LETTER TO HENRY KISSINGER FROM R. T. KENNEDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-30-1-18-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 16, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

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4P ?
DOS, JCS, NSS, Review
Completed.
SECRET/SENSITIVE January 16, 1973
ACTION
Henry:
Much to our amazement, Habib has drafted a proposed policy paper
which, among other things, proposes that we be planning a reduction
of U. S. forces in FY 1974 and an internal study looking to their
total withdrawal in the FY 7576 period (Tab B). He also wants to
consider seriously phasing out all grant assistance in the FY 76-77
period.
We think this should be turned off firmly now before it leaks out
(which it most certainly will o.. given the wishful thinking on the,"
part of some elements in State). Otherwise, we are headed for a
disaster in our relations with the ROK at this critical juncture.
We will be handling this firmly in the bureaucracy but believe that
the attached backchannel to Habib (Tab A) can put things in focus and
get him personally lined up.
Recommend you approve the attached message.
Approve IT? Disapprove
R. T. Kerq edy
Attachments
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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25X1
SECRET /SENSITIVE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER
1. I know that you and others in State and Defense are now engaged
in making contributions to various studies relating to U. S. policy toward
the Republic of Korea. In this connection, I thought that the President's
views on the nature of the U. S. military presence in Korea and on the
5-year Modernization Plan might be helpful to you in your consideration
of various options.
2. Regarding the U. S. military presence, the President has no plans
to carry out any further troop reductions for the forseeable future.
He remains conscious of the near-trauma -.our previous reduction
caused in our relations with the ROKs, and wants to be certain that the
question of our military presence is looked at very carefully in this
light to assure that whatever we do does not generate a.:grave loss of
confidence in us on the part of the ROK people and Government.
3. In the President's judgment, the 5-year Modernization Program
also relates very closely to this issue of ROK confidence and US-ROK
relations. He recognizes that Congressional funding maybe hard to
get, but on the basis of the assurances which we have given the ROK
leadership he considers that we have no alternative but to carry out
the program with such stretch-out as may be necessary to reach the
$1. 5 billion level. The ROKs consider that they have a commitment
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SECRET /SENSITIVE
from us, and so does the President. As he sees it, the only real
issue therefore is the mix of ground force, air force, and navy
requirements for a balanced defense. Some adjustments can of course
be made here as a result of recommendations from you and General Bennett,
from State and from Defense.
4. Any comments which you would care to make to me directly
would be very welcome. I fully appreciate the complexities of the
problems' which we face over the matter of our military relationships
with the ROKs, especially since the ROK constitutional changes went
into effect, and will look forward to your counsel.
5. Warm regards.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
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 FOR RM USC ONLY
A-432 SECRET-EXDI S
TO DEPA1'7.'J1:NT,OF . STATE
_.-
copy ova,. 6
FROM
Amembas sy SEOUIS? i'
DATE: December 10, 1972
SUBJECT : U. S. Policy in Korea Country Team Message.
REF
AStEER~
A Ly..rd.
KENt^"
LUVAN
LEVINE
NEGRO?--.._
ODEEN ---------
RATLIFF
RnR~ r~rr!r~".~
SAUNDERS
SONNENFELDT
V. G.
WALSH
SUMMARY
This is a three part paper containing the Country Team
assessment of the Korean situation, recommended objectives
and supporting policies in a PARA context and conclusions,
alternatives and tactics. In the light of developments
during 1972, the Country Team recommends review and mod-
ification of U.S. objectives and policies in Korea.
I. ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION AND IMPLICATIONS OF POLICY.
1: -In 1972, events have set n motion changes which pro-
foundly affect the Korean peninsula. The July 4 Communique
between'lhe North and South and President Park's "October
Revitalization" program have changed completely the context
of the ,South-North relationship and the structure of gov-
ernment in the Repubfic,Qf?Korea. Coupled with the develop-
ing new relationships betweerr Korea's great power neighbors
and the U.S., these changes affect not only Korea but the
U.S. role and, policies here.
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR PHILIP C. HABIB. SUBJECT TO
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652.
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DE- `
CLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1980.
DO' Donohue/PCHabib
Clrrtrocen: kul0 ; I-U 11RDID V'Y
UUP07~ ? RB~Pet erw li e six~be , ~~ i '?G - `ctnrt
~7HRicflirdson% er~'1,-mc.
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Page 2 of Scoul
A. SOUTH-NORTH RET ATTONS.
1. The ROKG and the? DPRK have moved rapidly in establishing
a substantive dialogue and the. intergovernmental mechanisms
for continued coordination and future joint actions (e.g.,
exchanges, economic relations, political discussions). The
July 4 Communique provided a framework within which future
negotiations between the two sides will be conducted.
2. While major substantive matters are being approached
cautiously, the process now in motion is not expected to cease
and we expect more measured, but still visible movement towards
broader dialogue and greater contacts between the South and the
North. For the foreseeable future, it is our assessment that
neither side - has' ag" i:t's target organic unification but rather
a level of accommodation that does not threaten absolute control
over their respective areas. Each will seek to further its own
short term objectives while biding time on the larger issue of
-.reunification.
South-North dialogue or, give the impressi.on that we are pre
time we must avoid actions which would threaten progress in the,,
.- problem of international recognition.--of the DPRK.fit the same..
our policies regarding. the Korean .question at the UN and. trip.
.for Korea. It affects.assessmentsof the security threat and.
3. As this. process continues, it inevitably affect:s,'.U.S. policy
need to be modified to reflect the new-situation in- Korea.
c .pif ately abandoning the ROIL. .. In`..sum; our,' pol cy::and programs
the ROKG and DPRK have reduced the importance of the
Militant threats and bitter exchanges between the.-two sides
have receded. In their bilateral contacts,-:including the hotline,
hostilities is less now than at any time since the 1953 Armistice.
There have been no reported incidents. along the DMZ.in a year.
THE THREAT OF WAR.
1. As a result of the South-North meetings and the , international
environment in which'they have occurred, the danger` of major
2. Nevertheless, formidable military forces face.each other.
In ground forces, the ROK has an advantage, and the-.navies are
at a standoff. However, the North maintains an.advantage in air
Military Armistice Commission.
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power if the U. S. air forces available are not taken into
account. This latter imbalance is not serious in the current
situation and the pi sent and projected deterrent pow, in
total forces available to the ROK is sufficient for/ iecd . If
the modernization plan for ROK forces is essentially achieved
in terms'of equipment, we have no doubt that the bilateral
military stand-off can be maintained.
C.
Korea, his country's.-national interest demands his. strong, un-
THE ROK DOMESTIC SCENE.
-l. Domestically, President Park has abandoned a political
course which has served him and his nation well and which we
have encouraged in Korea for 25 years. With the "October
Revitalization" he'has deliberately embarked on a program of
highly persohal,*auth'aritarian rule. There is now established
a governmental structure based essentially on tight executive
control. We have commented on Park's reasons in other messages.
They involve a complex of factors including, primarily his am-
bition to remain in power and his long-standing unhappiness
with the constraints and, political frustrations inherent under
the former c'onstitution." Park -is also convinced that in a
changing interna ional einviror tent,- and in dealing with North
challenged-leadership,
.far beyond the political institutions in establishing firm,
positive government control over South Korean society. Measures
now under consideration would affect education, labor, the press
and economic life.' The government speaks of exercising author-
ity with restraint, but there is little question that control
will be firm and dissent forbidden. However, disquiet exists,
particularly among the educated and students.
in the near future rests -onPark's. ability,: for the present
unquestioned, to maintain control through the traditional in-
struments of'a-dictatorship the bureaucracy, the police
agencies and the Army. The '-'.Oct,oberiRevitalization" will go
2 We cannot; :now predicts. the Tutu:re train' of. events. Stability
3. These changes will cause problems for us and may well affect
certain of our programs. Considering our substantial military
presence and long-term support for Korea, the USG will be faced
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with the conti__t _ng que, ttion of what our licy stance should
be towards uripalatabie domacstic actions of the Park Governracnt.
4. The ROKG hopes that we can be induced to appear to positively
support its domestic political plans. At a minimum it expects
to jar its control of the situation
that we will do or say nothing
and that key elements of U.S. policy (MAP, AID, PL 480, U.S.
forces) will not be seriously affected in the short terra. We
should not support or approve Park's repressive domestic
political actions or be associated with them publicly or privately.
Indeed, we believe they were unnecessary and in the long run
unwise. However, our long-term presence here and continuing
relationship with the ROK. associate us, at least tacitly, with
the ROKG. It is clear that no mere wrist slapping will deter
Park from his. political designs. He and those around him are
?comnitted to establ isl"iing a severely controlled society. This
we can deter only by direct and drastic intervention which would
threaten Park's hold on power, create instability and deepen
our involvement in the ROIL internally.
D. THE I ERNATIONAL SITUATION
The Scuth-North dialogue and President Park's "October
Revitalization" should be viewed.in?the context of the inter--
national, scene. Korea is no longer the frontier for East-West
confrontation and the interests of the-;bur great.powers in
Northeast Asia` ,transcend Korea. The evolving web of contact
between the great powers has lessened greatly the possibility
of a conflagration in Korea involving, or directly supported
by, the USSR and PRC.
2. The Koreans have recognized this. On both sides of the DMZ,
they have made their own hard-headed appraisal of the situation.
The ROKG expresses concern that it can no longer rely completely
on the U.S. cos?-fitment despite our frequent reaffirmations. it
is deeply conscious of the increasingly dominant economic role
being played by Japan, and asserts a desire for a continuing
U.S. economic presence as a counterweight. Koreans also fear
that Korea's future may be caught up and decided in some great
power permutations over which they have no control.
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3. In this situation, President Park is determined to move
toward a policy of--greater "self-reliance," diplomaticaally,
economically and militarily. Concern over the great powers,,
including the U.S., is a clear theme in Park's justification
for his domestic political actions as well as the South-North
dialogue. However, Park's view of self-reliance, paradoxically,
includes a desire and an expressed need for the U.S. presence
and assistance to continue -- at least in the short run. His
concern that we will reduce our aid program, withdraw our troops
sooner than he would like, and his doubt over the firmness of
our treaty commitment, come to the surface from time to time.
Generally speaking, he wishes to hold on to these elements of
strength for as long as he can, expecting they will diminish as
time goes on.
ti.ons. regarding supporting policies and-programs:
Based on the assessment contained in Part I,;:.there_follow the
Country Team recommended PARA objectives and summary recornmenda-
PROGRA14S
II. RECOMMENDED PAPA OBJECTIVES AND SUPPORTING POLICIES AND
particular, this would mean, continued 'av .i.labilities to the
U.S. of bases to support our security comnitmdnt and a major
A... R.ECOM?MENDED OBJECTIVES
Deter hostilities on the
Korean peninsula...
2.. Maintain a s table-eom from .se of' interests bearing
upon Korea 'among major powers in Ncartheas t Asia . ,. For J paiz, in
3. Support the South-North dialogue in a manner
eC0n0fJ.c x-oLU LLL L1.Vd. Cd.
consonant with U.S. interests.
4. Increase ROK self-reliance and reduce ROK. dependence
6. Support the continued presence of a government in the
ROK whose foreign policies and outlooks are favorable to the
U. S.
5. Avoid U.S. actions with regard to North Korea which
interfere with the development of South--North .accommodation.
.
on U.S. military support for its own defense.
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7. Maintain ;our long-term interest in the growth
of political maturity in the R01< and of institutions re-
sponsive to the needs of the Korean people.
8. Increase U.S. exports to Korea and expand private
investment in support of U.S. balance of payments while main-
taining our interest in sound economic growth in the ROK.
9. Further cultural relations between the United
States and Korea.
10. Maintain access to such military bases in Korea
as needed.-
B. SUPPORTING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS:
1. Domestic.
a. Recognize that the Park Government is embarked
on an.indeper:dent course based on a domestic foundation of
highly personal, authoritarian rule.
b. Maintain normal, friendly governmental relations
with the Park Government but seek to avoid associating ourselves
with Park's domestic authoritarian political plans and actions.
,c. ,Maintain normal contacts with elements of
Korean society outside the Korean Government, to include any
responsible political opposition that may exist.
d. Continue our public and.private support for
the ROKG in the South-North dialogue.
2. International.
a. While not rejecting postponement as a tactic,
accept the extension of unconditional invitations to both sides
to participate in discussion of the Korean question at the UN.-
Leave the question of membership for either one or two Koreas
to be decided by the ROKG and DPRK themselves. In this regard
the manner in which resolutions by the opposing sides would be
dealt with at the UNGA require special consideration. -
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 Maintain the Mutual. . -Defense Treaty.,
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b.Accept the early end of UNCURK in an
appropriate and dignified fashion.
c. Qu3.et'ly work to move the question of
Korean unification out of the XTN. context leaving it as an
issue for the two Korean regimes to settle - not as an
international responsibility.
d. Accept that the problem of third country
diplomatic relations with the ROKG and the DPRK is a matter
for the individual governments to decide. We should no
longer feel required to expend major diplomatic capital try-
ing to block diplomatic recognition of the North by other
governt;ents.
cautiously and only after full consultation with. the. ROKG.
A=432
e. Begin to review our policy with regard to
North Korea while avoiding any actions which could complicate
the development of South-North relations. At this. time we
should approach any bilateral dealings with the,North most
spring of 1973 and of ter.: t.he. Nationa:. As snmb ly e lec tion s .
:1-in FY 74. inform the RQKGof,.the *size'of the reduction in the
b.. Begin reducing ground combat. forces in the ROK
developments or-other,.even4s will affect timing.
Military.
c. :Study int na1.Iy t fie possibility of- complete
withdrawal of ground combat ` forces. from the. ROK .n. the FY
75.76. -period.. At the 'same time, recognize that South-North
d. Continue to. transfer the cost of the ROK
military defense to the. Koreans themselves:
-i, Proceed to reduce MAP "Operations
and Maintenance" costs through FY 75 as proposed in
Seoul 6679' and examine the need for any residual .0&M
thereafter.
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~~.. Attempt to S1lbsta-1nt l _y mecL the MOD
Plan "investment" obi! ectiVCS with FY 7 5 - as the target
terminal yea.r. This would involve significant increases
in "I" levels above those currently projected. Then
consider seriously phasing out all grant assistance in
the FY 76-77 period.
.
i. Review the utility of the UNC in the current
Korean situation, particularly as it xclates to operational
control, the armistice and likely UN developments. We should
also begin to talk to the ROKG about possible ways of trans-
ferring the UNC armistice responsibilities to the ROKG since
the two Korean regimes are already in de facto fashion dealing
directly on the maintenance of the peace.
4. ? ?Economic .: -
a. Continue our PL 480 program at levels approp-
riate to Korea's needs and in support of U.S. objectives
including trade development.
b. Continue our vigorous, expanded support for
U.S. commercial interests. This requires a more active
campaign to interest U.S. exporters in the Korean market,
improving EXrIM and other credit and guarantee facilities for
trade,' and when necessary, the usQ of official "leverage" to
the advantage,of U.S. commercial interests.
..c. Continue the.phasedown of AID technical
assistance programs. The ROK is a successful AID "graduate"
country. In its present stage of economic growth, the ROK
does not need the kinds of technical assistance, we provided
in the past.
d. Terminate U.S. development loans by the end
of FY 75 consistent with our understandings,under the Textile
Quota Agreement.
5. Other Programs.
as USIS
Continue the U.S. informational and.cultural
program in support of U.S. objectives as set forth above.
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b. Peace Corps
Review ongoing Peace Corps activities 'in
the light of likely ROKG restructuring of social institu-
tions. Do not increase the program above present levels
and assure continuation of a low profile, non-political
stance on the part of Peace Corps volunteers in a new,
restrictive political environment. Recognize that the
Peace Corps program is marginally useful to Korean develop-
ment but in selected areas its contribution has been valuable
and appreciated. It also provides a good environment for
American youth for service and self-development.
III.. CONCLUSIONS,--ALTERNATIVES AND TACTICS:
A. EARLY ACTION:
In major program terms, the recommended policies and program
changes listed in Part II would involve. early decisions on
the following matters. .These decisions should be made soon
.and would be couunicated to the Koreans in the first half of.
.
1973.
?.a.
Modification of our UN,policy concerning Korea.
b.
I vel of U.S. ground forces in Korea in FY 1974.
c.
Increase of MAP "I" to allow substantial fulfill-
ment of MOD Plan "I" objede ves~by tJe end of FY 75.
d. Approval of the MAP "Ost cost transfer schedule
previously recommended.
B. THE LONGER TERM:
1. Other recommended actions will be considered in
more detail in future messages if the general policy direction
as envisaged is approved. This involves such things as the
future of the United Nations Command, U.S. policy regarding
North Korea, U. S. force levels and, MAP p:_ogra.ms beyond FY 1974,
and economic and corranercial programs. Some of the, simpler
recommended actions can be accomplished within existing policy
guidelines.
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Mutual Defense Treaty would remain. Given our current assess-
ment of the security situation, the strength of the ROK forces,
and the ability of the Korean economy to bear increased defense
costs, we believe it entirely feasible that a carefully cal- ,
culated phasedown in our present high level of military support
w
2. It should be noted that, if our recoimmendataons
are accepted, there ;till will be a major U.S. prose-nee in
Korea in the foreseeable future. Our PL 480 program would
continue; MAP levels-Would.be high through FY 75 and would
substantially meet the joint U. S. /ROK modernization goals;
over 30,000 U.S. military personnel, including the air
component, would still be in ROK at the end of FY 74. Most
importantly, the basic U.S. security commitment in the
3. Our recommendations are in great measure a recog-
nition of trends and decisions already clearly in train. Our
recommended course of action would only begin, not complete,
the process of establishing a new U.S. relationship to Korea.
Our recommendations are sufficiently considered and flexible
to .avoid a major. increase in -.tensions and =to avoid compromise
of other important U.S. objectives in Korea and in Northeast
Asia. For instance, they. should not unduly upsets valid
Japanese: concerns about' the .: security of the.-area. Nor should
they jeopardize .the further development of the -dialogue between
can begin in FY 73-74.
South and North Korea.
levels and let events determine our policy.: There are dis-
to maintain our programs, support and .commitments at . present
C. THE ALTERNATIVES.
1. The most obvious alternative to our' recomendations is
advantages in this. They are:
a. The likelihood that events in Korea, the. UN and
ment of the situation, we would be faced-with a 'series of
discrete decisions made on an ad hoc basis, which we'suspect
would be more, not less, unpalatable to the ROK and morn
internationally will continue-to outpace our expectations.
Instead of adopting a prudent course reflecting our assess-
destabilizing in their impact.
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b. A lessened justification for our
present high levels of support in terns of the security
threat. We would, therefore, be mis-using resources and
our jrograms should be brought. into closer alignment with
desirable U.S. objectives.
A.443 2
c. The clear danger that maintenance of the status
quo in policy terms would not only be inappropriate but also
unresponsive to our interests as the situation in Korea and
Northeast Asia changes.
2. Another alternative would be a policy of active inter-
vention to force the Park Government to back down from its
authoritarian political plans and to reinstitute representative
- government.-, As-we--have noted earlier, we can only deter Park
by drastic intervention which would create major internal
instability and involve us deeply in Korean domestic affairs.
This alternative was rejected by the Embassy and the Depart-
ment at the time martial law was declared and the new Con-
stitution announced. There are those in Korea, aid elsewhere,
who will be disappointed if the U.S. does not'use what leverage
it has. to try to :brce the ROKG to reinstitute democracy in
Korea. However, it remains our view that the costs of trying
,to coerce Park to retreat are too great in terms of our
ob j ec to vas and our interests here 4nd, in any event, might fail.
3. Internationally and at the UN, we could also stand pat
on our past.positions trying. to- preserve the special status of
the ROK. However, the South-North dialogue and other develop-
ments, including the imminent international acceptance of
two Germanies, make it unlikely that we can sumessfully
accomplish this. Similarly UNCURK, which is of marginal utility,
appears to be nearing the end of its road with even the Aus-
tralians considering how to end the Commission. Because of
these considerations, we believe that our past UN policy will
not long stand up and that 1973 should be used as a transition
year to a policy more in keeping with the realities of the.
situation.
D. TACTICS AND ROK REACTION:
1. We would expect a strongly negative reaction by the ROKG
to any apparent diminution of our support. The ROKG wishes
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A-1+32
of Seoul
to preserve as long as possible the benefits of their relation-
ship with the U.S., whatever the actual requirements of the
situation are.
2. For obvious tactical.:reasons, the ROKG would insist that
there be,no reduction of U.S. troop levels through at least
FY 1975, that the MOD plan be fulfilled completely and that
UN strategy be unchanged. They might accuse us of weakening
our baste commitment t a time when they need it to deal with
the North. They might also interpret any U.S. actions as
manifestations of U.S. political displeasure with President
Park's domestic policies.
3. At the same time, the Koreans are tough and cynical
realists. They have already made their own appraisal of
the situation and are anticipating changes in their relation-
ship with the U.S. Prime Minister Kim's public statements
predicting U.S. troop withdrawals by 1975 reflect a.`private
conviction that a fundamental change in ROK/U'US relationship
we would consider scaling down our material support. However,
can manage it. The ROKO will not be surprised by the fact. .
is inevitable, and eventually desirable, as. soon as,: the ROK.
v to delay our actions. ..as long as po:sslLale.
.regarding UN policy, U.S -force levels and MAP. Rather we
4. . Tactically; we. would not present as a package our proposal s
envisage the-following scenario in 19.7.3:
a. February-March: Inform ROKG : of our , firm decision on
transfer of more "0 and. M" costs.. At the same time assure them
in concrete terms of -USG det"cnnination to seek sufficient
"I" to assure substantial completion of-.MOD plan objectives
by FY 75.
b. March-April: Inform ROKG of our view that our UN
strategy and policies must be modified in the light of
developments in peninsula and internationally.. Give them
our views on policy changes and the future. of UNCURK.
c. May-June: Inform the ROKG of a scheduled reduction
of U.S. ground forces in FY 74.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/20: LOC-HAK-30-1-18-7
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/20: LOC-HAK-30-1-18-7
A-432
the
In our approaches we would assure/ROK of .nour. continued
5Ai commitment to -1'tOK security:, pointing to remaiingJ. S . forces
and our comet fitment to MOD plan l levels. At the same time
we would also frankly pv:int 'ouut that our MAP 'aid U. S .. force
levels are not immutable. They are based on ongoangassess-
mients of the threat and on the ability of ROK to taear the
costs of its defense. Cie: would tell. the ROKG-trhat moderniza
tion of the ROK armed forces and the impressive growth of the
Korean economy mean that U. S. military ansource al.oca.tions
will continue to -change, while. our-basic treaty commitment
:remains firm.
CONCLUa.IOx
conclusion; we believe that-t 'he changed international
In
environment, the South-~ Nprth develop cents -and President
Park r s "October 'Revitalization' for e. ` review 'and : nac ;Lon of our ob ect fives in, Ko ea,-And our s pp rung,
pol.ales. The year. 1:92 has been ' aatexshed gear`. for:
Xarea, and iU.S polio es should reflect a newreality and.
changi.n U. S, role, Therefore we request a y ;consider-at~ion o the:.
l e recommend i ,pol i c es and. pr rg ams anxt :the. proposed
tacti s
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/12/20: LOC-HAK-30-1-18-7