COMMENTS ON CIA MEMORANDUM ON CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 27, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1
MEMORANDUM I
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
/TAI CII C AIC(` DM CACC IAICTDI I(`TI(ThIC ADDI V
SECRET /SENSITIVE
SUBJECT:
FR OM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE Lto
1652
INFORMATION
March 27, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
Comments on CIA Memorandum on Cambodia
Mr. Schlesinger, CIA Director, sent you a memorandum on March 23
recommending that General Haig visit Cambodia to determine if there
is any alternative to continued support for.President Lon Nol, and to
explore. the possibilities of an early Laotian-type settlement. Schlesinger
also suggested that Lon Nol be advised to release members of the royal
family, including Sirik Matak, from house detention, to declare martial
law and assign brother Lon Non to Washington as Ambassador. We have
questions about some of Schlesinger's suggestion and offer the following
'F'hnv~rrl,Fa.
-- General Haig would make good emissary to Lon Nol, but he should
be sent to Phnom Penh only with a concrete demarche to the President
and only after we have determined what we want to do. We can make this
assessment in Washington, and have already commissioned a comprehensive
study from the CIA on various future scenarios and options.
-- Release of detained members of the royal family would not accomplish
much; our intervention on Matak's behalf after his outrageous statements
on March 22 would be a bold affront to Lon Nol and could encourage Matak's
supporters seriously to consider a coup d'etat, under the assumption of
our acquiescence.
-- We do not understand CIA's suggestion about Sosthene Fernandez
assuming martial law powers. Does this mean that General Sosthene will
be the national administrator of the martial law or that he will have a special
mandate only for the armed forces? In any position, Fernandez probably
would be circumscribed by Lon Non if the latter remains in Cambodia.
SECRET /SENSITIVE XGDS 5 B 2 by Auth CIA (Impossible to
Determine)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1
SECRET/ SENSITIVE 2
-- Lon Non's exile to Washington would now probably be impossible
even if Lon Nol agreed. However, we should study this option further.
-- We should not be tempted to precipitous action -- such as the CIA
memo suggests -- or overreact to internal political developments. The
parallels to Vietnam in 1963 are too close. Rather, we should keep our
eyes fixed on our only important consideration in Cambodia -- whether and
for how long a friendly government can sustain itself under the changed
political circumstances following the March 17 bombing of the Presidential
Palace. Only if we conclude that the regime is indeed foundering and the
armed forces are unable to keep open lifeline LOCs should we take drastic
action (e. g., a presidential demarche or special emissary).
-- The essential question in Cambodia is not so much "national unity"
or "broadening the base" but efficient administration of the government
and army. To achieve this we agree that Lon Non's role must be eliminated
and more talented individuals be brought into the government. However,
Lon Nol does not have to depart as he.is a very useful element of legitimacy
and continuity.
-- Our task therefore is to locate another respected and dynamic
individual who can take over the government, attract better people and
push through essential reforms to keep the military budget under control
(i. e. eliminate "phantom" soldiers).
-- Considering Sirik Matak's inflammatory remarks to the New York
Times on March 22, we conclude that he is now "dead" with Lon Nol.
However, we should ask whether this is the end of the line or whether
another individual can be located and promoted to accomplish the above
objectives.
-- If we conclude -- after dispassionate review -- that Cambodia's
current drift is unacceptable, we should therefore focus our energies on
getting rid of Lon Non and finding a substitute for Sirik Matak in our game
plan.
-- In any event, we do not favor pushing the Cambodians into a Laotain-
type settlement. Such an agreement would give the enemy its essential
objectives (a veto over U. S. assistance to the Khmer and a free hand on
resupply through Kampong Sorn port to their forces in Vietnam). A de facto
partition of the country -- a standstill cease-fire -- would be far preferable,
leaving an independent regime in Phnom Penh and the Communists with only
half a loaf on their logistics requirements.
SF r r) V -P / Cam` ATcT1r TYr?G"
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1
w
49
R CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
P
rlto:S im DESK of
Tzs Dxiu eroa
March 23, 1973
TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
Attached are some thoughts on what
we might do to shore up the situation
in Cambodia.
James R . Sc'Iil Lnoer
Cy-Mr, Kennedy.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1
 23 March 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:. Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Possible Steps on Cambodia
Attached are a few thoughts relative to our discussions this
morning. I have done them up in the form of a blind memorandum
in case you wish to forward them.
Chief, Far East Division
Attachment
As stated above
25X1
25X1
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49 ~ 19
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1
Executive Hegist:p
' ; 6
 SUBJECT: Cambodia
--- Declaration of martial law with Major General
Sosthene Fernandez given necessary powers to fight
corruption and rejuvenate the Cambodian Army.
1. The situation in Cambodia has deteriorated rapidly enough
in the past week to suggest the need for an immediate reassessment
of prior plans to strengthen the Government. It now seems virtually
impossible to maneuver a situation in which Lon Nol could be induced
to depart Cambodia with Lon Non, leaving behind a caretaker government
under Sirik Matak. A. new look at policy can perhaps best be accomplished
by sending a Presidential emissary to Phnom Penh to consult with
all the Cambodian players and with the U. S. representation there.
General Haig would be abgical choice for this mission.
2. Our approach at this stage might best be one in which we
express very considerable concern to Lon Nol about the political
situation and its effect upon the capability of the GKR to: a) defend
itself against the NVA and the Khmer Insurgents and; b) develop sufficient
strength to carry out negotiations leading to some reasonable settlement.
The visit should be billed as a fact-finding one to all parties, but the
real purpose should be to assess whether there is any real alternative
to continued support of Lon Nol. Consideration might be given, however,
to suggesting the following steps to Lon Nol:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1
'Immediate release from arrest of the
members of the royal family including Sirik Matak as
a gesture of confidence on the part of the Government.
23 March 1973
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1
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--- Assignment of Lon Non as Ambassador to
Washington.
3. The Presidential emissary could also explore with all parties
the possibility and desirability of attempting to arrange a negotiating
channel with the Khmer Insurgents, either directly or through Hanoi.
Negotiations now might be leading from a position of weakness but if
the Government's effectiveness continues to deteriorate, it might be
better to attempt some kind of a Laotian solution earlier rather than
later.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/07: LOC-HAK-32-2-11-1