MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
November 19, 2010
Sequence Number: 
12
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 24, 1976
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9.pdf714.39 KB
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 SECRET/NODIS/XGDS ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY Turkey: Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs Amb. Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador Sukru Elekdag, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Amb. Ercumet Yavuzalp, Director General for International Security Affairs U. S.: President Ford Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State Amb. William Macomber, U. S. Ambassador to Turkey Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Wednesday - March 24, 1976 5:03 - 5:50 p.m. PLACE: The Oval Office President: I wish to welcome you here, Mr. Foreign Minister. You have been here a number of times. Caglayangil: Please excuse my English. It is very poor. President: I am very pleased to have you here. I know that Secretary Kissinger has discussed matters in detail with you. I hope that you will convey to the Prime Minister my best regards. Since I haven't had a chance to discuss your talks with Secretary Kissinger, Henry, will you review them for us? SECRET/NODIS/XGDS CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A- KISSIN , F R EXEMI'I' FRONT GENERAL DECLASSTFICATION SCHEDULE OF T:XE:UTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATE', o.,".Y 5 b L1, 3) AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det_ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 SECRET/NODIS/XGDS Kissinger: We discussed six issues. We resolved five of them and there is no reason to go into detail on them. The remaining issue is the level of assistance and the type of equipment we could make available. The level of aid we proposed is $250 million a year and perhaps $50 million of Export-Import credits. We can't frankly do any better, because we couldn't get it through Congress. We discussed selling equipment at reasonable prices -- like F-100's and ships. They don't need F- 1001s, though, and Clements is looking for ways to loan them more modern ones or something else. Caglayangil: As Secretary Kissinger says, we have resolved five out of six issues. We have not agreed on the level and scope of assistance to be provided to Turkey. I am sure you know that from the Adriatic to the Sea of Japan, Turkey is the only democratic regime in a sea of authoritarian regimes. Our per capita income now is about $600. We have to maintain a defense budget of about $259 per capita, and improve our economy, and do it while maintaining human freedom. The people at times abuse these freedoms and make it difficult for the government. Turkish-American relations are going through a crisis and there are those who would take advantage of this crisis. Support for our defense forces is an integral part of our difficulties. The antagonists of NATO or of Turkish-American relations always bring forth the aid that you provide to Greece or places like Egypt or Iran. Dr. Kissinger says you can't increase aid past $250 million and I am afraid this will not be satisfactory to the Turkish public. I told Secretary Kissinger today that if he had difficulty with the American Congress, we could modernize the Turkish armed forces through a swap deal. Kissinger: The problem is it won't work -- like trading F-100's for F-4's. The problem is we don't have any F-100's left in the US Air Force. President: We would have a terrible logistics problem, since we don't have any. Caglavangil: I appreciate that. We are just trying to find a way out. Let me assure you that whether we come to an agreement or not, we still have great esteem for our relations with the United States. We have not forgotten the assistance from across the Atlantic when the Soviet Union made its demands on the three provinces and the Straits. That is why I do not see any serious implications in the discussions we are having. We will certainly try to develop our alliance relationship. SECRET /NODIS/XGDS No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 SECRETINODIS/XGDS I bring you very warm greetings fm m my President and my Prime Minister -- who cherishes pleasant memories of meeting with you. When previously I was Foreign Minister, we came to this country and paid a visit to the American President. To greet the American President in Turkey would be a great honor and give us much pleasure. If I could receive acceptance, it would be the greatest gift I could bring back. President: I greatly appreciate the invitation. It would be a great honor for me to go there. I unfortunately have never been there and I will maximize my efforts to visit. We unfortunately now have some elections coming up, but I assure you that after November 2nd, if things go as I expect, I will certainly make every effort to visit Turkey. I would like very much to have the Prime Minister visit this country. I really enjoyed my meetings and discussions with him and I hope you will convey the invitation to him. Ca layangil: I will do so. President: I will leave the negotiating details to you two, but since I have been President, I have made every effort to show how important are our relations with you. I have discussed point six with Or. Kissinger. We have gone really as high as we can possibly go, and I hope that you will discuss it further with Secretary Kissinger.and make every effort to reach agreement. It would greatly facilitate all our proceedings. Caglayangil: We have followed how consistently you have defended U.S. -Turkish relations, especially with the Congress. We have no complaints whatsoever. If the American Government and Congress don't see eye to eye, that is an internal American problem. Obviously we can't explain that to our public. This problem is not peculiar to the American scene. We also have that same problem. The Turkish Constitution grants the right of amnesty only to the Grand National Assembly, but nevertheless, it has been granted by various of our governments to terrorists, etc. The whole American picture has been evaluated in Turkey as if what has been done has been the act of the government. This is in fact where we find ourselves. President: We hope that in this election we would get strong support from our people and get some changes in the Congress. Cooperation has gotten somewhat better in the past several months, but the real turn will come in January. SECRET /NODIS/XGDS No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 b V- t-. k11 V- J. / 114 V L 1.~ / AU1J b I just want to reiterate that we want to commit ourselves as deeply as possible to improving our relations and we have extended to the utmost our efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement. I wish you well in your discussions with Secretary Kissinger. C glayangil: I wish you cell in the election. I don't pretend prophecy, but only wishes. If the Congress can be improved, that is in the best interests of both our countries. President: What is the status of your discussions with Greece over Cyprus? Caglayangil: It is like a wound which needs medical attention. It can't be left the way it is. The important thing is to break the connection of American aid to the solution of that problem. While I accepted most of the Secretary's proposals on the five issues, my objective was this point. Turkey and Greece historically must know how to live together. The only way to do that is to sit down and talk. We think we have a good chance with the Karamanlis Government. Cyprus is the key to our relations. Here there are two obstacles -- Makarios is one, and this linkage is the othe r. Makarios is a complicated element.- so much that we can't solve the problem with him or without him. It is hard to get a proposal accepted by the Greek Cypriots which Makarios opposes. Kissinger: The problem is mhich side will put forward'the territorial proposal. Neither side wants to do it first, for good reasons. Any proposal either one puts forward is likely to become a domestic issue. I will talk to the Foreign Minister about some procedural ways we might attack it. Caglayangil : The Greek Cypriot negotiator promised his views on territory within six weeks and the Turkish negotiator promised to respond within 10 days. They will meet again in May. Then they will form two subcommittees: one for territory, and one for constitutional questions. Ithink this is a hopeful procedure. President: I hope this vrould move as you indicate. It raises serious questions here when there is no movement, so this would be helpful. Caglayangil: I have done my best to encourage Denktash and have told him he can say yes, but to tell me only when he plans to say no. SECRET /NODIS/XGDS [END] No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19 : LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 WASHINGTON SECRET /SENSITIVE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL OF TURKEY Wednesday, March 24, 1976 5100 p. m. (30 minutes) The Oval Office PURPOSE Turkish Foreign Minister Sabri Caglayangil (Chaw-lay-UN-gill) is in Washington at our invitation, to try to complete negotiations on a new bilateral US-Turkish defense cooperation agreement. This meeting will permit you and Foreign Minister Caglayangil to review US-Turkish relations, including U. S. security assistance for Turkey, the status of the ongoing US-Turkish bases negotiations and the prospects for settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. Your purpose in this meeting will be to: emphasize the concerted effort both you and your Administration have made and will continue to make to restore the full balance in our security relations with Tu rkey and, in this connection, the importance we attach to close ties with Ankara -- bilaterally and in the context of NATO and CENTO; emphasize that realistically it will be difficult to induce U. S. Congress to approve full restoration of aid without some visible progress on the US-Turkish bases negotiations or Cyprus; note that conclusion of a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Turkey during the Foreign Minister's stay in Washington, coupled with an understanding that U. S. operations in Turkey can resume at an early date, would almost certainly improve the prospects for Congressional approval of full restoration of military assistance for Turkey in the FY 1977 aid legislation soon to be considered by both Houses; and ST'Cf VT/81'NSIT1VF/XGDS No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/19: LOC-HAK-283-5-12-9 SECRET /SENSITIVE - 2 encourage the continuation of direct contacts between Athens and Ankara on issues of mutual concern, including Turkish support of the intercommunal talks on Cyprus. II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS A. Back round: Foreign Minister Caglayangil participated in your meetings with Prime Minister Demirel at the NATO and Helsinki summits last year. The Foreign Minister is an experienced politician and diplomat who has a close working relationship with the Prime Minister. He strongly believes that US-Turkish ties should be preserved and strengthened but is sensitive to and opposes any suggestion of outside pressure on Turkey >.. particularly by the U. S. Congress ..