SUMMARY OF FOREIGN REACTION TO YOUR TRIP TO CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-295-2-22-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2009
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: March 24, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/15: LOC-HAK-295-2-22-8 2599
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA8HIN0TON
SECRET / EXDIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
March 24, 1972
'THE PRESIDENT HAS S FFJ
SUBJECT: Summary of Foreign Reaction to Your Trip to China
We have prepared the following summary of the foreign official and
media reaction to your trip to China based on various reports
received from the State Department and CIA:
EAST ASIA
In general, the states of the area remain publicly approving, and
are now less apprehensive as a result of assurances given in high
level statements and the Green-Holdridge mission that we will
remain true to our commitments and have struck no secret deals.
Many capitals, however, believe that they must begin adapting their.
policies to a changing international context.
Republic of China. Taipei has drawn back from its initial
shock over the Communique, but it still is highly apprehensive of our
long-term intentions. Our high level. statements and the Green..
Holdridge mission appear to have rea'ssured the ROC that our defense
commitment is intact'for the present. But the Government and
populace seern'to be reserving judgment until they see how we proceed
in norni.alizing relations with Peking and whether they in fact now have
the full story on the visit. They wonder if the U.S. has agreed to steps
that will eventually force it to further compromise on the Taiwan
question; and whether the long-run U. S. strategy may not be to preserve
the appearance of adherence to its commitment, while backing out
through actions that deliberately undermine Taiwan's viability.
Japan. The Sato Government was greatly relieved that the
Communique did not go further to include U.S. - PRC agreements
that Sato felt might make his domestic position untenable. Sato is
SECRET /EXDIS
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0 -
now focussing on trying to establish direct official contact with Peking
to discuss the normalization of relations, and toward this end has
inched forward with, a minor modification of Japan's position on the
Taiwan question.
-. South Korea. The Park Government has been considerably re-
assured over the outcome of your visit, and now seems satisfied that
the Cons unique contains the sum and substance of the die cue ssion on the
Korean problem. Its underlying apprehensions can be easily stimulated,
however, as was shown by Secretary Rogers' March 7 press conference
remark that the U.S. had "indications" that North Korea was interested
in detente and the U. S. wanted to improve relations with all. including
North Korea. The ROKs suspected that these "indications" were given
to you by the Chinese in Peking.
- Southeast Asia. The lndos hlaese leaders have publicly endorsed
your trip, most strongly in Lis and Cambodia , and President Thieu and
his advisers appear satisfied that your China visit has not changed U. S.
policy toward Vietnam. Thail d remains skeptical that your initiative
will give it any immediate respite from Communist insurgency, which
has markedly increased in the past year, although its leaders are in
general accord with your policy. lndoges an leaders publicly and pri-
vately have welcomed your efforts to reduce tensions in Asia, but
have told us privately that they do not believe the PRC will moderate
its intention to dominate Southeast Asia. In the Philip es, while
the Green-i oldridge mission seemed to soothe the worst of the
Marcos Government's fears, President Marcos continues anxious over
the lan.g-tern impact on his country's security should Taiwan be
integrated into the China mainland policy.
,._ Australia and Now Zealand. Both c tiriesss have basically been
enthusiastic over your visit, but Prime Minister Mc.'ta-hon continues
highly concerned over how, in this election year, he can moot the
opposition Labor Party's challenge to move ahead quickly and radically
to improve Australia's relations with Peking.
-- Other Asian Cos tuthst States. The Worth Vietnamese are
bitter and disenchanted, despite Chou La-hits reported trip to Hanoi
immediately after your departure. The North Koreans have accepted
the prospect of improving U. S. -PRC relations (though they are not
very happy over it). and are engaged in their own diplomatic competition
with Seoub to appear more outward-looking and reasonable.
SEC #T / EXDIS
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? -
EUROPE
-- Soviet Union. For nearly three weeks the Soviets withheld
official comment, confining themselves to cautious, equivocal media
reaction expressing suspicion of possible U.S. - PRC secret
arrangements. Breahneev on March ZO in a speech wi hh the Soviets
have emphasized wad directed particularly at us, put a carefully
positive construction on the trip, saying that U. S. - PRC contacts were
natural, to be welcomed, and in conformity with the principles of
"peaceful coexistence. " He deferred "final assessment" to the near
future --by which he probably intended to mean the Moscow Sun-u rit,
implying that would be the real test of U.S. aims. He did not hide
Soviet sensitivity, however, darkly noting the secrecy surrounding the
trip and citing sarcastically the President's remark that the Chinese
and Americans hold the future of the world in their hands.
-- Eastern Europe. Moscow's East European allies have
stressed the anti-Soviet nature of theathe trip but have aimed their
editorial shafts mainly at Peking. Romania, however. applauded the
trip as a historic event in international life. Yugoslav reaction too has
been favorable and press coverage there is heavy.
-- 1- Western Europe. In W extern Europe the trip has whetted interest
in improving relations with Peking. Brandt's government has viewed
it as an opening for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the
PI&C. While the President was still in China, London announced the
exchange of ambassadors. Schumann, in an official statement, noted that
the 'U.S. had recognized the wisdom of France's earlier normalization
of relations with the Chinese. French officials said privately that the
Chinese "gave" more than the U. S. in the communique. Media coverage
in W' estern Europe was generally cautiously approving, with some papers
calling it "epoch-making. "
IdIDDLE EAST
The China trip seemed to stir only passing interest In the Arab
countries. Most teemed to see it in terms of the 'U. S. coming to grips
with reality, rather than as a direct threat to their interests. For the
most part the Israelis seem to view the visit as a significant world event,
but they too seem to regard it as being of little direct concerti to them.
Both the Arabs and the Israelis are in fact already looking ahead to the
Moscow summit where they know their vital interests will be directly
involved.
SECRET EXDIS
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/15: LOC-HAK-295-2-22-8
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Elsewhere in the Middle East reaction appears to have been gener&lly
favorable. The Turks. as you know from Erim, have applauded the
trip which many of thaw, see as a possible opening for a detente in the
Far Fast and as confirming their own policy of moving to establish
diplomatic relations with Peking. Greek reaction was a
unfavorable. The Shah, for his part, seems taabavee no problems with
the China trip although he most certainly is watching closely how we
maintain past commitments.
SOUTH ASIA
Reaction in South Asia has varied considerably. By far the most
negative reaction has come from India where there is a tendency to road
the worst possible into the trip. Aa ny Indians, including Mrs. Gandhi,
are worred that Improvement of relations between the U.S. and China
will somehow bring about a new balance of forces that will circumscribe
India's freedomef action. The depth of their fears and suspicions was
revealed by strong criticism of the references to Kashmir in tho
communique as blatant inteerferextcea In India's internal affairs.
in sharp contrast, Pakistani reaction to the trip was strongly positive,
and the communique was welcomed as holding out possibilities for
resolving many world problems, including those of South .Asia. The
Government of ngladeeh, however, adhered closely to the Indian line.
Nepal's reaction centered largely on continuing to walk the narrow Line
of non.aliignment betty China and India while the Ceylonese and Afghans
appear generally sympathetic with the purposes of the China trip.
LATIN A 4ERIC
In Latin America, official comment on the trip was cautious but the
general reaction was highly favorable. Many countries regard the
establishment of U.S. - Chinos* communications as a major accomplish.
moat in the effort to achieve world peace. A number of countries have
either called for or speculated on a similar shift in U.S. policy toward
Cuba. and Brasil has expressed particular concern that this might be
a real possibility. There has also been considerable interest in Latin
America in the effects of the visit an Formosa and its commercial ties
with the region, with a mix. of favorable and assn avoraMe comment on
the joint communique.
Cuban coverage of the visit was extensive but moderate, and factual in
tone. Throughout the visit Havana refrained from any direct criticism of
Poking. Cuban criticism of the U. S. role in Viezt , however, continued
to be .trap sed.
SECRET / ZIfI IS
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? IV
Official African reaction has been sparse but generally favorable.
What official public and private comment there was reflected the Africans,
interest in how developments in Sinn-American relations would affect
them. Left.-leaning governments, such as Tanzania, have wondered
whether the visit will improve Washington's attitude toward efforts to
end white minority rule in souther Africa. More conservative
governments, such as the Ivory Coast, have evinced some concern
that the U.S. may prove itself an unsteady ally by ''abandoning" the
Chinese Nationalists.
SECRET / EXDIS
No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/15: LOC-HAK-295-2-22-8