ANALYSIS OF THE NLF'S TEN POINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-285-8-11-5
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 4, 2009
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 9, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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Point 4 presents a plan for a political settlement Involving
elections, a constitutional assembly. a new constitution and then a
coalition government. It needs to be read in conjunction with Point 5
which calls for an interim coalition government prior to the elections.
With regard to Point e, itself, if the point awans that a coalition
government must result from the elections. this is, of course, un-
acceptable. If it means that one possible result of an election is a
coalition government, we would not object. We have not yet addressed
the question of whether we are prepared to accept the need for a new
constitution.
Point 9 deals with a period prior to an election. In stating that
"no site is to force the South Vietnamese people to accept its polite
regime, " it appears to imply that there is an interim period during
which the GVN. the NLF and other groups in the south would negotiate
about the setting up of a caretaker gavernmeaat. Hanoi's description
of those who could participate in such a government appears to rule
out the G'VN, although the statement omits the NLF's usual assertion
that the CT, S. most remove the GVN government. Thus, the words,
themselves. could permit GVN participation. They also could be
read to exclude the NLT from the caretaker government, although this
is almost certainly not the NLF's intention. Whatever orra=geaa~enta
are made, the actual political evolution in the south will depend on
the actual balance of forces. The prevention of an XL F takeover will
require an effective and i9etactioning am-Communist political goomm
0000. group.
is a standard call for good relations with Laos and
Cambodia and diplomatic relations with other countries. The oenly
now point is the reference to the need to establish diplomatic and
economic relations with the United States and the assertion that South
Vietnam must be able to accept economic and technical assistance
from any cory. This point is acceptable to us.
Point 7 calls for a step-by-step move toward reunification on
the basis gotianticn between the two zones and for normal relatlo
between the zones In the Interim. It accepts the military demarcation,
line but notes that it is only pravistonal in character and not a political;
border. FIneally, it states that the two snemss will decide an the stag
of the demilitarised s m and the manures for grossing the provision
demarcation line. Most of this language is standard and acceptable to
as. The final sentence seems to call for a now agreement between
SECRET-SXNSITIVE
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the two awes about the DMZ. This is acceptable if it means negotiations
between the GVN and Hanoi and if it leads to re-establishment of an
effective demilitarized area.
Point S provide* that prior to reunification. North and South
Vietnam sn not enter into military alliance and will not accept any
foreign military personnel on their territory. This is standard language.
We have not decided that we are prepared to agree to keeping no advisors
in South Vietnam or to accept renunciation of the SEATO protocol by
South Vietnam.
Point 9 deals with return of prisoners of war in more explicit
terms than hoe past. However, it also calls for reparations by the
U.S. to both North and South Vietm and implies a possible leakage
between prisoner release and reparations. Reparations is either
circumstance would be unacceptable to as.
Point 0 calls for all parties to agree an into rnational supervision
of the U. S. withdrawals. This is the first time Hanoi has proposed any
international supervision. It could provide an opening for a discussion
of international supervision for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces as well.
Positive Elements
1. Acceptance by implication of the presence of North Vietnamese,
forces in the south and indication that this is negotiable even if only
by the Vietnamese sides.
2. Presentation of a detailed plasm for a political settlement
with some now and potentially acceptable elements and without insisting
explicitly that this government be in accordance with the program of
the Prove.
3. Implication that the GVN might participate in negotiati+
about a caretaker government and the absence of an explicit statement
that the U.S. most remove the GVN.
4. Statement that there should be no retaliation against those
who cooperated with either side.
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3. Recognitieon of the DMZ as a provisional boundary and
willingness to ne goti apt, about it if only with the G VN.
6. Eaaaplicit ref.reaaace to release of prisoners (although possibly
linked to reparations).
7. In al reference to international supervis ion, if only related
to withdrawal of U.S. forces.
Negative Elements
I.AIl. f W I.IwY I r wwM Iy
1. Absence of an explicit statement of withdrawal of North
Vistaae i ese fore**.
Z. Call for both an interim and pernuumat coalition goverarn
with rsthsal to accept the present constitutional structure of the GYN.
3. I gaage which implies that coalition government should be
restricted to Communist or sympathetic elements.
4. Demand for U. S. reparations.
. ernatosal aapervision limited to U. S. withdrawals.
S~ubje:ct.w.r. to lr fllAawotiation
w.nlilww. rMw~wr a iw
1. Procedures for neegotiating withdrawal of North Vietnamese
fo rees sod the relationship of this withdrawal to the withdrawal of U.S.
forces.
oc edwerea in South Vietnam.
. Political arrangements prior to an election.
4. Status of the demilitarized zone.
S. Application of ieeter*attosaal supervision to North Vietnazoese
withdrawal.
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If Han;ai v W the NLF are sow ready for serious. detailed discussion.
there are many elements in the 10-Point Program which we could
probe, perhaps findieg the basis for agreenmat. If Hanoishas presented
this on a take-it-or-leave4t basis. it is very far from being satisfactory.
Attachment.
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SCE14ARIO FOR RES1DE11'T1AL STATEMENT ON VIETNAM
8:00 &M. Transmit to t of message in SECRET/
NODZS/EXCLUSIVE message loch.-
chwool to Bier and Lodge; and by
personal messenger to Secretaries Rogers'
sad Laird's offices (Eyes "y for them)
for cent. Request Bunker and Lodge
to comment by Sunday, 6:00 p.m., in
message Encleasive for the President,
the Secretary, and Kissinger.
day, $:40 . M.
.....,... gyn.
(Washington time)
Tuesday, Z;00 p.
.m.
Tuosdaeiy, 6:00-p
Twee-sdhay, S:0 p.m.
Taasday. 8:0O 1R.m.
horiz a Bunker to begin consultations
with President This** requesting comments
by Tuessday# noon, Washington time.
t+xt approved.
Reproduce final text of statem east.
Call Walt Rostow and transmit speech
to .Bi
Spoctal messages to Prix e Ministers
Carton and Wilson
Tuesday-, 8:00 p.m Transmittal of instructions and final
t*2d to key d*plo tic posts to permit
advance notice to governmental leader-
ship at f-Z (TCC, Japan and NAC).
Today, 10:00 pm. Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin.
We esday, 10:00 a. a. Consultation with Congressional leader-
ship.
Wedneada , 10:00 a.m. Consultation with other sslectied
.r.aan. r .n.rr.~r~r,.^r
C rasel
/SEN+'TTVE
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W dnesday. 10:0.0 a.m. Consultation with Ambassadors from
Troop Contributing Countries, Japan,
U.K, and France. U.S. Ambassadors
simultaneously brief Prime Ministers
where appropriate and NAC briefed.
Wednesday 10:00 . Transmit text to Ambassador Yost.
'We ,day I1:00 a.m. Press backgrounder. (Text given to
prose. Doors locked.)
Wedneada , 11:00 a.m. Transmittal of speech text to all other
diplomatic posts.
Wedneeft, noon Release of Presidential statement. Press
conference. President summarizes
statement.
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VIET - DRAFT V - 5/9/69
Kissinger /Haig / Eagle burger /Sneider /Halperin
Since taking office four months ago, the question to which I
have devoted more of my own time and energy than to any other is
how to achieve peace in Vietnam.
The issue has not been whether peace is desirable. On that
we all agree. The issue is how it can be achieved.
I wish now to report on some of the things we have done in
these four months and especially on the judgments we have reached
about the nature of an acceptable negotiated settlement and about
possible ways of approaching it. I also want to explain some of the
considerations that have entered into these judgments.
REVIEW AND REASSESSMENT
Our first step began even before Inauguration. This was to
launch an intensive review of every aspect of the Nation's Vietnam
policy. We accepted nothing on faith. We challenged every assumption
and every statistic, knowing that in Vietnam, disagreement has concerned
not only judgments but the facts themselves. We made a systematic,
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serious effort to examine all the options and alternatives that might
be open to us, including those that have been offered both by critics
and by supporters of past policies.
One of the first conclusions from our review was that we faced
a set of immediate operational problems. These included enemy
preparations for the second Tot offensive, which was launched in
February; a wide gulf of distrust between Washington and Saigon,
which hindered cooperation; and the fact that in eight months of talks
#aris, there ha*been no negotiations directly related to the nature
of a final settlement.
We therefore moved on several fronts at one
Militarily, we countered the Tot offensive. As a result, the
enemy failed to achieve his military objectives.
We restored a close working relationship with Saigon. As a
result, President Thieu and his ministers have taken important
initiatives in the search for a settlement.
We accelerated the strengthening of the South Vietnamese
forces. This has two purposes. One is to enable South Vietnamese
troops to shoulder more of the burden of fighting, as President Thieu
has indicated they are prepared to do as they become trained and
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equipped. The other purpose is to diminish Hanoi's hope that time
is on its side.
Our deepest concern has been the development of a coherent,
coordinated peace policy, so that our various moves would be mutually
reinforcing; we have established the limits of what we would consider
an acceptable settlement; and we have sought to press the Paris talks
toward the substantive issues essential to an agreement.
In weighing alternative courses, we have had to recognize that
the situation as it exists today is far different from what it was two
years ago, or four years ago, or ten years ago. These differences
have closed old options, and opened new ones.
One difference is that we no longer have the option of not
intervening. We have intervened. There are now more than half
a million American troops in Vietnam, and 35, 000 young Americans
have lost their lives there. Other countries have sent troops to
Vietnam in reliance on American pledges.
We are thus involved in solemn commitments to the people of
South Vietnam and to our other allies. The situation that confronts
us today is different because of these commitments. The question is
not whether we should have gone in. but what we do now that we are
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there; not whether we should have entered on these commitments,
but what they require of us today.
Against that background, let me discuss first what we have
rejected, and second what we are prepared to accept.
ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES
We have ruled out either a unilateral disengagement from
Vietnam, or the acceptance in Paris of terms that would amount to a
camouflaged surrender.
We also have ruled out attempting to im ose a urel militar
solution on the battlefield. Our objectives are limited, and they do
not require it.
I want to be quite precise about why we reject surrender,
however disguised.
First; When we assumed the burden of helping defend South
Vietnam, millions of South Vietnamese men, women and children
placed their trust in us. To abandon them now would risk their
massacre.
Abandoning our allies, however, would jeopardize more than
lives in South Vietnam. It would threaten our longer-term hopes
for peace in the world. A great power cannot renege on its
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conunitrn en is . Too many other nations rely too heavily on the
integrity of its pledges.
When it comes to maintaining peace, "prestige" is not an
empty word. I em not speaking of false pride or bravado -- they
should have no place in our policies -- but rather of the respect
that one nation has for anefter's steadfastness in defending its
principles and meeting its obligations.
If we collapsed our effort In Vietnam, the cause of peace
might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations'
confidence in our reliability.
Another reason stems from the debates raging within the
Communist world between those who argue for the use of force
and those who argue against the use of farce. Though the war in
Vietnam is not masterminded by Peking, for Hanoi to succeed in
taking over South Viet"= by force even after the power of the
United States had been engaged would greatly strengthen the
advocates within the Communist world of Peking's policy of con-
frontation.
If we are to move successfully from an era of confrontation
to an era of negotiation, then we have to demonstrate - - at the
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point at which confrontation is being tested -- that confrontation
serves nobody's interests.
I would add one thought. Almost without exception. the
leaders of non-Communist Asia have made clear -- in private if
not in public -- that they would consider a unilateral American
disengagement from Vietnam as a threat to the security of their
own nations.
These larger considerations are what compel the conclusion
that anything amounting to surrender would not serve the cause of
peace.
In determining what options would be acceptable, we have to
look first at the question of what our essential objectives are:
These can be stated quite simply. We seek the opportunity
for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political
future without outside interference.
Because our aims are limited to this one objective, we can
be very clear about several other points:
-- We seek no bases.
-- We will insist on no military ties.
-- We are willing to agree to neutrality for the South
Vietnamese people, if that is what they choose.
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We believe there should be an opportunity for full
participation in the political life of South Vietnam
by all political elements that are prepared to do so
without the use of force or intimidation.
-- We are prepared to accept any government in South
Vietnam that results from the choice of the South
Vietnamese people themselves, exercised freely and
without outside coercion.
We have no objection to reunification, if that turns
out to be what the people of North Vietnam and South
Vietnam want; we ask only that the decision reflect
the free choice of the people concerned.
In pursuing our limited objective, we insist on no rigid diplomatic
formula. It could be reached by a formal negotiated settlement. by an
informal understanding, or simply by a do facto establishment of the
necessary conditions -- provided only that the understanding was clear,
and that there were adequate assurances that it would be observed.
THE NEGOTIATIONS
This brings us, then, to the matter of negotiations.
I recognize that peace in Vietnam cannot be achieved overnight.',.
The war has been waged by dedicated and courageous men, both
sides, for many years. No matter how much we yearn for peace, we
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must recognize that a civil war which has raged for twenty years
can only be settled by detailed negotiations and then not at a single
stroke.
We ask nothing more than a settlement that will permit the
South Vietnamese people to determine freely their own political
future. This requires, first, the withdrawal of all non-South Viet-
namese forces from South Vietnam; and second# procedures for
political change that give each significant group a real opportunity
to participate in the political life of the nation.
In this s irit, I reaffirm now our willingness to withdraw our
forcesvn a specified timetable, without political conditions. We
ask only that North Vietnam re rou its forces in North Vietnam, with-
drawin them from South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
We include Cambodia and Laos to ensure that these would not
be used as bases for a renewed war. The Cambodian border is only
50 miles from Gatgon; the Laotlon border is only 50 miles from Hue.
I would stress three points in relation to this offer: It provides
for a simultaneous start on withdrawal by both sides; for agreement
on a mutually acceptable timetable; and f or withdrawal to be acc om -
plished as quickly as possible.
If North Vietnam wants to insist that it has no forces in South
Vietnam. we will no longer debate the point -- provided that its
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forces cease to be there, and that we have reliable assurances
that they will not return.
The North Vietnamese delegates have been saying in Paris
that political issues should be discussed along with military issues,
and that there must be a political settlement in the South. We will
not dispute this. But the military withdrawal involves outside forces,
and can therefore be properly negotiatid by North Vietnam and the
United States; the political settlement is an internal matter, which
ought to be decided among the South Vietnamese themselves and not
imposed by outside powers. However, if our presence at these
political negotiations would be helpful, and if the South Vietname se
concerned request it, we would be willing to participate, along with
the representatives of Hanoi if that were also desired.
Recent statements by President Thieu of South Vietnam have
gone far toward opening the way to a political settlement. He has
publicly declared -- for the first time -- his government's willingness
to discuss a political solution with the National Liberation Front.
The South Vietnamese Government recognises, as we do, that
a settlement must permit all individuals and groups that are prepared
to renounce the use of force to participate freely in the political life
of South Vietnam. To be effective, such a settlement would require
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two things: first. a process that would allow the South Vietnamese
people to express their choice; and second, a guarantee that this
process would be a fair one.
Such guarantees could take many forms. One possible form
would be, the creation of an international supervisory group, composed
of other Asian Nations. Such a group would also be in a position to
monitor the withdrawal of outside forces.
The principal point I want to make, however, is that the
forms of such guarantees are negotiable. The important thing is
that the guarantees should have the confidence of the South Vietnamese
people, and that they should be broad enough and strong enough to
protect the interests of all major South Vietnamese groups.
This, then, is the outline of the settlement that we seek to
negotiate in Paris. Its basic terms are very simple: mutual with-
drawal of non-South Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam, and
free choice for the people of South "Vietnam . I believe that the long-
term interests of peace require that we insist on no less, and that
the realities of the situation require that we seek no more.
PROGRAMS AND ALTERNATIVES
To make very concrete what I have said, I propose the following
seven steps, vkich seem to me consistent with the principles of all
parties:
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Step 1 -- As soon as agreement can be reached, U. S.
forces, those of our allies and those of North Vietnam would
simultaneously begin withdrawal from South Vietnam.
Step 2 4.. An International force drawn from Asian nations
acceptable to both sides would be created, and would begin moving
into South Vietnam.
Step 3 -- Over a period of twelve months, by agreed-on
stages, the major portion of the non-South Vietnar a as troops would
be withdrawn. The remaining North Vietnamese and U.S. forces
would remain in designated bases and not engage In combat operations.
Step 4 -- The international force would move into the
provinces in accord with an agreed timetable, and would arrange
local ceasefires.
Stop 5 --. As soon as possible after a ceasefire was arranged
in a particular area, local elections would be held under agreed
procedures and under the supervision of the international force.
All groups in the South would have the right to full participation in
these elections.
Step 6 -- The remaining U. S. forces would complete their
withdrawals as the North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn from
South Vietnam and returned to North Vietnam.
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Stop 7 -- All parties would agree to observe the Geneva
Accords of 1954 regarding South Vietnam and Cambodia and the
Laos Accords of 1962 regarding Laos.
The United States Government believes this proposal for
peace is realistic, and takes account of the legitimate interests of
all concerned. It is consistent with President Thieu's six points,
and it can accommodate the various programs put forth by the other
side. We and the Govermneut of South Vietnam are prepared to
discuss Its details with the other side.
However, I would stress that this proposal is not offered
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We are quite willing to consider
other approaches.
We recognize that negotitions can only succeed when each
side is willing to consider alternatives to Its own proposals. Our interest
is not in the words, but in the substance behind them; and not in who
initiates a proposal, but in whether it offers a possible path to
settlement. We are willing to talk about anybody's program --
Hanoi's four points. the NLF's 10 points -- provided it can be made
consistent with the few basic principles I have set forth here.
Last week, the NLF put forward a ton-point peace plan. Most
of what it contained was familiar, and some of what it contained or
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appeared to contain was w acceptable -- for example. its apparent
implication that as & condition of settlement, a coalition government
including the NLF should be imposed an South Vietnam. It also
failed to provide explicitly for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces from South Vietnam . However, it contained a great deal on
which we could agree in principle, such as the right of self-defense,
the establishment of broad democratic freedoms. healing of the war
wounds, freedom of individuals from retaliation for having supported
one side or the other in the straggle.
The ton points dealt mostly with means, rather than ends;
and with the particular details of a political settlement in South
Vietnam. These are matters that can appropriately be discussed
at the negotiating table if the other side is indeed prepared for
serious negotiations.
Every day that the war 4rags on, the toll in lives mounts
higher. There is no need for the suffering to continue; there is no
need to prolong the agcy further.
I have outlined tonight what I think are reasonable steps,
and reasonable requirements. I have indicated our willingness to
listen to other proposals, and to consider other approaches. But I
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must also make clear. in all candor. that if time goes on and the
needless suffering continues, this will affect other decisions. Hanoi
has nothing to gain by delay. The principles I have set forth here
can, I believe, be made to accommodate the essential interests of
both sides; but the principles themselves will not be compromised.
We are not going to soften. We are not going to let our military
situation weaken.
We will continue to insist on our one fundamental objective;
the right of the people of South Vim to choose their own future
course. We are prepared to negotiate among a variety of alternative
means of securing that right. For teen months now. our representatives
and those of Hanoi have been meeting in Paris. For tteoser same ten
months, the killing has continued. I now appeal publicly to the
leaders of Hanoi to join with us in beginning a speedy and serious
consideration of the issues necessary to settlement. Let us swing
open the doors of peace, so that the killing can stop, the land can
be returned to its people, and the anguish at last can be brought to an
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INFORMATION
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PARIS MEETINGS/ PLUS May 8, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Dean Moor
THROUGH: Richard L. Sneide r
SUFJECT: Assessment of the Private Meeting with the )RV in Paris
on 7 May
There were no changes in the substantive position of the Communist
side at this session. Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho seemed primarily
interested in setting out very basically, simply, and forcefully the
long espoused fundamentals of the Communist stand. There were hints
that they regarded this as the first of a new series of meetings.
According to Ambassador Lodge, there was nothing in the Communist
statements inconsistent with the theory that Hanoi believes by stalling
in the present talks it can eventually get a better deal with the U. S. At
the same time, Lodge believes the Communists will study the U. S.
statement with care; they showed special interest in the U. S. comments
on a political settlement in the Sotth.
Following are some of the more interesting aspects of the Communist
presentation:
1. They were concerned at getting some assurance that the U. S.
would keep the meeting secret; they claimed we had broken our agreement
on this after the last meeting. Hanoi, of course, does not want the U. S.
to be able to give the impression that some progress may be occurring
behind the scenes in Paris. They believe this tends to mollify anti-war
sentiment in the U. S.
2. The Communists argued, as they often have in the past, that
there was "nothing new" in the U. S. statement. Xuan Thuy said Hanoi
needed to know the "new and specific" views of the U. S. government
on the Communist proposals; the way the U. S. was approaching the
matter was not a "correct" approach.
SECRET /NODIS/ PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/04: LOC-HAK-285-8-11-5
 No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/04: LOC-HAK-285-8-11-5
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SECRET/NODIS - 2
PARIS MEETINGS/ PLUS
3. According to Communists, their "immediate" proposals,
or the "three things to be fulfilled," were as follows: 1) U. S. withdrawal
without conditions; 2) replacement of the Thieu/Ky/Huong administration;
3) U. S. to hold serious talks with the NLF. They appear to be trying
to get the U. S. to take some actual action on at least one of these elements.
4. The Communists rejected the competency of the GVN to speak
for SVN, and called for U. S. negotiations with the Front on "all questions
concerning" SVN. However, they did not rule out NIL-CVN talks.
5. The Communists reiterated their assertion that the Vietnamese
would create "favorable conditions" for a U. S. withdrawal. However,
they refused to be drawn out on this point by Lodge's effort to probe its
meaning.
6. The Communists established an interesting definition of their
adherence to the Geneva Accords. They said they viewed it in general
terms of respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity, territorial
integrity of Vietnam as a whole. They said nothing about respect for
individual provisions. Under this definition, of course, the presence
of NVN forces in the South would not be a violation of the accords.
7. Le Due Tho's presentation was diplomatic, stressing the great
cost of the war to both sides, but firm on the point that it was up to the
U. S, to take the action necessary to make a settlement possible. This
is the standard approach for Th.o, the senior statesman of the DRY
delegation. He said much the same thing in his earlier private talks
with Harriman and Vance in January.
SECRET! NODIS/ PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2009/12/04: LOC-HAK-285-8-11-5