COMMUNIST INTENTIONS DURING THE POST-CEASE-FIRE PERIOD

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
April 2, 2010
Sequence Number: 
25
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 28, 1973
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7.pdf130.45 KB
Body: 
ejvim,L,/ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02: LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 IIP MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRET/SENSITIVE INFORMATION February 28, 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER FROM: Army Review Completed JOHN H. HOLDRLDGE SUBJECT: Communist Intentions During the Post-Cease- fire Period MORI/CDF per C03223156 The CIA Station Chief in Saigon has forwarded his field assessment of Communist intentions during the post-ceasefire period. In summary, the assessment indicates that while the Communists are currently placing their main reliance on political struggle, the pattern of current Communist plans indicate that Hanoi is preserving and expanding its military options in preparation for a possible return to the use of military force should political developments fall short of Communist objectives. The assessment points to the following signs that no end to Communist military pressure is in sight: COSVN Resolution # 2 is reported as making clear that Hanoi is preparing to reveru ED main iorce wariare if the political struggle does not produce a settlement on its terms. ? Cadres of the VC 5th Division have been instructed to expand " "liberated areas" without awaiting the results of the political struggle. Other cadre have been instructed to observe the agreement outwardly but to violate it secretly. 25X1 25X1 25X1 as many as 16,000 NVA reinforcements, including many imancry uroops, are now in the pipeline heading south. ? -- In a pattern parallelling the southward move of anti-aircraft artillery in late 1971/early 1972, the NVA have established SA-2 SAM installations in Quang Tri Province, thus gaining a security shield for further offensive operations. ? The NVA is engaged in a major logistics push. Supplies are reported to be pouriag into the A Shau Valley west of Hue and Laos truck movements are reported to be over 400 per week. SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS ByAuth 4 ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02: LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02: LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 111 SECRET] SENSITIVE -2 -- Communist designation of Due Co and Xa Mat as entry points strengthen the prospect that they will continue to use Cambodia and Laos as logistics bases. The field appraisal concludes that these Communist steps may well be the opening slices in the traditional Communist "salami" campaign designed to maintain and strengthen Hanoi's military options and that "the extent and severity of the Communist moves will surely increase unless they are challenged promptly and with credibility." The Station Chief's assessment is at Tab A. SECRET /SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02 : LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02: LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02 : LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02: LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02 : LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02: LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02 : LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02: LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02 : LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02: LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02 : LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02: LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02 : LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02: LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/02 : LOC-HAK-31-2-25-7 25X1