MESSAGES FROM KINTNER ON OUR FORCES IN THAILAND

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
24
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
December 20, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 4, 1974
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9.pdf415.63 KB
Body: 
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 ,~ 469-X SECRET/SENNSITIVE/EYES ONLY February 7, 1974 TO: AMBASSADOR KINTNER, BANGKOK FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE I appreciate youx letter of January 24 and your cat+le coxraxnents our PARA statement: ~3a:decisionhas been made on the OV-l~0's, and we are we11 aware of your cax~.cerns. I cannot promise that ixx the end they. will be availahle~ because .ofi the need for them. in our awn active fozces. We will do ~.v: eve ICaxi,,. $o~cvever, and keep you posted, I will also get your phatagraphs. -,fie. for. our parojeeted troop levels iJa. 'Thailand, Z appreciate the dress you are putting on the developing Thai internal situation ancl. on the might mire must now give to this factor. As you know, it is nc~t the only; ~a.Ctor we are considexing, but we are sensiticre to all i.ts implications. ~e axe gaixag to -x~:Srlew all these issues in greater detail ovex the ce~3z~ ~areeks. I' understaxr~d you are returiaing here for a vi.sit~at should give us the ogpe~rtuasity to talk ovear these matters and to get tha b+ex~efit of your views fi.rsthaxrd. 'Farm. regaxda, SEGRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY ... 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 SEGRET/SENSITIVE/L,YES ONLY ACTION February 4, 197~k IvTEMORANDLTM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT FR QM: W.R. Sxnys,er;~. 'SUBJECT: Messages from Kintner on Our Farces in Thailand You have .recently received two communications. from. Ambassador Kintner regarding our traap levels in Thailand. about the adeguacy of our consultations with the Thai' on base planning and The first is a letter (Tab C) in which Kintner reports Doolins' claim that the transfer of OV-l0 aircraft to Thailand has been ruled out -- contrary to KintnerTs earlier understanding. Kintner asks you to look. into this. He also encloses some mexncons of marginal interest and asks. for signed photographs, which I can handle separately. The second is a telegram, provoked by our PARA policy statement, that argues that we should reduce our forces faster than we have been planning because of the Thai internal situation (Tab B). Tt also raises questions These issues are so messy that there is no sense going into them. right now. But we want to be polzte to Kintner and underscore our awareness of his concerns. [F'YT: We now have about 36, 000 troops in Thailand. These are to be reduced to 32, 200 by the end of FY 74, and to 24, 700 by "latter" 1975. DOD is now presenting plans for the dxawdown .over the next few months, and we have some questions about those .plans that we are handling in separate memoranda to the Secretary. ] R ecornmendation That you sign the attached telegram backchannel to Kintiner at Tab A. APProve Disapprove SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY -GDS No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 ******* S E C R E T #*****#S COPY ^ aslznnz FM BANGKOK FM AMBASSADOR KINTNER, BANrKOK b45 T[1s TwE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR GENERAL 5CLIWCROFT REFS Wt~ITE HDUSE 40354 1. I V>=RY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR DRAFT STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TpWARD THAILAND. THIS STATEMENT FILLS, A LOr!G FELT NEED AND. .WHEN FINALLY APPRnvED~ WILL GIVE US A 9ASIC FRAMi--WORK FOR OUR Pf1t,`ICY T~IWARD THAILAND WHICH NAS THE Ct7NCURRENCE O'* THE HIGHEST LE~IEL5 ^F THE U.S. G~IVERNMENT. T~+E FOLLOWING ARE MY COMMENTS ON TwIS .DRAFT: YDUR ~+ESSAGE 4ND BY COMMENTS HAVE BEEN SHOWN TO ASST SECY INGER$t7LL WHO CONCURS. 2, FIRST, T~J ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE, I AM DELIGHTEp TO St=F THAT THIS Pt1LICY 5TATE?~"ENT STRES5E5 THs= HIGH VALUE WE ATTACH TO nUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THAILAND AND RECOGNIZES TAE CONTRIBUTION ~~~HICH THAILAND HAS MADE OVER MANY YEARS TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF OUR 1n~,TFra;tST~ !N Sl1uiHEAST ASIA. IF I READ THIS STATEMENT CORRECTLY, IT ALSO SAYS THAT 'TIE PLAN Tp CONTINUE TO PLAY A ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. I WELCOME THIS INDICATION OF OUR LON TERM INTENTIONS. 3, THE DRAFT STATEMENT RIr,HTLY RECOGINIZES THAT TO MAINTAIN THAI CtIOpERATIgN iN AREAS IMP[7R,TANT TO U5, WE WILL HAVE TO ASSIST THE RTG IN r~tEETING ITS PRIORITY REQUIpEMENTS. IN THIS CgNTEXT, THREE Pt3RTI0NS t]F THE PAPER ARE ~ARTICUt_ARLY WELCnME: THf)SE SETTING FORTH OUR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TC1 PRgVIDE ECONOMIC AND MIt_ITARY ASSISTA~CE~ ~JUR WILLINGNESS TO TURN OVER EX%'E5S DEFENSE ITErnS Tq THE t?TG Tq THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, AND OUR WILLINGN~5S T~1 USE THAILAND AS A SUPPLIER OF ~~ATERIALS s~OR THE REHABILITA7I^N QF INDC?CHIt~A. IN THIS CONr.~ECTIr7N, I SUGGEST WE AL50 ADD A .STATEMENT TtI tHE EFFECT THaT WE WILL SEEK WgYS TO INCREASE THAI ExPC1RTS TO THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO REnUCE WHAT THE THAI REGARD AS A POLITICALLY SEr1SITIVE ADVERSE BALANCE OF TRADE, 4. ,THE MAJOR SHORTCOMING 17F THE DRAFT STATEMENTS AS I SEE IT, * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * +WHSR COMMENT * * * * * 5CCIwCROFT MCFARLANE RODMgN RECALLED PSN:055755 PAGE OI T^R:03b/14s29Z DTG:05.1200Z FEB 74 ******* S E C R E T *****#*S COPY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 ~Ob45 0361407 25X1 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 #****** S E C R E T *******S CQov I5 ITS FAILURE TG TAKE ACC~~UNT qF THE CURRENT THAI POLITICAL SITUA- TION. AS WE HAVE REp~?RTF'~ IN A N!IMBER f]F MESSAGES, THE THAT ARE BECnMING FAR MORE ASSERTIVE AND INDEPENpENT~ THIS IS A NCW GALL GAME FROM TH1= ^LD DAYS WHF~! TWE THAI AGREED TD ALMOST ANY RF9UEST WE MADE OF 7NFM. STUDENTS, P^LITICIANS AND OTHERS ARE FaC115ING l]N THE U.S, uILITaRY PRESENCE AND U.S. INFLUENrE IN THAILANn IN FNkRAL. THIS SITU4TION IS LIK~LV TO INTENSIFY AS WE M!;VE 7U:%AnL' ELcCTION~ WITHIri THE NEXT .SIX MpN7HS OR S'l. T 5UGGE$T LA~IGUAG(r REFLECTING THIS FACT BE INCLUDED. 5,, WHILE THE RTG HAS NOT pRE55FD US UNpULLY DURING THE PA57 SEVERAL M7NTH5, TO REr)UCE pUR MILITARY PRESENCE IT CAN 9E EXPECTED TO DO SO AS THESE PRESSURES GR^W. I BELIEVE IT IS MUCH IN QUR INTERESTS TQ STAY AHEAD DF THE GAME AND REDUCE OUR PRESENCE BEFORE THIS BECOMES A MAJOR P^LITICAL ISSUE. BY O1?JN GUESS WOULD RF THAT RETAINING 24,700 PERSONNEL HERE UrITIL LATE 1.975 IS MORE THAN THE TRAcFIC WILL BEAR. WE WOULD HAVE Tp HEDGE ~1UR SETS FOR THE PRESENT UNTIL WE 5EE THE Pf?LITICAL COMPLEXInN OF THE NEW G~~~ERN- MENT FOLLOr"IING ELECTIONS, RUT I THINK WE WOULD BE WISE TO REDUCE TO THE FORMER 32,200 CEILInG BY TAKING OUT l1 PERSONNEL JUST AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE ANp SHOAT FOR SOMETHING gELnW 2O,ODQ AFTER THE ]:975 DRY SEASON. EVEN THIS COULD BF TOSSED INT^ A COCKED HAT IF A WIGHLY NATIONALISTIC OR NEUTRALTST- LEANING GLIVERNMENT TAKES PiJWER AFTER THE ELECTIONS. 6. I BELIEY'E IT ALSO IMPO~.TANT TWAT THE PA?AGRAPH ON FORCE 4Cf111~TinniC Ti CAR1 V G7ATG TJiAT TuTC IC CIIR IGrT Tn rnAlClll TAtln~l ~ ~ ~~ ______ ~-..._-_- w._~.,~ I T H T H E RTG . W ~~- T~. AS A SECOND MAJOR SUGGESTION, I BELIEVE THE POLICY STATEMENT S~?pULD STRESS TWE IMPORTANCE OF DISCUSSING t~IITH THE RTG OUR INTENTIf~NS REGARDING SOUTHEAST ASIA BEYOND I975.~ WILL WE WANT TD KEEP ONE OR MORE OF THE THAI BASES BEYOND THAT TIME? IF 5O, WE NEED TO START PREPARING THE THAI FOR THIS NOW. QTHERWISE MI= MAY FIND THAT DEVEL^PMENTS IN THE MEANTIME CL05E C1UT CERTAIN OPTIONS FOR US, TO A CERTAIN ExTENT WE HAVE DONE TF+IS--AT LEAST TO THE EXTFr,JT OF KEEPING THE THAI INFORMED f1N IMMEpIATE DEVELOPMENT--BUT ALL TOn OFTEN WE HAVE FOUND OURSELVES TELLING THE THAI ABOUT IMPnRTANT U.S. DECISIONS AFFECTING THE tFIJTURE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA ONLY HOURS pR MINUTES BEFORE A PUBLIC ANNr-UNCMENT IS MADE. THE THAI np NOT REGARn THIS AS THE TyaE OF TRUE CC]N'SULTATION WHICH THEY, AS A LOYAL ALLY EXPECT. ******* S E C R E T No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 9. AT YOUR REQUEST WE HgVK SHO~rIN YOUR MESSAGE TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY INGERSOLL. HE IS IN GENERAL .AGREEMENT WITH OUR COMMENTS, 1C. THANKS AGAIN FdR THE r~PPORTUNITY Td CdMMENT ON THE ORAGT STATEME`JT. IT SHOWS A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT AND WILL FILL. A DEFINITE NEED. I LOOK FC)RWAR!a TO RECEIVING IT AGAIN THROUGH STATE CHANNELS. 11? SUGGEST YOU SHOW TMIS MESSAGE TO SECRETARY KISSINGER A~~Ds IF THEY HAVE SEEM THE DRAFT STATEMENTs TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND DIRECTQR OF CIA. I2. WARM REGARDS. 9p0 RECALLED PSNi055755 PAGE 03 dF 03 TOR:036/j,4:29Z DTG:051200Z FEB 74 ******* S E C R E T *******S COPv No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/06/05 : LOC-HAK-44-2-1-9 January 2~, 1~?'y SECr.T;T Aa you undoubtedly know, we have been having a rather hot ~. time in Thailand because T am enc~.osing 25X1 two memcons which will give you a more personal feel of the sittaation. The first report is on my canvers~atian last :ti*eek with t~^.e. Pr3::e TiTinister and Fore~.gn T~ii:~ister. Thy second report is on the conversation T had yesterday with A~.r ~?f3rshal Dawee, General Surakit and General Kriangsak. In the second, you will note that a'discussion of this-incident wild. take place at the National Le~ialative Assembly on rebruary 1. I am confident that. we will ride out .the atorr~, but: as both of these memoranda indicate, 7~, A RA ,. rt `~ A'r9 r r.1 ~ .~ ~F- s. ,-. Th n ~ .~ yr ....,,,.,,, ..,,., i~ .. ~- 4 1 7 ~ ?f .., ..~ Il,-A\. M!\.n..F l.