UNCURK AND THE KOREAN ITEM IN THE UN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-31-5-20-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 15, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDG
SUBJECT: UNCURK and the Korean Item in
the UN
You will recall that in discussing the Korean situation with Chou En-lai,
he indicated that if we can secure the abolition of UNCURK the Chinese
would be willing to-"keep the issue quiet. 11 By. this we assume he meant
the whole Korean question in the UN next fall. You told Chou that you
believed it would be possible to obtain the abolition of UNCURK by the
second half of this year, and that you had talked this matter over with
the President and had received his agreement. You said that you would
see if you could get the South Koreans to agree and, if possible, to have
them propose UNCURK's abolition. If not, you would consult with the
other members (we believe that you meant the other members of
UNCURK). Chou said that it would be best if the South Koreans took the
initiative. You told Chou that you would have the answer for the Chinese
on, this by mid-March.
To begin sorting this issue out, it might be useful to ask Ambassador Habib
for his views on how the South Koreans might react to offering to abolish
UNCURK if some arrangement can be worked out with the other side to
keep, the Korean issue quiet in the next UN session. He might also be
asked about South Korean willingness to take the initiative. At Tab A. is
a draft back-channel message from you to Habib which sets forth this
proposition. It is put in terms of its occurring to you following your talks
with the Chinese, and makes no mention of the subject having been dis-
cussed with them.
Your recent conversation with ROK Foreign Minister Kim Yong-sik
provides some insight into current South Korean thinking on this issue
(Tab B). When you asked Kim about UNCURK, he seemed to suggest that
its terms of reference were no longer germane, but added that the
organization should be maintained in order to put pressure on the North
Koreans. It would thus appear from Kim's words that we might have
some difficulty in persuading the South. Koreans to go along.
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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Bowever, there are a number of factors which might be used to
persuade the South Koreans to go along. First, the quid pro ?_
we would be proposing in itself constitutes some pressure on
North Korea, and the ROKs themselves--if they had some confidence
in the outcome of the deal- -might be glad to get the Korean issue
cooled in the UN next fall. Second, UNCURK may be in the process
of falling apart anyway. Two of its member nations (Chile and Pakistan)
have already withdrawn; both the Netherlands and Australia have
indicated that they believe it no longer has any utility; the Thai and
the Turks appear disinterested. The logic of trading a fading as set
for a tangible gain might appeal to the ROKs if the proposition is
presented to them in this form.
There is one major hitch to the outright abolition of UNCURK, how-
ever. A State paper (Tab C) points out that the outright abolition of
UNCURK. would require formal action by the.UNGA.--which almost
inevitably would lead to the acrimonious UN debate that both we and
the PRC want to avoid. In addition, such a debate could result in
others attacking the UNC, and the ensuing UNGA. action formally
abolishing UNCURK could be read as a North Korea victory and could
suggest a repudiation of UNCURK" s past actions in Korea.
The State paper therefore suggests several alternatives, the most
preferable of which, in my opinion, would be that of having the
UNCURK reach an informal understanding to adjourn sine die, and
to inform the UNGA. of their decision, explaining that in light of the
South-North talks UNCURK's efforts to secure Korean reunification
were no longer necessary. The organization would still remain on
the books, thereby preserving the fiction of its existence, but to
all intents and purposes cease to be a factor on the Korean scene.
As with the first alternative, the ROK's taking the initiative with
the UNCURK members toward this end would have a number of
advantages for Seoul and ourselves: it would help avoid an appearance
that the move had been forced on the ROK, would help the ROK
steal a march on the North, would .spike any North Korean claim of
victory, and would give the PRC and other Communist nations
leverage to try to persuade North Korea to acquiesce in deferral
of a UNGA. debate.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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In the case of either alternative, however, we would want to have
some idea of the ROK attitude.
Re commendation:
That you approve the draft back-channel message to Ambassador
Habib at Tab A.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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Arriernbassy Seoul
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR. HABIB FROM HENRY A.
KISSI GER
1. During my recent talks in Peking I gained the impression that
the Chinese share our interest in not exacerbating tensions in the Korean
Peninsula. In thinking this over, it has occurred to me that it might be
desirable to try to sidestep a potentially disruptive debate on the Korean
item in the 'coming UNGA session by moving in advance to abolish UNCUP,K.
2. As it looks to me, TJNCU'RK is a major focus of communist
attention but now serves no real practical purpose other than to provide
a UN presence in the ROK. In any event, its days appear numbered due
to the withdrawal of Chile and Pakistan, as well as Australia's possible
withdrawal.
3. It would therefore appear desirable to trade off what is at best a
fading asset for at least a reasonable chance of staving off a full debate
on Korea, and thus deflect attention from the much more sensitive issue
of the UN Command. In my opinion the Chinese are likely to go along
tacitly with moves by our side to play down the Korean issue.
4. Without approaching your hosts, I would appreciate your views
on this subject, and on how the ROK's would react. Could the proposition
be put to them in such a way as to get them to see advantages?
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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5. A. State study,
however, points out that the outright abolition
of UNCURK would have to be undertaken through formal UNGA. action--
which would almost inevitably lead to the acrimonious debate we and th?
PRC want to avoid. The State paper therefore suggests an alternative
under which the UNCURK members would agree to adjourn sine the,
and would inform the UNGA of their decision, explaining that in light
of the South-North talks its continued efforts to secure the reunifica-
tion of the two Koreas were no longer necessary.
6. Whichever of these alternatives we might decide on, we can see
a considerable advantage in the ROK's tal.ng the initiative to propose
such a move. By doing so, it would help avoid an appearance that the
move had been forced on the ROK, would have the ROK steal a march
on the North, aad would spike any North Korean claim of victory. In
short, it would put the ROK in the best possible psychological and
political position with respect to the DPRK. Also, an ROK initiative
would give the PRC and other Communist nations leverage to persuade
North Korea to acquiesce in deferral of the UNGA. debate.
7. Your early estimates and comments would be very helpful.
I regret not having been able to have discussed this with you in person
during your recent stay in Washington.
8. Warm regards.
SEC.RE i /SENSITIVE
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March 8, 1973
UNCURK
BACKGROUND
UNCORK was established by the UNGA in 1950 with
the mission of achieving under UN auspices.a "unified,
independent and democratic government" in Korea.
Since then, its mandate has been regularly reaffirmed
by the UNGA but in 1971 and 1972 the UNGA deferred
debate on Korea. By virtue of the successive UNGA
actions, UNCURK has a separate juridical status,'a
Commission designated by the UNGA, and a UN Secre-
tariat funded annually by the UN budget. Furthermore,
it symbolizes the historic UN role in Korea and the
UN's involvement in a major international political
issue. Nevertheless, during its twenty-two plus years
of existence, UNCURK has in fact done little but observe
elections and other developments in the South making no
progress in its assigned mission. (A full background
memo on UNCURK prepared for NSSM 154 is attached.)
With each passing year, UNCURK grows increasingly
anachronistic and increasingly viewed as an outdated
vestige of the cold war. The problem of unification
and South-North relations has been de facto trans-
ferred to the direct talks between the.ROK and
Pyongyang. Two members, Pakistan and Chile, have with-
drawn and others, Australia in particular, are threat-
ening to follow. Its mission of observing elections
is necessarily no asset to the ROK exposing it to
criticism while leaving.the North unexposed. UNCUIR will
not, for example, send a report on the recent National
Assembly elections as a compromise to avoid a critical
report., And, it has been determined easier to secure
in 1971 and 1972 deferment of the UNGA debate rather.
than to ask for positive reaffirmation of its UNCORK
mandate., In 1973, the early prospects for gaining UNGA
support for even deferment are not too promising. Not
only will UNCURK lack support in the UNGA from the
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Communist bloc,.many African states and non-aligned
countries, but its past supporters in the West in-
creasingly wonder if its preservation is worth the
effort in an era of detente.
In the past, UNCURK has been considered worth pre-
serving as a symbol of UN political support for the ROK
and its legitimacy in the North-South struggle. UNCURK
has.provided the ROK with moral and political buttressing,
but has only the most indirect security significance.
Both the US and UN Commands, which have a security role,
would.not necessarily be affected by UNCURK's dissolu-
tion.. However, the dissolution of UNCURK could lead to
efforts to disengage the UN totally from its historic
role in Korea and to challenge, specifically, the UN
Command, whose maintenance has been of greater value to
the United States.
The ROK, in particular, has placed.great store in
preserving UNCURK as a vehicle to confirm its privileged
international position and to provide a major advantage
over the North in its claim to legitimacy as the sole
internationally recognized government in Korea. But,
recently there have been signs of ROK flexibility on
the continuation of UNCURK and some recognition of the
prospect of UNCURK's dissolution in the near term. The
ROK leadership would still, however, far prefer UNCURK's
continuation and in particular be seriously concerned.
about any faltering in firm US support for theROK posi-
tion at the UN. The ROK places little intrinsic value
in UNCURK, per se, but it would be more fundamentally
disturbed by its dissolution, under some circumstances,
as the first step toward eventual total UN.disengage-
ment from Korea and "big power" determination of Korea's
interests. The ROK leadership also fears adverse
domestic repercussions from UNCURK's dissolution. How-
ever, the ROK might be convinced to accept UNCURK's dis-
solution, if, as a quid fro quo, UNGA debate were at the
same time deferred -- thereby minimizing the risk to the
ROK of the North achieving equal international status to
ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO DISSOLVE UNCURK
1. Formal Action by the UNGA
The most.direct and legally approved method to dis-
solve UNCURK would be by formal UNGA.action. But, this
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approach could almost inevitably lead to a recriminatory
UN debate, some downgrading of the past UN role in Korea,
a loss of status for the ROK, and a grant of legitimacy
to the North with little to gain for the ROK. '.Addi-
tionally, an UNGA debate on Korea might well.get out of
control and lead to a resolution urging dissolution as
well of the remaining UN structure in Korea; including
the UN Command. From the ROK viewpoint, and.US as well,
this course of events would be the worst of all develop-
ments.
2. Action by UNCURK
UNCURK's presence in the Republic of Korea might
effectively be ended without General Assembly action by:
a: An informal understanding among its remaining-.
members that its activities would cease on a
given date without formally reporting to the
b. An informal understanding by the members to
adjourn sire die combined with a report in-
forming the UNGA of its decision that, in light
of the North-South talks, it no longer needs to,.
function;
co A formal decision by these members that it would
no longer meet or report to the UN General As-
sembly because the situation in Korea no longer
warranted further UNCURK activities; or,
d. The resignation of one or more of the remaining
UNCURK members, leading to either of the fore-
going situations.
Any form of unilateral action by UNCURK, without
formal confirmation and debate by the UNGA, is obviously
open to challenge by the legal and UN purists. They
will question the action on the grounds that it repre-
sents an undesirable precedent, and that it degradates
the historic UN role in Korea. The UN Secretary General
may well see a UN-vested interest in keeping involved in
Korea, having been excluded in Viet-Nam.
Unilateral action obviously requires the cooperation
of the UNCURK members, and Thailand and the Philippines
will find it difficult to agree without ROK assent. For
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this and, other more basic reasons, ROK acquiescence
will be essential. Furthermore, if the approach is to
succeed, all the major powers, including the PRC and
the USSR (ergo North Korea), must concur in order to
defer the very kind of acrimonious UNGA debate this
tactic is designed to avoid.
An associated and potentially major problem will be*
the need to disband the UN Secretariat staff at UNCURK
headquarters. The UN Secretary General would have to be
persuaded to recall the staff. In the absence of such
steps, the UN's expenses for UNCURK would still be dis-
cussed each year in the UNGA's Administrative and
Budgetary Committee.
On the other hand, the potential advantages of this
approach are very compelling: it could avoid the need
for an UNGA debate; it provides a graceful exit for
UNCURK least harmful to ROK interests., or to the re-
maining UN presence in Korea; and it offers less immedi-
ate gain to the North. Finally, this approach provides
greater potential for leverage with the Communist nations
supporting the North in gaining a quid pro quo satis-
factory to ROK interests -- specific- ly, for example, a
deal to drop UNCURK in exchange for deferring UN debate
and the dismantling of other UN machinery until the
prospects for a stable North-South accommodation are far
more advanced.
Of the four approaches offered, the informal under-
standing ("a" or "b" above) may be preferable since they
provide the minimal targc for the UNGA,and it could be
argued that UNCURK is "inactive" but not formally dis-
solved. A more formal action might lead to stronger
demands for formal UNGA confirmation of the UNCURK
action, ergo a UN debate, although any unilateral approach
is vulnerable to such a demand.
PROPOSED SCENARIO
ELEMENTS OF A QUID PRO QUO ANNOUNCEMENT:
1. The UNCURK membership would unilaterally decide
to adjourn sine die, on the grounds that the North-South
talks no longer necessitate its functioning, and'so
report to UNGA.
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5.
2. The UN'CURK Secretariat would withdraw from Korea.
3. The UNGA would defer debate on Korea in 1973
without taking formal action to confirm the dissolution
of UNCURK, with the understanding that UNGA debate would
be resumed only when North-South talks had reached deci-
sions requiring or making advisable further UN action;
i.e., admission of two Koreas.
4. In 1974 and subsequent years, the Korean,item
would no longer be inscribed on the UNGA provisional
agenda, in the absence of an UNCURK report.
5. The ROK and North Korea would be separately en-
couraged to pursue their bilateral and direct efforts to
reach at least a temporary accommodation, assuming uni-
fication is still not feasible.
TACTICS
Stage One -- Explorations
1. The US will informally and quietly explore with
and seek the agreement of the PRC and USSR to the pro-
posed arrangement.
2. The ROK, with US support, would simultaneously
explore potential support for a reenactment of 1972 UNGA
deferment scenario with a view to providing further
leverage in gaining PRC and USSR support for the proposed
arrangement. (Neither power nor North Korea should assume
we have no alternative but to accept a losing fight on
deferment.)
Stage Two -- ROK Acquiescence:
Assuming PRC and USSR (and implicitly North Korean)
agreement to the proposed arrangement, ROK acquiescence
would be sought on the grounds that it offers the best
prospect for promoting the North-South talks free from
disruptive UN involvement or the threat of total UN dis
engagement from Korea. It could be argued that, even
though a 1973 UNGA deferment might be possible, the pro-
posed arrangement gives greater security to the ROK in
subsequent years.
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Stage Three -- UNCURK Actions:
1. The UNCURK membership would be
on the proposed course of.action. (They. are unlikely
2. Japan and the UK would be privately consulted
encouraged to dissolve informally.
co nave any oDjections. )
Secretary General would be requested to.withdraw the
3. Simultaneous with`UNCURK dissolution, the UN
Stage Four -- UNGA Action:
The UNGA would defer debate on the Kotean.item with
Background memo on UNCURK
prepared for NSSM 154.
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