LETTER TO JOHN O. MARSH, JR. FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 8, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASIIINGTON, D, C. 20505
The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.
Counsellor to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Jack:
MORI/CDF
C03382205
8 it,N 1976
This letter responds to your request of 7 January for a
list of issues relating to the Intelligence Community which
the President should address, and drafts of decision memoranda
for the President on the question of charters for Intelligence
Community elements.
TAB A - Issues for Presidential Consideration Relating
to U.S. Foreign Intelligence Activities
(Materials provided include recommendation on
all issues identified in the Presidential
"decision book," plus several additional issues
I consider should be addressed.)
TAB B - Key Resource Management Issues
_(Five Issues related to the discussion the
OMB Task Group "Draft Report to the President
on Organization and Management of the Foreign
Intelligence Community," dated 16 December 1975,
have been singled out for particular attention.)
TAB C - Central Intelligence Agency Charter
TAB D - National Reconnaissance Office Charter
TAB E Option 4, Modified - "Collective Management"
(1 have included for reference ? Attachment ?A of
my response .of 18 December 1975 to the Director, ?
ONE, which commented on the. 16. December "Draft
Report to the President on Organization and
Management of the Foreign Intelligence Community."
SECRET
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25X1
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lea Low 1.1 I t
While I do net consider that this is a propitious time
to undertake a major. _restructuring of the .Intelligence Community,
I recognize that other considerations may outweigh the-red.Sehing
I have presented in responses at TAB A. If significant organiza-
tional changes are to be considered, however, I invite your
attention particularly to the issues and recommendations Set-
forth in TAB B and my earlier comments at TAB E. These describe
what I believe would be the most effective,?..nd least disruptive
changes.
Enclosures:
as stated
Sincerely,
/(
Colby
2
SECRET
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A
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TAB A
ISSUES FOR PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDERATION RELATING
TO U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
NOTE.: The issues are grouped by category, and the list includes,
and expands upon, the issues set forth in the Presidential
"decision book" prepared for his use in Colorado. Issues
from the "decision book" are not listed in the same order
as they appear in the book, but are identified by page
number reference.
A. FIRST ORDER ISSUES.
1. Is this the time for a major reorganization of
the Intelligence CommUnity on initiative of the Executive
Branch?
DCI Recommendation: No. The issues involved in
organization and management of the Community are complex
and need much more careful study. A new DCI will shortly
take office and both the Secretary of Defense and his
Deputy Secretary handling intelligence matters are new
appointees. These officials need time to develop their
own ideas, to examine the issues and to make their
recommendations to the President. Also, any such proposals
would have to be taken to the Congress, where consideration
in the present atmosphere would pose major problems.
2. If the decision on the above issue is "No",
_should Executive Branch positions be prepared against
.the event that the Congressional investig-ations 'will
result in reorganization proposals?
DCI Recommendation: Yes. Staffing actions should
continue concerning reorganization proposals. Issues
which do not involve reorganization should be decided
and appropriate Executive Branch action taken.
3. What action can the Executive Branch take
to aid in restoring confidence in the U.S. Foreign
Intelligence Community?
DCI Recommendation: As the first step, Issuance of
restrictions on the Intelligence Community such as are
contained in the draft Executive Order which has been
under White House review will contribute to restoration of
confidence. Other possible measures are discussed under
the issues related to oversight.
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B. REORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
4. Should the charter of the Community institute
greater accountability? (Presidential "decision book"
Page 176)
Comment: ?As it is treated in the President's
"decision book" this issue would be better stated as:
Is it desirable to move now to streamline the chain
of command of the Intelligence Community? _
DCI Recommendation: As indicated in the comment
on Issue 1, this is not considered a propitious time
for a major reorganization of the Intelligence Community.
Should the President decide, however, that a reorganiza-
tion of the Community is to be undertaken this year (and
Congress in any case appears to be moving in that direction),
there are steps that should be taken to streamline the
Community structure. The authorities of the DCI should
be made commensurate with his responsibilities and his
relationships with the Department of Defense should be
clarified. On the other hand, the chain of command for
covert action is already quite clear and there is no
reason to change it.
5 Should any new charter for the Intelligence
Community be primarily statutory or administrative?
(Presidential "decision book" Page 1-8)
? DCI Recommendation: Proposals concerning a Central
Intelligence Agency charter and a National Reconnaissance
Office charter are at Tabs .0 and D. As for a charter
applicable to the Intelligence Community as a whole, this
Is presently covered by the National Security Council
Intelligence Directives. Any changes resulting from the
ongoing investigations and Executive Branch review should
be reflected in NSCID No. 1.
6. How should accountable leadership of the Intelli-
gence Community be provided?
Comment: This is phrased in the Presidential
"decision book" as follows: "What type of leadership
does the Intelligence Community require .(both internally
and externally) to efficiently provide effective leadership
on a timely basis? Which person or persons shall be held
accountable for leadership of the Intelligence Community?1,
(Page III-1)
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DCI Recommendation: Leadership mast be provided by
two persons, _the_.P.resident and ,his_Sepior U.S.._ foreign
Intelligente officer, who must function both as a close
adviser to the President and as an Intelligence Community
leader with authorities that match his responsibilities.
Thes-e-authoriths-must-include-sufficient budgetary
authority to make his leadership effective.
7. Should the senior U.S. foreign intelligence
officer also be the operating head of the Central
Intelligence Agency?
? Comment: This issue was not cited as an issue in
the Presidential "decision book", but it--and the following
three issues--are considered of critical importance in
formulating the future structure of the Intelligence
Community.
DCT Recommendation: Yes. It is essential that the
senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer not be separated
from his operating base. If he is to be the intelligence
adviser to the President, he must not be separated from
the analytical base responsible for the production of
national intelligence. While the DCT can be directed to
delegate day-to-day management of the CIA to a deputy,
he must retain operational and policy control of the Agency
or he will become a powerless "adviser" on the White House
staff.
/ 8... Should the DCI be a member of the NSC, or an
adviser to the NSC?
z
DCI Recommendation: An adviser to the NSC.
9. Should the DCI be the Chairman of the NSC
Intelligence Committee?
DCI Recommendation: No, not as the NSCIC is now
constituted.-'-7
(/
10. Should the DCT be the Chairman of the 40 Committee
(0:2- (or its equivalent)?
DCI Recommendation: No, he should continue to be a
member as at present.
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11. What principles should be important to you in
developing an Overall structure to work with Congress
On intelligence matters? (Presidential--decision book"?
Page 11-17)
DCI Recommendation: Because oversight activity must
be conducted for the most part outside of the public domain,
the oversight committees will feel the need to dig more
deeply into matters than would be the case If all the normal
mechanisms (press, interest groups, other Members of Congress,
etc..) were not blocked from access. At the same time., these
committees should not impinge upon constitutional prerogatives
not shared with the Congress.
If the committees are to back off from a "fully and
currently informed concept and if the oversight structure
is to work, the Executive Branch must be prepared to make
a number of concessions beyond the normal Executive Branch/
Congressional relationship.
Access to sensitive intelligence sources and methods
carries with it a special responsibility. It must not be
overlooked that the legislation that established the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, which is cited as the model for
a committee that can keep secrets, provides criminal penalties
for the unauthorized release of Restricted Data. A strengthened
oversight structure in the Congress would provide an opportunity
to close a serious gap in the criminal laws of the United
States in regard to protecting intelligence sources and
methods.
It should be insisted that the Congress enact and enforce
rules designed to ensure responsible Congressional handling
of sensitive intelligence information.
The oversight structure should be limited to the minimum
needed to do the job and to assure the Nation of Congressional
watchfulness over intelligence. This structure should exercise
exclusive jurisdiction, and the rules of the Congress should
be modified to restrict access to sensitive intelligence
information.
Sensitive intelligence information should not be
published by Congressional committees at their sole initiative..
Any one of a number of formulas for prior consultation that
provides an opportunity for the eventual assertion of
Executive Privilege would be acceptable.
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Any proposals to require prior approval of committees
for covert action or other high-risk activities _should be
rejected. Instead, there should be a direct and special
channel through which Congressional committees or their
members can make their views known to the President.
12. What mechanism would best provide control over
intelligence resources? (Presidential "decision book"
Page 111-7)
DCI Recommendation: Given the present organization
of the Community and the relationships between the DCT
and Department of Defense agencies, control over intelli-
gence resources is best exercised through use of an
Executive Committee or Committees chaired by the DCI.
The present EXCOM arrangement applies only to the National
Reconnaissance Program. A better arrangement would be a
single senior EXCOM for all national collection programs.
Short of this, there should be an additional EXCOM charged
with responsibility for program and resource decisions for
the SIGINT program. The use of EXCOMs avoids the need for
any basic change in present procedures for budget develop-
ment and approval within the Department of Defense, which
has the bulk of intelligence resources, and still gives
the DCI an important role in the programs and budgets for
major technical collection systems.
13. Should the collection organizations be consolidated
to improve quality, simplify management, and achieve greater
cost effectiveness? (Presidential "decision book" Page 111-9)
DCI Recommendation: Supervision under an EXCOM arrange-
ment and continuation of actions already under way to improve
the statement of requirements for collection will do more to
enhance effectiveness of the collection effort than would
attempts at consolidation. Diversity of effort is of great
value in operations against difficult intelligence targets,
and unwarranted duplication can be avoided by actions far
less disruptive than consolidation. The separate nature of
the technical collection tasks and human source collection
efforts is such that greater cost effectiveness could not
be expected from consolidation. Merging minor collection
aetivities would not achieve significant economies.
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14. Can the production (analysis) capability of
the Intelligence Community be improved through "organizational"
realignments? (Presidential "dee-Ts-Ion -b-o'ciTH Page III-11) -
DCI Recommendation: No. This issue is generally dis-
? cussed in terms -of resource- sam_ings resulting from the
elimination of duplicative production arrangements. With
minor exceptions, the existing alignments reflect the
proper national and departmental interests of the members
of the Intelligence Community. It is imperative that the
DCI provide the President, the National Security Council,
and the Congress with authoritative and reliable assess-
ments of foreign events. This capability can be exercised
only on the basis of analysis under the immediate control
of the DCI and independent of other departments. Moreover,
on critical national intelligence questions, competition
In analysis is desirable and should be encouraged. The
best approach to improving the quality of analysis and
production is to provide resources adequate to satisfy the
full range of the substantive needs for national intelligence.
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C. THE SCOPE AND CONTROL OF COVERT ACTION
.15. Do the Community's statutory and administrative
charters adequately deal with covert action? (Presidential
"decision book" Page 1-8)
DCI Recommendation: Yes. The National Security Act
of 1947 delegates to the NSC the authority to assign certain
action responsibilities related to intelligence. By the
NSCID's and the implementing DCID's and Decision Memoranda,
particularly NSDM-40, responsibility for the planning,
approval, and execution of covert action has? been adequately
established. The current legislative requirement to brief
six Congressional committees on every covert action has
proved to be so insecure that it has obstructed effective
covert action. This could be remedied by the creation of
a new legislative mechanism such as a single joint Congressional
committee with exclusive oversight responsibility, at least
for CIA.
16. How can adequate deliberation of covert action
proposals be assured? (Presidential "decision book" Page
11-16)
DCI Recommendation: Such deliberation can be assured
by reinstituting regular 40 Committee meetings and by
formalizing the process for excepting specific covert
action proposals from 40 Committee jurisdiction in those
rare cases when it may be deemed advisable. In addition
to the formal 40 Committee deliberation process, there
should continue to be informal interdepartmental coordination
as well as coordination with Ambassadors or, where appro-
priate, overseas military commanders. Consultation with
and advice from the DDI should also continue to be part of
the pre-40 Committee staffing process.
17. Should the covert action capability and possibly
all clandestine activity be separated from the CIA?
(Presidential "decision book" Page 111-13)
DCI Recommendation: No. Separating covert action
responsibility from CIA would in no way improve Executive
or legislative branch oversight. It could involve duplica-
tion and risky inefficiency as covert action invariably
involves using many of the same contacts and techniques
as clandestine intelligence collection. Responding to the
last part of the question, so long as we have a Central
Intelligence Agency, clandestine activities abroad con-
stitute a function that should be conducted by that central
service. There is an interdependency of analysis and
clandestine collection. The former benefits from propinquity
with the collection effort in evaluating the product, while
the collector needs guidance from the analyst in determining
priorities.
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D. THE NEED FOR STATUTORY OR ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
18. Should the jurisdictional arrangements between
the CIA and the FBI be revised? .(Presidential "decision
book" Page II-I)
DCI Recommendation: No. The 1966 Letter of Agreement
between the two agencies is a clear basis for effective
relations between the CIA and the FBI. The pending NSCID
No. 9 and Executive Order on Domestic Activities, which are
both consistent with the 1966 agreement, spell out in
greater detail some of the relationships in a useful
manner. NSCID No. 9 would establish the authority for
CIA operations within the United States and affecting U.S.
citizens abroad, would impose restrictions thereon, and
would set forth distinct lines of authority and coordination
procedures between the CIA and the FBI and other U.S.
departments and agencies as appropriate. CIA's collection
responsibility is and should continue to be restricted to
foreign intelligence.
19. What substantive restrictions should be placed
on intelligence activities other than the FBI? (Presidential
"decision book" Page 11-6)
DCI Recommendation: The provisions of the Executive
Order now in preparation, which will prohibit or limit the
activities of intelligence agencies other than the FBI,
adequately cover this issue. Because some of the listed
restrictions will be directed at activities that are essential
to a law enforcement agency, limitations on activities of
the FBI will be handled separately. The restrictions on
Intelligence agencies will limit: activities directed at
United States citizens; activities that may be conducted
within the United States; electronic surveillance;
examination of United States mail; access to Federal income
tax returns; secret infiltration of organizations of U.S.
citizens; human drug experimentation; participation in or
support of law enforcement activities; and assignment of
intelligence agency personnel to other Government agencies.
, 20. Should there be exceptions to restrictions on
the activities of intelligence agencies permitting them
to engage in certain activities directed at United States
citizens?
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Comment: The question above combines two issues from
the Presidential "decision book."
- a. "Whether to include an exception which would
allow the collection, analysis and dissemination of
information on the domestic activities of U.S. citizens'
reasonably believed to be involved in international
terrorist or narcotics activities or working in collab-
oration with a foreign nation or organization, but only
if collected abroad or from foreign sources." (Page 11-8)
b. "Whether to adopt an exception which would
permit sharing of information on domestic activities
of U.S. citizens among intelligence agencies or other
Federal agencies under guidelines of the Attorney
General." (Page II-10)
DCI Recommendation: Yes. For example, intelligence
agencies should be permitted to collect, analyze, and
disseminate information on the domestic activities of U.S.
citizens reasonably believed to be involved in international
terrorist or narcotics activities or working secretly in
collaboration with a foreign nation or organization, provided
such information is collected abroad or from foreign sources.
They should also be permitted to share information on the
domestic activities of U.S. citizens with other Federal
agencies properly concerned with such activities, but only
under guidelines to be issued by the Attorney General.
9
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E. THE NEED TO DEFINE SYSTEMS OF OVERSIGHT?EXECUTIVE,
LEGISLATIVE AND PUBLIC
21. Should a new Congressional/Executive relationship
provide for greater Executive Branch accountability to
Congress? (Presidential "decision book" Page I-11)
DCI Recommendation: Yes. Such accountability is an
essential ingredient of restoring public confidence. The
Executive must work to establish relationships with
committees that have exclusive oversight and that can
operate under effective rules to ensure the responsible
handling of sensitive information. If members of such
committees are to operate in a credible fashion as
surrogates for others, they must receive, on a voluntary
basis, sensitive information that is not available to the
press, interest groups, or other Members of Congress.
22. Is oversight within the Intelligence Community
adequate and effective? (Presidential "decision book"
Page II-12)
DCI Recommendation: Oversight within the Community
is being enhanced by upgrading the role of Inspectors
General in various elements of the Community and by
giving greater attention to Inspector General activities.
A Community-wide Inspector General would require additional
authority to be vested in the DCI. Current efforts of
the Congress and the changed attitude within the Executive
Branch will provide more than enough oversight for the
Community. The problem of the future may be to protect
the Community from being so over-overseen as to be
hamstrung.
23. Does effective oversight call for a mechanism
outside the Intelligence Community to advise the President
on propriety? (Presidential "decision book" Page 1I-13)
DCI Recommendation: No. The proposed Executive
Order on restrictions applicable to the Intelligence
Community or some similar Congressional legislation would
provide the framework for effective action within the
Intelligence Community, including clear provision for
reporting to the Attorney General on any instances of
impropriety.
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24. Would public confidence in Executive oversight
be enhanced by use of non-Government overseers? Should
an outside advisory board be given intelligence oversight
responsibilities and, if so, should it be the PFIAB?
(Presidential "decison book" Page 11-15)
DCI Recommendation: No. While a group of non-Government
overseers might serve some cosmetic purpose, no truly practical
role is seen. The PFIAB, in particular, should not be put in
an Inspector General role. In view of the expected continuing
Congressional interest in oversight and the strengthened role
of Inspectors General in Intelligence Community agencies,
public oversight is not considered either necessary or
desirable.
25. What should be your substantive position concerning
intelligence oversight committees? (Presidential 'decision
book" Page 11-21)
DCI Recommendation: In principle, it is up to the
Congress to put its haute in order, but in so doing, it
should recognize that Executive as well as legislative
prerogatives are involved.
It does not take six committees of Congress to exercise
oversight of CIA. The proliferation of sensitive information
must stop and the number of committees involved should be
reduced.
The nation should not be required to rely exclusively
upon the wisdom and restraint of individual Members to
protect sensitive intelligence information provided to the
Congress. The rules of Congress should make It clear that
access to especially sensitive matters will be restricted
to the agreed upon Committee structure and should provide
explicit sanctions for violation of the rules,
'(See response to Issue 11 for additional points...)
26. In what 'Manner should the intelligence budget
be displayed to Congress? (Presidential "decision book"
Page 11-22)
DCI Recommendation: The answer to this question
depends to a degree on future organizational arrangemenf
for the Intelligence Community. If effective amthorit
over the intelligence budget or a major Portion of it
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were to be consolidated In the DCI, he Could be held
responsible for displaying and justifying all intelli-
gence costs. If. present arrangment4_arbe malntaine
CIA, Defense, and other departments and agencies with
intelligence programs will present and display budgets
for their programs more or less as at present.
Within the present legal framework, a decision could
be made to submit to the Congress a separate classified
annex covering the intelligence budget. This annex would
? be prepared by OMB concurrently_ with the Federal Budget
and could be made available to the appropriate committees
of Congress for their consideration.
There has been some thinking within the Congressional
committee staffs about the possibility of having an annual
or semi-annual Congressional authorization for intelligence
appropriations. The President should not himself make
such a proposal. If, however, this idea were combined
with the maintenance of a secret appropriations process,
some arguments advanced by proponents of an open budget
would be effectively met without revealing exact budgetary
details. Such a process would, however, have the enormous
disadvantage of causing an annual Congressional debate on
the size and scope of the intelligence program and offer
a ready-made opportunity for passage or restrictive riders
on the major issue of the moment.
27. To what extent is public oversight appropriate?
(Presidential "decision book" Page 11-27)
DCI Recommendation: Public oversight, beyond that
expected to be provided by the Congress., is not considered
either appropriate or necessary.
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F. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE CONGRESS
_
28. What substantive intelligence should be seni-,-to -
Congress, and what official should be responsible for
making such determinations? (Presidential "decision
book" Page 11-23)
DCI Recommendation: Conclusions rached in the
Presidential "decision book" on this subject are concurred
in. Specifically, it is believed that:
a. Legislation on this subject would raise
serious Constitutional questions.
b. The Executive Branch should give more
systematic attention to the growing needs of the
Congress for information.
c. The flow of intelligence information to
the Congress should be centralized under the DCI.
29. Under what ground rules should the Congress be
provided substantive intelligence? (Presidential "decision
book" Page 11-26)
Comment: In context, this issue appears to refer only
to the ground rules under which the Congress can make public
substantive intelligence provided to it.
DCI Recommendation: The only acceptable arrangement
is that the Executive Branch continue to control the
declassification of classified substantive intelligence.
This in turn requires Congressional acceptance, collectively
and individually, or the Executive's security and classification
system, and hence is part, of the larger issue of how Congress
polices itself. A provision for appeal to the President would
not be inconsistent with this position.
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THE NEED TO REVISE SYSTEMS FOR CLASSIFICATION AND THE
PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
30. To what extent should the existing classification
system be revised? (Presidential "decision book" Page TV-1)
_
DCI Recommendation: Revision is needed. Classification
and declassification standards in the existing Executive
Order (E.0 11652) need clarification and simplification.
In addition, the order essentially provides for protecting
documents rather than information, which results in a
myriad of problems of implementation.
31. If the current classification system is to be
revised, should its revision be accomplished by Executive
Order or statute? (Presidential "decision boole Page IV-2)
DCT Recommendation: By Executive Order, not by
statute. The classification system.exists to protect
information originating in or coming into the hands of
the Executive Branch of the Government, information in
the areas (national defense and foreign relations) that under
the Constitution are matters within Presidential powers.
Conceptually, therefore, the Executive Branch must retain
the authority to determine the need for protection of such
information and the standards, procedures, etc., for doing so.
32. Should the Administration propose revised legislation
to protect classified information? (Presidential "decision
book" Page IV-3)
DCI Recommendation: Yes. Additional protection is
needed, and although there are draft proposals in S.1 (which
would revise the Criminal Code), they have caused considerable
controversy and consideration is being given to not pushing
these particular provisions. Legislation on the protection
of intelligence sources and methods is particularly needed.
33. Whether statutory protection should be accorded
only to intelligence sources and methods or to all types of
classified information. (Presidential "decision book"
Page IV-4)
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DCI Recommendation: Statutory protection for
Intelli-
gence sources and. methods is strongly urged. By letter of
31 December 1975 the Department of Juiitice-withdr-ew'dll- - -
objections to the CIA proposal. Clearly such legislation
is necessary in view of the inadequacy of the current law.
--The-present-proposal-has-an-ex.Gellent-chance of passage,
but should not be broadened to cover other types of
claSzified information.
_
I. Whether statutory protection for classified
information should cover only Government employees or
also the unauthorized recipient. .(Presidential "decison
book." Page IV-6)
DCI Recommendation: Statutory protection certainly
should cover both Government employees and other authorized
recipients, such as employees of Government contractors.
The draft proposals of S.1 do extend to the unauthorized
recipient as well as Government employees, but including
the unauthorized recipient is one of the reasons for the
controversial nature of the disclosure provisions of 5.1.
It seems highly unlikely that inclusion of the recipient
would be acceptable to the Congress.
35. What form of statutory protection should be
given to classified information (i.e., criminal or civil,
or both)? (Presidential "decision book" Page IV-6)
DCI Recommendation: As to classified information
generally, there should be both criminal and civil
Injunctive provisions in law. Clearly, additional
criminal sanctions are necessary because of inadequate
current laws. The civil injunctive provision can in
certain cases prevent disclosure rather than having
criminal action taken after the damage has been done.
There should be statutory protection for intelli-
gence sources and methods and it should include both
criminal and civil injunctive provisions. Today there
are no criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure.
While the 4th Judicial Circuit has approved an injunction
to protect classified information, including intelligence
sources and methods, it is quite possible that no other
circuit would see fit to grant injunctive relief. Both
criminal and injunctive provisions are in the proposed
CIA legislation.
15
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
TABS
KEY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES
? Issue 1: Should the role of the DCI be enhanced so as to
provide more focused management and control of the Intelligence
Community?
DCI Recommendation: Yes. The DCI should chair an NSC
Executive Committee, with Deputy Secretaries of State and
Defense as members. These officers among them would control
all major national intelligence assets and would act as a
Board of Directors for the Community. The EXCOM would, in
particular, provide policy and resource guidance for the
National Security Agency and the National Reconnaissance
Office.
Issue 2: Should the major intelligence budgets be appro-
priated to an Intelligence Community manager for reallocation
to individual operating departments, or should his management
be limited to the formulation of a recommended foreign intelli-
gence budget?
DCI Recommendation: Neither. Budgets should continue to
be appropriated as at present and administered under the guidance
?of the EXCOM. The DCI as Chairman of EXCOM should formulate a
recommended budget.
Issue 3: If he does not have direct budgetary control,
should an Intelligence Community manager have any responsibility
for approving the NSA and NRO programs and budgets?
DCI Recommendation: Yes. See No. 1 above.
Issue Lt Should an.Intelligence Community manager be
responsible for oversight and evaluation of all foreign
intelligence activities, or should that remain decentralized
as now?
DCI Recommendation: The DCI now has evaluation responsibilities
for national intelligence collection and production activities. He
does not have oversight responsibilities in terms of checking on
abuses--except for the CIA--nor should he. The DCI should be
relieved of any evaluation or budget review responsibilities relating
to tactical intelligence.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
Issue 5: Should an Intelligence Community manager be
responsible for the -presentation of the-foreign_intelligence-:
budget even if he does not directly control it?
DCI Recommendation: Yes_ It is quite clear that Congress
will expect in the future that someone present an Intelligence
CoMmunity budget It makes sense that this should be the DCI,
even if his control over major portions of it is minimal.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
Issue 5: Should an Intelligence Community manager be
responsible for the-presentation of the -foreign.
budget even if he does not directly control it?
DCI Recommendation: Yes. It is quite Clear that Congress
will expect in the future that someone preSent'-an Intelligente -
Community budget. It makes sense that this should be the DCI,
even if his control over major portions of it is minimal.
2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
TAB C
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CHARTER
1. Should the Agency have a charter?
Yes. Since CIA is an independent Agency a charter is virtually a necessity.
The Agency's basic charter is the National Security Act of 1947 which
created CIA Furthermore, there is no question but that the Congress
will want to modify the Agency's current statutory charter.
2. What should be included in the charter?
The charter should include: the designation of the director of the Agency
and a limited number ed senior deputies; ? the status of the director and his
relationship to the President or any subordinate official having authority
over him; the director's authority over or relationship to other elements
of the intelligence community; the duties, authorities and responsibilities
of the director and the Agency and specific provision for designation of
other duties, authorities and responsibilities by administrative action;
activities prohibited or restricted; general and specific exemptions from
the provisions of statutes, Executive orders and regulations which would
impinge upon the authorities of the director or the ability of the Agency
to effectively carry out its charter responsibilities; manner of appropriation
and expenditure of funds and specific authority on employment and termi-
nation of personnel.
3. Should the charter be a statute or an Executive order?
The charter should be a mixture of statute and Executive order or Presidential
directive. The Congress probably will insist on a good part of the Agency's
charter being clearly defined in law. In addition, however, a. with many
statutes some flexibility is desirable and this will assist the President in
modifying the Agency's charter from time to time within the framework of
the statute as there are new developments and circumstances. In addition,
there are certain classified aspects which can only be dealt with by Presi-
dential directive due to subject matter and the details necessarily involved
in certain sensitive matters.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
L
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
SECRU.
NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 'CHARTER' "
TAB D
1. Should the NRO have a charter?
Yes. Satellite reconnaissance of foreign activities
is essential to meet intelligence Community needs at the
national level. An organization is required to manage the
necessary effort and a comprehensive charter is essential
to define, authorize, and establish that organization.
2. What should be included in the charter?
The charter should define the supervision under
which the national office is established, the responsibility
and authority of that national office, and its relationships
to the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence
Agency.
The NRO charter should enable the organization to
implement responses to both national and tactical intelli-
gence requirements. The charter should provide for the
development and operation of satellite collection systems
which deliver the necessary product to the exploitation,
analytical, tactical and field command elements in the
Most responsive manner and with appropriate security
provisions.
The authority of the NRO should include
-a. Establishment of its necessary management
structure;
b. Definition of the required budgetary support;
c?
Development and operation of the satellite
d. Technology support for future efforts.
3. Should the charter be a statute or an Executive Order.?
The need for flexibility as new requirements for
satellite reconnaissance emerge (as is currently the case
with direct military support requirements) dictate that
the charter be established through Exedutive Order rather
than statute
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
.!. ;.?; ;
UUni
TAI3 13
ATTA=T :A
- "Collectivo
.This Option st;Irtf; frolo.the ivemic..: tat stron
pf thct Intellignce Co;=uniy is highly
siro.ble, bui- thati-he 1.-.--:Alanr-e of ini-eer-te;
in the prel7?ent structuz7c 3.s a realistic one and .;11.ou1d
be Ii1Rintaincd.. It ',:re:ionts a concept for aohievin-j a
clegree of collective managent while preservinf; -
preson.t..ornizationl relz.:tionships.- it requires a
minimwa of legislative change.
?SUXMAnY'DESCRIPIION
The 1.=CI would continue to be advisor to the
President, f.nator of the Co17,munitv, and Direc:tor
of CIA. The prE,.sent structurc.! of Comm3.tteos and ilot,:ds
would ba confted into tw3, both ohnired by thr, DCI:
an Executive Co=itteA of the /SC for Intelligenee at
the deputy secretary level, responsible for all Community
manzigomznt F,nd p:.)11(.7y p:.attersi and a:National Intoilic7cno
Board at the urc!5.nnt USIB Principals level, responsible
for subst4ntive production. To enable the pCT to give
more attention to his Community responsibilities he would
be provided with a second deputy.
op.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
r? I "I ?
I I ???!??? i ? ir ? , ; ? *
? "."-
? _..
.P.R11.;i0tY ;?.1,7.1). T.I.TECT5
The. .1,CI
Tho Irrasi1ic7nt intellicien6e
adviF;or,sndwould Direci.or of CI.A. With a vi mi
to r.i-tisd nct Lho Lituie of the job, cor..s.i.c.1..,-.,ration
clivc2;:i.o a?nq CbineL e 01110 bfl
r0E41)011.3.3.1.A.C,-; 7*:SC! I- for., t cooLdire-:tion of
tiati.02a in ton policy zInts1 for thc py.oduction
Of natiOnal. in tell iq ene . ? ion woulci
be mace however., betqeen his CoL,munity and. CIA roles. .
To this enCl., .he would. be ?provicled with an El..del.itional
Deputy, app:._?)::.ntc,.6 by the President and. by
.congre. The present:. Deputy would .be
fOY 1'i!..73.11u the l'..clienry Un(lev the pc1;?th0
other D,:..puty ;ouii b renonsible unjer the DCI for .
coordination of the Cem:Imnity. The DCI .would have an
Agency .offict:t at Langley? and a COI=unity ol=ice? downtown,
where his..Col-aunity Deputy. would be. located
? Coordination of Nationl TnteIlic,c,nce
The prescnt structure of boards. ?and
? would be ri-l.tionalized, on. the basic princ5--,-,1 that.
policy. and resource matters rcciuirincj a hala.ncinT:. of
departraentzil interests would be conSiderecl collcetively
by the senior officers controlling the as!.7cts and re--
sources concerned.? A Separate for-om wou:Ld?be provide:1
.for substantve intelli.gence issucs, on. ti.!O cirounds
that thesc! ?arc inappropriate for policy of.fieers to
. adjudicate? and that departmental intorest:7,.. aro protecteci.
by the right of dissent.
Policy and Resources
For the first of these purposes th,-.1 DOI..would?
chair an NSC Executive Corillaittec for Int?:Iligence, .
.with Doputy .(:::oCretaries of ?State and D-2f
The comnittec would have undcr control ; its
all import'ant intellience assets, and act s a
board of direcors for national EXC.C?!.!(T)?
would al)sorb t.h functions rsuc, L (RO
iS
equivalent res7):nsibi11ties for NSA), T. and
iexcept. national intellig,ance productic:',... It would
in addition coordinate policy matters
and the Ccr=unity, such as ?cover,
bases overseas, and. intelligence .a.gretts with f.orcicin
countries.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
?
- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
The pcatv, Cor:701nity D.::puLy would e 1!is alternatt:,
In YY.00'..:(I) but would not serve as Cnair:aan in hi.s
CC
The-1C tztafl would -1-:e the F.ecrei:..-a.q.:at--ci-c-F.C.1-(-.1),
DCA: would carry out hit; exi:-;tin9 rc:spon..:.i.oililjo for the
N:CIP ()osf; i t tactica3 and clepartn!ntal
t 11 _the._.1:1."; lat. CIF. C,CL 1 E XCO: woula
have appr0v1 authority f:ol: the CCP,
eind soI32 of the (DTP) and i tn (loci ;ions woul(-1
be hnve resource
_aut..horiy only o..,cr CIA. Pre.....'ent admj.nitrative arrangc-
ments for the /MP and CCP wbUld 1)2 '!?-,reserved.
Production?of.
? USIB would be rc,centituted as a 1.!atiOna1 Intelli-
gepce Poardi.limited bv chJirter to subst;.:ntiVe
and aeivorv to thiDM. Thc NIO's would i: as the T,CIls
-staft for the NIi;. The P.oard wDuld?be. chz:iy:17:d th
with his 11,7jency.Dv.puty a CIAmi:uher. ? The latter would
serve as Chair:Alan his absence.
Covert Action
The DCI would be a member of the e_O Co:.1.mittee, but
not its Chain,lan, with his Agency Deputy as altern.atc.
Clandesttine collectic;n and covert acLion would remain
assigned to ClA, without change in present z,rrangents.
Oversight
-Without aeministrative authority ovcr the Co=unity,
it would be inappropriate for the DCI to have an IG
responsibili.ty cxcept over CT7\.. Thin Option asst=s
Executive oversight at the 'ZSC or WhiLe !ouse level.
Congres
???
The DCI would continue to be the Co=unity sokesai
to Congress.
National/Tact4cJ Probir.
Excon(I) would handle matters relating to the
relationship between tactical and national intelligence.
The DCI would have no responsibility for the tactical
intelligence budgets of the military services,
-3-
CON I' I Di:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4
OPTEON m ODE-TIED
SECRETArlY OF DEFENSE
an..",..mormemaiRa~,k..,,ma?
DZPIJTY SECTIF.TARY CF .DEFEP,SE
?
(TL), Z.1EMDER
LISC t EXCOM 0)
".11.1?44,
DC1, CHAIRMAN
LSECDElt.P.T OF SILT E
(-,armagrent.a.a.
DEPUTY SEC!IET!,HY OF STATE,
VELIDER
*m. .1.m??????? 11.????nn
---.0111ATIOHAL COUTROL
POLICY AND RESOURCE GUIDANCE
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/06/08: LOC-HAK-337-1-2-4