMMENTS ON TwIS
.DRAFT: YDUR ~+ESSAGE 4ND BY COMMENTS HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO ASST SECY
INGER$t7LL WHO CONCURS.
2, FIRST, T~J ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE, I AM DELIGHTEp TO St=F THAT
THIS Pt1LICY 5TATE?~"ENT STRES5E5 THs= HIGH VALUE WE ATTACH TO nUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH THAILAND AND RECOGNIZES TAE CONTRIBUTION ~~~HICH
THAILAND HAS MADE OVER MANY YEARS TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF OUR
1n~,TFra;tST~ !N Sl1uiHEAST ASIA. IF I READ THIS STATEMENT CORRECTLY,
IT ALSO SAYS THAT 'TIE PLAN Tp CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA. I WELCOME THIS INDICATION OF OUR LON TERM INTENTIONS.
3, THE DRAFT STATEMENT RIr,HTLY RECOGINIZES THAT TO MAINTAIN THAI
CtIOpERATIgN iN AREAS IMP[7R,TANT TO U5, WE WILL HAVE TO ASSIST THE
RTG IN r~tEETING ITS PRIORITY REQUIpEMENTS. IN THIS CgNTEXT, THREE
Pt3RTI0NS t]F THE PAPER ARE ~ARTICUt_ARLY WELCnME: THf)SE SETTING
FORTH OUR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TC1 PRgVIDE ECONOMIC AND MIt_ITARY
ASSISTA~CE~ ~JUR WILLINGNESS TO TURN OVER EX%'E5S DEFENSE ITErnS
Tq THE t?TG Tq THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, AND OUR WILLINGN~5S
T~1 USE THAILAND AS A SUPPLIER OF ~~ATERIALS s~OR THE REHABILITA7I^N
QF INDC?CHIt~A. IN THIS CONr.~ECTIr7N, I SUGGEST WE AL50 ADD A
.STATEMENT TtI tHE EFFECT THaT WE WILL SEEK WgYS TO INCREASE THAI
ExPC1RTS TO THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO REnUCE WHAT THE THAI
REGARD AS A POLITICALLY SEr1SITIVE ADVERSE BALANCE OF TRADE,
4. ,THE MAJOR SHORTCOMING 17F THE DRAFT STATEMENTS AS I SEE IT,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * +WHSR COMMENT * * * * *
5CCIwCROFT MCFARLANE RODMgN
RECALLED
PSN:055755 PAGE OI T^R:03b/14s29Z DTG:05.1200Z FEB 74
******* S E C R E T *****#*S COPY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
~Ob45 0361407 25X1
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
#****** S E C R E T *******S CQov
I5 ITS FAILURE TG TAKE ACC~~UNT qF THE CURRENT THAI POLITICAL SITUA-
TION. AS WE HAVE REp~?RTF'~ IN A N!IMBER f]F MESSAGES, THE THAT ARE
BECnMING FAR MORE ASSERTIVE AND INDEPENpENT~ THIS IS A NCW GALL
GAME FROM TH1= ^LD DAYS WHF~! TWE THAI AGREED TD ALMOST ANY RF9UEST
WE MADE OF 7NFM. STUDENTS, P^LITICIANS AND OTHERS ARE FaC115ING l]N
THE U.S, uILITaRY PRESENCE AND U.S. INFLUENrE IN
THAILANn IN FNkRAL. THIS SITU4TION IS LIK~LV TO INTENSIFY
AS WE M!;VE 7U:%AnL' ELcCTION~ WITHIri THE NEXT .SIX MpN7HS OR S'l.
T 5UGGE$T LA~IGUAG(r REFLECTING THIS FACT BE INCLUDED.
5,, WHILE THE RTG HAS NOT pRE55FD US UNpULLY DURING THE PA57 SEVERAL
M7NTH5, TO REr)UCE pUR MILITARY PRESENCE IT CAN 9E EXPECTED TO
DO SO AS THESE PRESSURES GR^W. I BELIEVE IT IS MUCH IN QUR
INTERESTS TQ STAY AHEAD DF THE GAME AND REDUCE OUR PRESENCE BEFORE
THIS BECOMES A MAJOR P^LITICAL ISSUE. BY O1?JN GUESS WOULD RF THAT
RETAINING 24,700 PERSONNEL HERE UrITIL LATE 1.975 IS MORE THAN THE
TRAcFIC WILL BEAR. WE WOULD HAVE Tp HEDGE ~1UR SETS FOR THE
PRESENT UNTIL WE 5EE THE Pf?LITICAL COMPLEXInN OF THE NEW G~~~ERN-
MENT FOLLOr"IING ELECTIONS, RUT I THINK WE WOULD BE WISE TO REDUCE
TO THE FORMER 32,200 CEILInG BY TAKING OUT l1 PERSONNEL
JUST AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE ANp SHOAT FOR SOMETHING
gELnW 2O,ODQ AFTER THE ]:975 DRY SEASON. EVEN THIS COULD BF
TOSSED INT^ A COCKED HAT IF A WIGHLY NATIONALISTIC OR NEUTRALTST-
LEANING GLIVERNMENT TAKES PiJWER AFTER THE ELECTIONS.
6. I BELIEY'E IT ALSO IMPO~.TANT TWAT THE PA?AGRAPH ON FORCE
4Cf111~TinniC Ti CAR1 V G7ATG TJiAT TuTC IC CIIR IGrT Tn rnAlClll TAtln~l
~
~
~~ ______ ~-..._-_- w._~.,~
I T H T H E RTG .
W
~~-
T~. AS A SECOND MAJOR SUGGESTION, I BELIEVE THE POLICY STATEMENT
S~?pULD STRESS TWE IMPORTANCE OF DISCUSSING t~IITH THE RTG OUR
INTENTIf~NS REGARDING SOUTHEAST ASIA BEYOND I975.~ WILL WE
WANT TD KEEP ONE OR MORE OF THE THAI BASES BEYOND THAT TIME?
IF 5O, WE NEED TO START PREPARING THE THAI FOR THIS NOW.
QTHERWISE MI= MAY FIND THAT DEVEL^PMENTS IN THE MEANTIME CL05E
C1UT CERTAIN OPTIONS FOR US, TO A CERTAIN ExTENT WE HAVE DONE
TF+IS--AT LEAST TO THE EXTFr,JT OF KEEPING THE THAI INFORMED f1N
IMMEpIATE DEVELOPMENT--BUT ALL TOn OFTEN WE HAVE FOUND OURSELVES
TELLING THE THAI ABOUT IMPnRTANT U.S. DECISIONS AFFECTING THE
tFIJTURE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA ONLY HOURS pR MINUTES BEFORE A PUBLIC
ANNr-UNCMENT IS MADE. THE THAI np NOT REGARn THIS AS THE TyaE
OF TRUE CC]N'SULTATION WHICH THEY, AS A LOYAL ALLY EXPECT.
******* S E C R E T
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
9. AT YOUR REQUEST WE HgVK SHO~rIN YOUR MESSAGE TO ASSISTANT
SECRETARY INGERSOLL. HE IS IN GENERAL .AGREEMENT WITH OUR
COMMENTS,
1C. THANKS AGAIN FdR THE r~PPORTUNITY Td CdMMENT ON THE ORAGT
STATEME`JT. IT SHOWS A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT AND WILL FILL.
A DEFINITE NEED. I LOOK FC)RWAR!a TO RECEIVING IT AGAIN THROUGH
STATE CHANNELS.
11? SUGGEST YOU SHOW TMIS MESSAGE TO SECRETARY KISSINGER A~~Ds IF
THEY HAVE SEEM THE DRAFT STATEMENTs TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AND DIRECTQR OF CIA.
I2. WARM REGARDS.
9p0
RECALLED
PSNi055755 PAGE 03 dF 03 TOR:036/j,4:29Z DTG:051200Z FEB 74
******* S E C R E T *******S COPv
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
January 2~, 1~?'y
SECr.T;T
Aa you undoubtedly know, we have been having a rather hot ~.
time in Thailand because T am enc~.osing 25X1
two memcons which will give you a more personal feel of
the sittaation. The first report is on my canvers~atian
last :ti*eek with t~^.e. Pr3::e TiTinister and Fore~.gn T~ii:~ister.
Thy second report is on the conversation T had yesterday
with A~.r ~?f3rshal Dawee, General Surakit and General
Kriangsak. In the second, you will note that a'discussion
of this-incident wild. take place at the National Le~ialative
Assembly on rebruary 1. I am confident that. we will ride
out .the atorr~, but: as both of these memoranda indicate,
7~, A RA ,. rt `~ A'r9 r r.1 ~ .~ ~F- s. ,-. Th n ~ .~ yr ....,,,.,,, ..,,., i~ .. ~- 4 1 7 ~ ?f .., ..~
Il,-A\. M!\.n..F l.