REPLACEMENT OF RVNAF COMBAT LOSSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-32-3-7-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 29, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/10/01 : LOC-HAK-32-3-7-5
THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET March 29, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: Replacement of RVNAF Combat Losses
1.5(ofx
ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
OSD review
completed pages
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The President considers that it is premature to move to the
policy of restricted or delayed resupply proposed in your
memorandum of March 17, ,1.973. We have had less than 60
days experience with the ceasefire, and the North Vietnamese
are continuing to infiltrate men and materiel into SVN in
clear violation of it. If the DRV chooses to use these forces
to launch a major country-wide offensive, it could be critically
important that the GVN have all possible supplies immediately
available. Moreover, if we are to reduce the level of our
military supply support to the GVN at some point, it should be
in the context of a reciprocal reduction in supply to the DRV
by its supporters.
The GVN could and probably would interpret a restricted resupply
policy as evidence of reduced U. S. support, despite continued
provision of other items such as ammunition. The DRV and PRG
could also misunderstand that policy to be a lon.g-term rather than
.temporary approach. Consequently, for the present, the President
desires continued one-for-one replacement. This policy will be
reviewed- again on June 30,.1973, in light of developments.
Your proposals to increase the VNAF force structure, and to
replace VNAF F--5A attrition from F-5E production beginning in.
FY-74 are approved.
1
14-
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET
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MEMORANDUM
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR,: MR. KISSING
FROM:
RICHARD T. KENNEDY
JOHN H. HOLDRJDGE jtfq.
SUBJECT: Replacement of GVN Equipment Losses
Secretary Richardson has proposed a change in the one-fox-one rate at which
we replace major SVN military items (Tab B). Specifically, he recommends
that:
Those items which can be provided without degrading U. S. forces
or diverting from firm MAP/FMS commitments would be replaced
as urgently as possible.
Other items (i. e., those that would degrade U. S. forces or divert
from MAP/FMS commitments, such as those in the table below) would
be replaced as available, maintaining GVN stocks of ground equipment
at no less than six months estimated attrition.
The VNAF force structure would be increased to keep equipment on
hand in use, but aircraft replacement would be limited until crew
ratios are sufficient to justify additional equipment. (We are told
this increase would be from 56 squadrons. to 66, the planned steady-
state VNAF structure.)
..Mr.. Richardsonrs proposal is based on the fact that GVN inventories of major
equipment items are very. high, relative to their force structure as illustrated
in the following table:
?
Authorized
On Hand
. Excess
OSD review
completed
Light Tank
241
316
75
Medium Tank
188
265
77
APC
1164?
1373
209
W
eapons Carrier
153
158
5
MORI/CDF
105 mm Howitzer
1187
1270
83
C05106372 pages
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SECRET
DECLAS:12-31-81
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Mr. Richardson- ar.. ues that:
-- U.S. stocks :of.many major items are depleted, while the SVN
overages of .those same items are adequate to cover anticipated
attrition for from one to several years into the future without
further replacement deliveries.
-- We can establish "credits" with the ICCS for equipment not
immediately replaced.
-- Direct one-for-one replacement would generate procurement
costs of about $346 million through FY-76.
The VNAF is not likely to be able to provide sufficient trained
.crews to man their current aircraft inventory for several years
(thus, aircraft replacement would be correspondingly delayed).
-- Funding will be even more difficult if MASF is moved to MAP.
Mr. Richardson's proposal rests primarily upon the considerations of
funding, the impact on U. S. forces and on MAP/FMS commitments, and
congressional reaction toward maintaining SVN forces in a heavy excess
position while our own forces face shortages. In his view continued
regular replacements of items such as ammunition will serve to reassure
the GVN that our failure to promptly replace some major items does not
reflect a lessening of U. S. support.
The types of equipment which would be delayed are the major and high
visibility items. The extent of the delay would vary by item (informally
we are advised that no A-37s or UH-ls woul.be provided until late FY-75
or into FY-76, for example).
We believe that there are substantial reasons for opposing Mr. Richardson's
proposal at this time:
This policy of reduced replacement deliveries would come immediately
on the heels of our final withdrawal. Clearly the GVN could and
likely would interpret any appreciable delay in replacing such equipment
as a sign of reduced U. S. support.
military supply.
Our failure to resupply at the rate authorized by the Agreement would
be perceived by the other side. It could be misinterpreted by the
DRV and PRG as indicative of a longer-term intention to reduce our
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-- -Enhance Plus was undertaken to assure that the GVN would have
adequate means to--meet any military contingency should a ceasefire
break down. We have less than 60 days experience with the ceasefire,
and the North Vietnamese are continuing to infiltrate men and
material into SVN in clear violation of it. Until we can be reasonably
certain that the ceasefire will hold, we should continue replacement
on a direct one-for-one basis.
CIA estimates that deliveries from China and the USSR to North
Vietnam are continuing in all categories at a high rate. If we are
to reduce the level of our military supply support to the GVN at
some point, it should be in the context of a reciprocal reduction in
supply to the DRV by its supporters.
Establishing "credits" with the ICCS has two disadvantages. First,
if the DRV/PRG revert to major military action,the GVN will need
equipment in hand, not in transit. Second, credits notwithstanding,
at the point where we wanted to catch up, the change in resupply
policy would look like a massive infusion of hardware. The communist
members of the ICCS might also interfere with this resupply.
In our judgement the arguments against adopting Mr. Richardson's proposal
now are compelling. While we recognize that we will have to adjust the
rate of our deliveries at some point in recognition of the high inventories
in South Vietnam, it is much to soon to take that step. Only when we can
be reasonably certain of a durable ceasefire and a reciprocal reduction
of.arms supply to the North should we move in this direction.
Mr. Richardson makes two other points:
We should plan to replace GVN F-5As with F-SEs. The A. models
can only be obtained by withdrawing them from our allies. The E
models will be available beginning in FY-74.
VNAF will be expanded to its planned 66 squadrons now, even though
trained personnel are not available to fully man the increased number
of squadrons. Available crews would fly and maintain all the aircraft
in rotation. As additional crews become available, the units would
be brought up to strength. -
We believe both of these proposals, should be approved. The F-5E is an
acceptable replacement for the F-5A under the terms of Article 7. The
increase in VNAF force structure will assure that all of the aircraft we have
provided will be used regularly and properly maintained to sustain combat
readiness. Moreover, the GVN will have more operational flexibility
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with the larger number of units, and recruitment and training efforts will
be encouraged to fill them out more quickly.
The memorandum from you to Secretary Richardson at Tab A states that
for the present we should continue to effect maximum one-for-one replace-
ment but notes that we will review this policy on June 30, 1973, in light of
developments. It concurs with his proposals to increase the VNAF force
structure and to utilize F-SE production to replace F-5A attrition.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to Secretary Richardson at Tab A.
i+ Phil Odeen concurs.
SECRET
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THE ,SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20301
17 MAR 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Replacement of RVNAF Combat Losses (U)
(C) As I indicated during our conversation yesterday, we have addressed
the issue of the levels at which we maintain RVNAF inventories of major
items of equipment. Projects ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS provided RVNAF
inventory levels in excess of unit requirements, and also significantly
drew down US inventories of some items. I propose to replace RVNAF equip-
ment using the guidelines outlined below, unless it is contrary to agree-
ments we made with the GVN during the course of the negotiations.
(S) In ground equipment, the ARVN is in an extremely strong inventory
posture as.the table below on selected major items indicates:'
i
d
h
A
Est
Post
Cease-
or
ze
ut
In .Units .and
Main'Float
On Hand " Excess
6 Months
" Attrition
Fire
Losses
Tank, light M-41A3
. 241
316
75
15
15
Tank, medium M-48A3
188
265
77
3
. 16
APC, M-113
1164
1373
209
60.
22
Weapons carrier,
M-125A1
153
158
5
2
1
105mm, Howitzer
1187
1270
83
9
5
With no plans to increase its structure in such units as tank. or artillery
battalions, the RVNAF has, in some cases, several years of advanced attrition.
In the meantime, this equipment is in storage presenting major maintenance
costs. and deterioration problems.
(S) The high level of activities before and after the cease-fire resulted
in some losses in excess of the estimated attrition shown above. Virtually
all of these losses occurred as a result of the Marine Division attempt to
seize the south bank of the Cua Viet and hence are not likely to be re-
peated unless there is a general renewal of full-scale fighting--a circum-
Glassifed by= I?SA- --
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SUBJECT 'TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDUT.- OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMATICALLY D017YGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON__ 12/31/81
atie-~~ --~ C-- F r........ No. X-1056
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Even
stance which would change our entire concept of suppor for RVNAF.
with these heavier than predicted losses, the RVNAF inventory is still
ahead of needs and can amply meet expected attrition over the next few
years.
(S) By contrast the US inventory posture on these items was adversely
affected. ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS depleted our inventory of selected
items such as those illustrated above and required diversion of equipment
from US forces and MAP and FMS commitments. Unfortunately, funding
limitations, production lead time and worldwide shortages Tut th se
items in the scarce category for the foreseeable future.
tank exemplifies such a case. These tanks were diverted from US
reserve forces to meet the buildup of RVNAF. Currently, US resources
are limited to those in the hands of the reserves or scheduled to them
from depot rebuild. No production of this item is underway. The Armed
Services Committees have also pointed out that we have provided M-48A3
tanks to RVNAF while keeping the less effective M-48A1 for US forces.
They sought last year to make us exchange the ARVN A3s for Al models.
We held to our position, but further diversions to replace excesses
would undoubtedly cause Congressional repercussions. The Army, mean-
while, is studying ways to increase M-48A3 availability but time and
money will be required..
(C) For somewhat different' reasons it may be difficult to replace
critical air items such as fighter-attack aircraft, helicopters and
transports. As you know, F-5A aircraft are available only by negotia-
tions with selected Allies. An acceptable alternative for replacing
the F-5As is to wait until the F-5Es become available, starting in
FY 74.
(S) Other aircraft present major budgetary problems. Establishment
of a force structure which fully utilizes the A-37s, C-130s and UH-ls
provided under ENHANCE PLUS would generate. an immediate requirement for
replacement procurement through FY 76 estimated at over $346 million,
even though VNAF training is not likely to produce sufficient crews to
fully utilize such a structure for many years. Additionally, funds are
not available at this time for a sizeable RVNAF procurement program.
Attempting to fund the replacements will be even more difficult if
funding is transferred from MASF to MAP. Therefore, I propose to allow
the VNAF structure to be increased so that equipment is kept active,
but limit provision of replacement aircraft until crew-ratios are
sufficient to justify additional aircraft.
(S) In view of the above -consideratoas,a11owedebyatheoggreement is
replacement of all items of equipment
not prudent. I recognize that the GVN may have expected us to replace
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equipment on a one-for-one basis, and may view a failure to do so as a
sign of weakened US commitment. However, with careful management, I am
sure we can maintain their optimum com6at capability without incurring
Congressional wrath, reduced readiness for US forces, or extreme budgetary
penalities. Furthermore, we will be relieving the RVNAF of a measure of
their responsibility for storing, securing, and maintaining large depot
stocks which diverts skilled manpower and funds from other functions.
We will of course establish credits with the ICCS for any RVNAF equip-
ment which is not replaced immediately and will be able to provide re-
placements from world-wide US assets as the situation dictates. Therefore,
I propose to institute a policy under which we would replace as urgently
as possible on a one-for-one basis losses which can be accommodated without
degradation of US forces or diversion from firm MAP or FMS commitments.
Other items would be replaced as available, maintaining RVNAF stocks of
ground equipment at a level providing no less than six months advanced
attrition. Aircraft replacement will be analyzed on the basis of VNAF
crow-ratio and maintenance considerations.
(S) I believe the GVN must be made to understand the practical basis
for this policy and should recognize from our continued replacement of
such items as ammunition that we mean to continue to provide the where-
withal for them to defend themselves. Having established the RVNAF
national inventory level as of 27 January, we need the flexibility to
manage resources in a way that maximizes RVNAF:combat capabilities with-
out undue cost and disruption to the US.
C' L M ?
'117 13
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