REPORT ON SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEGOTIATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-283-10-8-8
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 29, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

C.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
t
September 29, 1976
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
William E. -Simon, Secretary of Treasury
George Bush, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership (list attached)
DATE AND TIME:
PLACE:
SUBJECT:
Tuesday, September 28, 1976
8:00 - 9:05 a.m.
The Cabinet Room
The White House
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
Report on Secretary Kissinger's Negotiations in
Southern Africa
The President: Thank you all for coming today. While I would also like
to discuss certain legislative matters, I think it would be useful to first
have a report on the recent negotiations undertaken by Secretary Kissinger
in southern Africa. What we are trying to do in this complex, complicated
area of the world is good for the United States and good for the people of
southern Africa. And, too, there are the broader ramifications of the
international implications. Henry has just spent about ten days in Africa
and in my view has done a first-class job. While the situation is far from
settled, I thought you needed an update so that you are fully briefed before
you go home. Henry?
Secretary Kissinger: I think it would be useful if George Bush first gave
an intelligence report.
George Bush: This is the intelligence report which I gave the President
and Secretary Kissinger before the trip. Assuming nothing were done it
was our assessment that it would be 1978, at the very maximum, when
we would witness the end of white control of Rhodesia by force. The Black
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Governments which would emerge from the conflict would be more attuned
to communist influence than governments brought about through negotiation.
Tie Rhodesian Government was already under siege and the radical govern-
ments which we saw emerging from the violence would be beholden to
outside communists.
There was and is increasing pressure on the Rhodesian government.
While we believed they could hold out for the rest of the year, there would
be escalating violence and continued incursions from Mozambique and
surrounding countries. There was also the possibility of involvement by
Cuban personnel and support of Soviet arms. Communists were already
providing aid to insurgents.
We believe the front line governments - Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania
and Zambia - have played a restraining influence. We believed they want
negotiations. However, if the situation remained unsettled and if asked
by Mozambique, it was our assumption the Soviets and Cubans, and per-
haps Chinese would respond. And as insurgents incurred into Rhodesia
there would be pressure on South Africa to aid Rhodesia which would bring
reaction from the neighboring governments.
The end result would be a bloody conflict resulting in Black rule no later
than 1978. And as the emergent Black governments are expected to have
a communist tilt, this would be harmful to the interests of the United States.
Secretary Kissinger: I wanted you to know the intelligence estimate on
which we have been operating all this year. That is, that the whites in
Rhodesia will be overthrown within two years. There is also the risk that
South Africa would be forced into the conflict by public opinion. It is our
view that communist intervention would then be certain. Moreover, the
only way Rhodesia can defend itself is through incursions along neighboring
borders. These countries will respond by asking for communist aid. The
now moderate states will find guerrillas within their borders which will
tend to radicalize their countries. These increasingly radicalized coun-
tries would then surround Zaire and could lead to an entire bloc in southern
African hostile to the United States.
There has been support of our efforts by the moderate states. They know
the potential impact of another foreign intervention. The issue goes far
beyond the questions of Rhodesia or South West Africa. The impact extends
elsewhere -- to the Middle East -- where a successful resolution of the
situation of southern Africa by force will not be lost on the countries there.
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The basic difficulty in this negotiation has been timing. The timing
outlined by George Bush meant that I could not delay. The rainy season
will begin in November. At that time, we can expect an escalation of
hostilities.
The difference between the negotiations here and the Middle East is that
in the Middle East there were two parties who had an agreement in
principle. In southern Africa we have four front line states plus Angola.
Among these five there is considerable distrust amongst each other. We
also have four liberation movements which are severely divided.
We have tried to offset potential Soviet influence through an ordinance of
self denial. We have said we would stay away from the liberation move-
ments if they would keep the Soviets out. The Soviets have been putting
on pressure to be able to aid and equip the liberation movements.
Our assessment of the situation in southern Africa is confirmed by the
other governments, particularly South Africa and Rhodesia. When I met
with Ian Smith I took him aside and asked him "Tell me if you think you
will be better off next May if we do nothing". He responded that he could
not say that -- he said things would be worse by then.
You must also understand that what the Black African leaders say to me
privately is far different from what they say publicly. They say privately
we want you to see what you can do. At the same time they make strong
public pronouncements.
The settlement which has been put forth arose from British principles --
British constitutional principles. When it was determined we could not
wait, I got in touch with the British. They had a plan for the transfer of
power in Rhodesia. I also got in touch with South Africa and asked them
whether they were ready to assist in this process. The South Africans
had the same interest we had. A negotiated transfer of power is in the
interests of the moderate blacks and South Africa. Understand there was
no deal made with South Africa for their participation -- no quids.
The British engaged in the drafting of a constitutional structure and a
plan for the takeover of rule by Black leaders. Five missions, American
and British, traveled throughout Black Africa trying out the ideas of this
structure and plan. The basic approach was accepted.
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There were two choices in negotiating with Ian Smith. To get an agree-
mept in principle on the concepts of majority rule and transition govern-
ment leaving the negotiation of details to later. We were afraid this
wouldn't work -- that when it came later to details, efforts would be
made to blow it up. The second choice, which we adopted, was to make
a synopsis of the British papers (on constitutional structure and transfer
of power) and commit Smith to this process. This achieved a framework
for negotiation on the fivepoint formula set forth by the British.
The five points, which Smith agreed to, I took to Presidents Nyrerere
and Kaunda and asked them whether or not to go ahead -- whether or not
I should tell Smith to delay his announcement. They said go ahead.
Last Sunday the five Presidents met in Lusaka. You have all read the
lurid stories that the Presidents rejected the proposed settlement. This
is not true. They have accepted the concepts. It was our fear that the
radicals would demand a constitutional conference first, with the view this
would take a year and a half and the fighting would continue in the interim.
We want a transitional government first. What we are doing is urging the
British to call a conference on the transitional government first and then
a constitutional conference will follow.
I think the Black leaders in their public statements reflected that a Black
cannot agree to anything offered by a white like Ian Smith and also that
they may desire some changes in the details of the settlement.
Our biggest problem now is to keep the hardliners in Rhodesia from blowing
it up and to keep the Black radicals from blowing it up. Concluding the
issue is up to the British. The United States has no legal standing in Africa.
For the British to call a conference quickly is the best.
Do not be concerned by the inflammatory statements you read in the press.
Key African leaders are prepared to go ahead quickly with a conference
(Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana). There is a good possibility for a moderate
Rhodesian government, with safety for the minority. Nevertheless we will
still have some hairy moments.
In respect to South West Africa there has also been major progress, though
it has been quieter. South Africa has agreed to a constitutional conference
to determine the future of South West Africa. We are in the process of
negotiating with South Africa, local forces, and other governments to get
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a conference going in the United Nations. The United Nations is the
agreed forum. One problem is that Angola is involved. Nevertheless
South Africa has agreed to transfer power.
The President: Let me review with you the options we had. We could
either do what Secretary Kissinger did or do nothing and get foreign
intervention in southern Africa and a.bloody war. We had the opportunity
to move constructively despite the risks -- and the risks were high -- or
let the inevitable, which George described to you, happen. There is
progress -- and I am perhaps more optimistic than Henry -- which is in
our interest and theirs in southern Africa.
Senator Scott: Isn't there one objection to holding the conference in Rhodesia?
Secretary Kissinger: This is true. The Rhodesians want it in London.
Others most anywhere other than Rhodesia. It will probably be in Livingston
which is in Zambia.
Let me take this chance to reiterate there are no secret commitments - -
none whatsoever. We have, however, been engaged in two study papers:
one on the look of the future Rhodesian government and another on economic
assistance. These are ongoing.
Senator Case: Did Smith insist on the lifting of sanctions.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, he wanted them lifted right away. However,
this will occur when the interim government is established and there is
a black Prime Minister. He will then ask that the sanctions be lifted.
Representative McFall: In respect to the study on economic aid, will this
be unilateral US assistance or multilateral.
Secretary Kissinger: It will not be unilateral. While nothing is yet
definite (studies are not yet concluded) we envision something like a trust
fund which will be used in part for investmeint in Rhodesia and in part as
an insurance fund for people forced to leave. We would hope to get private
contributions and, as well, funds from other governments. The amounts
whites could draw from the insurance fund would be geared to how long
they were to stay.
Representative McFall: Before Smith can sell all this to his people he must
have to be able to tell them something about what they will get for their land.
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Secretary Kissinger: There are no conditions on the settlement. Every-
thifi.g will go ahead before. They do, however, know we are undertaking
a study.
Representative McFall: Then do you see this as a multilateral bank?
Secretary Kissinger: In a way. We believe the longer the whites stay
the better for all -- the more viable the nation will be for the future. If
the new government drives the whites out, the economy will collapse. In
any event, they cannot drive them out for two years. This will be during
the interim government in which the whites will still have a strong influence.
After that the more whites who stay, the more money will be available for
investment (rather than compensation).
Representative McFall: How much American participation is envisioned?
Secretary Kissinger: This is hard to quantify since nothing is definite.
Over a five-ten year period the South Africans have used a figure of $1. 3
billion. This is their figure, not ours. We could guess the British would
contribute 20-25%; the French maybe 10%. Perhaps the United States would
give $300 million. We hope for as much as possible from private sources.
In fact, Senator Javits told me he has had discussions with a private group
putting together $500 million for Black Rhodesians to enable them to vote
under the current law there. If the amount is right it is substantial.
Senator Griffin: Will the British be picking up the ball now?
Secretary Kissinger: The British are moving but they tend to move in a
bureaucratic way. We need someone to take charge and say this is it.
Otherwise people will ask for more. But the British do have a source of
legitimacy in Africa. Once a conference can be put together, it M uld
take about 4-6 weeks to complete its work.
Question: Have you spoken with the Ge rmaizs and Japanese?
Secretary Kissinger: I have not yet spoken with the Japanese, however
I will be having breakfast with the Japanese Minister tomorrow. I have
spoken with the Germans and they are supportive. They have not made
any aid commitment because they want to save their contribution for aid
to Southwest Africa. That is a former colony where many German settlers
still remain.
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The rest of the meeting turned to discussion of pending legislation.
,during this discussion, the Speaker mentioned the importance of
congressional action on the stock disposal bill (defeated under suspension
of the rules). Senator Griffin indicated the Senate would pass the con-
ference report on the foreign aid bill today. Secretary Simon interjected
the need for the Senate to pass the Bretton Woods Agreements act.
Senators Byrd and Sparkman commented on the fact Senator Proxmire was
holding this bill hostage to final action on the Export Administration Act
Bill with its boycott provisions. Simon reiterated his view that boycott
legislation is no more than Congress legislating higher crude oil prices.
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The President
,The Secretary of State
The. Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
The Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration
14OU SE
Carl Albert
Tip O'Neill
John McFall
Bob Michel
Doc Morgan
Bill Broomfield
George Mahon
Al Cederberg
Frank Morton
SENATE
Bob Byrd
Hugh Scott
Bob Griffin
John Sparkman
Cliff Case
Russell Long
John McClellan
Milt Young
Frank Moss
STAFF
Jack Marsh
Dick Cheney
Phil Buchen
Ron Nessen
Brent Scowcroft
Jim Cannon
Alan Greenspan
Jim Lynn
Bill Baroody
Max Friedersdorf
Jim Cavanaugh
Bill Gorog
Charlie Leppert
Tom Loeffle r
Pat Rowland
Bob Wolthius
Russ Rourke
Joe Jenckes
Cathy deSibour - NSC
Paul Myer
REGRETS
The Vice President
Rep. John Rhodes
Rep. John Anderson
Sen. Bob Dole
Sen. Bill Proxmire
Sen. Carl Curtis
Bill. Seidman
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