WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THIS IN THE LIGHT OF LEHMAN'S MEMORANDUM?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-3-3-27-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2009
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: December 9, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-3-3-27-5
! !
SECRET December 9, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR
MR. EHRLXCHMAN
What do you think about this in the
light of Lehxraan's memorandum?
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET Attachment
-IAK:AMH:feg:12/9/69
MAY CONTAIN
CONGRESSIONAL MATERIAL
MORI/CDF
C03338573
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-3-3-27-5
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-3-3-27-5
MEMORANDUM.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
29 November 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EHRLICHMAN
FROM: J. F. LEHMAN
1. IAMB. MCClintock's performance before the Symington Subcommittee was unobjectionable
if the written transcript alone is used as a basis for judgment.
2. Amb. McClintock may be justly criticized for a general disregard for White
House directives, and an overeagerness to please Sens. Symington and Fulbright,
at the expense of the better interests of the Executive Branch. The following
are some examples:
Conduct of the Interdepartmental Group
The IG was set up on 22 Sept, in the White House, and McClintock was given
clear instructions that he was to follow guidelines set by the White House.
-? As the hearings progressed, and their seriousness became evident, MCC disregarded
one after another guideline in the face of ferocious browbeating from Symington
and Fulbright - this despite specific protests from Mr. Mollenhoff and Mr. Lehman.
- As McC's conduct of the IG diverged further and further from White House directives
he began neglecting to notify Mr. Lehman and Mr. Mollenhoff in time for them to
attend; or if they attended, he failed to recognize them from the floor; and in
several instances resorted to sarcasm and ridicule , eg asking Mollenhoff if he
should be commenting on legal matters since he was a "journalist.
-.When told point blank that the White House Group directed that x be done, he
invariably demurred saying that Alexis. Johnson was his boss and he couldn't do
anything unless Johnson told him to.
- When told point blank that Mr. Ehrlichman had specifically directed that the
figures for Philcag not be released, he replied "Mr. Ehrlichman's writ does not-
run over here'. The figures were given to the Subcommittee and published.
-.W ut informing anyone in the White House, indeed going to some length to keep
it secret, McC arranged a "deal" with Symington whereby State would not censor
the Philippine testimony in return for Symington's delaying publication until after
the Philippine elections.
- The White House Group had directed Mr. Lehman to attend the hearings as a member
of the DoD team. McC told Symington who Lehman was, and asked him if he thought
Lehman should attend. Symington refused to allow Lehman to attend.
- McC attempted to get State off the hook in the Laos hearings by attempting to
have the DoD witness appear as a co-principal witness with Amb. Sullivan. He was
.thwarted only by explicit instructions from Mr. Ehrlichman to Alexis Johnson.'
- Despite explicit instructions that the White House was not to be mentioned , McC
told Symington that the White House, not State was holding up the Laos transcript'.
This resulted in an enraged call to Dr. Kissinger from Symington and "blew the cover."
Despite repeated warnings not'to mention the White House, McC caved under very
heavy pressure from Fulbright and said for the recd-rd that he was acting under
White House instructions. When pressed further he referred erroneously to instructions
from the Attorney General and invoked Executive Privilege,
SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-3-3-27-5
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-3-3-27-5
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
DEPARTM ENT OFSTATE
Washington. D.C. 20520
'November 28, 1969
SUBJECT: Highlights of Symington Subcommittee Session on
.the Republic of China (3), November 26,.1969.
U
J
S/S
EA
- Ambassador Green-
- Ambassador McConaughy
Ambassador Brown
Mr. Moore
EA/ROC -? Mr. Shoesmith
EA/ACA - Mr. Kreisberg
L - Mr. Stevenson
L/EA - Mr- .. Futterman
PM - Mr. Spiers
PM/JW - Mr. Wolf
S/PC - Mr. Cargo
H
-W'H
- Ambassador Torbert
- Mr. Ehrxichmanf . ---*0
-- Mr . Mo l lenho f f
NSC Mr. Lehman
DOD Mr. French
Mr..Knaur.
CIA
I;SA
Mr. Banner
.Pursuant to arrangements made with
White House con-
currence by the Department with Senator Symington, Ambassador
McConaughy appeared unaccompanied by other witnesses before
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-3-3-27-5
 No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-3-3-27-5
SECRET
the Subcommittee at 2:30 p.m. to testify in regard to
sensitive intelligence matters in the understanding"that
a. single copy of the transcript would be made and retained
in the custody of the Department., It was further understood
that a record would be returned to the Subcommittee contain-
ing those portions which might be made public.
ton __ said
Before the proceedings started, Senator Symi_ng_
he would undertake to sanitize the. record of the previous
two days to eliminate much of the material involved in one or
,two sharp exchanges that took place , particularly with senator
Fulbright. He said he would. edit the record "as much in your
favor as in ours." The Chairman remarked that he had known
Senator Fulbright a good many years, but there were times
when he was "very intense."
Ambassador McConaughy, in response to an initial question
from Counsel about overflights of the Chinese mainland,
proceeded to give a detailed description of activities bear-
ing on this question and other sensitive matters. He assured
Counsel that the US remained in control of any operations in'
which it had a hand. He also indicated that the Ambassador'
in
was informed in general/regard to all sensitive programs and
received full reports on them, although basic policy decisions
were made in Washington.
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-3-3-27-5
 Senator Symington expressed appreciation for the forth--?
coming remarks of the Ambassador. Senator Fulbrih, who
appeared quite intense; asked a number of questions intended'
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/16: LOC-HAK-3-3-27-5
to show that our actions in Taiwan led the Chinese Communists
again attempted to engage in a protracted discussion of
Vietnam. Senator Symington interrupted to indicate the dis-
cussion,was.getting off course and that he. expected ambassadors
- to.support the Administration's policy. Senator Aiken also
tried to divert the discussion by inquiring about oil deposits
to feel that they were subject to US aggressive tactics.. He
in .China, leading to a comment by Senator. Symin ton that the'
discovery of-extensive. oil deposits could solve much of
Returning to a subjects discussed earlier in the pro-
ceedings, Counsel asked. in what circumstances 'US aircraft on
China's political problems.
Taiwan would shoot down Chinese Communist aircraft in the
Taiwan Strait. He did not, however, press far an answer,
but indicated he wished to have the question on record.in
.-the event the An vide a response.
The session ended at about 3:30 p.m.
S/PC:ALSeligmann:lm 11/28/69