SOVIET GRAIN, AND INTELLIGENCE FAILURE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-37-5-21-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 7, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KIS
FROM: A. W. Maf shall
Action
August 7, 1973
NSS Review
Completed.
SUBJECT: Soviet Grain, an Intelligence Failure?
Further Comment
In response to your marginalia I would add:
ON-FILE Agriculture RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
-- While the key CIA analyst probably had a reasonable.
estimate of Soviet needs and personally drew some of the right
conclusions as to Soviet buying, the routine CIA product did not
convey a strong, clear alerting message. This is a .common
failure of the CIA product.
-- He personally communicated his concerns to Agriculture
where he knew some people; he did not do so at the NSC because
he had not been dealing. directly and personally with anyone on
the NSC staff. CIA does not positively encourage personal
initiative in communication, especially to the NSC.. He may
not have known Latimer.
--_Therefore, my preliminary diagnosis is that is a
primary case of communication failure. In contrast with
thex areas the failure is often in collection and analysis;
they really have nothing to communicate. For example, the
persistent inability to provide intellectually interesting ex-
planations of Soviet decisionmaking with respect to their
ICBM program..
Question
A case study could address the following issues:
Was there an intelligence failure?
-- If so, what was the nature of the failure: Collection,
Analysis, Communication?
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SECRET
= What were the major causes of the failure?
-- What can be done about them?
Its results would shed some light on the performance of the CIA:.
How interested are you in this case?
Do you want me to initiate a study of this case?
Yes
No
SECRET
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s
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MEMORANDUM
W
1 11
NATIONAL SEC ..U ITY COUNCIL
' e a
f ae'.s
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSI rRR
. FROM:
A. W. Marshall'
ACT ION
July 31, 1973
SUBJECT: Was the Soviet Grain Deal an Intelligence Failure?
You recently expressed the opinion that the cause of the U. S. being taken
in last year's Soviet grain deal was inadequate i.nte?lligence. For your
information here is my assessment of that situation:
-- The major intelligence community failure was in the communication
from intellige?ice-analysts to responsible officials.
- While collection and analysis of information on Soviet
grain needs could have been improved (as they are now being),
the key CIA analysts estimated. Soviet needs fairly accurately,
- The written items included in the regular. intelligence
publications (see the chronology of CIA reporting attached
at Tab A) communicated the message, but less strongly and
less clearly perhaps than it might have.
The key CIA analysts sought to convey personally to
Agriculture officials their concern as to Soviet actions when
they saw that the message was not getting through. (They_
had no personal contact on the NSC staff they fel ey could
appi oacho)
A .~ too weak, and there is a perception problem on the receiving end.
Here, as in other cases we have examined, the communication
r,.. ,
The bureaucratic interest in, and the historical focus of
Agriculture on, supporting and increaskpg domestic prices,
an opportunity rather than a prob.l.exn.
SECRET - XGT)S
D1ECLAS TMPDET
13YAUTH - H_AI ISSINGER
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SECRET
Agriculture evidently preferred its own sources
and analyses to CIA.'s. Indeed, Butz and Palmby
indicated they did not want to receive the GIB and other
CIA products when offered to them.
m Moreover, the major strategic intelligence failure
is Agriculture's responsibility, for they are the agency
tasked to produce worldwide market forecasts. They have
not done agood job. They did not forecast the general
increase in the market for U. S. grain. They have been
so conditioned by the historical experience of potential
and actual oversupply that they missed the turnaround in
the basic situation, and were psychologically unprepared
for the warnings of others.
What really happened is a very complex tale. It illustrates in some of
its aspects the range of problems U. S. institutions and society have in
dealing with the Soviets. For example, our capabilities to follow their
activities here by intelligence or other means are very limited. Pre-
ve 'ion of their r n..a.ni.peri;a.i;.r' ~.i_e cti1J aaiaLar.eL is ULLL.Lcul1..
%L.,--
A more comprehensive assessment of the performance, of intelligence in
the Soviet wheat deal could be undertaken. Do you wish to initiate a study
of the problem? If so, I will get it started.
SECRET
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 SFC FT
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production and Drain imports
Publication
publications Dealing with Soviet Grain
Number
IM 71-161
27 Sept 71
Title and Content
The Soviet Grain Sup-ply, 1971*
"Even with a near record grain crop of 140-145
million tons (in 1971) the Soviet Union will be
hard pressed in fiscal year (FY) 1972 to meet
domestic needs and, at the same time, to continue
supplying its client states at the level averaged
in recent years. The surge in use of grain as
livestock feed in the past year... is expected to
continue. More importantly, wheat reserves
suitable for consumption as food are believed
to be currently near minimum levels...it appears
likely that the USSR is in a shaky position...
The USSR has already contracted for up to 4
million tons of wheat imports for FY 1972 from
Free World suppliers.")
CIWR USSR- Good Harvest but Grain Problems*
17 Sept 71 "Despite indications that the quantity of grain.
L~a th year may fall Just short of the
previous record, insufficient reserves of bread-
grains may increase Soviet requirements. for grain.
imports. This situation arises because of a
sharp increase in the use of wheat as livestock
feed, a higher level of dependence of East
European. and.o.ther.:client states on Soviet.graih,
and physical deteriQriation of:some'grain
reserves...")
CXWR Soviet Economy Dances to A ricultuxe's Tune*
29 Oct 71 ("Unusually good weather during the recent
harvest.period improved the prospects for this
year's grain-crop...Nevertheless, the Soviets
are still in the market for Western grain. By
September, they had contracted for about 4.
million tons of Canadian and Austrialian wheat
worth about $305 million.")
*Publications received by the US Department of Agriculture.
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53916 rie.finq of Secretary of Commerce Stands
:10 Nov 71 on the Soviet E;conony
(Reports Soviet grain purchases and predicts
that grain and meat imports will be at least
$600 million between 'l July 71 and the of
1972.)
CXWR Agriculture Slows Economic Growth*
28 Jan 72 "After a bumper year. in 1970 because of
CIB Brief
22 Feb 72
unusually good weather, agricultural output last
year declined by about 1.5 percent ...the Soviets
are.buying grain and sugar in non-Communist
markets to cover domestic requirements. and export
commitments.")
USSR
T"Party and government leaders of the 15 republics-
met late last week in Moscow with Brezhnev Lo
assess Like dv ucsye Lu. wiuuLer yrai.ris caused by the
severe cold...If the winterkill is as extensive
as in 1969, the net loss could amount to about
t four'percent, of the planned'grain crop, or.
seven million tons--almost as much'as.the USSR
planned to import this year.")
CIWR C61d Hits Soviet, East.Euroaean Crops*
25 Feb 721 ("Severe cold and scanty snow. cover threaten
winter crops in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe ...the net loss could amount to about
four percent of the planned grain crop, or
seven million tons -- almost as much as the.
USSR has arranged to import this fiscal year.
Last week, Soviet foreign trade bank officials
admitted that further imports may be necessary.
S-4228 Soviet Indebtedness and,the Role of US-Soviet
14 Mar 72 Trade
(Soviet: indebtedness, to the West, mainly long-
term, has grown rapidly in recent years and
apparently exceeded $2 billion by the end of
1971. Previous estimates of US--Soviet trade.
growth following the dismantling of trade
SEC ,. ;"w
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IM 72-48
15 Mar 72
barriers put the level of US exports o the.
.USSR at $400-500 million by 1975 and about
$1 billion by 1980. .If a new USDA estimate
of Soviet requirements for $1.95 billion in
US-agricultural products over the period FY
72/73 to FY 76/77 is correct,, however, the
leveliof US exports by 1975 might reach $800
million.)
Soviet A siculture in 1971 and the Outlook for.
("Even though farm production in'1971 was near
.the record 1970 level, the Soviet Union spent
roughly $650 million-$700.. million in hard
currency to purchase large quantities of grain,
sugar, and meat in 1971 and early 1972. Imports
nd may even
e
ti
-
a
nu
con
of grain are likely to
increase next year because-they are required
to support the growth of the Soviet livestock
economy so as to provide more. meat and milk
to the increasingly demanding Soviet consuiner.
~'z-----
-~ USSR ? H~5' N~ 7~ r~ i rt ("r_d'J,a
CiB Note -4. ---VC rPnnrt_s indicate that
L L l.,ives o
("USSR short of'all types of feeds but "shortage
of concentrate feeds is most acute".. Concludes,.--
that, on basis of cost-efficiency, USSR has
clear incentive to'use mote corn and soybeans
and that "interim purchases of US corn and.
soybean meal would be a quick fix approach
to the Soviet feed problem" .if necessary
financial arrangements can be made.)'
S-4253 Prospects for Soviet Trade with the. West
28 Mar 72 and the Unzed States* _
("During most of the last two decades, the USSR
has been a net importer of agricultural products.
While the domestic supply situation is tight for
many agricultural products, prospects for, and
speculation about, large new purchases center
on those commodities for which the Soviet: Union
paid $650-$700 million in hard currency in 1971
and early 1972 -- grain, w~ather~uthe,outlookafor Due,
to adverse winter
S-4249 n 4- 'k
28 Mar 72 t Ck Rations*
"rn and Soyhean M[}a1:
16 Mar 72 (? kxeceni ~~~~~4 PLC?
unfavca~?;~1 e :.cagier during the first two months
of the year killed about one third of the
winter grains sown in the Ukraine and Belorussia
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25X1
the USSR's grain crop in 972 is uncertain.
However, in view of the USSR's grain requirements.....
both foreign and domestic -- even if an average
grain crop is obtained, it is almost certain
that the Soviet Union will purchase more grain
in FY 72/3 than the 3.5 million tons already
contracted for.") ?
S-4265 Briefin of - Secretary of Acrri culture Earl Butz
3 April 72 Soviet consumer programs are concentrating on
the Soviet diet. "The Soviet decision to import
$700 million of grains, meat, and sugar between
last July and the end of 1972 shows that they
are indeed in a hurry to alleviate the existing
shortages:") .
IM 72-6.5 The Current State of the Soviet Economy'
28 Apr 72 --("The fragility of.the USSR's grain and livestock
economy has been exposed once again...?Even with
average weather, the USSR will probably buy
more grain in 1972...If the weather this spring
and summer turns out to be worse than normal,
the possibility of large additional Soviet
imports of foreign grain would of course be
even greater...A large share of the imports
would have to come from the US.")
?CIB N. ~- ' USSR
% 17 May 72 ("Soviet trade officials have indicated a
14+- Credit
o
S G
Soviet Devel-
opments
6 'Jul 72
y
orcun
willingness to accept U
Corporation terms in purchasing US grain, but
only for a.one- or two-year conmiitment...Under
the short-term pommitment,"however, annual
purchases could reach $500 million, about twice
that suggested in earlier talks.")
Soviets Assess 1972 Grain Crop?
("During a public lecture in Leningrad a Soviet
economist admitted that one third of the 1971-
72 winter wheat crop had been destroyed by the
severe weather...current estimates-are for
a grain crop of'not less than 175 million tons'.
Our agricultural attaches estimate that Soviet
production will be 171 million tons")
CIB Brief USSR
.19 Jul 72 ("Moscow reportedly has purchased for delivery
during the next 12 months 1.5.million metric
tons of Canadian wheat and 300-400,000 of
barley... Unconfirmed reports state that four
million tons of wheat and five million tons of
corn worth $500 million have already been bought
d i..L 0 . iv M
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W
under the US pact for delivery y mid-1973.
.During the next 12 months the USSR should become
a large net importer of grains for the first
time since the. disastrous harvests of 1963 and
1965. .Imports lmay .total. h5 .million tons.")
soviet uevt:~l" v..r4.?- .. .,, -- -
opments ("reportedly, 122.3 million hectares of grain-
24 Jul 72 were left from the fall and spring sowings
implying that 11.5 million hectares, or one-
third of the total planted in winter grains,
had been used for forage or lost to winterkill.")
CIWR USSR: Economy' at Mid-Year*
28 Jul`r.72 ("Soviet economic growth sagged during the first
half of 1972 although industry was still on the
1971-75 plan schedule...As in 1969, agricultural
problems threaten the. achievement of five-year
plan goals...Figures in the mid-year report
on sown area imply that one third of the winter
bread-grain acreage had been lost to winterkill
or used for spring forage ...Brezhnev's livestock
program requires a grain harvest substantially
higher than in 1971.")
Soviet Devel- VIP Meeting Reflects Concern for'Harvest
opments An array of VIPs attended .a meeting in the
9 Aug 72 Central Committee headquarters on u Aug u~L Lo
discuss harvest progress and other agricultural
problems, indicating unusual concern over this
year's harvest. "It is estimated to be about.
9-10 percent less than 1970 and 1971, largely
because of severe winter weather and summer
~'drought...As a.result...the USSR is buting large
amounts of foreign grain, mainly wheat, for
delivery during the next year.")~~
CTB Brief
10 Aug 72
.LIL
''Memorandum for Kissinger, Peterson, and Butz:
A poor harvest this year (estimated to he about
10% less than in 1970 and 1971) is forcing the
Soviets to import record quantities of grain.
So far they have bought about 21.6 million tons
of grain and soybeans worth almost $1.4 billion
from the US, Canada, and France for delivery in
FY 1973.)
(S ma a as above)
S-4530 Some Implications of the Poor Soviet Grain
25X1
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II g
opments ,("Confronting poor harvest prospects, the
11 Aug 72 Soviets have contracted to purchase by mid-1973
about 21.6 million tons of grain and soybeans
worth. almost $1.4 billion from the US,.Canada
and France. As a result, their hard currency
trade deficit will rise to more than $800
million in both 1972 and 1973.")
IM 72-124 Outlook for the 1972 Soviet Grain Harvest*
15 Aug 72 ("Because of a combination of.winterkill, and.
drought, the preliminary estimate of 1.972
Soviet grain prop ects is for a decline in the
crop to about 135 million metric tons of
usable grain, 13 million tons less than the
1971 harvest. To stave off the consequences of
this shortfall, the USSR has already bought more
than 20 million tons of grain from the West
for delivery in fiscal year (FY) 1973, up '1.2
million tons over imports of the. previous.year.")
CIWR USSR: The Grain Drain*
18 Aug 72 A "The prospect of a poor; harvest this year (more
than 10% below 1970 and 1971) is forcing the
Soviets to import record quantities of grain.
So far, they have bought about 20.6 million tons
of grain worth almost $1.3 billion...and they
are negotiating to buy more.")
Soviet Devel- Brezhnev Travels to What Belt
opments ("General Secretary Brezhnev arrived in the
25 Aug 72 Kazakh grain--growing center of Kokchetav on
Thursday, presumably to urge farm officials
to exert. maximum effort in the?harvest nowl..
underway." The situation is precarious
because of a late-ripening crop and the danger
of frost.)
Soviet Devel- ? Soviet Campaign to Save Grain '
opments ("For the third time in a decade Soviet leaders
28 Aug 72 are asking consumers to 'save bread.' The
campaign began in early August in the Ukraine
-- one of the areas most severely affected by
this year's poor harvest... Although the large
foreign purchases'of grain this year will partiall,
offset domestic losses, some' additional measures,
such as rationing and lowering the quality of
bread that were taken in 1963, may have to be
employed again.")
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CIB Brief
29 Aug 72
CIB Brief,
29 Aug 72
n
a
hit by early frosts.)
Soviet . Devel-
opments
31 Aug 72
CIWR
1 Sept 72
Soviet Devel-
opments
5 Sept 72
Soviet Devel-
opments
6 Sept 72
USSR article i of 25
TSa,me as Soviet Developments
August)
USS of concern over the
("In an unusual display
harvest. prospects, Party General Secretary
Brezhnev has flown out to the key virgin Lands
grain-growing area for conferences with local
farm officials." Adverse weather.hhs already
damaged the crops in the other major g
growing areas and the situation in the Virgin
Lands is precarious because the crop is late
ripening and is in serious danger of being
UP I N?CJSS h
("Continuing his unusual tour of the Vi rgin Lands
grain-growing area, Brezhnev addressed a meeting
of party and economic executives. in Novobirsk
on 31 Aug, once again focusing on this ysi
harvest.")
USSR: Wti'orrVfL 10, About the Harvest*
("Brezhnev flew to the Virgin Lands for a
icials-
local a.nfarm
round of conferences with
above~average
The Virgin Lands have produced
stand of wheat i~uL i t i c in serf ~'us dancer of
being hit by early frosts. Harvesting is
hampered by cool and rainy weather.)
Mare Mare Grain Purchases in ProS'OeCtain
("The president of a large international grain
-trading firm, Cook Industries, is in Moscow at
the invitation of the Soviets to discuss.,The
purchases
additional grain.and soybeans
.Soviets invited Cook to return to Moscow in
November, saying that their agricultural plan
for 1973 would then be firm ofor delivery
purchases of grain and soybeans tons,
by mid-1973 already top 2million
mainly from the US.")
Soviet Fi.nancin of Hard Currency Needs
ard-
("T eh enormous ddit ediwithurecenttSov~ethgrai
currency cash associ
purchases have evidently led the USSR to seer`
selective foreign loans.")
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AIM 72-135 Some Aspects of Recent Soviet Crain Purchases*
6 Sept 72 ''This year's poor harvest, a result of severe
winter weather and summer drought, is forcing the
Soviets to import record quantities of grain.
So-far they have bought about 25.2 million metric.
tons of grain and soybeans worth almost US
$1.6 billion, mainly from the US, for delivery
in fiscal year 1973... The massive grain imports...
also reflect a recent change in agricultural
and consumer policy. Brezhnev's livestock
program, aimed at improving the Soviet diet, has
required large increases in grain supply which
have exceeded Soviet grain production, even in
good years.")
S-4575 The View from the Kremlin Three Months After
7 Sept 72 the Summit
("Because of the poor weather that has plagued the
Soviet grain areas this year, the 1972 crop
will fall far short of covering both domestic
reg4irements and export commitments... As a result
US exports of. grain and soybeans should reach
$650-700 million in 1972... Moreover, the delayed
ripening of grain in the crucial New Land area
of Siberia and Kazkhstan could cause above-normal
harvest losses during the coming weeks and could
generate a need for further imnports.")
CIWR
15 Sept 72 Report on the Soviet Harvest*
Soviet Devel-
opments
19 Sept 72
C .
("Grain yields reported by the USSR for areas
where the harvest has been completed confirri
that poor weather severely damaged the crop
in the major grain-growing areas of European
Russia...that will only be partially offset by
a good harvest in the New Lands...The un-
'certainty surrounding the final verdict on the
Soviet harvest. apparently has temporarily' halted
negotiations for additional grain imports...
Soviet purchases of grain for delivery by mid-1973
already top 27 million tons...")
,Leningrad's-Questions Concerning the Harvest
A- Leningrau lecturer sax. that some ^~es;:c rn
reports put the harvest this year at 20 percent
below last year's. It is "known," he said,
that the USSR has bought 7-12 million tons of
grain from the US, 5 million from Canada, 1-1.5-
million from France, and some from Australia.and
Sweden.")
i. , k 't, ,.^
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c
;Soviet Deve1Romanian Wheat Too L
25 Sept 72 that the Romanians nave agreea to suppLy ;nt.-
?Soviets with as much as 500,000 tons of wheat
from the successful harvest this year.")
CIB Brief
Soviet Devel-- Comment on NY Times Article on Soviet Wheat
opments Harvest
28 Sept 72 ("The New York Times today reports that USDA
estimates that the wheat harvest in 1972 will
be 75 million tons, 25 percent below last year...
primarily a result of winterkill and summer
drought...The USDA estimate is virtually the same
as the Cm Pst--imate -- 76 million tons... Soviet
wheat purchases of 18 million tons for delivery
by mid-1973 cover most of this year's losses and
will go far to ensure an adequate supply of
milling quality wheat.")
Soviet Devel- Forced Slaughtering of Herds Reported
opments (Deputy Minister of RS?SR'' s Meat and Dairy
28 Sept 72 Industry says the drought in the RSFSR is "the
most severe since the 1930s." He adds that
even some of basic cow herds are being butchered.)
27 Sept 72 ("Slow progress in grain harvesting threatens.
additional losses...If this slow pace is maintain&
the harvest will extend well into October-,,when
conditions usually deteriorate... Thus, harvest
prospects have deteriorated further since the last
major round of Soviet grain purchases in early
August. Racent reports of negotiations for
wheat from West Germany and Romania could
reflect a reassessment of, the country's immediate
needs for milling quality wheat. Confirmed
Soviet purchases of grain for,delivery by mid--
1973 now stand at almost 27 million tons...").
CIWR Soviet Outlook Gets Dimmer*
?29 Sept 72 ("Since the last major round of Soviet grain
purchases in early August, harvest prospects
have gone on deteriorating. We now estimate
that the 1972 crop of usable.grain will be roughly
128 million tons -- down 20 million tons for
1971." Total confirmed purchases of grain stand
at about 27 million tons worth over $1.6 billion
and there are recent reports of negotiations
for more wheat from West Germany and Romania.)!
25X1
Y /. Ri ti6 arl
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29 Sept 72
or
Since the last major round of Soviet grain
Soviet Grain -- Purchases and Prospects*
purchases in early August, harvest prospects
have deteriorated even further because of
poor weather. The 1972 .crop'of usable grain is
now estimated a roughly 128 million tons ---
more than 10 percent below 1971 output. Recent
reports of negotiations for more grain from
West Germany and Romania may reflect a reastessrnent
of the country's immediate needs. Confirmed
purchases now total more than 26 million tons.
worth $1.7 billion.)
CIWR Soviet Harvest Problems Persist*
13 Oct 72 "The grain harvest is stall behind schedule..
Deteriorating weather conditions jeopardize its
completion... They (the Soviets) now say this
year's grain crop will -be no more than. 160--167
million tons compared with 'the 181 million tons
harvested in 1971. We estimate that gross grain
production will be 160 million-tons ...foreign
grain purchases stand at about 28 million tons
for delivery by mid-1973...")
CIB Brief USSR
18 Oct 72 `There is a near record lag in.completing the
yr ai har Vest ten percent of all grain si-i11
had not been threshed as of 9 October.
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