DRAFT AGREEMENT ON LAO SETTLEMENT PROTOCOL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-37-4-25-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2010
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: August 4, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to-Declassification in Part 2010/05/28: LOC-HAK-37-4-25-9
MEMORANDUM I. v 4371
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
August 4, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
MR. KISSINGER
WILLIAM L. STEARMAN
Draft Agreement on Lao Settlement Protocol
a copy of the draft protocol (Tab A) implementing the.. 25X1
internal Lao agreement of February 21, 1973 and containing points which
the RLG and the Pathet. Lao have agreed on, as of July 30. The document
as a whole should not be considered definitive as certain minor points
are still under discussion between the two sides.
While the draft protocol improves the agreement in the areas of POW/
MIA and in deletion of specific mention of the USG and the RTG, the
document -- as it now reads -- contains several worrvsome features.
In some respects, it does not yet meet our special concerns, particularly
on the issues of foreign military aid, unsupervised troop withdrawals,
reconnaissance flights, and ICC activities. The following is a list of these
unfavorable features. (Most of them derive from objectionable provisions
in the basic February agreement. At this late stage we can do little to
remedy the deficiencies set forth below.
-- The Joint National Political Council (JNPC): The draft protocol
gives the JNPC a regrettably large role in formulating the domestic and
foreign policies of the country which are to be implemented by the coalition
government. Article 7 (c) of the protocol specifies that "there must be
consultations, consideration and agreement" between the government
and the Council (or its standing committee) on these policies. The danger
of this cumbersome arrangement lies in the fact that the. Pathet Lao are
thereby given a double veto on major governmental initiatives, as both
bodies operate on the basis of unanimity. While the Vientiane side may
protect its interests through exercising its own veto, the arrangement
provides a formula for endless debate and administrative paralysis on
controversial issues.
SECRET XGDS 5B(2)
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..- Neutralization of Vientiane and Luang Praban : Article 10 of the
agreed draft protocol give: the Pathet Lao a, large role in affairs of Laos'
two principal cities and severely restricts RLG military and police access.
The protocol provides, in effect,, that the only armed personnel in these
areas will be a joint 1, 000-man police force and separate military commands
of one battalion each in Vientiane and two companies in Luang Prabang.
All other forces -- namely RLG -- must be withdrawn and are prohibited
from passing through the capitals except in transit status at the airfields.
(One loophole in this arrangement is the provision that withdrawal distances
will be determined by the Joint Lao Commission on Implementing the Agree-
ment, which must, in any event, act unanimously.) Combat aircraft are
also prohibited from flying through the cities' airspace.
-- Enclaves: While Article 13 of the protocol; recognizes and protects
the existence of RLG and LPF enclaves, it limits road and air access to
these areas by requiring the Joint Lao Commission to fix' resupply routes
and approve each flight ferrying food through the airspace of the other side.
Reconnaissance: Article 14 (b) prohibits all air force activities
into the airspace controlled by the other side. Contrary to our strong
preference for maintaining a loophold for reconnaissance, "intelligence
flights" are specifically precluded.
--.Supervision of Withdrawals: While the language of the protocol is
somewhat murky on this point, Article 25 (b) provides for a sketchy ICC
check-out procedure. The Article states that the ICC will "control and
supervise'' withdrawals and will station a team at the withdrawal site"
and on the date provided by the Joint Commission. ' While it is unlikely
that this Joint Commission will in fact' ever agree-to the'requisite date
and site, we point out that Souvanna was well aware of our opposition --
due to Thai sensitivities to supervised withdrawals and our preference
for a post-withdrawal sweep of foreign troop locations.
Foreign Military Aid: The draft protocol provides little improve-
ment on the Agreement's unsatisfactory conditions on receiving foreign
military aid. Indeed, the protocol flatly prohibits either side from re-
ceiving weapons and war materiel of any kind from any foreign country.
(1In contrast, the agreement provided a wide loophole by allowing military
aid under the rather loose "self-defense" conditions specified by the
Geneva Agreement.) However, this absolute prohibition is somewhat
weakened by another provision that in cases where it is necessary to
"change or replace" worn-out equipment, the two sides must first consult
together. (The February accord required prior agreement in addition to
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SECRET 3
consultations and limited this process to replacement of worn-out
equipment -- viz. changing and replacing equipment as provided in the
protocol.) Nevertheless, this aspect of the protocol could cause difficulty.
Again, Souvanna was aware of our strong preference.for letting the Geneva
Agreements control all foreign aid deliveries.
-- LPF Forces Adjacent to Thailand: The Agreement itself contains
no language which would require a Pathet Lao withdrawal from areas
adjacent to the Thai border. The Thai have expressed strong concern on
this point and reportedly Souvanna has pressed the Communists to agree.
Unless a hypothetical secret understanding exists on this matter, the RTG
could have cause for being upset.
-- Joint Commission- The protocol gives the Joint Commission to
Implement the Agreement (JCIA) very great responsibilities. The Com-
mission - which will work on the basis of unanimity -- is responsible
for implementing the MIA and POW provisions, neutralization of the
capital cities; withdrawal times and sites; import of foreign military
equipment; access to enclaves; cease-fire violations; ICC inspections;
etc. Disputes in this critical group apparently will be resolved jointly
by Souvanna and Sou?phanouvong, a procedure which gives the Communists
ay veto over all activities of the Joint Commission. (Recently we have
advised Souvanna. of our preference that he alone decide Joint Commission
disputes.)
-- ICC: The Protocol (Article 25) provides no relief from restrictions
on the ICC and in fact conditions any ICC investigation.on a prior unanimous,
request from the Joint Commission. The ICC will function according to
the 1962 modalities. Thanks to these provisions, it has no chance of
developing into an effective supervisory force.
-- United States Aid: Contrary to our repeated requests that the
protocol not specifically mention the United States, Article 26 provides
for establishing a group to discuss with the "United States Government"
the matter of "U. S. contributions to post-war reconstruction." Despite
strong Communist resistance, the Lao, however, have managed to strike
all other reference to the United States and Thailand.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/05/28: LOC-HAK-37-4-25-9