MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER BAREND WILLEM BIESHEUVEL OF THE NETHERLANDS ON JANUARY 26, 1972 AT 11:00 A.M.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-279-3-7-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 26, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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CONFIDENTIAL
January 26, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTS FILE
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
BRIG. GENERAL ALEXANDER HAIG
Meeting Between the President and
Prime Minister Barend Willem
Biesheuvel of the Netherlands on
January 26, 1972 at 11:00 a. m.
The President
Prime Minister Barend Willem Biesheuvel
of the Netherlands
Baron Rijnh~rd B. Van Lynden, Nether-
lands Ambassador
William Middendorf, U. S. Ambassador to
the Netherlands
Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Following press photographs, President Nixon expressed his pleasure at
having an opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister before his visits
to Peking and Moscow.
The Prime Minister expressed his gratitude at the opportunity to visit
the President. The visit had developed somewhat incidentally, he said,
as a result of his visit to the Antilles.
President Nixon remarked that he hoped that the Dutch would move with
great care and deliberateness with respect to the problem of the Antilles
and Surinam, since it has been his experience that precipitate exodus
from former colonial areas only contributes to instability. The peoples
involved must have an opportunity to develop their own self-reliance
carefully in a way which is not forced or artificial, or which puts them
in a position of full responsibility before they are prepared to accept it.
This situation has become very clear to him during earlier visits to
Africa, where it was obvious that some of the countries were placed on
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their own too rapidly and that as a result unnecessary turbulence and
instability resulted. While these countries would and should ultimately
have full self-determination, it is essential that the timing not cast the
bird from the nest before it can fly.
During his visits to Indonesia, the President continued, it was apparent
that the Dutch had left a mark of progress and contribution to Indonesian
culture that was evident in many areas. He asked the Prime Minister
about current Dutch relationships with Indonesia.
The Prime Minister replied that relationships were extremely cordial at
this point, having progressed from a point of near open warfare earlier.
Now relationships were warm and cordial, and that the visit of the Queen
to Indonesia last year had been highly successful.
President Nixon emphasized the importance of Indonesia and its great
potential, both in terms of population and natural resources. He urged
the Prime Minister to take the opportunity to visit Indonesia should the
occasion present itself, since he was confident that such a visit would be
welcomed by the Indonesians.
The Prime Minister stated that he agreed completely with the President's
assessment of both Indonesia and the need to maintain close ties with
former colonies in a way which would insure stability and sound growth.
With respect to Dutch Caribbean holdings, there were many forces at
work which sought a precipitate disengagement, but he was convinced
that the Netherlands had to continue to exercise influence especially in
the areas of security where the peoples involved could not bear the burden
or shoulder this kind of responsibility.
President Nixon stated that the Unitedaates was very grateful to the
Prime Minister and to the Dutch people for their steadfast support for
matters of mutual interest to western unity and strength. He was
especially pleased that the Dutch had been so helpful with respect to their
own defense contribution; the attitude of all the NATO allies had been
helpful on this important subject.
The Prime Minister noted that the United States defense budget would be
increased this year, and that this action would also assist the European
powers to continue to allocate their own resources to security needs.
Both men agreed that the current environment made it very difficult for
political leaders to make the hard decisions necessary to insure that
security needs were met.
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President Nixon stated that in a strategic sense he believed the strength
of Europe was a bedrock foundation for worldwide stability. He noted
that there were five major powers which were crucial to the evolution of
world affairs. These included Europe, the Soviet Union, the People's
Republic of-China, the United States and Japan. Other areas were
important but these five constituted the most important entities. In this
respect, western freedom was most carefully linked to cooperation and
unity between Europe, United States, and Japan.
The Prime Minister expressed agreement with this analysis. He pointed
out that it was important that Europe not become an inward-looking, self-
serving entity but rather continued to look outward. In the context of
the Common Market and its future development, he noted that its political
strength and cooperation were perhaps the central issues; economic con-
siderations should not totally dominate and contribute to an inward-looking
evolution.
President Nixon then explained the nature and objectives of his visit to
Peking. He emphasized that the visits to Peking and Moscow were dis-
tinctly different in character. In the first instance, we had remained
totally isolated from Peking for a quarter of a century. He had concluded
that as China would soon be a first-rate nuclear power, it was essential
that the United States find a means to communicate with the Government
of the People's Republic of China. This, in essence, is what the Peking
visit is about. It is being undertaken without any flavor of naivete-, for
certainly the differences which divide the People's Republic of China
and its system from the United States are wide and cannot be bridged
through the atmospherics of a Head of State meeting. There were some
misinformed people who have concluded as a result of the announcement
of the visit that now all the differences would be resolved, or, in some
cases, had concluded that there were no real differences in the first
instance. This is inconsistent with the realities of the situation and does
not represent the United States view on the matter.
On the other hand, as China's great potential continues in the maturing
process, and especially as China's nuclear capabilities -- which are
already considerable -- are fully realized, then it is essential to establish
communication. It is probable that diplomatic relations will not result
from the Peking visit for the United States still has relations with Taiwan
and his commitments which it will keep. On the other hand, there should
be some provisions arrived at for continuous communication as a result
of the visit. This accomplishment would in itself justify taking this first
step. In fact, failure to do so would be most irresponsible.
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The visit to Moscow, on the other hand, would be highly substantive.
The United States has had relations with the Soviet Union over an extended
period. Both sides know each other well, and therefore discussions with
the Soviet leaders will be more detailed and touch upon subjects which have
a long history of common exchange. In Moscow, however, the discussions
will not be conducted on topics which involve the vital interests of friends.
Certainly the United States cannot consider negotiations with the Soviet
Union in which the interests of long-standing allies are placed in jeopardy.
For example, discussions on SALT will be'carried out in full consulta-
tion with our European allies and in no instance would the United States
consider bargaining with those assets which are related to European
security.
The same, of course, would apply to Mutual Balanced Force Reductions,
which must be conducted in the context of a community of interest and in
a coordinated fashion with the western powers concerned. Thus, in no
instance would the United States negotiate in,`Moscow on European interests
without full consultation with its allies.
The Prime Minister asked about the United States attitude with respect
to European security.
President Nixon stated that we are of course willing to discuss the subject.
On the other hand, great caution must be exercised, and certainly it is
essential that all of the allies know precisely what would result from such
a conference before entering into one.
The Prime Minister agreed, stating that an obvious Soviet objective in
pushing for a conference would be to loosen Europe's ties with the United
States.
President Nixon agreed, adding that to the Soviets the European security
conference might well substitute for the NATO Pact which the Soviets
would like to portray as outmoded and unnecessary. The United States
considers that the conference cannot become a substitute for allied se-
curity arrangements or for NATO. This is also a fundamental aspect
of improved East-West trade and economic arrangements, the President
continued. They can never be undertaken in a way which would dilute
the unity of the European Economic Community or, more importantly,
the Atlantic partnership.
The Prime Minister agreed that caution has to be the keynote on the
European security conference. He asked President Nixon what he thought
about the relationship between MBFR and the security conference.
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President Nixon stated that here again the United States would urge
great caution. Thus far, the security conference itself was being
described in terms of cultural, political and economic issues. MBFR,
on the other hand, involved vital issues of military security and thus
far the United States has been unable to find any specific formula for
mutual force reductions which would not result in some derogation of
the overall security of the Western Alliance. Thus, in his view, it was
essential that the allies sort out very carefully how they wish to proceed
on MBFR and arrive at a firm consensus on direction before positively
linking MBFR and the security conference. Concurrently, a thorough
review and consultation had to take place with respect to the objectives
of the European security conference itself. Here again, it would be
most injudicious to enter into a conference until all the allies were in
full agreement on the direction in which they want to proceed, until each
had carefully assessed the impact of this direction on their own and on
the overall security interests of the allies, f
The Prime Minister stated that he had been with Secretary Rogers at
a dinner with Ambassador Van Lynden the previous evening. All had
watched the President's television address on Vietnam. He complimented
President Nixon warmly on the address, which he felt would be a major
contribution to European understanding of United. States policies and
objectives. He was confident that the speech could not help but garner
increased support for United States policies in Southeast Asia, especially
the United States initiative on proposed political arrangements for a new
election. The Prime Minister stated that, as he interpreted the speech,
it meant that the President was holding firm on the essential issues and
that in no instance would the United States consider turning over the
Government of South Vietnam to Hanoi.
President Nixon endorsed this interpretation. He stated that it is essen-
tial that Hanoi recognize that a military victory in South Vietnam is no
longer in the cards. Only with such a recognition would they be willing
to negotiate in a give-and-take fashion which would result in an accept-
able solution.
The meeting adjourned at 12:02 p.-m.
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUS
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
I. PURPOSE
E
Henry A. Kissinger
INFORMATION
' January 25, 1972
Meeting with Prime Minister Biesheuvel
Wednesday, January 26, 1972
11:00 - 11:45 a.m.
Oval Office
MORI/CDF
C03318508 pages
6-12
726
NOTE: This visit is being kept low-key by us and the Prime Minister's
call on you is being played as incidental to his return home from the
Antilles. We have not billed it as part of your Western summits because
to do so would arouse resentment among other NATO allies not included,
notably the Italians whose proposed visit here has had to be postponed.
There are no specific agreements intended to come out of your meeting
with the Netherlands Prime Minister Barend Willem Biesheuvel
(BEEshoevel). He has sought this appointment because,, like, most of
his predecessors, he considers it important for the DutchPrime,Minister.
to have a personal relationship with the leader of the Free World.
Biesheuvel is particularly eager to be included in the round of summit
meetings taking place prior to the Peking and Moscow trips.(See above
NOTE.) He will wish to receive your views on these trips. He is also
looking forward to discussing with you the major facets of US-European
relations. He has just completed a visit to the Netherlands Antilles
and Surinam; he is carefully working toward independence for these
Dutch possessions; and he will wish to discuss the Netherlands' approach
to this issue.
Your meeting with Biesheuvel will give a strong boost to US-Dutch
relations. You will have the opportunity to assure the Prime Minister
that the United States deeply appreciates the understanding and co-
operation we have had from the Dutch -- a close NATO ally - and that
you look forward to working closely with him on future issues of
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mutual interest. Your meeting with Biesheuvel should bolster his
position domestically at a time when his government is experiencing
a decline in public confidence because of its apparent inability to deal
with increasingly troublesome economic problems.
You should emphasize that:
-- The United States reaffirms its support for the continued progress
of the European Communities; at the same time, the US looks to the
Dutch to assist in resolving US-EC trade issues.
-- Now more than ever before, when there may be some chance for
better relations with the USSR, it is essential that the Allies harmonize
their individual approaches within a common framework. In your
negotiations with the USSR, you will not be willing to settle for vague
assurances or a good climate devoid of substance.
-- During your visit to Moscow, you will not negotiate on European
interests without consulting with the Allies.
You may wish to ask the Prime Minister to review the results of his
visit to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles and to review the situation
in the Caribbean as seen by the Dutch.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS PLAN
A. Background: Biesheuvel comes.to Washington for the first time
time as Dutch Prime Minister at the peak of a political career
that began 16 years ago. This will be your first meeting with him.
He has been a strong supporter of US foreign policy and of close
and effective relations between his country and the United States.
Domestically, after six months of leading a five-party coalition,
Biesheuvel is running into rough weather. Unemployment is at a
record high; the rate of inflation last year was the highest in twenty
years, and labor-management negotiations on new wage rates have
reached an impasse and the Government is coming under increasing
criticism for its failure to intervene. Biesheuvel's Achilles heel
is that his own Anti-Revolutionary Party has only 13 of 150 seats in
the Second Chamber and there are divisive strains within the major
coalition party.
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Nevertheless, Biesheuvel has several major assets, including
his own political talents and strength of character. Biesheuvel
feels strongly that the odds favor the survival of his government
until at least 1973. However, he does not expect a final solution
to Dutch domestic problems until US/EC economic and monetary
relations have found a sounder footing. Biesheuvel feels the need
for an improved structure for US/EC dialogue on subjects that cut
across functional lines, such as monetary issues, trade matters
and burden-sharing.
The Prime Minister strongly supports both the United Nations and
NATO and believes that full coordination of European foreign policy
should be a goal of the European Community. He opposes a Western
European nuclear force independent of the United States and supports
efforts to coordinate the British and French nuclear forces with
NATO. He favors a Conference of Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE)? in principle; however, the Dutch, like the United
States, take a cautious approach to CSCE.
Biesheuvel, who is fluent in English, is a self-professed "great
friend of .America;" he generally understands US policy and has
been frank in his negotiations with American officials. He will
appreciate a briefing on your forthcoming Peking trip. The Dutch
have had diplomatic relations with the PRC at the charge level
since 1950. At present, there are no major issues in their bilateral
relations. He will appreciate a similar briefing on your May trip
to Moscow.
Biesheuvel has just concluded visits to Surinam and the Netherlands
Antilles. He will probably wish to discuss these visits, particularly
in light of the mutual interests of the Dutch and US in maintaining
stability in the Caribbean region.
B. Participants: You will meet privately with the Prime Minister.
General Haig will sit in on the meeting.
C. Press Plan: The visit has been announced, and there will be a
photo opportunity. In keeping with the low-key character of the
Prime Minister's courtesy visit, Ron Ziegler will make a brief
statement after your meeting.
III. ACTION SEQUENCE
The normal routine for an Oval Office visit will be followed. You will
receive the Prime Minister at 11:00 a.m.; 45 minutes have been
scheduled for the meeting.
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The Prime Minister and Mrs. Biesheuvel will have arrived in Washington
from the Caribbean on Tuesday afternoon, January 25. They will be
guests of honor at a dinner at the Dutch Ambassador's residence that
evening. Following his meeting with you on Wednesday morning, the
Prime Minister will go to the State Department for talks with Secretary
Rogers and for a luncheon in his honor. The Prime Minister and Mrs.
Biesheuvel will then go to New York and depart for The Netherlands
on Wednesday evening.
IV. YOUR BASIC TALKING POINTS
A note of appreciation Since US-Sudanese relations were broken
after the June 1967 war, the Dutch Embassy in Khartoum has been host
to an American-staffed US Interests Section, and you may wish to express
US appreciation for the cooperation and assistance the Dutch Embassy
has given our mission.
ement and US/EC Trade Negotiations
-- We have always supported European unity; we appreciate the con-
structive-role the Netherlands has played in enlargement of the European
Community. The entry of Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway
to the EG is a step forward and you should congratulate Biesheuvel on
this great achievement for Europe and on the Dutch contributions to the
success of the negotiations.
-- You should emphasize the importance of successful conclusion
of the US/EC trade negotiations, to supplement the December monetary
agreement. We have, for example, requested the EC not to increase
support prices for corn, to lessen discrimination against US citrus
exports and to avoid harming our tobacco exports. Thus far we have had
little success, and you should impress on Biesheuvel the political
ood trade package from the E C to
passage of gold price legislation.
-- With regard to future US/EC relations, you may wish to reassure
Biesheuvel that our support for European unity and the strengthening
and enlargement of the EC remains firm, and to note that the US is
prepared to consider sympathetically any EC proposal for strengthening
the consultative procedure between the US and EC.
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Soviet Relations and the Moscow Visit
-- You are working for genuine detent? with the USSR, detente based
on substance.
-- There are elements in Soviet conduct that suggest they may want
a better relationship with the US (and with Europe), but there are also
aspects of their policies -- especially outside of Europe -- that are sobering.
-- There is still the dangerous tendency in Moscow to seek a marginal
advantage even though this sort of policy cannot help but jeopardize any
longer term relationship.
-- What concerns you now is that having achieved some solid results,
as in the Berlin agreements, we not allow the Soviets to begin playing
the Allies off against each other.
-- There are some tactical differences in the Alliance -- on such
issues as the timing of a European Conference, or the precise approaches
to negotiating troop reductions; these are of no great consequence unless
we .allow the Soviets.to enlarge on o?r small differences and inflate them
into major issues.
-- On European Security, you believe a Conference with the Warsaw
Pact must be deferred, while the concentrates on ifs own prepara-
tions. The conference must not ecozne a substitute security arrange-
me t for NATO, whit is what the Soviets want.
-- Similarly, improved East-West trade and economic arrangements
must not dilute the unity o the EEC, or our Atlantic partners sip.
-- On negotiated troop reductions, we rule out any bilateral bargain
with the USSR; any agreement must come through Allied consensus.
-- You may wish to compliment Prime Minister Biesheuvel on the
Dutch defense performance, and the active role that the Dutch have
played within the EUROGROUP to secure the Euopean Defense Improve-
ment Program. ~^~ I..r...~.
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-- The United States attaches particular importance to the EUROGROUP
as a primary forum through which the European Allies can coordinate
and publicize their efforts to assume a more equitable share of Alliance
defense.
-- You may wish to express US concern that certain Allies (Denmark
and, perhaps, Norway) may be planning to reduce their defense oft rt,
you may wz suggest that the EUROGROUP might wish to monitor
this.
The Peking V'i sit
-- Your visit to the People's Republic of China will differ in its
objectives and contents from that to Moscow; after 25 years of no com-
munications we must first establish the philosophical framework for
relations with China; this will take time; more specific matters can
follow later when the framework is set.
- - You did not embark on your China policy to harm Soviet interests
although the effect of recent Soviet actions in South Asia could produce
such a result; these Soviet actions were in part intended to humiliate
China.
-- Your basic point, which you believe is shared by the Prime
Minister, is that China will be a major international actor in the years
ahead; therefore, we must have communication and normal relations
with it; this will also help China to resist Soviet pressures.
Independence of Surinam and Netherlands Antilles
Biesheuvel will wish to describe his visit to these parts of the Kingdom
and discuss the growing impetus in the Netherlands for a revision of
the Realm Statute which would give them independence or dominion status.
There is little enthusiasm for independence in Paramaribo, and even less
in the Antilles. A Realm Committee is being established to study the
q estio b is recommendations are not expected until 1973 or later.
There is substantial US investment in Surinam bauxite and oil refinin
in the Antilles. He wi probably state that after independence, the
Dutch wil no neglect their responsibility for economic stability and
development assistance, but will be less involved in defense and internal
security matters.
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-- You may wish to say that the United States shares the concern
of the Dutch Government that premature independence of the Netherlands
Antilles a d,S1&,?;iga might contribute to the destabilization of the
Caribbean area.
-- You may wish to inform Biesheuvel that the US strongly favors,
as a stabilizing influence, the prolongation of the present Dutch relation-
ship in all its essential aspects.
Prime Minister Biesheuvel may wish to discuss the Dutch role in
Indochina and receive your review of US policy in Southeast Asia. Aside
from Indonesia, the Dutch have a very limited interest and role in So
east Asia. They chair the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia. (IGGI)
and this year increased their pledge 10% in guilders to US $42 millio7
-- You may wish to express appreciation for Dutch leadership in the
Intergovernmental Group, an excellent example of multilateralism which
full accords with the spirit of the Nixon Doctrine.
Japan
The Prime Minister may be interested in your appraisal of US policy
toward Japan and your perception of the future Japanese role in East Asia.
-- You may wish to review the results of your meeting with Prime
Minister Sato.
-- If Biesheuvel should raise the question of growing Japanese
competition in Europe, you may wish to point out that the US market
is still far more open to Ja anese goods than the European market.
nd, you may wish to stress the importance o uropeans i era izing
t eir restrictions against Japan.
A memorandum and talking points from Secretary Rogers are at Tab A.
In the attached briefing book, there are background papers on the EC pre-
ferential agreements and agricultural issues with the European Communities,
biographic sketches, a map of Dutch possessions in the Caribbean, and a
schedule,
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