BOMBING HALT STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-3-7-1-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 15, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMOKAN3JL'&i
'I'FIE WHITE HOUSE
~~,.rr~r'n~rrmrn r
a oraz~a z ~T~rx ss
~"anuary 15, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSJNGER
FROM: Al Haig ~?~":
~.=
5UPTEC'1': Bombing Halt Study ,-~,,~.~..G,-t_~ ~
..!7'Z~-'ti~
The attached memorandum from Bob Haldeman enclosing a mempranduxxx
from Tom Huston points out the difficulties that Huston has run into in
trying to piece together the history of the bozxzbing halt. As you know
his point of departure was the inforrrzation we had assembled over a
long period last' spring.
I have talked to Huston and he believes that the studios done by Davidson
and Moor were biased and loaded in favor of the Democratic Administration.
I could not but agree. Nevertheless, he has had the sarn.e difficulty they
had in trying to get the infarrrzation necessary to .make a real hard
judgrrzent, Since there w-ere so many people around who were obfuscating
the true facts, I doubt they will ever be known and frankly believe that
Huston should write his piece on what he now has to a degree he can do
so. I watched Phil Habib do the rz7ost delicate dance in the history of an
NSC ;meeting last winter when the President asked him if there was a
bombing halt agreement and a caxnplete understanding by both sides
that one existed. Z do not think Phil could ever be mare forthcoming
than he was on the gri11 in front of the President and with the pressures
working nn him at that moment I doubt that Huston or anyone else could
gin up any more. Consequently, 1 think this now becomes a sterile
exercise unless they want Huston to z-nake a career of it. Frankly, the
only reason for which this dacuz~n.ent will be employed in the near future
will be to present this Administration's view of the problem. It will,
therefore, probably be subjected to the sarrze kind of judgment that the
Davidsonf Moor studies, were and thus serves the purpose for which the
President is seeking,
I recommend that you tell Haldeman that Huston should be tr~]d to proceed
with what he now has, to make it an interpretive document which would ?)
,'be-political v~.].ue and to give up on the well digging, J
--~-
~'llh7'"^rT"'T"'r7'~7"~T' A T
v v ? ~ ~. a.t.r 1~ rv~:"lrlSi
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[.~.. ~ ;~
~ecerxzber 19. 1969
Your are Correct in assuming ttxat the, President wants a complete
and corr7prehensive review o? all the rnate~rial at hand with regard
to the bom?aing halt, C~xban Missile Crisis and the Diem Murder.
A re-write ,job such as you've indicated `could not be adequate.
While I realize that yau~r taking on this assignment independently
while maintaining your other duties may not Ue feasible I would
stitl like you to devote a substantial arxiount a? time an this in
conjunction with the apprapxiata members o? Henry Kissinger's
staff.
Pleae~e pxoceed with this project as quickly as possibles and provide
for the T'resi.dent. a 6rie? status report on ~~vhere the project stands.
Sn addition you rn.ay want to include a statement o? any of the. problerz~s
that you're presently herring on the project and your suggestion of how
we caz~ solve therm to make sure that this project ie cozngleted in a
reasonable amount a? time.
HRH:LH:prn
cc: Henry Kissinger
Jim Keogh
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 --
,., No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/07/16 : LOC-HAK-3-7-1-9 ,~;~:'~
corrFm~NTZAx. January ~~, lg7a
MEMQR~a.NDUM FG~R GENERAL A. M. HAIG
FR?M: Jan. Hawe
5Uk3JEC'x'r Hu~tan's Mernarandum re T3ambix~g Halt
At Tab B is Hustan's arequest far infarmatian on the availability of
xrxat?rial relating to events leading to the 19b8 bombing halt. At
Tab A are three xxaemaranda far your signature per your request.
JTH:feg:1 /13/70
Cf~NFIT3ENTI.AI.,
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 January 1 ~#, i g7~
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CC~N~'II~EN'~'T..~1. L
MEM4IiAi'+T~UM ~O~
executive secretary
i"3epartmc~nt of Stag
A member caf the White ~Tvu~e: ataxi'f i~ prepaxing a repaxt faar the
~xea3~der~t an the ~.vailability of n~~.tcxial xe~latin~ to ev~:nta leading
to the 1~6t3 txalt of the bc~mbin~ a~' ~voxth Vi~txiarn. Would ycsu
please h~.ve~ a che?k made rrf yaux filee~ fax zxxemvra~xda. res~axtd
r~r atho~r ~aextinent ix~foxma.tiax~ aril provide a brief deacxiA~tive
list.
Alexazader M. lYa3~g
l3rigadiex Genexalr U. ~. Army
Militaxy A.~~aletant
AMH:JTH:~eg: l / 13/7p
CC?NFIl]ENTIAL
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CC)N15'~~'NT~A1'. January ~~, Z97t}
5pccial Assistant to the T?irectar
of Central Intelligcxxc~
Washington, .~]. G.
A ~enemb~r eaf the Wh?te I~ou~sc~ staff,i~ prepa.rix~g a report far the
Fresidont crn the av~.ilabiZity cif n~~.terial relating to events leading
to the 1~b6 halt of the bombing a:E North V'ictn~em. ~6':roulcl you
Please have ~. check made of your ~ile~s for m.exxsaranda, reports
car ether pertin~sr~t infc~xrs~.ation and: provide a i~riaf cle~criptive
list.
/5/
,AlexandQr M? Haig
Brigadier General, U~ ~. Army
Militaxy ~,, s sis tent
AMH:JTH:feg:I /13/70
~UN~'SUEN~'IAL
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corrFZnE~rTx~,~.
f~ ~/
MEMC3~tANAUM F'C)R
JFi121Lt21~( .~'~r 1970
Golo~xel ~tabe~rt Parsley
Military Assistant
CJi'fice Q~ the Secretary of Uef~use
'xhe Heritagax~
A member a~ the '~'4'hite Houst~ staff #s pr~sparirxg a report for they
Fre~sideo.t an th+~ availabilit+,~ off' xx~ate~rial r~lat3ng to events leadixxg
to thr 3.~(a~ 1~~-lt of the l~rsxa~birsg of Nc~xth Vietnam. ~~ould you
please have ~ check made of ~r?ur files fox meinoraxxda, repoarts
or ocher pertinent infoxmativn and larvvide a brief descriptive
list.
Alexaxxder M. Hs.i;g
Srig$dier Geaneral. U. 5. Arxxzy
Military Assistant
AMH:,TTH:feg:l / 73/7Q
ERtfld~'~'IT3ENTIA L
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CON~'1DENTlAL January.' 14, 1970.
MEMC7RANDUM FdR GENERAL A. M, HA1G
`~
FRUM: Jon Howe A~~
SUI3JFC T:
Hustan's Memorandum re Bombing Halt
At Tab B is Hustan's request for information on the availability of
material relating to events leading to the 19b$ borx-ibing halt. At
Tab A are three memoranda for your signature per your request.
CONFIDENTIAL
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MEMO1tANllUM
THE 'FVIIITE f~OUS~
wnst~rNOTOrr
January 13, 1970
CONIj'IDEIVTIAL
RE: The Bombing Halt
In order to make the record clear, should the President
inquire, I wat~ld like to have ?ron7 the State Department a formal
statement that they do nat presently have in their Files, in either
.the office of the Secretary, Under Secretary, or Assistant
Secretary for East Asian Affairs, any memoranda, reports, ox
athex material relating to the events leading to the 196$
bombing Halt.
While it is rxiy understanding that the only xecord they
have is the cable traffic, I would like to satisfy myself completely
that this is the case.
I intend to make a notation o? the result o? this inquiry in
my report to the President.
It would also be helpful if a similar inquiry were officially
directed to G7A and OSD.
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, MEMORANDUM
~CONFTnENTIAL
.~-
January 10, 197Q
MEM(71~.AN]~UM FOR HENRY KxSS1NGER
STIBJECT Bombing Halt_SEudy
Without raising any stir or pointa.ng any fingers, I would
appreciate your reaction to the attached ra.~emarandun~ ?rom
Tom Huston. It appears to me that Tom, once again; has
raised some vital points. On the other hand, the depth o?
digging that he is suggesting znay iza fact, not be appropriate
ar necessary., What I need to lcnaw is your ?celing on the
situation. If you da not agree with 1-lust-an, it would pro-
bably be best for us to establish a position an this project
and present that position to the President sa that we can
either proceed or forget it.
Attachment
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wa.s~irv~rorv
January q, 1170
CONFI"DENTII~ L
M:CMC7RANDUM F OR H. R. HALDEMAN
Fxom: Tom Charles Huston
Subject: Bombing Halt Study
After an extensive effort to xesolve the question of whether
the President wishes a detailed historical sumxr~.ary of the negotiations
leadixxg to a Bombing Halt or a detailed analysis from a political
perspective, l: have concluded that no one is quite certain. Alex
Butterfield advised that you thought the President wanted the
former; General. Haig thought he wanted the latter. I will attempt
to give him both.
The written manuscript which 1 have completed to date, has
xeached such a length that I can't. spare my secretary's time to
count the pages, and 7 still have a way to go. I have found a rather
significant gap in the NSG cable file and they have had to go back
to State to get the missing materials. l should have these on Monday.
I will then be in a position to complete the narrative history.
T doubt if anyone will want to wade through my historical
narrative by virtue of its length and detail, but it has served a
useful purpose for me in that it has enabledxne to get a firm grip
on the problem, to identify the crucial issues and junctures during
the negotiating period, acid to understand the relative positions of
the various individuals intimately involved in the negotiations. Once
the narrative is coz~nlalete, it will. be possible to locate the significant
gaps and formulate the crucial questions to which answers are lacking
in the present record.
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CONFIDENTIAL
Assuxx~ing you wi11 grant me the time to do so, l intend to da.
a much shorter ~ analysis of the ebb and flow of the negotiating
process and the implications of the decisions which were taken at
each crucial step along the way. This may be what Dr. Kissinger
had.in. mind when he referxed to a "politically oriented" document.
The final step which T plan t4 take is to put on paper each of~~~~
the important unanswered questions which require answex s if a complete ,
uzxderstanding of what took place is tv be achieved. I will. also identify ~~~%~
4.-
possible sources for this information and pos.~ible steps which: could
be taken to acquire it, along with the risks involved, i. e. , the "ripples"
.that might be created.
If this plan of work is not satisfactory, or if you think part of
it is unnecessary, please let me know. I can ca11 it quits after
completing the detailed historical record.
There are certain pxoblems which I have encountexed which
should be seriously considered before I proceed to examine the
Cuban Missile Crisis and the Diem Murder. The three subjects
which I have been assigned axe among the five messiest foreign.
policy problems of the past eight years (excepting only the Laos
Accords of 1962 and the Say of Pigs.) Each of them constituted a
"crisis" during the Democratic .A dxxainistrations and they all smell
once you strip away the facade of pexfum.e which. the JFK-LBJ
propaganda squads sprayed over there. The point which must be
xemembered is that the culprits made a determined effort to cover
their tracks. The written records which xeally tell the story
axe at Cambridge ar Austin and the pevple involved are not talking.
A cursory exarninatian of the public recoxd will not tell .the President
anything lie doesn't already know and a fear of causing some ripples
may pxeclude the type of digging and 'investigation which would be __
necessary to get at the juicy facts.
There is also the problem of having the mandate, latitude, and
resources to da the type of job necessary to ferret out the facts,
I am luxe my difficulties in getting coopexation have not been due
to the unwillingness of people to help, but to the fact that they simply
CONFll7ENATZAL
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CONFIDEIVTIA L
dan't have time to mess with it anal don't much understand ox care
what it is I am about. And I don`t feel free to ga very fax on my own
initiative far fear of intruding into someone's domain without a
proper authorization.
I have been reluctant to raise these problems far fear that at -
would appear I was either presurnptuous ar self-serving, ar both.
But I have concluded as a result of working on the Bombing Halt that
there is no sense trying to maintain the fiction that I axn adequately
handling the assignment which I have been given.
To do the job effectively, I thank it should be handled at
a highex level so that some latitude is available on determining what
information to seek and from whom. to seek it. Also, the services of
more than one person is required ... assuming that what the Pxesadent
xeally wants to know as what LBJ and JFK made such an effort to
conceal. My suggestion is that sevexal highly txained investigators
fxom the FSI and the intelligence services of the,Arz-x-iy and Navy,
along with perhaps one CIA man, be detailed to the White House
fox this type of work. These people ao uld have to be carefully
screened and selected far political xeliabilaty as well as prafessianal
competence, but they would provide the capability to da the extensive
digging and interviewing, under apprapriate covers, that is necessary.
With a little effort one can locate a great number of prafatable
leads, .but they are worthless unless you can follow up on them.
Moreover, there are a number of people stall in the govcrnrnent
who have first hand knowledge of many of the events which we are
interested in. We ought to make an effort to get this information
from 1:hem while they are still around. Many would be reluctant to talk of
directly approached, but a? approached under a suitable pretext, might
give us some important anfoxmation. Others should be required
to give us the information we seek.. For example, I fail to understand
why Phillip Habib should occupy such an important pasation in this
Administration and yet be unwilling to give us some of the information
we seek about what took p1aGe in Paris during 196P.
O
CONFIDENT IA L
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Ct7NFIDENTIf~ L
I have not gone into detail about the. xnyx'iad measures that
could be employed to gather this type of information since it is
unnecessary i.f the fundamental approach appears to you to be an
over-reaction to the problem. 1 don't know the priority the
President attached to this type of i.nfarmation. 1 only know what
would be required to get it if he really wanted to have it available.
X suspect that this type of operation will stralce yQU as highly
irxegular as well, perhaps, as totally unnecessary. l will grant
the farmer anal only you can. judge the latter. Haw ever, 1 believe
that there are probably a great number of areas beside the there
assigned to me where the President would like to have sensitive
information which is currently unavailable because we don't have
the resources available to gather it without a direct, public effort.
If this is true, such an operation as that which 1 axn suggesting
could have value beyond the scope of the three projects wha.ch x
am working on.
a~^''
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
GONFIDENTIA L
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z~~E~,~ ~~~1~~~,~ ~ ~.~
THE 'W:~IITE HOUSE
December lg, 1g6g
MEMOIZA.NDL7M ~'OR. TONS i-iUS'T'ON
You are correct i.n assum.irAg that the President wants a complete
a.nd comprehez7si.ve xevie?r of all the material at hand with regard
to the bombing halt, Cuba.z,. ;Missile Crisis and the Uiem Murder,
A re-write job such as your~re indicated would not be adequate,
While Y reali2e that your taping an this assigx~rxa.ent independently
while xx~axntaining your other duties ,may not be feasible, T would
still like you to devote a : ubstan.tial arxiount of time on this in
conjunction with tl~e appropriate members of Henry Kissinger's
staff.
Please proceed with this project as quickly as possible and provide
for the President, a brief status report on where the project stands,
In addition you xn.ay want to include a statement of any of the probleiris
that you're presently havj.vAuY on the pxaject and your suggestion of how
we can solve them to make sure that this project is completed in a
reasonable amount of tixrxeo
cc: Henry Kissinger
Jixn Keogh
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wnsxxxrrasonr
x7ecexnbex 3, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE STAFF SECRETARY
I have xeceived from Dr. Kissingex's staff a rough draft
memorandum relating the sequence of events which led to
the bombing halt in November of l9b$. 1 have not received
any material on the Cuban Missile Crisis ar the Diem. Murder,
although I have asked for this.
It was my understanding that the President wanted as cbxnplete
a retard as possible of each of these three events. I assumed
that ixraplicit in my assignment was the responsibility for deter-
mining whether the xx~aterial at hand was an adequate record.
However, it may be that all that I am expected to do as to rewxite
,the memaranduxn pxepaxed by the NSC staff.
If what the President wants as a simple rewrite job, I can. have
that done by the first of next week. However, based an my study
of the materials at hand, it is my opinion. that the final result
would be a polished but incomplete xepoxt. I believe that someone
should go back aver the oxiginal cable traffic and make an.
independent assessment of the facts contained in the NSC draft
xnexnoxandum and determine whether these are not gaps in the record
which should and could be filled. This would be atime-consuming jab
and fox me to do it in conjunction with zny ether duties would require
sevexal weeks rrzinimum. Someone else could conceivably do the task
an a shoxter period.
Since I have been. unable to secure any xnatexial on the othex two~itexns
which I was to look into, I cannot make an assessment of the time
required to do either a rewrite or an independent analysis.
I would appreciate it if you would advise whether a rewxite of the
NSC :kx~emoranduzn an. the Bombing Halt will meat the Presiden.t's
xequirement, or whether some thing more substantial is required.
TUM C1~4RLES HLTSTON
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wnszzzxcroza
Octok~er 2Q, 1969
r~',i,I~01?AIdDUT?I l~'OP. KEtd COLE
1 rnet taclay ~~ri.th Colonel I:aig to discuss t}~e reports the
President requested an ~hc: Bomb IIa1t, the Cuban PTissile
Crisis and tt~e Diem Plunder. Colonel Ilaig has ac~rec~d to
provide me wit}~ the in~orm~~ta_on the DISC presently ]ias
avai]_ak~le on tiiF~se supa jc:cts. 1 ta~.ll review this material
axtd detexz~ine whether additional inyormation is required.
1 will su}~mit another interim zeport on my progress after
I have had an opport.t~nity to review this material..
TOrt CF'~RLES IIUSTON
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October lb, 1969
MEMOR.AN]~UM FOR 'S`OM HUSTC.~TV
"VVauld you please get together with the appropriate rrs.erx~.ber of
Henry Kissinger's staff in regard to working out a report for
the President on the barx~lZing halt glue same additional, assign-
xnEnts on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Diem, murder. ~Ie~ary
received a mexx-orandum from the President regoesting that he
develop a report an these subjects and in turn, that 'S'am Huston
be assigned to work with Henry's staff on developing the xeport.
I believe Plenty's staff has already done some work. vn this issue
so it may k~e a question of organizing the date. into the mast usable
form for the President.
Thank you very much,
H. R. HALI7EMA.N
HRH: LH: pm
bc: Tizn Keogh
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M~MOii~Nll u M
TI~~ WIiITIa. HOUSIa
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMOIi.ANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
~... / ~_
FROM; Henry A. Kissinger I ,"!
C
.October 13, 19b9
SUBJECT: President's Request that You Assign a Staff Member
to Develop a Report on the Bomb Halt, Cuban. Ma.ssile
Crisis and the Diem Murder
By memorandum of September 22, 1969, the President asked for a
complete report on the bomb .halt from all vantage points, as well
as whatever data we could get on the Cuban missile crisis and the
Diem murder.
Attached is the correspondence on this matter, together with your
covering note in which you recommend th~.t Ton- Huston be used
for this purpose. You should be aware that we completed for the
President a thorough research of all the records dealing with the
bombing halt. They are available if you decide to put Tom Huston.
on this job. I fear we will have somewhat mare difficulty with the
Cuban missile crisis and the Diem murder, but I would like to designate
a member of my staff to work with Huston in:
a. Converting the research data already completed on the
bomb halt to a more politically oriented document responsive to
the President's desire.
b. Obtaining from State, Defense and CIA that data which is
available on the Cuban missile crisis and the Diern murder.
If you would ask Huston to contact me, I will insure that the project
,gets started.in response to the President's directive.
CONFIDENTIAL
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~~T ~.3 i4'~~3
,.
..
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to L'evc~Iop :x ?t~.y qa?i on t'~M ~o..xb ~Za.1i, Guiawn A,Ii.~~ilw
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cozxa. 1:: c.~~ x?ej~n:~.~l ~rJ1 tae bo:~~"s.a ~zL!lt irnz-x1 ~?? v~Znt~..Ue paint;;, as ~~~~?3.
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fog t:r~iw p~}??,r~o~o. Yc+.t Ss~GV.?d bc, x ~,-~~.xe that ti~'e ec~r_i ?cw ~-d nor tiz~
Presi~ze:~t t tn.,x?a~:,a re~.~,.-:c,iz a:i all tizo reepx?us d~.-':?:in v~ith t.a
bozZZ~.~an;~ h-z?t. Th^y ~ ra ~ ;,?s:?I b?~ iz yc~u d~czd~ to ; ~!t '?'o~ H~i~~,~n
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