COSVN OFFENSIVE INSTRUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 8, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
INFORMATION
September 8, 1972
MR. KISSINGER
JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE V
COSVN Offensive Instruction
has given us the latest COSVN in-
structions for the continued offensive which are reportedly based on a
mid-August Hanoi Party Central Committee appraisal of the South Vietnam
situation (Tab A). According to this appraisal, October will be the decisive
month of the offensive during which increased Communist military pressure
will force President Nixon to make concessions leading to a settlement and
cease-fire. The following are the main points of the Central Committee
appraisal and the implementing COSVN instruction:
-- "There will be an October highpoint led by the main forces which will
force President Nixon to adopt a clearcut position of ending the war and
making concessions so as to reach a settlement and cease-fire or face the
prospect of losing the elections.
-- "The Central Committee, foreseeing the difficulties which might
confront us after the 1972 U. S. presidential election period, did not launch
the offensive and uprising in 1971 nor postpone it until 1973.. rf
-- t' The U. S. will have to accept a political settlement sooner or later
because the issue of U. S. prisoners will remain when the U. S. election
period has passed. The U. S. knows that unless it reaches an agreement...
the prisoners will not be released." Therefore, it is important to capture
as many prisoners as possible. (The cadre conducting the briefing on which
this report is based warned that it demoralized troops to speculate on
whether or not President Nixon will refuse to make concessions because
he feels sure of re-election and on whether he will harden or soften U. S.
policy if re-elected.)
-- "The Central Committee has found through secret talks that the U. S. -
puppet attitude is softer than before."
WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE CLASSIFIED BY CIA
TNT .LLIGENCE SOURCES AND METd1ODS INVOLV : EXE
EXF'INik'I' I*R41M GENE, RAE DF,I.LAS~IIJGA,"I`10N
SECRET SCtHED)ULK OF' t=XECUT1VE ORD at1( C~S7.
rYf.MMr"1'lON CAThGORY 1 -----.
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0
SECRET 2
-- There are to be concentrated attacks on the pacification program,
and the "liberated" areas are to be expanded, particularly those in the
Mekong Delta. In September there are to be heavy artillery and sapper
attacks against the Saigon Capital Zone defense line, district seats in
various locales, and major U. S. and GVN military installations. Local
forces are to expand control in the countryside and "'eliminate" GVN
personnel.
-- In preparation for a cease-fire, there must be intense political
preparations, especially those aimed at penetrating and ultimately con-
trolling GVN organizations. When a political settlement comes, Party
members must be everywhere and able to control one third of the population
"if we are to defeat the enemies by political means. 11 COSVN has estimated
that "we now have only one Party member for every 3, 000 civilians. " (It
is not clear whether this is an overall figure or refers to a specific area.)
"If this ratio remains unchanged, we will be unable to influence political
developments during the cease-fire and International Control Commission
period. "
-- "The morale and determination of our Party members and cadres
are lower than those of the enemies. We, for fear of 'being killed, are
unwilling to seize greater victories. The enemies, although beaten, are
determined to rally their forces for a counteroffensive to recover the areas
they have lost."
Comment:
that the next o ensive xg poin would come in October. This seems to
show some slippage in the enemy timetable as previous reports indicated
that COSVN selected August-September as the "decisive" period. Most
likely the enemy is having difficulty mustering the necessary manpower
and supplies for the next push. It is also possible that Hanoi has decided
that military pressure would have a greater political payoff if it is closer
to our elections.
The emphasis on attacks around Saigon helps confirm our belief that the
major Communist military objective is to isolate Saigon by controlling the
main routes to the city and the surrounding countryside. ARVN units would
be tied down in coping with main force attacks while local forces, and guerrillas
filtered past the main 'battle areas and expanded Communist control over the
countryside around Saigon. The Communists calculate that isolating Saigon
would give them tremendous political leverage in a cease-fire situation.
SECRET
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SECRET
They no doubt also want to isolate Hue, Danang,- Qui Nhon and other major
cities prior to a cease-fire. Such encirclement is probably more important
to the enemy at this point than expending manpower in a costly effort to
capture cities. Concomitant with this will be an increased effort to gain
control of the populated (or once populated) areas in the countryside.
It is interesting to note the other side's concern about the possibility of the
President being re-elected without his having made the necessary concessions
leading to a settlement. Here the Central Committee feels compelled to
make it clear that all will not be lost in this eventuality and that we must
sooner or later come to terms to get our prisoners back. The distinct pos-
sibility (in Hanoi's view) of the President's re-election must be causing
considerable problems at all levels on the other side. The 'briefing cadre's
side remark on the impact of this on troop morale is significant. The con-
tinuation of private talks has no doubt also caused problems among the rank
and file, and the Central Committee has felt it necessary to justify their
continuation on the putative grounds that our position is getting softer. On
the other hand, the Central Committee warns cadres and troops that if they
do not do their part "the negotiations will falter. "
Instructions, such as these issued by the Central Committee and COSVN,
almost always exhort cadres and troops to do better by pointing out both
their strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, these latest instructions
reflect a real concern in Hanoi that the Communist apparatus in the South
might not be ready for the political struggle when'a settlement and cease-
fire is reached. The Communists probably believe that even with a political
settlement on their terms, the political struggle will be difficult and com-
plicated and will involve a great deal of foul play on both sides. They realize
that the imposition of a coalition government does not, of itself, eliminate
strong organized political opposition or armed forces hostile to the Com-
munists. For this reason, the Communists believe it would be extremely
dangerous politically to have a cease-fire without a coalition, and even with
this political advantage, a commanding military position on the ground is
essential. It is against this backdrop that the above Hanoi instructions must
be read.
Incidentally, the reference to the "cease-fire and International Control
Commission period" strongly suggests --as one might expect -r that Hanoi
will insist that the ICC as now constituted police any cease-fire agreed upon.
In this connection, Hanoi media reported that ICC delegates attended a Sep-
tember 1 National Day function in Hanoi. This is the first time in years that
ICC presence at such a function has been publicly mentioned.
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THIS IS AN INFORMATIONRLrUKI, IVUI rtINIALt,.t L,rr,LW-.
SECRET
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT
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WARNINC NOTICE PAGE 'I OF ,7. PAGES
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND RSRTIIODS INVOLVED
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CITE TDCS 314'/06832-72
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DIST 3 SEPTEM~3ER 19?2........._...__.._
COSVN INTENT IONS TO LAUNCH A MAIN FORCE HIGHPO INT
IN OCTOBER 1972 AND ITS INSTRUCTIONS FOR MILITARY
AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES DURING SEPTEMBER 25X1
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
ET
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- ?"a
SUMMARYoo THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (CO.-rN) HAS
ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBORDINATE PARTY COMMITTEES AND MILITARY
FORCES OUTLINING VIET LONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (VC/NVA?) OBJECTIVES
FOR. THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER T HR O UG H OCTOBER 1972. THE INSTRUCTIONS
IDENTIFY OCTOBER AS THE.DECISIVE MONTH OF THE 1972 OFFENSIVE, THE
MONTH DURING WHICH MAIN FORCES WILL LEAD A CONCERTED HIGHPOINT
DESIGNED TO FORCE U.S.-GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) POLICY CONCES-
SIONS AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE PRIOR TO THE U.S. NOVEMBER
PRESIDENTIAL .ELECT IONS AND TO MOVE THE REVOLUTION INTO A NEW
POLITICAL STAGE BY THE END OF- 1972- THE COSVN 'INSTRUCTIONS,
WHICH ARE BASED ON A MID-AUGUST CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE APPRAISAL
OF THE OFFENSIVE AND ARE DIVIDED INTO THREE SECT IONS, CONTAIN A
SUMMARY OF THE CENTRAL.COMM.ITTEE EVALUATION OF THE VC AND U.S.-
GVN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. THE SUMMARY SECTION HIGHLIGHTS THE
CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE STATEMENT THAT FOR NEGOTIATING PURPOSES
AT THIS TIME IT IS MORE DESIRABLE TO CAPTURE ONE U.S. SOLDIER OR
CIVIL IAN THAN TO KILL 30 OTHERS- AND INSTRUCTS CADRES AND TROOPS
TO GUARD ALL U.S. PRISONERS CLOSELY TO PREVENT THEIR ESCAPE OR
DEATH, SINCE IT IS THE PR ISONER _I,SSUE_ WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY FORCE
THE U.S. TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE WAR. THE SECOND
FOREIGN DISSEM
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SECT ION OF INSI:RUCI IONS DEFINES SPECIFIC MILITARY TASKS TO BE
ACCOMPLISHED B Y MAIN. AND LOCAL FORCES DURING SEPTEMBER AS PART
OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE OCTOBER HIGHPO INT'. THE ARTILLERY AND
SAPPER ARMS OF VC/NVA MAIN FORCES ARE DIRECTED TO ATTACK SA IGQN
CAPITAL ZONE DEFENSE LINES AND MAJOR GVN AND U.S0 MILITARY INSTALLA-
TIONS s PRIMARILY TO DIVERT GVN FORCES FROM LAUNCHING COUNTER-
OFFENSIVES OFFENSIVES TO RECOVER LIBERATED TERRITORIES. THE MAJOR TASK FOR
LOCAL FORCES IN SEPTEMBER IS THE ASSASSINATION OF GVN HAMLET
.OFFICIALS AND LOCAL MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL, IN ORDER TO
BRING ABOUT GVN ADMINISTRATIVE COLLAPSE AT THE BASIC-GOVERNMENT
LEVEL. THE THIRD SECTION OUTLINES IN GENERAL TERMS FAMILIAR
VC PROSELYTING AND POLITICAL TASKS WHICH, IF ACCOMPLISHED DURING
SEPTEMBER 9 WOULD SERVE AS A FOUNDATION FOR VC ACTIVITIES DUR I NG-;
THE CEASEFIRE AND AN INTER IM ??CONTROL COMM I SS ION?? ER 10D AND WOULD
ALLOW VC PREPARATIONS TO ASSUME CONTROL OVER A FUTURE "COALITION
GOVERNMENT". END SUMMARY.
1. AT A LATE AUGUST 1972 VC' PARTY COMMITTEE CONFERENCE,
COSVN CADRES PRESENTED A CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE APPRAISAL OF THE
SOUTH VIETNAM SITUATION AS OF MID-AUGUST. THE APPRAISAL INCLUDED
NO FOREIGN DISSEM ~_.IIw1,~rym~~
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TDCS 314/06832-72
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sEc- Er NO FOREIGN DI SSEM
teicssi/icatinn) fdtssem confrots)
AN EVALUAT ION OF FACTORS I NFLUENC I I' THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ? S
DETERMINATION TO BRING THE REVOLUTION TO-THE POLITICAL STAGE
PR IOR TO THE END OF 1972 AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A HIGHPO INT 9 .
TO BE LED BY MAIN FORCE UNITS9 DURING OCTOBER. THE CADRES OUT-
LINED VC/NVA MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES FOR SEPTEMBER I N
PREPARATION FOR THE OCTOBER HIGHPO INT AND ISSUED COSVN INSTRUCTIONS
TO SUBORDINATE CADRES AND TROOPS ON THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. AS
REMEMBERED BY A PROVINCE LEVEL CADRE WHO ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE 9
THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE APPRAISAL AND THE COSVN INSTRUCTIONS
ARE AS FOLLOWSo
A. THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE SITUATION APPRAISAL.
C1) ??WE ARE FACED WITH A FAVORABLE OPPOR-,T-UNI,TY AND
CAN DEFEAT U. S. PRESIDENT R I CHARD M. N I X 0 N? S DOCTRINE OF
VIETNAMIZATION AND THE "PUPPET'' (GVN) PACIFICATION) PROGRAM. WE
CAN REALIZE THE (CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE) DECISION TO FORCE THE
U.S. TO ACKNOWLEDGE DEFEAT AND ACCEPT THE SEVEN-POINT PEACE
PROPOSAL FOR A POL IT I CAL SETTLEMENT. WE CAN BR i % THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION TO A NEW POLITICAL-STAGE BY THE END O.F
1972. WHILE WE MAY MEET WITH SOME DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS
CAUSED BY THE ENEMIES (U.S. AND GVN) IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH
' FOREIGN DISSEM
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a
1 (classf/fcatfon) (dfstem controls)
-VIETNAM, WE ARE DETERMINED TO OVERCOME THEM AND WIN THE GREATEST
pO.SSIBLE VICTORIES IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. OCTOBER WILL
BE THE DECISIVE MONTH OF THE 1972 OFFENSIVE. THERE 'WILL BE AN
OCTOBER HIGHPOINT LED BY THE MAIN FORCES WHICH WILL FORCE
PRESIDENT NIXON TO ADOPT A CLEARCUT POSITION OF ENDING THE WAR
AND MAKING CONCESSIONS TO US SO AS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT AND CEASE-
FIRE OR FACE THE PROSPECT OF LOSING THE NOVEMBER U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS. COSVN I S MAKING SUBORDINATE PARTY COMM :TTEES AWARE :
OF THE DETERM INAT ION OF THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE TO BR ING; THE
REVOLUTION INTO A POLITICAL STAGE BY THE END OF 1972- THE CENTRAL
PARTY COMMITTEE CALLS UPON EVERY PARTY MEMBER TO MAKE HIS GREATEST
EFFORT TO CARRY OUT THIS DECISION AND TO BE WILLING TO DIE
FOR THE PARTY. PROCRAST INAT ION, COWARD ICE, AND FEAR ARE CRIMES
AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND THE PARTY. THE -ENTIRE PARTY MUST BE
DETERMINED TO DEFEAT V IETNAM IZAT ION, DESTROY PACIFICATION, AND
PROVE THAT THE ENEMIES ARE LOSING TO THE REVOLUTION, AND TO. DO
THIS PRIOR TO THE NOVEMBER U.S. ELECTIONS SO THAT PRESIDENT NIXON
WILL BE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN PITESENT U.So POLICY."
COMMENT:
THE PROVINCE CADRE INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT THAT CQ?,$VN HAS MADE
O
SELECT COMMITTEES AWARE OF THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE PARTY
25X1
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APPRAISAL I N ORDER 10 STOP LOWER LEVEL DISCUSSIONS 9 SOME OF WHICH
APPARENTLY REACH THE CONCLUSION THAT THE WAR WILL CONTINUE
INDEFINITELY,, ACCORDING TO COSVN, THERE IS TOO MUCH CONCERN
EXPRESSED BY LEVELS NEITHER ABLE TO UNDERSTAND NOR TO INFLUENCE
THE TREND OF THE REVOLUTION. LOWER ECHELONS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS
QUESTIONS SUCH H AS WHETHER OR NOT NIXON WILL REFUSE TO MAKE CONCES-
SIONS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES HE WILL WIN THE U0,S0 , PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
OR WHETHER IF NIXON IS REELECTED9 U.S,, POLICY WILL BE HARDENED OR.
WILL BE MODIFIED TO CONCEDE POINTS,, DISCUSSION OF SUCH POINTS
SERVES ONLY TO DIVERT ATTENT I OM THE_ TASKS _AT HAND AND TO
DEMORALIZE LOWER `LEVEL CADRES AND TROOPS CADRES HAVE BEEN ORDERED
~-+ ?... -..as.K:..w:9.rwyrw.-.wu..Jrta.e.ax ~.y.s,w._ ./.S. -W:fin..~r.. . .ss Y.W'~~?s".b+?r.1T.C91'.p:.Yi.4.Y
TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT. THE ENEMY I S LOSING TO THE REVOLUTION I N
EVERY WAY AND TO DO THIS.PR COR TO THE U.S. NOVEWBER ELECTIONS.)
(2) THE PUPPETS ARE AWARE OF THEIR PRECARIOUS
SITUATION AND OUR DETERMINATION; THEREFORE9 PRESIDENT tGIJYEN VAN
T H I E U'S REGIME IS TRYING TO RECOVER THE AREAS LIBERATED SINCE
APR.IL9 SUCH AS QUANG TRI AND BINII DINH PROVINCES. EVEN THOLG#-I THE
PUPPETS HAVE NOT RECOVERED THESE AREAS AND ARE SUFFER ING, GREAT
LOSSES IN QUANG TRI PROVINCES, THEY KEEP TRYING TO COUNTERATTACK.
THEY CONTINUE TO CONSCRIPT MEN9 IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THEIR
O FOREIGN DISSEM
R E T
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(cla'ssd}dcatdon) (lssem controls)
COLLECT MONEY FROM THE POPULACE TO CARRY OUT THESE .
TROD ND
JECT IVES SO AS TO PROVE THAT THEIR VIETNAM IZAT ION -AND PACIFICA-
TION PROGRAMS CANNOT FAIL. THEY ARE MAKING MAXIMI II EFFORTS TO
RECOVER THEIR STRENGTH, TO COUNTERATTACK, AND TO SEE THAT THE
PRESENT U. S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH VIETNAM I S MAINTAINED D I N THE
JUDGEMENT OF THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE~AND COSVN,~THE MORALE
DETERMIN.."~ . ..-' OUR PARTY MEIt,3ER AND CADRES ARE LOWER THAN
AND DETERMI
THOSE OF THE... ENEMIES. WE, FOR FEAR OF BEING KILLED, ARE UNWILLING;
d.~
TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE GREATER V ICTOR I ES o- THE ENEM ! ES, ALTHOUGH,'
BEATEN, ARE DETERMINED TO RALLY THEIR FORCES FOR A COUNTEROFFENSIVE
THIS WO U125X1
TO RECOVER THE AREAS THEY HAVE LOST
SEEM TO CONTRADICT THE OPENING STATEMEI4T THAT THE VC ARE, FACED
WITH A FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY.) CO MM NT: THE COSVN COMRADES 25X1
EXPLAINED THAT DURING THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE OFFENSIVE THE VC/NVA
SACRIFICED MANY OF THEIR MEN TO PENETRATE ENEMY DEFENSE LINES OF UU
CONCRETE. NOW, WHILE THE ENEMY-IS ATTEMPT INQ- TO BUILD NEW DEFENSES
WITH NOTHING BUT MUD AND CLAY, THE VC ARE NOT EVEN TRYINGnTO DESTROY
THEM 13UT ARE RATHER GIVING THE ENEMY TIME TO BUILD NEW DEFENSE
? LINES AS BIG AND STRONG AS THE OLD .LNESs. AND THE ENEMY IS TAKI%;..
' " ~ RED I F THE VC DO NOT ATTACK CONTINUALLY
F
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VANTAGE TI-{US OF
 EDITIONS
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THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM, THE ENEMY WILL HAVE CONSCRIPTED NEW MEN,
TRAINED THEM, PROVIDED THEM WITH NEW WEAPONS, AND REBUILT HIS
DEFENSE LINES W ALL OF WHICH WILL DOABLE THE DIFFICULTIES
CONFRONT ING THE VC AND THE TIME IT WILL TAKE TO MAKE THE REVOLUT ION
A SUCCESS.)
(3) "THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE, FORESEEING THE
DIFFICULTIES WHICH MIGHT CONFRONT US AFTER THE 1972 U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PERIOD, DID NOT LAUNCH THE OFFENSIVE IN
1971 NOR POSTPONE IT UNTIL 1973. - IT CHOSE TO LAUNCH THE OFFENSIVE
AND UPRISING I N o 1972 TO PROVE ITS DETERMINATION TO BRING.. THE. SOUTH
VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION TO A NEV,' STAGE, THE STAGE OF POLITICAL
STRUGGLE, THE PARTY'S RESOLUTION REMAINS UNCHANGED. WE MUST
IMPLEMENT ITS POLICIES AND CARRY OUT ITS MISSIONS& THE CENTRAL
PARTY COMMITTEE HAS POINTED OUT THAT THE U. S. WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT
A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SOONER OR LATER BECAUSE THE ISSUE OF U.S.
PRISONERS WILL REMAIN WHEN THE U.S. ELECTION PERIOD HAS PASSED o
THE U.S. KNOWS THAT UNLESS IT REACHES AN AGREEMENT WITH *THE VC/
NVA THE PRISONERS WILL NOT BE RELEASED O' -THEREFORE 9 THE CENTRAL
PARTY COMMITTEE INSTRUCTS ALL VC/NVA TROOPS AND CADRES THAT AT
THIS TIME (PRIOR TO THE NOVEMBER U.S. ELECTIONS) IT IS MORE DESIR-
'' .FOREIGN DISSEM
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ABLE TO CAPTURE ONE AMERICAN ALIVE THAN TO KILL 30 OTHERS. AFTER
A U.S0 SOLDIER OR CIVILIAN IS CAPTURED HE MUST BE GUARDED CLOSELY
TO PREVENT *H I S ESCAPE OR DEATH."? COMMENT: THE PROVINCE 25X1
CADRE COMMENTED THAT 9 ACCORDING TO THE COSVN CADRES, IF THERE
HAD BEEN NO U.S., PRISONERS IN VC/NVA HANDS9 THE U.S. WOULD NEVER
HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO TALK. WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND MIGHT
HAVE BEEN WILLING TO FIGHT ANOTHER TEN YEARS. THEY MAINTAINED
THAT EVERY PRISONER CAPTURED REDUCES THE U.S. WILL TO FIGHT.)
(4) THE CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE HAS FOUND THROUGH
SECRET TALKS THAT THE U.S.-PUPPET ATTITUDE IS SOFTER THAN BEFORE,.
IF COSVN OBJECTIVES ARE FULLFILLED THERE ARE CONCENTRATED ATTACKS
ON THE PUPPET PACIFICATION PROFGRAM, THE_L (BERATED AREAS ARE
EXPANDED t PARTICULARLY THOSE I N THE F QN ,DlLZA 9 AND VC POLITICAL
STRENGTH IS DEVELOPED IN PREPARATION FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
THEN VC/NVA UNITS AID CADRES WILL HAVE ASSISTED I N FORCING CONCES-
SIONS AT THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS; IF CADRES AND UNITS PROCRASTINATE
IN THEIR PURSUIT OF COSVN OBJECT IVES, THEN NEGOTIATIONS WILL
------------
FALTERQ'COSVN REPRESENTATIVES TOLD THOSE 25X1
ATTEND ING THE CONFERENCE THAT THEY MUST HAVE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE
IN CENTRAL PARTY COMMITTEE JUDGMENTS, AND THAT THEY COULD 00
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E _ M T - ) NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(dtssrm contrail)
(r.7usst)taatton)
9
DESPITE THEIR CONCERNS. 114 MAD
ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS
NOTHING
WERE ORDERED TO DEVELOP A LARGE NUMB ER OF INFRASTRU ~T`URE
THEY
CADRES AND OBTAIN PLACES FOR THEM TO SETTLE, SO THAT W~64
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OCCURS, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT COM11`~'(ES
W ILL BE ABLE TO SEND OUT HUNDREDS OF CADRES WHO REPRESENT VC
BELIEFS TO DEVELOP, LEAD, AND CONTROL LOCAL POLITICAL BASES-)
B. ?'KEY MILITARY `MISSIONS FOR SEPTEMBER IN PREPARATION
FOR THE OCTOBER HIGHPOINT IN GENERAL, CADRES AND TROOPS MUST
BE MOTIVATED TO FULFILL LOCAL ASPECTS OF THE, COSVN SPRING?SUMMER7_.
1972 PLAN. ALL ASFECTS OF THE SECOND OFFENSIVE PHASE ARE LAC ft THE THREE PUNCHES (MILITARY ATTACK, POyLIT ICAL STRUGGLE 9 AND
Ml INTER PAC IF I CAT 10 N) MUST BE COORD 1 NATED AND DEL `. VERED~y.W I TH EQUAL
FORCE. THE THREE PRONGS I T A R Y PQL IT I CAL 9 AND TROOP P 0
MUST BE COORD I NATED CLOSELY TO HIT THE ENEMIES CONTINUALLY TO PREVENT
THEM FROM RECOVERING THEIR STRENGTH. AT THE SAME TIME 9 URGENT AND
COMPLETE PREPARATIONS FOR THE OCTOBER 1972 HIGHPO INT MUST BE
MADE AT EVERY LEVEL AND BY EVERY INDIVIDUAL.
(1) SPECIFIC MILITARY TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN
SEPTEMBER BY COSVN MAIN FORCES INCLUDE MAKING FULL USE OF ALL
ARTILLERY AND SAPPER ARMS TO ATTACK THE SAIGON CAPITAL ZONE
'FOREIGN DISSEM r
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
49 w
IN 699398
TDCS 314/06832-72
PACE 11 OF ] 5 PAGES
(classfflcat{on) (d{ssem controls)
DEFENSE LINE, DISTRICT SEATS IN SELECT AND DIVERSE LOCALES, AND
JOR U. S. AND GVN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS., ARTILLERY AND SAPPER
INTENTIONS SHOULD BE TO INFLICT HEAVY LOSSES ON ENEMY FORCES AND
TO DISPERSE ENEMY DIVISION UNITS IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AT A
NUMBER OF LOCALES. AT THE SAME TIME MAIN FORCES WILL DEPLQY
NECESSARY UNITS TO SAFEGUARD LIBERATED AREAS FROM ENEMY COUNTER
ATTACKS AND WILL MAKE COMPLETE COMBAT PREPARATIONS FOR THE OCTQBER_.
HIGHPOINT.
(2) 1..OCAL FORCES MUST LAUNCH COUNTER-PACIFICATION
ATTACKS IN HAMLETS AND VILLAGES, DEVELOP GUERR ILLA WARFARE TO
CONTAIN ENEMY OUTPOSTS, AND EXPAND LIBERATED VILLAGES OR HAMLETS.
THEY WILL PENETRATE STRATEGIC (GVN CONTROLLED,. RURAL DEVELOPMENT)
HAMLETS REPEATEDLY TO ELIMINATE ALL HAMLET TYRANTS, PARTICULARLY
HAMLET CHIEFS9 PACIFICATION CADRES, PEOPLE?S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES
(PSDF) TEAM AND INTER-TEAM LEADERS, PHUNG HOANG PERSONNEL, APO
POLICEMEN. DO NOT LET LOCAL PUPPET OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO WORK
;:
(3) "'PROVINCES AID DISTRICTS WILL ORGANIZE RECONNA ISSANCE a_'z
AGAINST US. LOCAL FORCES MUST EFFECTIVELY USE SECRET GUERRILLAS
TO UNDERMINE LOCAL GVN SECURITY UNITS SUCH AS PSDF PLATOONS
AND ASSASSINATE LOCAL GVN AUTHORITIES.
SAPPER TEAMS WHOSE MEMBERS ARE TO INFILTRATE INTO WEAK AREAS (WHERE
GOVERNMENT SECURITY IS INADEQUATE OR, W4qJCH ARE CONTESTED) TO ELIMINATE
G cf%nCI rAI nYf u
Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24 : LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
 SECT
IN 699398
TDCS 314/06832-72
PAGE 12 OF 15 PAGES
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
EDITIONS
TYRANTS AT HIGHER LEVELS, ATTACK KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICES, RECONNOITER.
PROSPECTIVE BATTLEFIELD AREAS, AND HELP 'MAIN FORCE UNITS RECONNOITER
TARGETS FOR THE OCTOBER 1972 H IG HPO INT.
C. "SPECIFIC POLITICAL AND PROSELYT IIQ TASKS MUST BE
ACCOMPLISHED IN SEPTEMBER TO PREPARE FOR THE OCTOBER HIGHPOINT AND
PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE POLITICAL ACT IV"ITY DURING A CEASE-
FIRE PERIOD.
(I) WE MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AND
INCREASE OUR IN-PLACE FORCES, PARTICULARLY SECRET SELF-DEFENSE
MEMBERS, YOUTH GROUP MEMBERS9 AND PARTY MEMBERS. WE MUST.DEVELOP
A STRONG STRUGGLE FORCE WHICH CAN LEAD THE POPULACE TO DEMAND
REACE, AN. END TO THE WARS AND BETTER LIVING CONDITIONS. WE MUST
DEVELOP AGENTS (PARTY MEMBERS) FROM AMONG THE OPPRESSED, EXPLOITED,
IMPOVERISHED ELEMENTS OF THE POPULACE AND MOTIVATE THESE PEOPLE TO
JOIN THE REVOLUTION. THESE ARE THE PEOPLE WHO CAN GUIDE OUR TROOPS
TO STRATEGIC HAMLETS AND IDENTIFY HAMLET OFFICIALS AND THEIR
RESIDENCES. WE MUST PLACE OUR AGENTS 'IN-LEGAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
THEN USE THESE ORGANIZATIONS TO MOBILIZE THE POPULACE. BY
CONTROLLING THE ORGANIZATION WE CAN MUSTER LARGE NUMBERS OF
PEOPLE TO DEMONSTRATE I N FAVOR OF OUR DEMANDS. WE MUST B E ABLE
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
i" No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24 : LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(Nfical(dn(dissenn controls)
IN 699398
TDCS 314/06832--72
PAGE 13 OF 15 PAGES
TO PENETRATE AND ASSUME SOME DEGREE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL
PRIOR TO AND DURING THE,.CEASEFTE PEiJ-Q- SO THAT WE CAN ORGANIZE
STREET DEMONSTRAT IONS. WELCOML [ P ANS? -D-4 SDLU-
TION OF THE PUPPETS' OPPRESSIVE MACHINERY AND THE UNM ASG
OF THOSE WHO .R,E.=TYRANTS OUR ING THE WAR. REME~BER, THE FIRST
STEP IN GAINING ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL MUST BE THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A SECRET DEFENSE CORE WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION WHICH CAN BE
USED TO CONTROL AND/OR ELIMINATE OPPOSING FORCES. THESE PEOPLE .
CAN ALSO BE USED TO ELIMINATE A NUMBER -OF LOCAL TYRANTS, SUCH AS
HAMLET CHIEFS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, PSDF UNIT CHIEFS, AND POLICE
INFORMANTS* ADDITIONALLY, WE MUST CONSTANTLY EMPHASIZE THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF REVOLUTIONARY PARTY MEMBERS I N PREPARATION FOR A POL IT_ICAL
SETTLEMENT, WHEN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT COMES INTO BEING THESE
'ARTY MEMBERS MUST BE PRESENT EVERYWHERE. THEY MUST BE ABLE TO
ARE TO DEFEAT THE ENEMIES BY POLITICAL MEANS. COSVN HAS ESTIMATED
CONTRO?'?ONETHIRD F THE POPULATION IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES IF WE
THAT NOW WE HAVE ONLY ONE PARTY MEMBER FOR EVERY 3,000 CIVILIANS.-
COMMENT: THE BASIS FOR THE COSVN NUMERICAL ESTIMATE .WAS
NOT AMPLIFIED AND IT WAS NOT CLEAR IF THE FIGURE WAS FOR A SPECIFIC
AREA OR AN OVERALL FIGURE.) "IF THIS RATIO REMAINS UNCHANGED, WE
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
 SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
IN 699398
TDCS 314/068,37-72
--PAGE 14 OF 15 PAGES
NO FOREIGN.DISSEM
(class{/!cation) ftH,~wm controls)
WILL BE UNABLE TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE
CEASEFIRE AND INTERNAT IONAL CONTROL COMMISSION PERIOD.
(2) "IN DEALING WITH THE LOCAL POPULACES WARN THEM
TO REMAIN ON GUARD AGAINST ENEMY CONSCRIPTION SCHEMES. LEGAL
CADRES MUST CONTINUE TO MOTIVATE THE POPULACE WITH COUNTER
CO'NSCR IPT ION AND COUNTER-TAXATION THEMES. REMIND THE PEOPLE THAT
ALL SOCIAL STRATA s, FROM WORKERS TO LANDLORDS, ARE BEING AFFECTED
BY TAXATION AND CONSCRIPTION. TELL THEM THAT MANY PEOPLE I N
BOTH THE CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE WILL STARVE AS A RESULT OF
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE RISING COST OF LIVING. I N SEPTEMBER-, TWO
SPECIFIC POINTS MUST BE ACHIEVED IN CIVILIAN PROTELYTINQ THE
FIRST I S TO MAKE THE POPULACE AWARE THAT THEIR PRESENT LIVING
CONDITIONS ARE THE RESULT OF CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE GVN AND THE
U.S. THEY MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE THAT THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT IS
SQUEEZING INCREASING AMOUNTS OF MONEY AND MANPOWER OUT OF THEM
TO SUPPORT THE V IETNAM IZAT ION OF THE WAR o IF THEY WANT PEACE AND
PROSPERITY, THEY MUST JOIN THE REVOLUTION AND RISE UP TO CREATE
A NEW ORDER a ONLY BY BECOMING REVOLUTIONARIES CAN THEY SAVE
THEMSELVES. EVERY PROBLEM THAT ARISES MUST BE DIRECTLY RELATED
FAULTS OF THE GVN AND THE U.S.; BY BLAMING THE ENEMIES FOR
'=OREIGN DISSEM_
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
l0
I
 v
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
IN 699398
-- TDCS 314/O68.32- 77
PAGE 15 OF 15 PAGES
E RYTHING, WE CAN EVENTUALLY COND IT WN THE POPULACE 10 COI,4?LA-N
AGAINST AND,,-:THEN.--`,STRUGGLE IIITH THE ENEMIES FOR BETTER LIVING
1 0 0 ' 0 ' THE SECOND CIVILIAN PROSELYTING POINT IS TO URGE'
THE POPULACE TO BREAK UP THE OPPRESSIVE GRIP OF THE PUPPETS BY
STRATEGIC (GVN-SECURED, RURAL DEVELOPMENT) HAMLETS AND'-RETURN TO
-OLD HOMESITES. TELL THEM TO PLANT MANIOC, BEANS, POTATOES, AND
LAND IQ FARM TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES, ADVISE THEM TO-.ABANDON THE
F1:EDQM d K MOVEMENT AND OF RESIDENCE . ADVISE THEM TO DEMAND
[; MOVINIG 'O THE COUNTRYSIDE. MOTIVATE THE POPULACE TO DEMAND
`SHORT-TIME RICE CROPS TO PREVENT FAMINE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.
(
REMIND THEM NOT TO SELL ALL OF THEIR SURPLUS AT MARKET; INSTEAD 9
HAVE OUR LEGAL CADRES BUY FOODSTUFFS FROM THEM FOR EMERGENCY
ST O 4'K P IL I NG . ??
D ISSEM e EMBASSY USMACV USAID CORDS 7TH AIR FORCE
NAVFORV 5225TH M I GP 7602ND AIG O S I COMSEVENTHFLT CTF 77 AT SAIGON;
REPORT CLASS S E 0 R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SENT TO CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFI.cEW. EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E000 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (1)9(2). IMPOSSIBLE
TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION.
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/24: LOC-HAK-26-6-3-3